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THE JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CHIEF JUDGE WILLIAM J.
HOLLOWAY, JR.
The son of a former Oklahoma gover-
nor, Judge Holloway was born in Hugo,
Oklahoma, in 1923. He and his family
moved to Oklahoma City in 1927. He
served as a First Lieutenant in the Army
during World War II. He then returned to
complete his undergraduate studies at the
University of Oklahoma, receiving his B.A.
in 1947. He graduated from Harvard Law
School in 1950.
In 1951 and 1952,Judge Holloway was
an attorney with the Department ofJustice
in Washington, D.C. Afterwards, he re-
turned to private practice in Oklahoma City
where he was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit by Lyndon B.Johnson in 1968 and be-
came Chief Judge on September 15, 1984.
He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and Phi
Gamma Delta.
JUDGE JAMES K. LOGAN
Judge Logan was born in Quenemo,
Kansas, in 1929. He received his A.B. from
the University of Kansas in 1952 and was
graduated magna cum laude from Harvard
Law School in 1955. He went on to be U.S.
CircuitJudge Walter Huxman's law clerk in
1956 and then practiced with the Los An-
geles firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. He
became Dean of the University of Kansas
Law School in 1961 and served in the ca-
pacity until 1968.
Since 1961 he has been a visiting pro-
fessor at Harvard Law School, The Univer-
sity of Texas Law School, Stanford
University, and the University of Michigan.
He was a commissioner for the U.S. District
Court from 1964 until 1967 and was a can-
didate for the U.S. Senate in 1968.
Judge Logan is a Rhodes Scholar, a
member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the
Coif, Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta
Kappa, Pi Sigma Alpha, Alpha Kappa Psi,
and Phi Delta Phi. He has co-authored nu-
merous books on estate planning and ad-
ministration. In 1977 he was appointed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit.
JUDGE JAMES E. BARRETT
The son of the late Frank A. Barrett,
who served as Wyoming's Congressman,
Governor, and U.S. Senator, Judge Barrett
was born in 1922 in Lusk, Wyoming. He
attended the University of Wyoming for
two years prior to his service in the Army
during World War II. After the War, he at-
tended Saint Catherine's College at Oxford
University. He received his LL.B. from the
University of Wyoming in 1949. In 1973
he was given the Distinguished Alumni
Award from his alma mater.
Prior to his appointment, Judge Bar-
rett had been involved in private practice in
Lusk and had served as County and Prose-
cuting Attorney for Niobrara County;
Town Attorney for the towns of Lusk and
Manville; and attorney for the Niobrara
County Consolidated School District. In
1967 he was appointed by Governor Stan-
ley K. Hathaway to serve as Wyoming At-
torney General and he remained in that
position until 1971.
Judge Barrett is a member of the Judi-
cial Conference Subcommittee on Federal
Jurisdiction, the U.S. Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review, and is a
trustee of Saint Joseph's Children's Home.
He was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
1971.
JUDGE MONROE G. McKAY
Judge McKay was born in Huntsville,
Utah, in 1929 and lives in Provo. He grad-
uated from Brigham Young University in
1957 with high honors. He received his
J.D. from the University of Chicago and be-
came the law clerk forJusticeJesse A. Udall
of the Arizona Supreme Court in 1960.
From 1961 to 1974, Judge McKay was with
the firm of Lewis and Roca in Phoenix, tak-
ing two years out to serve as Director of the
United States Peace Corps in Malawi, Af-
rica. He was a law professor at Brigham
Young University from 1974 until he was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1977.
JUDGE STEPHANIE K.
SEYMOUR
Judge Seymour was born in Battle
Creek, Michigan, in 1940. She graduated
from Smith College, magna cum laude, in
1962 and earned her J.D. from Harvard
Law School in 1965. She was admitted to
the Oklahoma bar in 1965.
Judge Seymour has practiced law in
Boston, Massachusetts, 1965-1966; in
Tulsa, Oklahoma, 1967; and Houston,
Texas, 1968-1969. Most recently, she has
practiced with the Tulsa firm of Doerner,
Stuart, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson from
1971 to 1979. Judge Seymour is a member
of Phi Beta Kappa, and the American,
Oklahoma, and Tulsa County Bar associa-
tions. She served as a bar examiner from
1973 through 1979.
Judge Seymour was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit by President Carter in 1979.
JUDGE JOHN P. MOORE
Judge Moore was born in Denver, Col-
orado in 1934 and still lives in Denver. He
received his B.A. from the University of
Denver in 1956 and received his LL.B.
from the University of Denver College of
Law in 1959. Following graduation he
practiced as an associate at the Denver law
firm of Carbone & Walsmith until 1962.
From 1962 through 1975 Judge Moore
worked in the Colorado Attorney General's
Office. He served as Assistant Attorney
General from 1962 through 1967, as Dep-
uty Attorney General from 1967 through
1972, and, ultimately, as Attorney General
for the State of Colorado from 1972
through 1975.
In January of 1975, Judge Moore was
appointed to the Bankruptcy Court of the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado. Judge Moore served as a
bankruptcy judge until July of 1982 when
he was appointed to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Colorado by
President Reagan. President Reagan ap-
pointed Judge Moore to the United States




Judge Anderson was born in 1932. He
attended Eastern Oregon College between
1949 and 1951, and Brigham Young Uni-
versity in 1955 and 1956. He received an
LL.B. degree from the University of Utah
College of Law in 1960. Judge Anderson
served in the United States Department of
Justice between 1960 and 1964. He was a
trial attorney in the tax division of the De-
partment of Justice. In 1964, he became a
member of the law firm of Ray, Quinney,
and Webeker, P.C., in Salt Lake City, Utah.
From November, 1985, until the present,
Judge Anderson has served as a Circuit
Judge on the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit.
Judge Anderson has appeared as lead
counsel in 17 courts throughout the United
States. He has served as President and
Commissioner of the Utah State Bar. He
was a member of the Utah Judicial Counsel
and the Utah Judicial Conduct Commis-
sion. In addition, Judge Anderson pres-
ently serves as the chairman of the Utah
Law and Justice Center Committee and is a
member of the Fellows of the American Bar
Foundation. Judge Anderson has been a
director of three major corporations and
has held prestigious positions with the Salt
Lake Area Chamber of Commerce and the
University of Utah Law School Alumni
Association.
JUDGE DEANELL R. TACHA
Deanell Reece Tacha grew up in Scan-
dia, Kansas. She graduated from the Uni-
versity of Kansas in 1968 with a B.A.
degree with honors in American Studies.
At K.U., she was a member of Mortar
Board and Phi Beta Kappa. She attended
law school at the University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, Michigan, and received a J.D.
degree there in 1971. In the spring of
1971, Judge Tacha was selected to be a
White House Fellow. During her fellow-
ship, she was sent on official trips to South-
east Asia, East and Central Africa, and the
European Economic Community. Follow-
ing her year as a White House Fellow,
Judge Tacha was an associate with the law
firm of Hogan and Hartson in Washington,
D.C. In 1973, she returned to Kansas and
was engaged in a private law practice in
Concordia, Kansas.
In the fall of 1974, she was appointed
to the faculty of the Law School at the Uni-
versity of Kansas. In 1979, she was ap-
pointed as the Associate Vice Chancellor
for Academic Affairs, and in 1981 became
the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs.
In December of 1985, President Reagan
appointed her to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, where she
now serves as a Circuit Judge. With her ap-
pointment to the Court of Appeals, she be-
came the seventeenth women to be
appointed to that court in its nearly 200
year history.
BOBBY R. BALDOCK
Judge Bobby R. Baldock was born in
Rocky, Oklahoma, in 1936 and grew up in
Hagerman and Roswell, New Mexico. He
is a graduate of the New Mexico Military
Institute in Roswell (1956) and received his
J.D. from the University of Arizona College
of Law (1960). He is a member of the New
Mexico and Arizona bars. Judge Baldock
was appointed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in late
1985. Since 1983, he had served as a fed-
eral district judge in Albuquerque, New
Mexico. Before that and for 23 years, he
had been a trial lawyer in the firm of Sand-
ers, Bruin & Baldock, P.A. Judge Baldock
resides in Roswell.
SENIOR JUDGE OLIVER SETH
Judge Seth was born in New Mexico in
1915 and grew up in Santa Fe. He received
his A.B. degree from Stanford University in
1937 and his LL.B. from Yale in 1940.
During World War II he served as a
Major in the U.S. Army and was decorated
with the Croix de Guerre. Judge Seth has
been a director of the Santa Fe National
Bank, chairman of the Legal Committee of
the New Mexico Oil and Gas Association,
and counsel for the New Mexico Cat-
tlegrowers' Association. He has also been
a regent of the Museum of New Mexico and
a director of the Santa Fe Boy's Club. In
1962 he was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit by
President John F. Kennedy. He became
Chief'Judge in 1977 and held this position
until September 15, 1984. On December
25, 1984, Judge Seth assumed senior
status.
SENIOR JUDGE ROBERT H.
MCWILLIAMS
Judge McWilliams was born in Salina,
Kansas, in 1916 and moved to Denver in
1927 where he has lived ever since. He re-
ceived his A.B. and LL.B. degrees from the
University of Denver. In 1971, he was
awarded an Honorary Doctor of Law de-
gree from the University.
During World War II, Judge McWil-
liams served in the United States Army and
was with the Office of Strategic Services.
He has served as a Deputy District Attor-
ney, a Colorado district court judge, and
was a member of the Colorado Supreme
Court for nine years prior to his appoint-
ment to the Court of Appeals.
Judge McWilliams is a member of the
Judicial Conference Committee on the Ad-
ministration of the Criminal Law, Phi Beta
Kappa, Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi Delta
Phi, and Kappa Sigma. He was sworn in as
a Judge of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit in 1970. On
August 31, 1984, Judge McWilliams as-
sumed senior status.
SENIOR JUDGE DELMAS C.
HILL (RETIRED)
Judge Hill was born in Wamego, Kan-
sas, in 1906. He received his LL.B. from
Washburn College in 1929. From 1929 to
1943 he practiced law in Wamego, serving
as an Assistant U.S. Attorney from 1934 to
1936. He was general counsel for the Kan-
sas State Tax Commission from 1937 to
1939 and Chairman of the State Demo-
cratic Committee from 1946 to 1948. Dur-
ing World War II he was a Captain in the
U.S. Army. In 1945, he assisted in the
prosecution of General Yamashita in Ma-
nila. He was a U.S. District Judge from
1949 until 1961 when he was appointed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit. Judge Hill became a Senior
Judge on April 1, 1977.
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IN MEMORIAM TO THE HONORABLE
WILLIAM E. DOYLE
1911 - 1986
The Board of Editors of
THE DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
humbly dedicate this issue
William E. Doyle 1911 - 1986
Judge William Edward Doyle was a man who lived his life compelled
to "do justice." He was born on February 11, 1911 in West Denver to
Irish parents. His father William R. Doyle, was a teamster on a Tivoli
Brewing Company delivery cart. Judge Doyle inherited his father's work
ethic and began working at the early age of eight as a newspaper boy.
He attended West High School and distinguished himself as an all-city
football star. Judge Doyle then attended the University of Colorado. In-
itially, he entered college as a pre-med student, but changed his focus
when the law captured his interest. After graduating from C.U., Judge
Doyle attended the George Washington University Law School in Wash-
ington D.C. and received hisJ.D. in 1937.
Judge Doyle came back to Denver after law school and began work-
ing in the District Attorney's office as an investigator. After passing the
bar exam in 1938, he became a Deputy District attorney and quickly
gained a reputation as a fine trial lawyer. In 1939, he married Helen
Sherfey, a classmate at George Washington University. They eventually
had two children, Michael and Susan. Judge Doyle remained in the Dis-
trict Attorney's office until 1941, when he opened a private law office.
World War II, however, forced the young attorney to leave his new prac-
tice and he served as an infantryman in Africa, Italy, Sicily, France and
Germany. After the war, Judge Doyle returned to his private practice
and began teaching torts at Westminster Law School. Remarkably,
Judge Doyle continued to teach this course five days a week, at 8:00
a.m., for twenty years. He also taught courses at the University of Colo-
rado's Law School, the University of Denver's Law School, and prepared
students for the bar exam with a one-man refresher course.
Judge Doyle's judicial career began in 1948 with a brief appoint-
ment as a Denver DistrictJudge. That same year he returned to criminal
prosecution as the Denver Chief Deputy D.A., a post he held until 1952,
when he returned to private practice. In 1956, Judge Doyle managed
the successful U.S. Senate campaign of his brother-in-law, the lateJohn
A. Carroll. In 1958, he was elected to the Colorado Supreme Court
where he served until 1961. At this time the Judge could be found on
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weekends playing a fast game of touch football in Congress park. He
participated in a variety of athletic endeavors while on the bench and
often spent his lunch hour working out at the Y.M.C.A.
In 1961, President Kennedy appointed Judge Doyle to serve on the
U.S. District Court with Judge Alfred J. Arraj and Judge Hatfield Chil-
son. While serving on the federal bench, Judge Doyle rendered the
Keyes v. School District I decision which reinstated a mandatory plan for
school busing in the Denver public schools. Despite wide spread public
disapproval and a subsequent bombing of his home, Judge Doyle re-
mained steadfast in his pro-integration stance. A Denver attorney and
close friend of judge Doyle's commented at the time that the Judge was
"fearless" in rendering and enforcing the Keyes decision. Judge Doyle
retained control over his 1968 busing order for eight years and never
retreated in the face of controversy.
2
In 1971, Judge Doyle was appointed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. He served on the Tenth Circuit full time until assuming senior
status on December 28, 1984. While sitting on the Tenth Circuit, Judge
Doyle penned 644 published opinions. To see the depth of his thought
and clarity of his writing, one need only look at the dissent Judge Doyle
filed during this survey period in Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp.3 Truly, his
contribution to the Tenth Circuit region was immense.
Judge Doyle's thirst for knowledge remained keen throughout his
years on the bench. He returned to school, and in 1982, at the age of
71, received a master of law's degree from the University of Virginia
College of Law. Judge Doyle completed this program by attending
courses in the summer and by correspondence.
Judge Doyle was the quintessential jurist. By his own proclamation,
he followed Judge Learned Hand's "idealist school." Judge Doyle felt
that the idealist is one who "mitigates, evolves, pioneers, in the law and
keeps an open mind." He reflected that "the law is not a static thing. It
moves. You can't use a pat principle to decide any case, because dis-
putes arise in different contexts." Judge Doyle's jurisprudence exempli-
fied these words. His decisionmaking approach varied depending on
the case before him. For example, he was tough on criminals, while fe-
verishly guarding the rights of individuals in civil law.
Foremost, Judge Doyle believed in doing justice. He protected the
Constitution tirelessly and was not easily detoured when confronted
with a tough issue. He once noted that "you have to be your own man if
you're going to be any kind of Judge." In fact, Judge John P. Moore, a
fellow Tenth Circuit Judge, recently pointed out that "Judge Doyle's
penchant for justice made him rather difficult to work with at times. He
1. 303 F. Supp. 279 (D. Colo. 1969).
2. Judge Doyle wrote six opinions regarding the Keyes case. Keyes v. School Dist.,
380 F. Supp. 673 (D. Colo. 1974); Keyes v. School Dist., 368 F. Supp. 207 (D. Colo. 1973);
Keyes v. School Dist., 313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1970); Keyes v. School Dist., 313 F. Supp.
61 (D. Colo. 1970); Keyes v. School Dist., 303 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1969); Keyes v.
School Dist., 303 F. Supp. 279 (D. Colo. 1969).
3. 769 F.2d 1451, 1462 (10th Cir. 1985) (Doyle, J., dissenting).
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could challenge any panel member to deeply search his or her con-
science, to do thorough research." Judge Doyle was his own man and his




During the past two survey periods, the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has shown substantial deference to agency actions and has favored
judicial review. 1 The cases discussed herein continue this trend. In
Donovan v. Hackney Inc.,2 discussed in Part I, the Tenth Circuit showed
deference to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration by
refusing to allow court review of the validity of administrative search
warrants until the challenging party had exhausted all administrative
remedies. In three cases discussed in Part II, two dealing with uranium
mill tailings 3 and a third dealing with compound 1080, 4 the Tenth Cir-
cuit showed substantial deference to Environmental Protection Agency
action on questions involving scientific and technical expertise. In Ed-
wards v. Valdez, 5 discussed in Part III, the Tenth Circuit adopted the So-
cial Security Agency's interpretation of the statutory section at issue,
once again showing deference. Finally, in the cases discussed in Part
IV, 6 the Tenth Circuit favored judicial review where alternative interpre-
tations of the statutes of limitations at issue might otherwise have barred
such review.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH AND SEIZURE, THE FOUR-CORNERS
DOCTRINE, AND EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES:
DOINOVAN v. HACKNEY
In the 1985 case of Donovan v. Hackney, Inc.,7 the Tenth Circuit sanc-
tioned the issuance of an administrative search warrant. In so doing, the
Tenth Circuit upheld Judge Russell's contempt citation against appel-
lants Hackney and Schwedland. 8
A. Facts
In January 1982, pursuant to an administrative inspection plan, an
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) compliance of-
ficer appeared at the facility of Hackney, Inc., in Enid, Oklahoma, to
perform a regularly programmed inspection of the premises. 9 Hack-
1. See Note, Administrative Law, Thirteenth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 63 DEN.
U.L. REV. 165 (1986); Note, Administrative Law, Twelfth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 62
DEN. U.L. REV. 109 (1985).
2. 769 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1458 (1986).
3. American Mining Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1985); American
Mining Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1985).
4. National Cattleman's Ass'n v. EPA, 773 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1985).
5. 789 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1986).
6. Smith v. Marsh, 787 F.2d 510 (10th Cir. 1986); C.O.D.E., Inc. v. ICC, 768 F.2d
1210 (10th Cir. 1985).
7. 769 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1458 (1986).
8. Id. at 652.
9. Donovan v. Hackney, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 773, 775 (W.D. Okla. 1984), af'd, 769
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ney's plant manager, Wayne Schwedland, refused to allow the inspec-
tion. As a result, OSHA sought and was issued an administrative search
warrant based on the affidavit of an OSHA supervising industrial hygien-
ist. 10 Upon returning to the plant with the warrant, the OSHA compli-
ance officer was again denied entry. Contempt proceedings were then
initiated. I 1
B. District Court Proceedings
The initial issue before the district court involved the scope of re-
view to be used in assessing the magistrate's decision to issue the search
warrant. 12 Generally, any review of the validity of a search warrant must
be limited to an examination of materials presented to the magistrate.'
3
Under the rule established by the United States Supreme Court in
Franks v. Delaware,14 evidentiary hearings challenging the validity of a
search warrant will only be allowed when the challenging party is willing
and able to offer proof of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for
the truth on the part of those who seek the warrant.' 5 Hence, the review
of both administrative and criminal warrants is ordinarily confined to the
"four-corners" of the warrant application.16 Constitutional challenges
to the validity of the warrant are thus limited, since the party subject to
the inspection may not challenge the administrative plan upon which the
warrant is based. Both the district court and the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals wrestled with this issue in Hackney.
In reviewing applicable cases, the district court noted that courts
have adopted two approaches to this problem. Under one approach, if
the party named in the inspection refuses to permit the inspection, it can
raise challenges to the administrative plan in contempt proceedings.'
7
When following the other approach, courts require an exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies, whereby the challenging party allows the search
and attacks the validity of the administrative plan upon which the war-
rant is based in subsequent citation proceedings before the Occupa-
F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1458 (1986). Apparently the OSHA com-
pliance officer was seeking to perform the inspection as allowed by an OSHA inspection
plan. Id. at 776; see OSHA CPL 2.25B (OSHA inspection plan).
10. Hackney, 769 F.2d at 775.
11. Id.
12. If reasonable legislative, administrative, or judicially prescribed standards for con-
ducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling, probable cause to
issue an administrative search warrant exists. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967). The probable cause involved in
Hackney was based on an administrative plan. See infra text accompanying notes 16-17 & 33.
13. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). Although Franks involved warrant re-
view in a criminal case, it is generally accepted that the same reasoning applies to adminis-
trative inspection warrants. Marshall v. Horn Seed Co., 647 F.2d 96, 100 (10th Cir. 1981);
Hackney, 583 F. Supp. at 776.
14. 438 U.S. 154.
15. Id. at 171.
16. Hackney, 583 F. Supp. at 776. For application of the four-corners doctrine, see
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
17. Hackney, 583 F. Supp. at 776. See also Weyerhauser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373
(7th Cir. 1979); Donovan v. Athenian Marble Corp., 535 F. Supp. 176 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
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tional Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC). 18 An adverse
finding by OSHRC can then be appealed to the court of appeals. 19 The
district court, relying on the Tenth Circuit's opinions in Marshall v. Horn
Seed Co. ,20 and Robert K. Bell Enterprises v. Donovan,2 1 chose to apply the
latter approach.
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution requires
that a search be "reasonable," '2 2 and supported by "probable cause." '2 3
In addition, it is well settled that inspections under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act 24 must be made pursuant to a valid administrative
warrant. 25 As with criminal warrants, the administrative warrant serves
to provide property owners with sufficient information to assure them
that the entry is legal.
2 6
When opting to follow the second alternative, the district court
acknowledged that the search must have taken place in order to avoid
contempt citations. Initially, it appears as if "such a procedure fails to
protect Defendants against a potentially unconstitutional search." '2 7
However, it is clear that inspection pursuant to an administrative war-
rant is a much less substantial intrusion than entering a private home
pursuant to a search warrant. 28 Here, the Hackney plant was selected
for inspection pursuant to a programmed plan. Accordingly, the court
held that Hackney's fourth amendment interests were adequately pro-
18. "The basic purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to allow an administrative
agency to perform functions within its special competence - to make a factual record, to
apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies."
Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972) (quoting McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185,
194 (1968)). Accord Baldwin Metals Co. v. Donovan, 642 F.2d 768 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 893 (1981); In Re Worksite Inspection of Quality Products, Inc., 592 F.2d 611
(1st Cir. 1979).
19. Hackney, 583 F. Supp. at 777.
20. 647 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1981).
21. 710 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 (1984).
22. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
23. "[N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1970).
25. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
26. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977).
27. Hackney, 583 F. Supp. at 777.
28. The fourth amendment protects commercial buildings, as well as private homes.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967).
Whereas probable cause for the search of a private home must be based on specific
evidence of a crime, Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); United States
v. Matthews, 615 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1980), probable cause for an administrative inspec-
tion need only be based on a showing that reasonable legislative or administrative stan-
dards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular establishment.
Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 320; Camara, 387 U.S. at 538; see supra note 12. An administrative
warrant may therefore be based on a "showing that a specific business has been chosen for
an OSHA search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the
Act derived from neutral sources such as, for example, dispersion of employees in various
types of industries across a given area, and the desired frequency of searches in any of the
lesser divisions of the areas .... Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 321.
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tected by the availability of a post-inspection challenge.29
The district court then addressed the issue of whether the warrant
application presented to the magistrate indicated the existence of prob-
able cause. 30 Applying the Franks four-corners doctrine, 3 1 the district
court found that there was indeed probable cause to issue the warrant,
and thus upheld Hackney and Schwedland's contempt citations.
3 2
C. Tenth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit addressed Hackney's attempt to go
beyond the four-corners of the warrant application. Hackney argued
that the OSHA administrative plan upon which the inspection warrant
application was based was improperly promulgated, and thus improp-
erly applied.3 3 Relying on Marshall v. Horn Seed Co. ,34 the court rejected
such an argument.
In Horn Seed, an administrative warrant was obtained based on spe-
cific employee complaints, rather than pursuant to an administrative
plan.3 5 When considering the validity of search warrants, the Tenth Cir-
cuit mentioned that courts may only review the information which was
before the magistrate. However, the Tenth Circuit did not go into any
analysis as to the efficacy of the four-corners doctrine.
3 6
In Robert K Bell Enterprises v. Donovan,3 7 however, the Tenth Circuit
did discuss its preference for requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies in challenging an administrative plan, 38 thus limiting a district
29. Hackney, 583 F. Supp. at 778. It is interesting to note that the court recognized
that a private individual realistically has no opportunity to challenge a search warrant until
after his home has been searched. The district court logically refused to allow businesses
the opportunity to challenge a warrant issued under a programmed inspection plan until
after the search has occurred. Id. at 778 n.3.
30. Id.
31. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. In Hackney, only a feeble attempt
was made to show "reckless disregard for the truth" or "deliberate falsehood." The dis-
trict court summarily dismissed these assertions. Hackney, 583 F. Supp. at 778 & n.6.
32. Hackney, 583 F. Supp. at 779.
33. Donovan v. Hackney, Inc., 769 F.2d 650, 653 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S.Ct. 1458 (1986).
34. 647 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1981). "In ruling on the validity of a search warrant, the
reviewing court may only consider the information provided the issuing magistrate or
judge." Id. at 104.
35. Id. at 98-103. The standards to be applied in determining probable cause for an
administrative warrant based on a specific allegation or complaint are somewhat different
from the standards applied to warrants based on administrative plans. When the warrant
is based on a specific complaint, the affidavit should include the name of the person who
received the complaint, the source of the complaint (though not necessarily the name of
the complainant), the underlying facts and circumstances surrounding the complaint, the
steps OSHA officials took to verify the complaint, personal observations, the past regula-
tory history of the employer, the number of prior entries, the scope of the search, and the
time of day it is to be performed. Id. at 102-03. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507
(1978).
36. "In ruling on the validity of a search warrant, the reviewing court may only con-
sider the information provided the issuing magistrate or judge." Horn Seed, 647 F.2d at
104.
37. 710 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 (1984).
38. Bell, 710 F.2d at 675; see supra text accompanying notes 18 & 21.
[Vol. 64:2
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W
court's review of a contempt citation to the four-corners of the warrant
application rather than the administrative underpinnings upon which
the warrant is based. Though Bell was not cited by the Tenth Circuit in
Hackney, the district court relied on that case in its decision. 39
The Tenth Circuit, in upholding Hackney's contempt citation,
found that ex parte warrants are to be "executed without delay and with-
out prior notification ' 40 and should not have their execution hindered
by cumbersome discovery procedure.4 1 This further strengthened the
requirement that the four-corners doctrine be adhered to in district
court contempt proceedings.
The Tenth Circuit next considered whether the magistrate acted on
probable cause in issuing the warrant authorizing the inspection of the
Hackney plant.4 2 While noting that OSHA inspection warrants are is-
sued on a lesser standard of probable cause,4 3 the Tenth Circuit relied
on the probable cause test language contained in Camara v. Municipal
Court 4 4 and Marshall v. Barlow's Inc. 4 5 Accordingly, the court found that
the magistrate acted on probable cause in issuing the administrative
warrant. 4 6 The standard of review utilized by the Tenth Circuit in
reaching this conclusion was one of "substantial deference" to the mag-
istrate's finding. 4 7 The Tenth Circuit extended the rule it pronounced
in United States v. Wood,4 8 holding that such deference was "equally ap-
plicable" when considering the issuance of administrative warrants. 49
The Tenth Circuit thus affirmed all judgments of the district court.
D. Analysis
Any analysis of administrative search issues must begin with the
1978 United States Supreme Court case of Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.50
Barlow's involved a warrantless OSHA search of the defendant's plumb-
ing installation business. In Barlow's, the Supreme Court ruled that "[i]f
the government intrudes on a person's property, the privacy interest
suffers whether the government's motivation is to investigate violations
39. Hackney, 583 F. Supp. at 777.
40. Hackney, 769 F.2d at 653 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 316
(1978)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 652.
43. Id.
44. 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967) (Probable cause upon the basis of which warrants are
to be issued for area code-enforcement inspections is not dependent on the inspector's
belief that a particular dwelling violates the code but on the reasonableness of the enforce-
ment agency's appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole.).
45. 436 U.S. 307, 315-21 (1977) (Entitlement to a warrant will not depend on the
demonstration of probable cause that conditions on the premises violate OSHA but
merely that reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an inspection
are satisfied with respect to a particular establishment.).
46. Hackney, 769 F.2d at 652.
47. Id. at 653.
48. 695 F.2d 459, 464 (10th Cir. 1982) (magistrate's finding of probable cause to is-
sue a criminal search warrant is entitled to substantial deference).
49. Hackney, 769 F.2d at 653.
50. 436 U.S. 307 (1977).
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of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory stan-
dards."' 5 1 A search warrant to inspect Barlow's business was therefore
required.
5 2
The Court in Barlow's did note that certain exceptions to the general
warrant requirement exist for "pervasively regulated business[es],
' 53
and for "closely regulated" industries "long subject to close supervision
and inspection."5 4 In addition, administrative entry without a warrant
will be allowed in certain exigent circumstances.
55
In Barlow 's, the Supreme Court refused to allow a warrantless search
of employment facilities. Rather, the Court noted that a warrant must
be obtained pursuant to an administrative plan. 56 The issue in Hackney,
which was left open in Barlow's, involved the proper mode of challenging
warrants issued under administrative plans, and the appropriate form
for challenging the plans themselves. On this issue, the circuits are di-
vided, some requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, 5 7 and
others allowing direct challenge beyond the four-corners of the warrant
in contempt proceedings. 5 8
As previously discussed, the Tenth Circuit has opted to apply the
four-corners doctrine to challenges of administrative search warrants in
contempt proceedings before the district court. 59 Therefore, any chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of an administrative plan underlying a
search warrant may only occur during an administrative enforcement
proceeding before the OSHRC, or on review of OSHRC's decision by a
court of appeals.
The courts which have required exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies do so for one of two reasons. The first includes the traditional ra-
tionale for requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies. This
traditional rationale emanates from theories, such as: the protection of
administrative autonomy; deference to agency expertise; easier judicial
review through creation of a factual record by the agency; and judicial
economy, given that the controversy may be mooted if the agency grants
51. Id. at 312.
52. Id. at 325.
53. Id. at 313 (quoting United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (firearms
regulated under Gun Control Act)); see Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (under-
ground mines regulated under the Mine Safety and Health Act).
54. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 313 (quoting Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397
U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (liquor distribution)). The Eighth Circuit has extended this exception
to include inspections of drug manufacturers. See United States v. Jamieson-McKames
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 651 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982).
55. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (firefighters allowed to enter premises
without a warrant in order to extinguish a fire).
56. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 321-23; see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
57. See Brock v. Brooks Woolen Co., 782 F.2d 1066 (1st Cir. 1986); Baldwin Metals
Co. v. Donovan, 642 F.2d 768 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981); Babcock & Wil-
cox Co. v. Marshall, 610 F.2d 1128 (3rd Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Central Mine Equipment
Co., 608 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1979); In re Worksite Inspection of Quality Products, Inc., 592
F.2d 611 (Ist Cir. 1979).
58. See Donovan v. Athenian Marble Corp., 535 F. Supp. 176, 180 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
59. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
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the relief sought.60 The second reason for requiring exhaustion is an
equitable one - a court should simply refrain from exercising its equita-
ble jurisdiction unless the challenging party clearly demonstrates that its
constitutional rights cannot be adequately adjudicated in the pending or
anticipated administrative enforcement proceeding against it.6 1 In
either case, federal appellate review is available upon exhaustion.
62
A criticism of the exhaustion approach is that although the proce-
dure may ultimately protect the aggrieved party from citations based on
an invalid administrative plan, it does not protect against the unreasona-
ble search itself.63 Some courts have recognized this problem, and will
thus only require exhaustion if the search has already occurred or if the
complaining party has commenced OSHRC proceedings. 64
The Occupational Safety and Health Act is a statute designed to
protect worker health and safety through regulatory powers, inspec-
tions, and enforcement proceedings. 6 5 When determining whether to
require exhaustion, courts must balance these statutory and regulatory
protections against the infringement of employer's constitutional rights
which would result from a bad plan underlying a search warrant. In
Hackney, the Tenth Circuit has favored worker health and safety over
what is a somewhat tenuous constitutional issue. Other courts have
gone the opposite way, while the Supreme Court has remained silent,
and will apparently remain so, given their recent denial of certiorari in
Hackney .66
II. CONVERGENCE OF THE "SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE" AND "ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS" STANDARDS OF REVIEW ON QUESTIONS
INVOLVING SCIENTIFIC EXPERTISE: THE URANIUM
MILL TAILINGS AND COMPOUND 1080 CASES
In two cases6 7 challenging regulations issued under the Uranium
Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA), 68 and in another chal-
lenging the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) decision to lift re-
strictions on the use of a pesticide designed to kill coyotes, 6 9 the Tenth
60. Baldwin, 642 F.2d at 772; see also Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972).
61. Brock v. Brooks Woolen Co., 782 F.2d 1066 (1st Cir. 1986); Marshall v. Central
Mine Equipment Co., 608 F.2d 719, 721-22 (8th Cir. 1979); In re Worksite Inspection of
Quality Products, Inc., 592 F.2d 611, 615 (1st Cir. 1979).
62. See 29 U.S.C. § 660 (1982) (discussion ofjudicial review).
63. Weyerhauser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Hufihines
Steel Co., 488 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
64. Baldwin, 642 F.2d at 774 n.13. Compare Cerro Metal Products v. Marshall, 620
F.2d 964 (3rd Cir. 1980) (available administrative remedies does not preclude injunction
to avoid imminent threat of harm from continued inspections) with Babcock & Wilcox Co.
v. Marshall, 610 F.2d 1128 (3rd Cir. 1979) (exhaustion required if search has occurred).
65. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1982). See generally BENJAMIN W. MINTZ, OSHA: HISTORY,
LAw, AND POLICY (1984).
66. 106 S.Ct. 1458 (1986).
67. American Mining Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S.Ct. 2275, 2276 (1986); American Mining Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 640 (10th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 2275, 2276 (1986).
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2022, 7901-7942 (1982).
69. National Cattlemen's Ass'n v. EPA, 773 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1985).
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Circuit for the most part upheld the EPA's decisions over the objections
of competing industry/environmental and rancher/wildlife protection
interests. In so doing, the Tenth Circuit continued to show deference to
the agency's findings of scientific facts necessary to support administra-
tive actions. Indeed, these three cases illustrate that when a court
reviews agency action based on scientific evidence, any distinction be-
tween the "arbitrary and capricious" and "substantial evidence" stan-
dards of review may be illusory.
A. The UMTRCA Cases
1. Facts
The two companion cases of American Mining Congress v. Thomas
70
involved challenges to regulations promulgated by the EPA under the
Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978 (UMTRCA).
7 1
Two separate sets of regulations were challenged, one set in each case.
In the first companion case, regulations controlling inactive uranium
mill tailings sites were challenged. 72 In the second companion case,
regulations controlling active uranium mill tailings sites were
questioned.
73
The regulations at issue in these two cases were promulgated to
combat the health hazards posed by uranium mill tailings. 74 The rules
issued by the EPA placed limits on radon released into the atmosphere
from the tailings piles, as well as limits on water contamination from the
piles. 7 5 In both situations, initial radon emission limits were set at 2
70. American Mining Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 2275, 2276 (1986) [hereinafter Inactive Sites]; American Mining Congress v.
Thomas, 772 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2275, 2276 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter Active Sites].
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2202, 7901-42 (1982).
72. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d 617.
73. Active Sites, 772 F.2d 640.
74. The purpose of UMTRCA is to:
provide a program of assessment and remedial action at [inactive mill tailings
sites] . . . including, where appropriate, the reprocessing of tailings to extract
residual uranium and other mineral values where practicable.... [and to provide]
a program to regulate mill tailings during uranium or thorium ore processing at
active mill operations and after termination of such operations in order to stabi-
lize and control such tailings in a safe and environmentally sound manner and to
minimize or eliminate radiation health hazards to the public.
42 U.S.C. § 7901(b) (1982).
Tailings are the residue from the uranium milling process. Health hazards arise from
the emission of radon gas from radium, a radioactive constituent of tailings. Radon and its
radioactive decay products may be potent carcinogens. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 621. Per-
sons exposed to radon emissions from tailings piles may be subject to an increased risk of
contracting lung cancer. See 48 Fed. Reg. 19,584, 19,585-86 (1983) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
§§ 192.00-43) (proposed April 29, 1983). In addition to radon, uranium mill tailings piles
contain other hazardous constituents which may have toxic effects when ingested in either
food or water. These constituents include arsenic, lead, selenium, and molybdenum. I
Final Environmental Impact Statement for Standards for the Control of Byproduct Materi-
als from Uranium Ore Processing at 3-8 (EPA, Sept. 1983).
75. 40 C.F.R. §§ 192.00-43 (1986); see also Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 622.
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pCi/m 2 /s. 76 After a lengthy comment period supported by extensive
technical studies and expert analysis, 7 7 the EPA issued its final "opti-
mized cost-benefit" radon emission limit of 20 pCi/m 2 /s. 7 8 In arriving
at this standard, the EPA "evaluated a number of alternatives in terms of
their costs and the reductions achievable in potential health effects."
79
This selection method prompted environmental petitioners to question
the efficacy of the EPA's use of cost-benefit analysis to set radon emis-
sion standards aimed at protecting human health. 80 Industry petition-
ers, in contrast, contended that the regulations placed an undue fi-
nancial burden on an economically ailing industry.
8 1
2. Issues Raised on Appeal
a. Inactive Sites
In Inactive Sites, industry petitioners alleged that, in UMTRCA, Con-
gress required the EPA to find a "significant risk" posed by uranium mill
tailings piles. Such a finding would serve as a trigger allowing for regu-
lation in this area. Without such a finding, it was argued, regulations
could not be imposed. 8 2 The industry petitioners based their argument
on Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute.
83
American Petroleum Institute involved a challenge to Occupational
Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) regulations designed to
protect workers from the potentially carcinogenic effects of the chemical
benzene.8 4 Justice Stevens, writing for the American Petroleum Institute
plurality, found that under the applicable statutory language, 8 5 OSHA
76. 46 Fed. Reg. 2556, 2562 (1981) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 192.00-.43) (proposed
April 22, 1980). The EPA stated that:
pCi/m 2-sec stands for picocuries per square meter per second, a measure of the
release rate of radioactivity from a surface. A curie is the amount of radioactive
material that produces 37 billion nuclear transformations per second. A
picocurie is a trillionth of a curie. One picocurie produces a little more than two
nuclear transformations per minute.
46 Fed. Reg. 2556, 2559 n.5 (1981) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 192.00-.43) (proposed April
22, 1980).
77. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 623.
78. 40 C.F.R. § 192.02 (1986).
79. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 624 (quoting 48 Fed. Reg. 590 (1983) (codified at 40
C.F.R. §§ 192.00-43) (summary of final rule)).
80. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 630-32.
81. Id.; see also United Nuclear Corp. v. EPA, decided sub nom American Mining Con-
gress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 617 and American Mining Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 640 (10th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 2275, 2276 (1986). The EPA estimated active site cleanup
costs through the year 2000 to be between $310 million and $540 million. Active Sites, 772
F.2d at 646. Inactive site cleanup was estimated to be approximately 314 million (1981)
dollars. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 638.
82. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 627.
83. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
84. A causal connection is believed to exist between exposure to benzene and leuke-
mia, a cancer of the white blood cells. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. at 613.
85. The applicable statutory language is found in section 652(8) of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act which states:
The term "occupational safety and health standard" means a standard which re-
quires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, meth-
ods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment and places of employment.
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must find, "as a threshold matter, that the toxic substance in question
poses a significant health risk in the workplace," prior to imposing a
regulation.
86
The industry petitioners in Inactive Sites argued that a similar re-
quirement of finding a "significant risk" was envisioned by Congress
when it enacted UMTRCA.8 7 The Tenth Circuit conceded that certain
language appearing in the legislative history of UMTRCA might suggest
that the EPA must find that radon poses a significant risk before regulat-
ing emission.8 8 The court did not, however, find any language to this
effect in the conference committee report.8 9 In addition, the Tenth Cir-
cuit concluded that "[t]o hold that [the] EPA must determine that the
tailings piles pose a significant risk before regulating would change the
entire structure of the statute." 90 Thus, the court refused to impose a
significant risk standard, dismissing the industry petitioners' claims that
a finding of significant risk was required prior to regulation.
The next major issue raised by all petitioners involved the EPA's
use of a cost-benefit analysis 91 in arriving at the standards. Industry peti-
tioners argued that the EPA failed to properly consider costs of disposal
and cleanup in light of what they perceived as limited health benefits of
the regulation. 9 2 In contrast, environmental petitioners claimed that
health-based standards under UMTRCA should be based primarily on
technical feasibility, and to a lesser extent on economic feasibility.
93
Environmental petitioners argued for an application of "feasibility
analysis," basing their assertions on American Textile Manufacturers Insti-
tute, Inc. v. Donovan.94 In that case, the Supreme Court held that the
controlling section of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 9 5 pre-
cluded a cost-benefit analysis.
96
29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1982) (emphasis added).
86. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. at 614.
87. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7901(b) (1982) with 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1982).
88. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 629 n.8 (citing 128 CONG. REc H8816 (daily ed. Decem-
ber 2, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Lujan) and 128 CONG. REC. S 13,055-56 (daily ed. October 1,
1982) (remarks of Sen. Wallop and Sen. Simpson)).
89. Id. at 629; see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 884, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45, reprinted in
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3592, 3603-21.
90. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 629 n.8.
91. "The label 'cost-benefit analysis' encompasses everything from a strict mathemati-
cal balancing formula to a less strict standard that merely requires the agency to recognize
both the costs and benefits of specific proposed alternatives and consider the differences in
choosing an appropriate alternative." Id. at 631.
92. Id. at 630.
93. Id. at 631. The language of the UMTRCA amendments clearly envisioned the
EPA's consideration of costs in arriving at the emission standards. "[T]he Administrator
shall consider the risk to public health, safety, and the environment, the environmental and
economic costs of applying such standards, and other factors as the Administrator determines to
be appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2022(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
94. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1982) (requiring health standards to be set at a point which
most adequately assures protection of worker health and safety).
96. The Supreme Court in Donovan found that Congress, in defining the relationship
between cost and benefits of the regulations, placed "the 'benefit' of worker health above
all other considerations save those making attainment of this 'benefit' unachievable." Don-
ovan, 452 U.S. at 509. The Court explained that "[a]ny standard based on a balancing of
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The Tenth Circuit found that the operative language of UMTRCA,
which requires the EPA to consider "the environmental and economic
costs" of the standards, precluded feasibility analysis. 9 7 The court went
on to find that the "optimized cost benefit" approach adopted by the
EPA was a reasonable outgrowth of the statutory scheme envisioned by
Congress. 98
The court then considered whether the EPA's radium-in-soil con-
centration standards were valid. 99 Upon a review of the record, the
court concluded that there was nothing which would indicate that the
actions of the EPA in adopting these standards were arbitrary and
capricious. 100
The final standard considered by the court involved the limitations
set forth for the allowable level of indoor radon concentration. Initially,
the EPA had set this limit at 0.015 WL. l0 l However, the EPA subse-
quently raised this limit to 0.03 WL, while merely requesting that a rea-
sonable effort be made to achieve a level of 0.02 WL. 10 2 This change in
the allowable level of indoor radon concentration greatly increased the
risk of contracting cancer. 10 3 However, although the change in stan-
dards allowed a significant increase in the risk factor, the court deter-
mined that the EPA did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 10 4
After considering other minor issues, 10 5 the Tenth Circuit found an
costs and benefits by the Secretary that strikes a different balance than that struck by Con-
gress would be inconsistent with the command set forth in § 6(b)(5). Thus, cost-benefit
analysis by OSHA is not required by the statute because feasibility analysis is." Id.
97. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 631 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2022(a) (1982)); see supra
note 93.
98. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 632.
99. Id. at 635.
100. Id.
101. 45 Fed. Reg. 27,370, 27,375 (1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 192.12(b)(1)) (pro-
posed April 22, 1980). A working level or WL means "any combination of short-lived
radon decay products in one liter of air that will result in the ultimate emission of alpha
particles with a total energy of 130 billion electron volts." 40 C.F.R. § 192.11 (c) (1986).
102. 40 C.F.R. § 192.12(b)(1) (1986)
103. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 635-36. This change in radon concentration levels in-
creased the risk of contracting lung cancer from 0.8 in 100 to approximately 1.3 in 100. Id.
at 636.
104. Id. at 636.
105. Another issue discussed by the court involved the area to which the emission lim-
its applied. Industry petitioners argued that the EPA exceeded its authority by adopting
standards which were to be enforced inside the mill tailing sites. Id. The thrust of this
argument centered around the fact that the EPA's authority to promulgate environmental
standards was limited to locations outside of the mill tailings sites. Id. at 629-30. This
argument derives from the 1970 Reorganization Plan "which transferred the Atomic En-
ergy Commission (now NRC) authority to set generally applicable environmental stan-
dards to the EPA." Id. at 629. However, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that since the mill
tailings sites are the sources of origin for radon gas, the EPA should have the power to
regulate the emission of radon gas from its source. As a result, the Tenth Circuit held that
the EPA did not exceed its authority. Id. at 630.
The court was also confronted with determining what documents could be reviewed.
The court determined that "extra-record" materials could be reviewed to see if they fell
within any accepted exceptions. Id. at 626-27. The court ultimately felt that reference
could be made to some of these extra-record materials, however, they could not be utilized
to supplement the record. The only document which was allowed to supplement the rec-
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error in the EPA's issuance of guidelines for control of waterborne pol-
lutants. The EPA's proposed guidelines indicated that there was a prob-
lem with water contamination. In response to this problem, the EPA
initially proposed specific standards which were designed as a means of
generally regulating water quality. Pursuant to input received during
the comment period, the EPA discarded the proposed regulations,
adopting "site-specific" standards instead. 10 6 While scrutinizing this
drastic change in standards, the Tenth Circuit noted that the EPA ac-
knowledged the existence of a problem with water contamination when
it initially suggested the adoption of specific standards designed to gen-
erally regulate water quality.10 7 As a result, the Tenth Circuit re-
manded, holding that UMTRCA requires the EPA to adopt regulations
that have general application.1
0 8
b. Active Sites
In attempting to spur the EPA into promulgating regulations, Con-
gress, in a 1983 UMTRCA amendment, 10 9 set an October 1, 1983 dead-
line for promulgation of active mill site standards. If this deadline was
not met, the EPA's authority to set standards would terminate in favor of
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ' 10 The EPA published proposed
standards for the active mill sites in the Federal Register on April 29,
1983.111 Final standards were signed by the EPA's Administrator on
September 30, 1983, and were apparently released to the public on that
day.' 1 2 The regulations were not published in the Federal Register,
however, until October 7, 1983.1 13
ord was a transmittal letter. This supplementation was allowed largely because the motion
to allow this document to supplement the record was unopposed. Id.
The court also faced the issue of whether the radon flux limits set by the EPA imper-
missibly limited the "engineering or design standard to be selected by the implementing
agency." Id. at 630. The court noted that although the EPA was only charged with the
responsibility of setting the standards, the emission limitations adopted were necessary in
order to comply with the mandate that it use a cost-benefit analysis. The court reasoned,
that to some extent, the EPA was required to consider methods of implementation in or-
der to effectively complete its cost-benefit analysis. Id.
106. Id. at 638. Compare 46 Fed. Reg. 2556, 2562 (1981) (codified in 40 C.F.R.
§§ 192.00-.43) (general standards proposed April 22, 1980) with 48 Fed. Reg. 590, 593-95
(1983) (codified in 40 C.F.R. § 192.02) (rationale for abandonment of proposed general
standards). The "site specific" standards required each site to be tested, with corrective
measures to be ascertained after such testing.
107. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 638-39.
108. Id. at 638.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2022(b)(1) (1982). See infra note 110.
110. The amendment provides as follows:
If the Administrator [of the EPA] fails to promulgate standards in final form
under this subsection by October 1, 1983, the authority of the Administrator to
promulgate such standards shall terminate, and the [Nuclear Regulatory] Com-
mission may take actions under this chapter without regard to any provision of
this chapter requiring such actions to comply with, or be taken in accordance
with, standards promulgated by the Administrator.
42 U.S.C. § 2022(b)(1) (1982).
111. Active Sites, 772 F.2d at 643; 40 C.F.R. § 192.30 (1986).
112. Active Sites, 772 F.2d at 643.
113. Id.; 40 C.F.R. §§ 192.30-43 (1986).
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Publication of the active mill site standards on October 7, 1983
provided several of the industry petitioners with an opportunity to
challenge the EPA's jurisdictional authority by claiming that such regu-
lations were "promulgated" beyond the statutory deadline."14 Peti-
tioner's claim equated "promulgation" with publication in the Federal
Register.' 15
The Tenth Circuit agreed that the cases cited by the petitioners
hold that statute of limitations provisions for seeking judicial review be-
gin to run on the date rules are published in the Federal Register." 
6
However, the court acknowledged that " 'promulgation' does not have a
single accepted meaning in all contexts."' 17 The court then went on to
find that the September 30 signing and release of the regulations consti-
tuted "promulgation" sufficient to satisfy the congressional deadline.'' 8
It is important to note that, in the Active Sites case, the Tenth Circuit
reaffirmed several of the holdings which were set forth in the Inactive
Sites case.' 19 However, unlike the water standards adopted to regulate
inactive sites, the EPA adopted a two-part groundwater standard for ac-
tive sites.120 Not only did the court determine that the EPA adopted the
required general standards, but it also held that the EPA exhibited ade-
quate effort to respond to the concerns of both the environmental peti-
tioners and the industry petitioners during the comment period. As a
result, the court held that the EPA's water standards for active mill sites
was valid. 121
Finally, the Tenth Circuit denied standing to one of the petitioners,
AMAX, Inc. 122 AMAX challenged the EPA's designation of molybde-
num as a hazardous constituent of uranium and thorium mill tailings,' 23
claiming that such designation subjected molybdenum to groundwater
protection standards. However, neither AMAX nor any of its customers
owned or operated any mill tailing sites. 1 24 The regulations specifically
114. Active Sites, 772 F.2d at 644.
115. Id. at 645. Petitioners' argument was based on two cases. In Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the court held that a district
court's order to "promulgate" regulations was satisfied by publication of such regulations
in the Federal Register. Id. at 813. In Laminators Safety Glass Ass'n v. Consumer Product
Safety Comm'n, 578 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the court, for purposes of determining the
effective date for calculating a statute of limitations, implicitly equated the date of Federal
Register publication with the date of promulgation. Id. at 408.
116. Active Sites, 772 F.2d at 645. See Laminators Safety Glass Ass n, 578 F.2d at 408-11.
117. Active Sites, 772 F.2d at 645.
118. Id.
119. The court again held:
that a finding by the EPA of a 'significant risk' is not a prerequisite to promulgat-
ing the regulations; . . . that the EPA may promulgate standards to apply within
the boundaries of the millsites; . . . that the EPA's standards do not unlawfully
impose management, design, and engineering requirements; . . . and that the
EPA properly considered cost-benefit factors in establishing standards.
Id. at 645-46. In addition, the arbitrary and capricious issue was not rediscussed.
120. 40 C.F.R. § 192.32(a)(l)-(2) (1986).
121. Active Sites, 772 F.2d at 648-49.
122. Id. at 649. AMAX is "one of the world's leading producers of molybdenum." Id.
123. Id. at 650.
124. Id.
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state that molybdenum is listed as a hazardous constituent "only for
purposes of controlling uranium and thorium byproduct materials."'
12 5
Therefore, AMAX's molybdenum holdings were not covered by the reg-
ulations and the court accordingly denied AMAX standing.'
2 6
c. Standard of Review
In both Inactive Sites and Active Sites, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the
EPA's rulemaking record to determine whether its decision was arbitrary
and capricious. 127 Except for the remand of the groundwater guidance
standards in Inactive Sites, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the EPA's decisions
in both Active Sites and Inactive Sites, thus showing substantial deference
to the EPA's expertise in a highly technical field.
B. The Compound 1080 Case
1. Background
In National Cattleman's Association v. EPA, 12 8 the EPA was caught be-
tween competing challenges of the Defenders of Wildlife and those of a
number of livestock industry trade associations.
Prior to 1972, Compound 1080 was one of the primary substances
used by ranchers to kill coyotes and other predators of livestock. In
1972, the EPA determined that Compound 1080 was leading to a sub-
stantial number of deaths of non-target, non-predatory animals. 12 9 Pur-
suant to its authority under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),130 the EPA cancelled the registration of Com-
pound 1080 for use as a predacide.'
3'
Regulations promulgated under FIFRA allow the Administrator to
reconsider a prior cancellation of a pesticide in light of any "substantial
125. Id.
126. The Tenth Circuit relied on National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Califano, 622
F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1980), in which it held that a plaintiff must allege that he has been or
will be "perceptibly harmed" by an agency action, "not that he can imagine circumstances
in which he could be affected by the agency's action." Id. at 1387 (quoting United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688-89 (1973)). The Tenth Circuit found that the regulatory im-
pact of UMTRCA was so far removed from the harm AMAX was alleging, that standing did
not exist. Active Sites, 772 F.2d at 652.
127. The standard of review applied by the Tenth Circuit was the arbitrary and capri-
cious test. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1982). Under this standard, the court reviews the evi-
dence "to determine whether the agency decision was rational and based on consideration
of the relevant factors." Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 941 (1976). As a result, the reviewing court may not "substitute its judgment for that
of the agency." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971). A court may reverse, however, upon a finding that the agency made a clear error
ofjudgment. Id.
128. 773 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1985).
129. Id. at 269.
130. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a-y (1982). Section 136d(b) of FIFRA allows the EPA's Adminis-
trator to cancel or modify the registration of a registered pesticide if it is found to have
"unreasonable adverse effects" on the environment. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b) (1982). Proce-
dures for this process are codified in 40 C.F.R. § 164.1-.133 (1986).
131. National Cattleman's Ass'n, 773 F.2d at 269; see 37 Fed. Reg. 5720 (1972) (adminis-
trative notice disallowing the use of Compound 1080 for predacide purposes).
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new evidence" which was not available at the time of cancellation.' 3 2 In
1972, Compound 1080 was predominantly administered in large bait
stations.13 3 By 1982, two new means of administering the pesticide had
been developed: single lethal dose baits (SLD) and toxic collars.
134
These new distribution methods precipitated a 1982 hearing to deter-
mine whether they constituted "substantial new evidence" sufficient to
require a reversal or modification of the 1972 suspension order.'
3 5
As a result of the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
found that the advent of toxic collars and SLDs did constitute substan-
tial new evidence, thereafter lifting the ban on use of Compound 1080
when administered by these methods. 136 However, the ALJ imposed
certain restrictions on the use of toxic collars and SLDs, 13 7 while main-
taining the ban on large bait stations.
On appeal to the Administrator, the ALJ's ban on large bait stations
was upheld and additional restrictions on the use of SLDs and toxic col-
lars were imposed. 13 8 Both the Defenders of Wildlife and the National
Cattleman's Association appealed the Administrator's decision to the
Tenth Circuit.
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Defenders of Wildlife asserted that the Administrator's deci-
sion to lift the ban on Compound 1080 was not supported by substantial
new evidence. The National Cattleman's Association, on the other
hand, questioned the EPA's restrictions on the use of SLD baits as well
as the EPA's refusal to lift the ban on large bait stations. 139
The statute requires a reviewing court to sustain the Administra-
tor's decision if it is "supported by substantial new evidence when con-
132. 40 C.F.R. § 164.132(a) (1986).
133. "A large bait station consists of a fifty to one-hundred-pound portion of horse or
sheep carcass impregnated with Compound 1080. These bait stations [are] set out during
the winter and early spring in rangelands suffering from heavy predation by coyotes."
National Cattleman's Ass'n, 773 F.2d at 270.
134. "An SLD consists of a bite-size piece of meat or other material containing a lethal
dose of Compound 1080 which is placed in a location where it is likely to be taken by a
coyote and not likely to be consumed by non-target wildlife .... Toxic collars consist of
rubber collars with small reservoirs filled with Compound 1080." Id. These collars are
worn by sheep or goats. Coyotes generally strike at an animal's throat, and are thereby
exposed to a lethal dose of 1080. Id.
135. Id. at 269; see 40 C.F.R. § 164.132(a) (1986) (allows reversal or modification).
136. National Cattleman's Ass'n, 773 F.2d at 270.
137. The Administrative Law Judge's order required that all Compound 1080 uses be
supervised by a federal agency. This requirement was reviewed by the Tenth Circuit. See
infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text. "Collars could be filled and distributed only by
registered users and only administered by certified applicators." SLD baits could only be
prepared and distributed by certified state or federal employees. National Cattleman's Ass 'n,
773 F.2d at 270.
138. Under the Administrator's decision, the certification of SLD applicators would be
run solely by the federal government. Additional testing under experimental use permits
would also be required. With respect to toxic collars, additional labelling and usage re-
quirements were imposed. Id. at 270.
139. Id. at 270-71.
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sidered on the record as a whole."' 140 With regard to the two new
delivery methods, the Tenth Circuit found that the EPA's decision was
supported by the requisite substantial new evidence in the record. 141
The Tenth Circuit, however, rejected the EPA's requirement that a
federal agency determine the competency of and certify all users of SLD
baits. The court held that this requirement exceeded the EPA's statu-
tory authority since FIFRA allows states to adopt certification plans for
applicators. 14 2 Such plans, however, must be approved by the EPA."
4 3
The Tenth Circuit found that the EPA's requirement of mandatory fed-
eral agency certification would have the effect of rejecting state certifica-
tion plans prior to their submission, thus contravening the statute., 44 In
all other respects, the EPA Administrator's decision was affirmed.145
C. Analysis
In the three cases discussed above, the Tenth Circuit deferred to
the EPA's expertise with regard to its interpretations of scientific evi-
dence. In spite of this deference, it is important to note that the
UMTRCA cases were reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard," 4 6 while the Compound 1080 decision was reviewed under the sub-
stantial evidence test. "4 7 Indeed, it is often difficult to distinguish the
requisite quantity of evidence needed to uphold a given decision under
either of these tests," 4 8 particularly when the agency action under re-
140. Id. at 271 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136n(b) (1982)). "Substantial evidence 'is more
than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.' " Id. at 270 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NRLB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
141. Id. at 271.
142. 7 U.S.C. § 136b(a)(2) (1982) reads:
If any State, at any time, desires to certify applicators of pesticides, the Governor
of such State shall submit a State plan for such purpose. The Administrator shall
approve the plan submitted by any State, or any modification thereof, if such plan
in his judgment-
(A) designates a State agency responsible for administering the plan
throughout the State;
(B) contains satisfactory assurances that such agency has or will have the
legal authority and qualified personnel necessary to carry out the plan;
(C) gives satisfactory assurances that the State will devote adequate funds to
the administration of the plan;
(D) provides that the State agency will make such reports to the Administra-
tor in such form and containing such information as the Administrator may from
time to time require; and
(E) contains satisfactory assurances that State standards for the certification
of applicators of pesticides conform with those standards prescribed by the Ad-
ministrator under paragraph (1) [of this section]. Any State certification program
under this section shall be maintained in accordance with the State plan approved
under this section.
143. Id.
144. National Cattleman's Ass'n, 773 F.2d at 272.
145. Id. at 273.
146. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
148. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Associated Indus. of N.Y. State v.
United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349-50 (2d Cir. 1973):
[Ilt is difficult to imagine a decision having no substantial evidence to support it
which is not 'arbitrary', or a decision struck down as arbitrary which is in fact
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view is based on scientific expertise.' 49 Thus, in these cases, judicial
scrutiny was limited to review for compliance with statutory authority
and review for procedural compliance. 150 The Tenth Circuit exhibited
almost complete deference to the agency's findings, ensuring only that
the agency decision was supported by some evidence.
In these three cases, the Tenth Circuit's decision to strike down
certain aspects of the agency's decisions' 5' was based on the EPA's at-
tempt to engage in ultra vires actions. 152 The court, after its purported
"searching inquiry" into the facts, affirmed the EPA's scientific judg-
ment in all three cases. While it is not suggested that these Tenth Cir-
cuit decisions should have been decided differently, it may be that the
Tenth Circuit's reluctance to scrutinize scientific evidence' 5 3 blurs any
distinction that exists between the arbitrary and capricious test and the
substantial evidence test.
This deference reflects the judiciary's preference to rely on the sci-
entific expertise concentrated in the agency. Such deference may be
most pronounced where the court, like the agency, finds itself caught
between competing interests. Each litigant, sophisticated in the scien-
tific bases of a given regulatory option, may muster their experts to re-
fute an agency choice which has been arrived at through the use of a
technically trained staff. Use of skilled agency professionals, however, is
supported by 'substantial evidence' . . . in the review of rules of general applica-
bility made after notice and comment rulemaking, the two criteria do tend to
converge.
The primary difference according to the Administrative Procedure Act is that the substan-
tial evidence test applies to "on the record hearings," 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982), while
the arbitrary and capricious test applies to informal rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(1982). See Ethyl Corp. v. E.P.A., 541 F.2d 1, 37 n.79 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976); Associated Industries, 487 F.2d at 349-50.
149. When scientific or highly specialized subjects are involved, wide-ranging judicial
review may strain the technical competence of the court. Levin, Scope of Review Doctrine
Restated. An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 239, 260 (1986). "When
available technological data and research are unfamiliar or untried, the Agency necessarily
enjoys broad discretion." Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 612 F.2d 1232, 1236 (10th
Cir. 1979); see BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 647 (1st Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1096 (1980). When a court is reviewing an area "fraught with scientific
uncertainty," the judicial review function encounters "significant limitations in the sub-
stantive aspect." Id. (quoting Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027 (D.C. Cir.
1978)).
150. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); CF&I
Steel Corp. v. Economic Dev. Admin., 624 F.2d 136 (10th Cir. 1980).
151. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text (guidance standards in the
UMTRCA cases); notes 142-44 and accompanying text (the exclusive Federal agency de-
termination of competency and power to certify users of SLD baits).
152. With regard to the Tenth Circuit's rejection of the groundwater guidance stan-
dards in Inactive Sites, it is unnecessary to decide whether the court's rejection was based on
either statutory or procedural deficiencies. It is sufficient, for the purposes of this argu-
ment, to note that the decision was not based on an extensive review of, or inquiry into,
the scientific evidence. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
153. This reluctance to scrutinize scientific evidence is by no means out of line with
accepted standards. As Justice O'Connor said in Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87 (1983), "a reviewing court must remember that
the Commission is making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers
of science. When examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple
findings of fact, a reviewing court must be at its most deferential." Id. at 103.
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the purpose of rulemaking procedures. 15 4 It would be unreasonable, if
not erroneous, for a court to pick a side in a scientific debate among
experts.155 Thus, the logical result, as exemplified by the Tenth Circuit
decisions discussed herein, is deference to the administrative agency's
"middle ground," regardless of the legal standard by which the agency
decision is reviewed.
III. JOINING THE SOCIAL SECURITY/UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
OFFSET BANDWAGON: EDWARDS V. VALDEZ
In Edwards v. Valdez, 15 6 the Tenth Circuit reversed Judge Wein-
shienk's district court opinion,' 57 thereby upholding nearly identical
federal and state provisions allowing unemployment benefits received
by those who have begun to collect their social security pensions to be
offset by the monthly amount of social security received. This decision
brought the Tenth Circuit into accord with all other federal circuits that
have construed the federal statute at issue.
158
A. The District Court Opinion
Edwards involved three Colorado residents who began to receive so-
cial security benefits upon retirement. Each of these three individuals
subsequently acquired new employment, became unemployed, and filed
for unemployment benefits. Pursuant to their interpretation of the Fed-
eral Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA),1 59 the defendants deducted each
154. See O'Brien, Marbury, the APA, and Science-Policy Disputes: The Alluring and Elusive
Judicial/Administrative Partnership, 7 HARV. J. OF L. AND PUB. POL'Y 443 (1984).
155. For a different characterization of these issues, see Stever, Deference to Administrative
Agencies in Federal Environmental, Health, and Safety Litigation-Thoughts on Varying Judicial Ap-
plication of the Rule, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 35 (1983).
156. 789 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1986).
157. Edwards v. Valdez, 602 F. Supp. 361 (D. Colo. 1985), rev'd, 789 F.2d 1477 (10th
Cir. 1986).
158. See Peare v. McFarland, 778 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1985); Mayberry v. Adams, 745
F.2d 729 (lst Cir. 1984); Watkins v. Cantrell, 736 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1984); Bowman v.
Stumbo, 735 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1984); Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984).
159. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-11 (1982). The FUTA section applied in Edwards reads:
[T]he amount of compensation payable to an individual for any week which
begins after March 31, 1980, and which begins in a period with respect to which
such individual is receiving a governmental or other pension, retirement or re-
tired pay, annuity, or any other similar periodic payment which is based on the
previous work of such individual shall be reduced (but not below zero) by an
amount equal to the amount of such pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity,
or other payment, which is reasonably attributable to such week except that-
(A) the requirements of this paragraph shall apply to any pension, retire-
ment or retired pay, annuity, or other similar periodic payment only if-
(i) such pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or similar payment is
under a plan maintained (or contributed to) by a base period employer (as deter-
mined under applicable law), and
(ii) in the case of such a payment not made under the Social Security Act
or the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 (or the corresponding provisions of prior
law), services performed for such employer by the individual after the beginning
of the base period (or remuneration for such services) affect eligibility for, or




plaintiffs' social security benefits from their unemployment benefits.
Plaintiffs challenged this interpretation.
160
Consequently, the primary issue in Edwards was the construction of
section 3304(a)(15)(A)(i) of FUTA and a similar Colorado provision. 16 1
These provisions allow a state to "offset unemployment compensation
by the amount of social security benefits received whenever the 'base
period' employer participates in the social security program."' 6 2 One
of the likely reasons for the enactment of this provision was the preven-
tion of 'double-dipping.' 
6 3
Plaintiffs' primary claim was that section 3304(a)(15) of FUTA only
applied to persons who worked for a base period employer, retired, and
then went back to work for the same employer for the time necessary to
become eligible for unemployment compensation. The district court
agreed that such a construction could be inferred from the statutory lan-
guage, 164 thus concluding that the language was "ambiguous." 165 This
conclusion forced the court to resort to the legislative history in order to
determine the meaning of the statutory provision. 1
66
The most compelling evidence supporting the construction urged
by the plaintiffs was a statement by Senator Bradley which indicated that
it would be possible for an individual to lose his unemployment benefits
during the offsetting process if the individual's pension benefits were
higher than his unemployment benefits.16 7 Indeed, Judge Weinshienk
(B) the State law may provide for limitations on the amount of any such a
reduction to take into account contributions made by the individual for the pen-
sion, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or other similar periodic payment;
26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(15) (1982).
160. Edwards, 789 F.2d at 1478.
161. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-73-110 (Supp. 1986) reads in pertinent part:
(3)(a) An individual's weekly benefit amount shall be reduced (but not below
zero) by the prorated weekly amount of a primary insurance benefit under Title II
or the federal "Social Security Act," a pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity,
or any other similar periodic payment from a plan or fund which has been con-
tributed to by a base period employer.
162. Edwards, 789 F.2d at 1479. "The 'base period' is the period of time an employee
must be employed before he is eligible for unemployment benefits. The 'base period em-
ployer' . . . is the employer who paid wages during this eligibility period." Id. at 1479 n.2.
163. "'[D]ouble-dipping' in this context refers to the collection of both pension bene-
fits and unemployment benefits based on the same period of work and contributions by
the same employer." Id. at 1479 n.5.
164. "One logical meaning of [29 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(15)] (A)(i) would be that social se-
curity payments are offset only if the base period employer was one who 'contributed to'
the social security benefits of the specific employee before retirement." Edwards, 602 F.
Supp. at 364 (D. Colo. 1985).
165. Id. at 365.
166. The general rule is that where the plain language of the statute is clear, resort
should not be had to the legislative history. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 183 n.29 (1978); Exparte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949). It is only where an ambigu-
ity in the statutory language exists that the legislative history should be consulted. Nichols
v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 195 F.2d 428, 431 (10th Cir. 1952). The Tenth Circuit, by its
own admission, has been far from consistent in applying these general rules. Edwards, 789
F.2d at 1481 n.7.
167. Senator Bradley stated:
A worker at company A retires at age 65 after 35 years of service there and begins
collecting a pension of $600 per month. He unsuccessfully seeks new employ-
ment and files an unemployment insurance claim. The State computes this indi-
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accorded great weight to these remarks. 16 8 As such, she concluded that
"Congress intended social security benefits to be offset only if the base
period employer was the same as the social security employer and not
when the base period employer merely participates in the federal social
security system."' 169 She, therefore, held that the plaintiffs were not
subject to the offset provisions of section 3304(a)(15).17
0
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
When construing section 3304(a)(15)(A)(i), the Tenth Circuit ig-
nored the inconsistent language in the legislative history,171 finding the
language to be "clear and unambiguous."' 72 The majority concluded
that "[t]he language of the statute, standing alone, compels only one
interpretation: that social security benefits offset unemployment bene-
fits if the base period employer makes social security contributions."'
17 3
In reviewing plaintiffs' equal protection claims, the Tenth Circuit
found the classification justified by the governmental interests of fiscal
integrity, ease of administration, diminished possibility of truly retired
workers collecting unemployment, and the prevention of a requirement
that would force employers to fund two wage-replacement programs for
the same period of employment. 1
74
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. 175 Judge
Seymour dissented, finding that the language of the statute was ambigu-




The Tenth Circuit's Edwards decision is consistent with decisions of
all other federal cirtuits that have looked at section 3304(a)(15), 177 as
well as the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the provision. 17 8 In
vidual's unemployment benefit rate at $130 per week, or $520 per month,
because of the past earnings reported to the State. This individual would not be
eligible for unemployment insurance payments, because the amount of the pen-
sion received from the base period employer exceeded the unemployment insur-
ance payments that were to be paid.
126 CONG. REC. 26,041 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1980) (remarks of Senator Bradley).
168. Edwards, 602 F. Supp. at 368; see generally North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456
U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982) ("Remarks ... of the sponsor of the language ultimately enacted
are an authoritative guide to the statute's construction.").
169. Edwards, 602 F. Supp. at 369.
170. Id.
171. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
172. Edwards, 789 F.2d at 1481.
173. Id.
174. Edwards, 789 F.2d at 1483.
175. Id. at 1484.
176. Id. (Seymour, J., dissenting).
177. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
178. See Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 7-81, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,905
(1982); Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 7-81 (Change 1), 47 Fed. Reg.
29,908 (1982); Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 7-81 (Revised Change 2), 48
Fed. Reg. 37,740 (1983) (revokes Change I and reinstates the position stated in original
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Unemployment Insurance Program Letter (UIPL) 7-8 1, the Secretary in-
terpreted section 3304(a)(15)(A)(i) to allow states to deduct "dollar for
dollar, the amount of any pension payment received without regard to
the proportion of base period wages that may have been paid by the
employer who contributed to or maintained the pension."1 79
The Secretary also interpreted the pension offset provision to be
the minimum deduction required by federal law. Under this interpreta-
tion, states are free to broaden the scope of deductions of pension pay-
ments beyond this federal minimum.' 8 ° In Watkins v. Cantrell,' 8 1 the
Fourth Circuit looked at the statutory language, the legislative history,
and the Secretary's interpretation of section 3304(a)(15) to conclude
that the State of Virginia's pension offset provision,' 8 2 which offset un-
employment benefits in excess of the amounts required to be offset by
section 3304(a)(15), did not contravene the statutory requirements of
FUTA. 1
83
Three other federal circuits which have interpreted section
3304(a)(15) under similar fact situations have arrived at the same con-
clusion as the Tenth Circuit.' 8 4 Furthermore, recent district court deci-
sions have been consistent with the federal circuit opinions.' 8 5 It
therefore seems fair to conclude that social security and other pension
benefits may be offset from unemployment insurance benefits, though
the extent of these offsets will vary according to the laws of the individ-
ual states.
IV. GOOD TIMING - FINALITY OF JUDGMENT, MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION, AND STATUTORY LIMITATIONS IN FILING
APPEALS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
In C.O.D.E., Inc. v. ICC, 1 8 6 and Smith v. Mlarsh, 18 7 the Tenth Circuit
addressed the issue of timeliness in filing appeals for judicial review of
Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 7-81, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,905 (1982) which
allows "[s]tates greater latitude in taking into account an unemployed individual's contri-
butions to a pension fund"); see also Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (hold-
ing that this directive, with the exception of Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No.
7-81 (Change 1), 47 Fed. Reg. 29,908 (1982), was an interpretative rule, thus not subject
to the notice and comment rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act).
179. Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 7-81, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,905 (1982).
180. "Although a State may broaden the scope of its deduction of pension payments
beyond the conditions in which deduction is required under the Federal law, it may not
adopt less stringent conditions which fall short of the Federal requirements." Unemploy-
ment Insurance Program Letter No. 7-81, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,905, 29,906 (1982).
181. 736 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Note, Federal Pension Offset Provisions: Mini-
mum Standard or Federal Mandate?, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 647 (1985) (discussing Watkins).
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 60.1-48.1 (1950 & Supp. 1987).
183. Watkins, 736 F.2d at 946.
184. See Peare v. McFarland, 778 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1985); Bowman v. Stumbo, 735
F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1984); Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1099 (1984).
185. See, e.g., Bleau v. Hackett, 598 F. Supp. 727 (D. R.I. 1984); Duso v. Ratoff, 600 F.
Supp. 3 (D. N.H. 1983).
186. 768 F.2d 1210 (10th Cir. 1985).
187. 787 F.2d 510 (10th Cir. 1986).
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administrative agency decisions. In both cases, the Tenth Circuit found
that the petitions for review were filed in a timely manner. In C.O.D.E.,
the Tenth Circuit decided that the filing of a discretionary appeal to the
agency tolled the statute of limitations for appeal to the court. This al-
lowed for court review if the petitioner filed its appeal within sixty days
of the agency's denial of the discretionary appeal. '8 8 In Smith, the court
found that refusal by a military review board to upgrade an undesirable
discharge was a separate administrative action, distinct from the original
discharge decision, and thus reviewable on a petition filed within the
statutory time period. 189 The two cases raise issues regarding the final-
ity of agency action, the exhaustion of administrative remedies, the ef-
fect of motions for reconsideration on limitation of action provisions,
the exercise of the court's equitable jurisdiction, and the tendency of
courts to favor judicial review.
A. C.O.D.E. v. ICC
In C.O.D.E., the petitioner sought review of an Interstate Com-
merce Commission (ICC) decision allowing a competing company to
operate as a common carrier. The initial decision was made by the
Commission's Review Board No. 2, which held that petitioners "failed to
demonstrate that [the Board's] grant of the application would be incon-
sistent with public convenience and necessity."' 90 C.O.D.E. then ap-
pealed to Commission Division 1, which denied its appeal. 19 1 Finally,
C.O.D.E. filed a discretionary appeal to the full commission, seeking to
have portions of the case declared as matters of General Transportation
Importance (GTI). 19 2 This appeal was also denied.
Regarding the statute of limitations, section 2344 of the Adminis-
trative Orders Review Act (the Hobbs Act) requires any party aggrieved
by an agency decision to seek judicial review within sixty days after a
final agency order is entered. 193 This statutory review provision is juris-
dictional,i 9 4 and may not be altered or enlarged by the court. 19 5 There-
188. COD.E., 768 F.2d at 1212.
189. Smith, 787 F.2d at 511-12.
190. CO.D.E., 768 F.2d at 1211.
191. Id.
192. Id.; 49 U.S.C. § 10322(g)(2)(A) (Supp. 1986) provides that:
"The Commission may grant a rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration of an action
of the Commission that was taken by a division or an employee board designated by the
Commission if it finds that-
(A) the action involved a matter of general transportation importance ......
See also 49 C.F.R. 11 15.3(b)(2) (1986) (matters of general transportation importance as a
prerequisite to an administrative appeal).
193. 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1970) provides in part that:
On the entry of a final order reviewable under this chapter, the agency shall
promptly give notice thereof by service or publication in accordance with its
rules. Any party aggrieved by the final order may, within 60 days after its entry,
file a petition to review the order in the court of appeals wherein venue lies.
194. Failure to file within the statutory time period will therefore divest the court of its
powers of review. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
666 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Chem-Haulers, Inc. v. United States, 536 F.2d 610 (5th Cir.
1976); Microwave Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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fore, the primary issue before the Tenth Circuit in CO. D.E. was whether
the petitioner's appeal should have been filed following the decision of
Division 1 (in which case the action would have been barred as un-
timely), or whether filing within sixty days of the denial of the discretion-
ary appeal to the full commission allowed judicial review.
19 6
In deciding this issue, the Tenth Circuit relied on the Eighth Circuit
case of B.J. McAdams, Inc. v. ICC.19 7 In McAdams, a motion for reconsid-
eration was filed by McAdams on September 19, 1975, after his applica-
tion to transport candy and confections was denied on August 12, 1975.
This petition was ultimately denied by the Commission. The notice of
denial was served on McAdams on January 7, 1976. Subsequently, on
January 15, 1976, McAdams filed a petition requesting a declaration that
certain issues were matters of general transportation importance. This
petition was also denied by the Commission. McAdams was served with
notice of the denial on February 3, 1976. McAdams filed a petition for
court review on March 31, 1976.198 The issue presented to the Eighth
Circuit was when the 60 day limitation period began to run. The court
held that although the GTI petition was not necessary for purposes of
exhaustion, the 60 day time period began to run from the date of its
denial. 199
The Tenth Circuit, following the McAdams decision, concluded that
requiring an appeal to be filed with the court prior to the Commission's
ruling on a discretionary appeal would be premature. 20 0 The court thus
held that "[i]t is in the interest ofjudicial economy and agency responsi-
bility to allow the Commission to reconsider its orders . . . rather than to
compel an applicant to invoke immediate judicial review.
'20 1
In making its determination, the Tenth Circuit distinguished
C.O.D.E. from Selco Supply Co. v. EPA. 20 2 In Selco, the Tenth Circuit held
that a motion for reconsideration did not toll the running of a sixty day
statute of limitations imposed by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 20 3 The court held that Selco was distinguish-
able from CO.D.E. on policy grounds, since "resolution of EPA orders
under FIFRA, like orders under other environmental protection stat-
utes, should be made promptly."
'20 4
195. Chen-Haulers, 536 F.2d at 614; see FED. R. App. P. 26(b) which provides in part that:
[The court of appeals may not] enlarge the time prescribed by law for filing a
petition to enjoin, set aside, suspend, modify, enforce, or otherwise review, or a
notice of appeal from, an order of an administrative agency, board, commission
or officer of the United States, except as specifically authorized by law.
196. CO.D.E., 768 F.2d at 1211.
197. 551 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1977).
198. Id. at 1114.
199. Id. at 1114-15.
200. CO.D.E., 768 F.2d at 1211 (citing McAdams, 551 F.2d at 1115).
201. Id. (quoting McAdams, 551 F.2d at 1115). For a discussion of similar policy rea-
sons for requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, see supra notes 18 & 60-64 and
accompanying text.
202. 632 F.2d 863 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981).
203. Id. at 865; see Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 136(n)(b) (1982).
204. CO.D.E., 768 F.2d at 1212 (quoting Selco, 632 F.2d at 863). Judge Seymour con-
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Here, the court held that C.O.D.E.'s appeal was filed in a timely
manner. However, in reaching this conclusion, the court noted that de-
cisions as to the tolling of the statutes of limitations of agencies other
than the ICC were not controlling.
20 5
B. Smith v. Marsh
1. Administrative Proceedings and the District Court's Decision
Smith v. Marsh20 6 involved the refusal of a military review board to
upgrade the status of a former serviceman's undesirable discharge.
20 7
Mr. Smith's first claim was that the Army's 1971 denial of his conscien-
tious objector application was improper and that his constitutional and
regulatory rights had been violated.2 0 8 He further claimed that the sub-
sequent reviews of the 1971 decision, by the Army Discharge Review
Board (ADRB) and Army Board for Correction of Military Records
(ABCMR) denying his upgrade, were arbitrary, capricious, and unsup-
ported by substantial evidence.2 0 9 The district court agreed with the
latter claim, and the Army appealed.
2 10
2. Tenth Circuit Decision
The Army's primary contention on appeal was that each of Mr.
Smith's claims were time-barred by 28 U.S.C. sec. 2401(a). 2 1 1 The
Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court, finding that the petitioner's
first claim was time-barred since it accrued in 1972.212 It also affirmed
the trial court's acceptance of Smith's second claim, holding that the
statute of limitations began to toll in 1983.213 Review of this decision
curred with the Selco majority opinion, yet took issue with the majority's adoption of a
separate, stricter rule denying the tolling of the statute of limitations for EPA orders under
FIFRA. "Prompt resolution of environmental orders is an important goal. It is not self-
evident, however, that there is a lesser need for quick determination of issues before ...
the Interstate Commerce Commission." Selco, 632 F.2d at 866 (Seymour, J., concurring).
205. C.O.D.E., 768 F.2d at 1212.
206. 787 F.2d 510 (10th Cir. 1986).
207. Id. John Smith received an undesirable discharge from the U.S. Army in 1972. In
1980, Smith applied to the Army Discharge Review Board (ADRB) to have his discharge
upgraded. The ADRB denied his claim. Mr. Smith then applied to the Army Board for
Correction of Military Records (ABCMR), which also denied his claim in November 1983.
Id. at 510-11.
208. Id. at 511.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1982) states in part that: "[E]very civil action com-
menced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six
years after the right of action first accrues."
212. Smith, 787 F.2d at 511.
213. Id. at 512. The Tenth Circuit, in reaching this conclusion, relied on Geyen v.
Marsh, 775 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1985), a case which was "practically indistinguishable on
its facts from [Smith]." Smith, 787 F.2d at 511. In Geyen, the Fifth Circuit found that
Geyen's first cause of action, in which he challenged his "activation and the Army's denial
of his hardship applications," Geyen, 775 F.2d at 1308, was barred by the six-year statute of
limitations. Geyen's second cause of action, in which he alleged "that the ABCMR's 1982
decision denying him an upgraded discharge was arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by
substantial evidence and erroneous in law," Id., was not time barred since it accrued at the
time of the 1982 ABCMR decision. d. at 1309.
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was therefore not time-barred. The Tenth Circuit then found that the
ABCMR's decision was indeed arbitrary and capricious, and affirmed the
trial court's order requiring the Army to issue Mr. Smith an honorable
discharge.
2 14
In Smith, the Tenth Circuit refused to follow the rule most recently
expressed in Hurick v. Lehman.2 15 In Hurick, the Federal Circuit held that
"the failure of the Correction Board to set aside a military discharge
does not give rise to a separate and independent claim, since that action




Statutes of limitations represent a "legislative judgment that it is
unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend [an action] within
a specified period of time, and that 'the right to be free of stale claims in
time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.' "217 In the
administrative law context, time limits impart "finality into the admin-
istrative process, thereby conserving administrative resources and the
reliance interests of those who might conform their conduct to adminis-
trative regulations. ' 2 18 Although the federal courts have recognized
these concerns, they have not applied statutory time limits in a consis-
tent manner.
The Tenth Circuit's Smith decision, when contrasted with the Fed-
eral Circuit's Hurick decision, exemplifies how a differing characteriza-
tion of an agency action may either allow review of or bar identical
claims. Likewise, the Tenth Circuit's CO.D.E. and Selco decisions de-
monstrate how a motion for reconsideration in one instance may toll the
statute of limitations,2 19 while in another instance, it may not.220
Other considerations, such as ripeness, 2 2 1 the application of a rule
214. Smith, 787 F.2d at 512.
215. 782 F.2d 984 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
216. Id. at 987.
217. U.S. v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (quoting Railroad Tel. v. Railway Ex-
press Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)).
218. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. ICC, 720 F.2d 958, 960 (7th Cir. 1983); see also
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 666 F.2d 595, 602
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
219. See American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532 (1970) (motion
for reconsideration upheld); Pennsylvania v. ICC, 590 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (motion
for reconsideration tolled statute of limitations); Outland v. CAB, 284 F.2d 224, 227 (D.C.
Cir. 1960) ("Where a motion for rehearing is in fact filed there is no final action until the
hearing is denied.").
220. See also NRDC, 666 F.2d at 602 (sixty day period for seeking judicial review may
not be enlarged by courts); Provisioners Frozen Express, Inc. v. ICC, 536 F.2d 1303 (9th
Cir. 1976) (denial of petition to reopen by commission will not allow judicial review of
administrative decision after sixty day limitations period has elapsed, but review may be
had to determine whether denial of petition to reopen was arbitrary and capricious).
221. Where the right to review is limited by a statute of limitations, but such regulation
is not ripe for review for lack of the necessary information, petitioner may delay reconsid-
eration until such information becomes available. This decision can then be appealed
under § 553(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act. See Eagle-Picher, Inc. v. EPA, 759
F.2d 905, 912-15 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v. ICC, 672 F.2d 146,
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or regulation to a specific situation, 22 2 uncertainty as to the applicability
of agency actions,223 and equitable considerations, 2 24 may also toll the
running of statutes of limitations. Indeed, these examples are consistent
with the general willingness of courts to allow judicial review, if possi-
ble. 22 5 The Tenth Circuit's C.O.D.E. and Smith decisions exemplify this
willingness, even where strictly construed statutes of limitations might
otherwise preclude such review.
Curtis L. Michael
149 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Geller v. FCC, 610 F.2d 973, 978 n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Investment
Co. Inst. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 551 F.2d 1270, 1280-81 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
222. A statute of limitations will only bar direct review of an administrative rule. How-
ever, subsequent application of a rule may allow a court to review both the underlying rule
and its application to the situation at bar. Texas v. United States, 730 F.2d 409 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied sub nom., ICC v. Texas, 105 S.Ct. 3513 (1985); Functional Music, Inc. v.
FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 813 (1959).
223. Where an agency leaves room for doubt as to the applicability of its actions, the
statutory review period is tolled until the doubt is eliminated. Recreation Vehicle Indus.
Ass'n v. EPA, 653 F.2d 562, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
224. A statute of limitations may be tolled on "clear evidence that a failure to consider
a petitioner's claims would work a manifest injustice." Brotherhood of Locomotive Engi-
neers v. ICC, 761 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at 909), cert.
granted, 106 S.Ct. 1457 (1986).
225. The Administrative Procedure Act's "generous review provisions" should be
given "hospitable interpretation." Only on a showing of "clear and convincing evidence"
of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review. Abbott




In two decisions rendered during the past survey period,I the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed several issues of antitrust law. In
Instructional Systems Development Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 2 the
court examined claims of conspiracy and predatory practices in violation
of the Sherman Act, and applied the per se rule and the rule of reason in
its examination of alleged market division and anticompetitive market-
ing arrangements. In Motive Parts Warehouse v. Facet Enterprises,3 the court
reviewed employer-employee conspiracy under the Sherman Act, and
competitive injury and the concept of a relevant market in the context of
the Robinson-Patman Act.
I. INSTRUCTIONAL SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT CORP. V. AETNA
CASUALTY & SURETY CO.
A. Facts
Beginning in 1956, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company (Aetna) li-
censed a series of manufacturers to produce a driving simulation system
under its trademark, "Aetna Drivotrainer." In 1974 Aetna discussed the
possibility of a manufacturing arrangement with both Instructional Sys-
tems Development Corporation (ISDC) and Doron Precision Systems,
Incorporated (Doron) when its current manufacturer decided to leave
the business. ISDC was founded in 1974. Doron had manufactured
driving simulation equipment for Allstate from 1973 (when it acquired
production capabilities and an Allstate film library) until 1974, when All-
state discontinued its driving simulation program and stopped making
films.
In 1975, Aetna and Doron signed a joint venture agreement. Ac-
cording to the terms of this agreement, 4 Doron was exclusively licensed
to manufacture driving simulator hardware under Aetna's trademark.
Doron was required to provide service and parts, continue development,
take primary responsibility for marketing, replace Allstate films it then
owned and marketed with Aetna films, and purchase all future films
from Aetna except when Aetna declined to produce a particular film.
1. A third antitrust case heard by the circuit court in this review period, Cinelli v.
American Home Prod., 785 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1986) will not be discussed in this article.
In Cineli, the court reviewed a forfeiture clause in an employment contract which became
operative on plaintiff's subsequent employment by defendant's competitor. In determin-
ing that the clause did not constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade under the Sher-
man Act, the court upheld the distinction between "restrictions which actually seek to
interdict post-termination employment and those which merely make such employment
unpalatable." Id. at 266.
2. No. 82-2105, (10th Cir. Mar. 31, 1986) (petition for rehearing pending).
3. 774 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1985).
4. Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp., slip op. at 5-6.
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Aetna agreed to provide promotional services such as advertising, do-
mestic customer referrals, participation in educational programs,
teacher training, and systems software expertise. The agreement per-
mitted Aetna to sell films and provide promotional assistance to compa-
nies other than Doron. At the time of the agreement, Doron was the
only active manufacturer and Aetna the only active film producer in the
simulator field.
In late 1975, Aetna sold films to ISDC to be used in the production
and development of a driving simulator system. ISDC began marketing
such a system in the spring of 1976 and at the same time entered into an
agreement with Aetna to acquire and sell Aetna films. Assistance with
promotions and sales, such as that provided by Aetna to Doron, was not
offered to ISDC although it was requested by them repeatedly.
5
In 1978, ISDC ceased operations and filed suit against Aetna and
Doron. ISDC alleged that Aetna and Doron had conspired in violation
of sections one6 and two 7 of the Sherman Act, and that Doron had indi-
vidually violated section 2 by certain pricing activities and other acts.8
The district court awarded the defendants summary judgment on all
claims.
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit noted that "summary judgment should be used
sparingly in antitrust litigation." 9 In reversing and remanding all issues,
the court discussed the conspiracy claims under sections one and two
and monopolization under section two.
1. Section One Conspiracy Claim
In regard to ISDC's section one conspiracy claim, the Tenth Circuit
found that violations could reasonably be inferred from the facts on the
basis of either the per se rule or the rule of reason.' 0 The court deter-
mined that the 1975 joint venture agreement, although not violative of
5. Id. at 6.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) states in part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony ...
7. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) states in part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony....
8. Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp., slip op. at 6-7.
9. Id. at 7.
10. Id. at 10. Per se antitrust violations are those business agreements, such as price-
fixing, which are considered inherently anticompetitive and injurious to the public regard-
less of any inquiry by the court into the reasonableness of the agreement or any determi-
nation that the agreement has actually injured market competition. Under the rule of
reason, the legality of restraints on trade is determined by the factfinder after weighing all
the facts and circumstances of a case, including, for example, the economic condition of
[Vol. 64:2
ANTITRUST LA W
section one in its grant of an exclusive license, "on its face appears to
contain" an agreement to divide a product market, a per se violation."
Evidence of this market division could be inferred from the provision
that Doron would cease film production and Aetna would thereafter be
the sole producer of simulator films. Other evidence of an intent to di-
vide the market was found in a letter from Aetna to Doron acknowledg-
ing Doron's surrender of its production rights in exchange for Aetna's
promotion of Doron hardware. 12 Further evidence was contained in an
interoffice memo written by an Aetna administrator discussing the nega-
tive implications for Aetna of a possible decision by Doron to "go into
film production." 13
The court held that even if the factfinder rejected a per se violation,
the defendants might be found to be in violation from a rule of reason
perspective. According to the court, the existence of marketing arrange-
ments in the joint venture agreement beyond those necessary to effectu-
ate the license constituted a violation under the rule of reason,14 as did
the existence of concerted activity beyond the scope of the agreement
which would have an anticompetitive impact. 15 The court found that
both could be inferred from the activity of the defendants. The division
of the product market could be found to be an agreement beyond that
necessary to effect the license, and Aetna's referral to Doron of all for-
eign accounts could constitute concerted activity outside the scope of
the agreement. Whether the impact of these acts was anticompetitive,
and whether the acts in regard to overseas accounts were pursuant to an
agreement between the defendants, were questions of fact.
16
2. Section Two Conspiracy Claims
In assessing ISDC's section two conspiracy claim, the court again
found sufficient evidence to support the inference of a violation. While
recognizing that the plaintiff must prove the existence of an agreement
to monopolize and overt activity in furtherance of that agreement as well
as specific intent, the court reaffirmed its attitude expressed in Perington
Wholesale, Inc. v. Burger King Corp. ' 7 that the gravamen of an offense is the
intent to achieve the unlawful result. Requisite intent was found by the
court in the deposition testimony of Doron's national sales manager
who stated that his goal was to put ISDC out of business.
18
the industry and the effect on competition. For a textual discussion of the per se and rule
of reason doctrines, see L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ANTITRUST § 72 (1977).
11. Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp., slip op. at 9.
12. This letter was written in response to Aetna's decision to end its promotion of a
joint film curriculum containing Doron's Allstate films which ISDC was unable to obtain.
The letter emphasized Doron's surrender of a "valuable right" in exchange for a "special
relationship" with and "cooperation" from Aetna. Aetna subsequently proceeded with
the joint curriculum. Id. at 10-11.
13. Id. at 10.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 11.
16. Id.
17. 631 F.2d 1369, 1377 (10th Cir. 1979).
18. Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp., slip op. at 12.
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Evidence which indicated that Aetna and Doron made joint deci-
sions in furtherance of this intent was found by the court in the imple-
mentation of the joint venture. t9 For example, Aetna administrators,
who were aware of Doron's intentions regarding ISDC, directed Aetna
sales personnel to follow instructions from Doron, and acknowledged
that Aetna did not have complete control of the decision making process
under the joint venture agreement.2 0 There was also some evidence
that Doron had influenced Aetna's agreement with ISDC to ISDC's
disadvantage.
2 1
The element of agreement was found by the court in the sum of the
evidence. 22 The court did not point to specific instances indicating that
Doron and Aetna agreed to monopolistic acts.
23
3. Section Two Monopolization Claim
In accepting ISDC's claim against Doron for section two monopoli-
zation, the court concluded that ISDC had presented sufficient evidence
of predatory pricing and other predatory acts 24 to support the inference
of a plan to achieve a monopoly.2 5 Noting the lack of an authoritative
consensus regarding standards by which predatory pricing is estab-
lished, 26 the court reiterated its own guidelines set forth in Pacific Engi-
neering & Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.2 7 In that case the court
determined that unreasonably anticompetitive behavior may warrant a
finding of predatory pricing even though sales have been above average
variable costs. 2 8 In examining the record, the court found evidence of
some behavior that it felt could be construed as unreasonably anticom-
petitive. First, the court noted that Doron's pricing pattern was preda-
tory in and of itself in the opinion of ISDC's testifying expert. On both
occasions when Doron was the sole hardware manufacturer2 9 Doron's
prices went up dramatically. Doron's prices, however, had dropped
when ISDC entered the market. Second, the court noted evidence that
Doron priced the product below its self-determined minimum price
when bidding against ISDC. Finally, an Aetna supervisor stated in depo-
sition testimony that the national sales manager intended to price the
19. Id. at 12-13.
20. Id. at 13 n.2.
21. Id. at 12-13.
22. Id. at 13.
23. Id. at 13-14.
24. A predatory practice is one by which the alleged discriminator sacrifices present
revenues for the purpose of driving a competitor from the market while expecting to
recoup losses through subsequent higher prices. For a textual discussion of predatory
prices and conduct, see L. SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at §§ 220-21.
25. Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp., slip op. at 16, 18.
26. Id. at 14-15 (citingJ. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTrrRUST LAwS AND TRADE REGULATION
§ 10.01-03 (1985)).
27. 551 F.2d 790, 797 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
28. Doron's prices were below full cost but above average variable cost. Instructional
Sys. Dev. Corp., slip op. at 15. For a discussion of cost measurement see P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 712-15c (1978).
29. Doron was the sole manufacturer when Aetna's previous licensee went out of busi-
ness and ISDC left the market.
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product below the price at which a profit could be made in order to take
business away from ISDC, and that "Doron could outlast ISDC in an
underbidding situation."
30
With regard to other acts the court identified three instances which
could support the conclusion that Doron's conduct was predatory:
Doron bribed public purchasing officials, disparaged ISDC's product,
and delayed payments to ISDC by filing lawsuits against purchasers
when it lost a bid to ISDC.
3 '
Finally, the court quoted hornbook law3 2 and delineated standards
for the identification of predatory practices. In general, practices are
predatory and illegal if they impair opportunities of rivals or are more
restrictive than necessary to compete. 33 In contrast, normal practices in
response to market conditions and practices fostering competition on
the merits are not illegal. It is not necessary that conduct involve the
use of monopoly power; conduct may be predatory by virtue of the con-
tribution made to the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power.
3 4
The final test to show a violation of section 2 is that the conduct "must
appear reasonably capable of contributing significantly to creating or
maintaining monopoly power."
'3 5
II. MOTIVE PARTS WAREHOUSE V. FACET ENTERPRISES
A. Facts
Facet Enterprises was created in 1976 to compete with Bendix Cor-
poration in the automotive aftermarket 3 6 as a result of a litigation settle-
ment between Bendix and the Federal Trade Commission. Prior to the
settlement, Bendix had both manufactured and sold P&D brand auto
parts. As part of the settlement the sales component of the P&D opera-
tion was transferred to Facet. Loss of the profit margin associated with
manufacture caused the P&D sales division to lose money under Facet.
In an attempt to make the P&D sales operation profitable, Facet in-
30. Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp., slip op. at 16.
31. Id. at 18-19. The court also discussed in conjunction with this claim Doron's con-
tention that its attempts to bribe public officials were immune from attack under the anti-
trust laws because of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. The court summarily dismissed the
possibility that this doctrine could protect bribery, misuse, or corruption of governmental
processes. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine exempts activity to influence legislative and
administrative bodies from antitrust challenge.
32. Id. at 17 (citing L. SULLIVAN, supra note 10, §§ 35, 43 and P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAw (1978)).
33. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 28 at 625b.
34. Id. at 626c.
35. Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp., slip op. at 18. The court, in a third section of the opin-
ion, considered Aetna's argument that ISDC had failed to prove antitrust injury. The
court determined that injury could be inferred. Id. at 19-20 (citing World of Sleep, Inc. v.
La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 756 F.2d 1467, 1478 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 77 (1985)). See
generally Note, Twelfth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey: Antitrust Law, 63 DEN. U.L. REV. 183, 193-
94 (1986) (discussing the Tenth Circuit's holding in World of Sleep regarding injury under
the Robinson-Patman Act).
36. The automotive aftermarket is the market for replacement parts of the same brand
as the original equipment. Motive Parts Whse. v. Facet Enter., 774 F.2d 380, 383 (10th
Cir. 1985).
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stituted in 1980 a franchise marketing program called the Wagon Master
Plan to replace its system of warehouse distribution used since 1976.
3 7
Under the program a limited number of high turnover products were to
be distributed through franchisees directly to dealer markets, bypassing
the warehouses. Termination of warehouse business was expected to
occur through uncompelled attrition and the trimmed operation was ex-
pected to cut costs. 38 Following approval of the plan by Facet manage-
ment, sales employees were offered the opportunity to franchise and
were involved in discussions regarding pricing and other details. 39
Motive Parts Warehouse (MPW) had been a P&D customer previous
to Facet's acquisition of P&D and was one of many distributors used by
Facet in its warehouse marketing program. MPW operated thirteen
warehouses in the Gulf Coast area. Facet supplied P&D products to six
of these and the other seven were supplied with Standard brand prod-
ucts by Standard Motor Products (Standard). Upon learning of Facet's
franchise plan, MPW contracted with Standard to supply the six ware-
houses formerly supplied by Facet and to replace MPW's P&D inventory
with Standard products.
This action arose when Facet filed suit against MPW to collect on an
open account for goods sold. MPW counterclaimed, alleging Facet had
violated the Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman Act in establishing
its Wagon Master Plan.40 MPW alleged that a conspiracy existed be-
tween Facet and its franchisees to fix prices and boycott MPW in viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act.4 1 MPW also alleged that Facet
discriminated against MPW and other warehouse distributors in viola-
tion of sections 2(a), 42 2(d),4 3 and 2(e)4 4 of the Robinson-Patman Act by
offering Facet's franchisees lower prices, better terms, and more
services.
Furthermore, MPW alleged violations of the Robinson-Patman Act
37. Under the previous warehouse system, Facet distributed P&D parts to warehouse
distributors who would then resell the merchandise to jobbers. Id. at 384.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 387.
40. Id. at 385. MPW also asserted claims for intentional infliction of economic harm
and breach of contract. A discussion of these claims is outside the scope of this note.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See supra note 6. MPW's claims were based on both the per
se rule and the rule of reason. Motive Parts Warehouse, 774 F.2d at 385. For a discussion of
these antitrust rules, see supra note 10.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1973) states in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce .. to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality ...
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1973) provides that it is unlawful to pay or to accept anything
of value for promotional services or facilities furnished "unless such payment or consider-
ation is available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the
distribution...."
44. 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1973) provides that it is unlawful-
to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against another purchaser ... of a com-
modity bought for resale ... by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by con-
tributing to the furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with the
processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased
upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms.
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in connection with Facet's treatment of MPW vis-i-vis Keystone Auto-
motive Warehouse (Keystone), a competitor of MPW's warehouse in
Kansas City (MPW-KC). 4 5 MPW cited the following facts as evidence of
Facet's antitrust violations. 4 6 Keystone had become a Facet customer in
1976. Under its agreement with Facet, Keystone was allowed to pay for
its initial stock over a period of four years and to return an unlimited
amount of unsold stock during the same period of time. Keystone also
received discounts of up to fifty percent, special promotional considera-
tions, and the services of a full-time sales representative. MPW-KC in
contrast, was allowed three months to pay for stock orders and was lim-
ited to returns of five percent of its annual purchases. MPW asserted
that neither MPW-KC nor its customers received benefits comparable to
those offered Keystone and that this discrimination put MPW-KC at a
distinct and substantial disadvantage in the P&D resale market. MPW
alleged that by these activities Facet violated the Robinson-Patman Act.
The trial court, however, refused to accept MPW's claims and Facet pre-
vailed on all antitrust claims.
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit first reviewed the directed verdicts which were
awarded Facet in response to MPW's claims of Sherman Act and Robin-
son-Patman Act violations stemming from the Wagon Master franchise
program. The court's assessment of these verdicts was based upon the
standard that "a directed verdict is justified 'only if the proof is all one
way or so overwhelmingly preponderant in favor of the movant as to
permit no other rational conclusion.' ,,47 The court upheld directed
verdicts in Facet's favor on the claims that Facet and its franchisees con-
spired to boycott MPW, 48 and that Facet discriminated between compet-
itors in its treatment of MPW vis-A-vis the franchisees. 49 The court
reversed each of the other directed verdicts on the antitrust claims, and
remanded the only antitrust claim submitted to a jury - MPW's claim
that Facet discriminated against MPW by its treatment of Keystone Au-
tomotive Warehouse in Kansas City.
50
1. Employer-Employee Conspiracy
Facet had asserted a two-level defense to the charges of conspiracy
under the Sherman Act: that its actions constituted permissible unilat-
eral conduct, and that only this interpretation is possible under the gen-
45. Motive Parts Warehouse, 774 F.2d at 393.
46. Id. at 393.
47. Id. at 386 (quoting Kiner v. Northcut, 424 F.2d 222, 223 (10th Cir. 1970) (quoting
Fischer Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins., 420 F.2d 271, 275 (10th Cir. 1969))).
48. Id. at 389 (finding no evidence of any refusal to deal with MPW).
49. Id. at 389-90. The court found that since there was no evidence of competition
between MPW and the franchisees, an allegation of discrimination between competitors
could not stand.
50. See infra notes 60-74 and accompanying text.
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eral rule that an employer cannot conspire with its employees. 5' The
Tenth Circuit noted that there exists a right to independently undertake
to change one's business practices to improve one's profit position.
5 2
Such unilateral conduct does not constitute a conspiracy and is not vio-
lative of the Sherman Act regardless of any anticompetitive effect.
53
The court, however, rejected Facet's argument that the employer-em-
ployee conspiracy rule was applicable and found instead that the facts
could reasonably be inferred to fit an exception to the rule. This excep-
tion is that employees are capable of conspiring with their employer
when they have an independent stake in the restraint of trade afforded
by the conspiracy. 54 The court found that the franchisees' potential
benefit from setting their own prices below those paid by warehouse dis-
tributors was sufficient to support the inference that they dealt with
Facet in their own self-interest as independent businessmen. 55 The uni-
lateral nature of Facet's decision, although supported by the manner in
which Facet management made the initial commitment to franchise, was
brought into question by evidence that franchisees participated in nego-
tiations to work out these details regarding pricing and other matters.
56
In sum, the court found sufficient evidence of an "independent per-
sonal stake" on the part of the franchisees to support the possibility of a
conspiracy. 57 The court also found support for the inference, under the
per se rule, of an agreement between Facet and its franchisees to stabi-
lize prices and effect a horizontal restraint of trade.5 8 Additionally, the
court noted that the evidence supported an inference of unreasonable
restraint of trade under a rule of reason analysis.
5 9
2. Robinson-Patman Act Violations
MPW's allegations that Facet violated the Robinson-Patman Act
60
in its dealings with Keystone was submitted to a jury; the verdict re-
turned was in Facet's favor. On appeal MPW asserted that the trial court
erred in two respects. First, MPW argued that the trial court erred in its
instructions regarding the element of competitive injury in the context
of the price discrimination claim.6 1 Second, they argued that error was
51. See Holter v. Moore & Co., 702 F.2d 854, 855 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 347 (1983) (cited by the court for the general rule).
52. Motive Parts Warehouse, 774 F.2d at 386.
53. Id.
54. See Holter v. Moore & Co., 702 F.2d 854, 857 n.8 (10th Cir. 1983).
55. Motive Parts Warehouse, 774 F.2d at 387.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 388.
58. A horizontal restraint of trade exists where agreements are made between produ-
cers, wholesalers or retailers relating to sale or resale terms. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note
10, at §§ 79-80.
59. Motive Parts Warehouse, 774 F.2d at 388. The court also set forth in its opinion, in
response to Facet's defense that MPW lacked standing by virtue of never having purchased
from Facet at the alleged fixed prices, the applicable test for antitrust standing. Id. at 388-
89 (citing Farnell v. Albuquerque Publishing Co., 589 F.2d 497, 500 (10th Cir. 1978) and
remanding issue of standing to trial court).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1973). See supra notes 42-44.
61. Motive Parts Warehouse, 774 F.2d at 393.
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made initially in permitting evidence of Facet's behavior toward ware-
houses outside the Kansas City area, and then was compounded by the
court's failure to give curative instructions to the jury.
62
Price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act is illegal when
it substantially lessens competition. 63 In its instructions the court di-
rected the jury to consider the effect of the alleged discrimination in
light of Keystone's position as a new customer, and to consider both the
possibility that special discounts to new customers might lessen compe-
tition and the possibility that such discounts might foster competition.
64
The Tenth Circuit denied that these instructions imply that new and ex-
isting accounts are to be treated differently. 65 The court cited the lower
court's reference to a case from the Second Circuit 6 6 in which the fact
that the customer was new was central to the rationale of the decision
that competitive injury had not occurred. The Tenth Circuit interpreted
the lower court's instructions as properly focusing on the requirement
that discriminatory pricing is illegal only when it tends to lessen compe-
tition in the marketplace generally.
67
The other aspect of competitive injury on which MPW claimed the
jury was improperly instructed was in regard to the presumption that
injury occurs when price discrimination is of substantial magnitude.
The Tenth Circuit, however, met this objection not by considering the
magnitude of the discrimination but by pointing out that the defendant
had rebutted the presumption by breaking the causal connection be-
tween the price discrimination and the competitive injury.6 8 This rebut-
tal was accomplished by presentation of evidence that MPW-KC was
subject to competition not only from Keystone but also from eight to ten
other warehouses in the area. This evidence created an inference of in-
jury from other sources. Furthermore, to establish competitive injury
arising from Facet's support of Keystone, the (court) held that MPW
would need not only to establish the causal connection between its own
injury and Keystone's advantage but also a connection between Key-
stone and injury to other warehouses. This requirement stems from the
fact that the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits injury to competition and
not injury to a particular competitor.
69
MPW's second argument concerned the admissibility of evidence
regarding offers of promotional services which Facet made to MPW
warehouses outside the Kansas City area. This evidence was submitted
to bear on the discrimination between MPW-KC and Keystone in Kansas
City. The trial court admitted the evidence as relevant to the nature of
62. Id.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1973). See supra note 42.
64. Motive Parts Warehouse, 774 F.2d at 394.
65. Id.
66. Interstate Cigar Co. v. Sterling Drug, 655 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1981).
67. Motive Parts Warehouse, 774 F.2d at 394.
68. Id. at 395.
69. Id. (citing Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 548 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315 (1984).
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promotional services offered by the industry to new customers in gen-
eral. 70 The trial court acknowledged that the Kansas City market area
was the only market location relevant to an assessment of MPW's Robin-
son-Patman Act claims, but since no other "new customer" existed in
the relevant area the court felt justified in admitting evidence of offers in
other locations.
7 '
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. Citing Supreme
Court precedent 7 2 and the express terms of the Robinson-Patman
Act, 73 the court held that the admission of evidence from an irrelevant
market could not be reconciled with the intent of the Robinson-Patman
Act to prohibit discrimination particularly and solely among those ex-
isting in a competitive relationship to one another, that is, between com-
petitors in the same market.
74
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit has not broken any new ground with its decisions
in Motive Parts Warehouse and Instructional Systems Development Corporation.
It has, however, sent to the trial courts a strong message regarding the
use of directed verdicts and summary judgments in antitrust litigation.
Despite the temptation to use these means to dispense with complex
litigation they are to be used in the antitrust area only when there is
essentially no evidence to support the claim.
75
Martha Ely
70. Id. at 396.
71. Id.
72. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959).
73. Motive Parts Warehouse, 774 F.2d at 397 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 13 (d)-(e) (1973)).
74. Id.




During the past survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed several important civil rights issues. In the area of age dis-
crimination, it reviewed the level of evidence necessary for a jury to de-
cide by inference whether age discrimination had occurred. Also, it
examined the availability of front pay and liquidated damages under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the Act or ADEA). Further, the
court reiterated its policy of liberal construction of civil rights com-
plaints. The Tenth Circuit also held a governmental representative lia-
ble for injuries to an individual's reputation. Despite its consistent
liberal position on these civil rights issues, however, the Tenth Circuit
narrowed its view on the availability of attorneys' fees awards under sec-
tion 1988.
I. AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
A. ADEA Litigation: Sufficiency and Structure of a Disparate Treatment Suit1
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the Act or ADEA)
2
generally prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals
between the ages of forty and seventy3 with respect to their employment
based on age. 4 The broad language of the Act has provided wide lati-
tude for judicial determination of the elements of an ADEA prima facie
case. Substantively, the ADEA is similar to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII) 5 which prohibits employment practices that dis-
criminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
6
Thus, for guidance in ADEA litigation, the courts have looked to the
body of Title VII case law.
1. Disparate treatment should be distinguished from disparate impact. The former
occurs when some individuals are treated less favorably because of a trait upon which such
different treatment may not be lawfully based. The latter occurs when facially neutral
conduct falls more harshly on one group than another. See International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1982).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would de-
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-1 7 (1982).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1982). The Supreme Court has noted that the substan-
tive provisions of the ADEA "were derived in haec verba from Title VII." Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978); see also Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818,
820 (5th Cir. 1972) (ADEA terms are essentially identical to those of Title VII).
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1. The Prima Facie Case 7
The Title VII case which has influenced ADEA litigation most sig-
nificantly is McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,8 in which the Supreme
Court set forth guidelines sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
employment discrimination based on race. 9 A typical ADEA application
of these guidelines for a claim of wrongful discharge requires that a
plaintiff show: (1) membership in the protected age group; (2) satisfac-
tory job performance; (3) discharge; and, (4) after discharge, that the
plaintiff's position was filled by a younger worker.10
The moderate initial burden of the McDonnell Douglas model" is
meant to assure "the plaintiff his day in court despite the unavailability
of direct evidence." 12 Discrimination is usually a covert process and the
employer is in the best position to explain why an individual has been
adversely affected by work-related decisions.'
3
The Supreme Court, however, has made clear that the McDonnell
Douglas model is not a rigid or mechanical method to be applied in all
discrimination cases.1 4 It is merely one method particularly suited to
establishing a claim based on circumstantial evidence. 15 It should be
noted that where direct evidence is available, the model has been found
7. In Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the Court
made clear in what sense the term "prima facie case" is used in Title VII cases: "the
establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" as opposed to a plaintiff's
burden of producing evidence sufficient to permit the trier of fact to make inferences. Id.
at 254 n.7.
8. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
9. These guidelines require a plaintiff to assert: (1) racial minority status; (2) appli-
cation and qualification for a position for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(3) rejection, despite qualification; and, (4) after rejection, the employer's continued
search for applicants with plaintiff's qualifications. Id. at 802.
10. See, e.g., Schwager v. Sun Oil Co., 591 F.2d 58, 61 (10th Cir. 1979); accord Haskell
v. Kamon Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 1984) (although replacement need not be less
than 40 years old, he should be substantially younger); cf Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766
F.2d 788, 793 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 796 (1986) (substantial age difference
may be sufficient for inference of age discrimination).
11. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; see also Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act: Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA. L. REV. 621 (1983)
(stating that a prima facie ADEA case is so easy to establish that most plaintiffs will need
stronger evidence to get case to jury on issue of illegal motivation).
12. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979).
13. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977).
The model effects its purpose by immediately establishing that a plaintiff's rejection was
not based on "the two most common legitimate reasons:" lack ofjob qualifications or lack
of a job vacancy. Id. at 358 n.44.
14. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n.6; Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
575-76 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973); see also
Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 (rejecting defendant's objection to the use of the McDonnell Douglas
formulation as a "strict analysis" only suited to "more invidious" forms of discrimination
such as race or gender). But cf. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 n.4 (6th Cir.
1975) (finding that the McDonnell Douglas model is suited only for bench trial; because of
the natural progression of younger workers replacing older ones, the model is too strict to
account for differences in age and Title VII-type discrimination). See generally Comment,
Adjudicating ADEA Disparate Treatment Claims Within the Evidentiary Framework of Title VII An
Order of Proof for Age Discrimination Cases, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 865 (1983).




Establishment of a prima facie case is the initial step in an employ-
ment discrimination action. The plaintiff continues to bear the burden
of persuading the trier of fact that age was a determinative factor in his
rejection.17 By establishing a prima facie case the plaintiff can withstand
the defendant's motion for directed verdict' 8 and the burden of produc-
tion shifts to the defendant.' 9
2. Shifting Burdens: Order of Proof
The general structure of Title VII disparate treatment cases as set
forth in McDonnell Douglas has been uniformly adopted in ADEA litiga-
tion. The format involves three basic trial stages with stage one being
the showing of a prima facie case.2 0 If the plaintiff succeeds in such
proof, stage two shifts the burden of production, requiring the defend-
ant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the em-
ployee's rejection."'' z Should the defendant meet this requirement,
stage three shifts the burden back to the plaintiff to prove that the em-
ployer's reasons were not true, but a pretext for discrimination.
22
The requirements of the employer's stage two burden were made
clear by the Supreme Court in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
flexible and pragmatic nature of the model is exemplified by its various forms, designed
for differing fact situations.
For cases supporting a finding that when a discharge is the result of a reduction in
work force, a showing of replacement is unnecessary, see Caldwell v. National Ass'n of
Home Builders, 771 F.2d 1051 (7th Cir. 1985); Stumph v. Thomas & Skinner, Inc., 770
F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1985); McCuen v. Home Ins. Co., 633 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1981); McCor-
stin v. United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1980); cf. Holley v. Sanyo Mfg.,
Inc., 771 F.2d 1161, 1165-66 (8th Cir. 1985) (in reorganization case plaintiff must show
more than mere termination; for example, statistical or circumstantial evidence of prefer-
ence for younger employees).
For examples of other variations, see Garner v. Boorstin, 690 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (where claimant seeks and is denied employment, it is sufficient that available posi-
tions were filled by individuals with comparable qualifications who were not members of
the protected class); Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1977)
(evidence ofjob qualification may be unnecessary where strong evidence of improper reli-
ance on age criterion exists).
16. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985); Lindsey v. Ameri-
can Cast Iron Pipe Co., 772 F.2d 799 (11 th Cir. 1985); Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp.,
710 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Stanojev v. Ebasco Serv., Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 921 (2d
Cir. 1981) (direct proof of discrimination, statistical evidence, or other circumstantial evi-
dence can obviate need to rely on McDonnell Douglas model).
17. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983); Burdine,
450 U.S. at 253; EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1170 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 312 (1985); Perrell v. Finance America Corp., 726 F.2d 654,
656 (10th Cir. 1984).
18. Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976); cf. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. at 254 (if employer is silent after establishment of prima facie case, court
must enter judgment for plaintiff); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1015 (prima facie case may entitle
plaintiff to directed verdict if defendant fails to carry burden of production).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 20-28.
20. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973); see also Burdine,
450 U.S. at 252-53.
21. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
22. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
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Burdine. 23 Whereas the plaintiff always bears the ultimate burden of per-
suasion, 24 the employer's burden merely is to rebut the presumption of
discriminatory motive which the prima facie case establishes.2 5 It is suf-
ficient for the employer to raise a genuine issue of fact as to the alleged
discrimination. 2 6 However, the explanation of the factual issue must be
specific enough to allow the plaintiff a fair opportunity to demonstrate
pretext.
2 7
Stage three of the trial should result in a "new level of specificity"
into the factual inquiry. 28 This higher scrutiny results from focusing the
evidence on any underlying reasons for the employer's actions. Stage
three therefore, completes an order of proof which is essential for nar-
rowing the issues and enabling the trier of fact fairly to decide if age was
a determinative factor in an employer's decision to reject an employee
or applicant.
3. EEOC v. University of Oklahoma
Marion Clark, a 59 year old employee of University of Oklahoma
(OU), applied for the available position of section chief, cartography
section of the Oklahoma Geological Survey (OGS), a department of
OU. 29 Dr. Charles Mankin, head of OGS, chaired a nineteen person
search and selection committee which, after a nation-wide advertising
campaign, narrowed the field of applicants to three.3 0 Ms. Clark was the
only internal applicant among the three and was rejected in favor of a
Mr. Furr, then age thirty-six a' The EEOC filed this action on behalf of
Ms. Clark.
3 2
At trial the parties stipulated that the plaintiff had made out a prima
facie case. 33 However, there was conflicting testimony as to any actual
discriminatory conduct on the part of OU. The search committee mem-
bers who testified stated that age discrimination did not enter into their
voting process.3 4 The defendant's proffered rationale for not promot-
ing Ms. Clark was her lack of management experience and problems
with productivity. Testimony detracting from this reasoning showed
23. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
24. Id. at 253.
25. Id. at 254.
26. Id. at 254-55.
27. Id.; see also Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 n.2 (1978) (per curiam)
(this burden of showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale is met by an explanation
by the employer of what he has done). For a discussion of different ways of demonstrating
pretext, see Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases,
32 STAN. L. REV. 1129, 1154 n.128 (1980).
28. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255.
29. EEOC v. University of Okla., 774 F.2d 999, 1000-01 (10th Cir. 1985), rev k 554 F.
Supp. 735 (W.D. Okla. 1982), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1637 (1986).
30. EEOC v. University of Okla., 554 F. Supp. 735, 737 (W.D. Okla. 1982), revd, 774
F.2d 999 (10th Cir. 1985).
31. University of Okla., 774 F.2d at 1001.
32. The ADEA provides for administration and enforcement by the EEOC. 29 U.S.C.
§ 633a (1982).
33. University of Okla., 774 F.2d at 1001.
34. University of Okla., 554 F. Supp. at 738.
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that Dr. Mankin had no way of knowing or measuring productivity
levels. Moreover, though Ms. Clark had no extensive managerial experi-
ence, the applicant chosen may have had less.
3 5
On appeal from judgment n.o.v. rendered in favor of OU, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.3 6 It found that the district
court had granted the judgment n.o.v. in error by reweighing the evi-
dence and injecting its own view of the witnesses' credibility. 37 The dis-
trict court had found that in stage three of the trial, 38 the plaintiff's
evidence supported only "murky theories" that OU's articulated reasons
for Ms. Clark's rejection were pretextual.3 9 The Tenth Circuit set out
much of the testimony in its opinion and concluded that it was reason-
able for the jury to infer that age discrimination was a factor in OU's
hiring decision.
40
In his concurring opinion, however, Judge Seth wrote that it was
unnecessary for the court to set out the "ritual" of the McDonnell Douglas
model. After the trial had taken place, he reasoned, the model had
served its purpose and had become irrelevant. 4 ' At the appellate level,
Judge Seth favored applying only standards for judgments n.o.v. rather
than conducting an in-depth review of the evidence.
42
4. Analysis
EEOC v. University of Oklahoma demonstrates the value of the McDon-
nell Douglas prima facie model and order of proof structure in disparate
treatment litigation. Where all the evidence is circumstantial and the
testimony disputed, the Supreme Court's Title VII guidelines provide
the trier of fact with a workable model in which it can separate and ana-
lyze the probative force and credibility of such evidence.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in this case clearly supports the use of
the McDonnell Douglas model. The model provides a means for guiding
the trier of fact through a narrowing of issues so that a rational determi-
nation can be made as to whether the plaintiff's ultimate burden has
been met. In EEOC v. University of Oklahoma, the district court abrogated
the benefits and policies behind the model by taking the case away from
the jury.4 3 Civil rights actions alleging age discrimination deserve to be
35. University of Okla., 774 F.2d at 1002.
36. Id. at 1000.
37. Id. at 1002.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 22-28.
39. University of Okla., 554 F. Supp. at 740. The district court found that even though
problems existed in the cartography section, this fact could not be used to support an
inference of a "scheme" or "plot" against Ms. Clark. Id.
40. University of Okla., 774 F.2d at 1003. Much of the evidence advanced for Ms. Clark
showed that Mr. Furr's conduct in his new job was similar to that which OU proffered to
denigrate her suitability for the position. See id.
41. Id. at 1004-05 (Seth, J., concurring); see also EEOC v. Samsonite Corp., 723 F.2d
748, 749 (10th Cir. 1983) (finding that when the McDonnell Douglas model has been used at
trial and the inquiry has reached the ultimate question of discrimination, it has served its
purpose and drops out of the case).
42. Id. at 1004-05 (Seth, J., concurring).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
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given close scrutiny because discrimination is usually secretive and al-
ways subjective. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit was correct in critically
analyzing the lower court's decision.
University of Oklahoma recently has served as precedent allowing the
Tenth Circuit to reverse a directed verdict against another ADEA plain-
tiff in Cockrell v. Boise Cascade Corp.4 4 In Cockrell, the Tenth Circuit found
that sufficient circumstantial evidence existed from which a jury could
have determined a discriminatory purpose in the defendant's offer of
demotion.
4 5
B. Monetary Remedies Under the ADEA
Section 2(b) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
4 6
provides that the purpose of the legislation is "to promote employment
of older persons based on their ability rather than age; [and] to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment."' 4 7 The remedial provi-
sions of the ADEA4 8 incorporate portions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA), 4 9 and together the two statutes provide for a wide range of
remedies. 50 Furthermore, the Act's broad allowance of trial court dis-
cretion 5 ' to fashion remedies creates a mandate to "make whole" suc-
cessful ADEA plaintiffs. 5 2  This broad interpretation of ADEA
guidelines has been embraced by the Tenth Circuit.
5 3
1. Liquidated Damages
The availability of liquidated damages is a frequently litigated reme-
dial issue under the ADEA. When liquidated damages are awarded
under the ADEA, the plaintiff is awarded not only unpaid wages, but
also an additional equal amount constituting liquidated damages. 5 4 The
44. 781 F.2d 173 (10th Cir. 1986).
45. Id. at 179. The Tenth Circuit found that in granting the directed verdict for the
defendant, the trial court erroneously acted as factfinder. The Tenth Circuit cited EEOC v.
University of Okla., 774 F.2d 999, 1002 (10th Cir. 1985), rev g 554 F. Supp. 735 (W.D. Okla.
1982), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1637 (1986), to support its finding.
46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982).
48. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(b)-(c) (1982).
49. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982). The incorporated provisions of the FLSA are
§§ 211 (b), 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof), and 217.
50. The available remedies include "such legal or equitable relief as may be appropri-
ate to effectuate the purposes of [the Act], including without limitation, judgments compel-
ling employment, reinstatement or promotion," or damages in amounts "deemed to be
unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982)
(emphasis added).
51. See id.
52. E.g., Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922 (6th Cir. 1984); Gibson
v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 1982).
53. Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 1976), affd per curiam by an
equally divided court, 434 U.S. 99 (1977) (ADEA is "humanitarian legislation" which should
be liberally construed in order to end age discrimination).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982). For a brief discussion of liquidated damages, see
Nosier & Wing, Remedies Under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 62 DEN. U.L.
REV. 469, 481-83 (1985) and Richards, Monetary Awards forAge Discrimination in Employment,
30 ARK. L. REV. 305, 327-36 (1976).
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ADEA specifically states that liquidated damages are only to be awarded
when an employer's acts are found to have been willful. 55
Some courts have found that liquidated damages are compensatory
and therefore such "double recovery" as liquidated damages plus pre-
judgment interest can be denied. 5 6 Others have held that liquidated
damages are punitive, thereby allowing awards of both types of relief.
5 7
The Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Trans World Airlines
v. Thurston.5" The Thurston Court found that Congress intended liqui-
dated damages to be "punitive in nature" 59 and adopted a "reckless dis-
regard" standard for determining willfulness. 6 0
Although the ADEA and FLSA contain similar remedial require-
ments, the Acts differ in their provisions for the award of liquidated
damages. The ADEA requires a finding of willful violation for an award
of liquidated damages 6 ' while the FLSA does not.62 Thus, the Court's
interpretation that Congress intended liquidated damages to be punitive
in nature when awarded under the ADEA is supported by the differences
in the remedial provisions of the two statutes.
2. Front Pay
Front pay is another highly contested issue in ADEA litigation. It is
generally awarded as compensatory damages for amounts not yet in-
curred by a plaintiff at the time of trial. 63 Courts are in general agree-
ment that front pay exists as a part of the broad remedial powers of the
Act even though it is not explicitly provided for in the ADEA.64 This
construction is consistent with the liberal "equitable relief ... without
55. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
56. Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1479 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
874 (1984); see also Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 1982)
(no award of both liquidated damages and prejudgment interest absent exceptional cir-
cumstances); cf. Heiar v. Crawford County, Wis., 746 F.2d 1190, 1202 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985) (ADEA liquidated damages are compensatory, delay being
one item compensated); Brooklyn Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 715 (1945) (liquidated
damages under the FLSA compensate for delay and therefore prejudgment interest is not
available).
57. E.g., Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544, 556 (9th Cir. 1983); Hannon
v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215, 218 (D. Colo. 1977).
58. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
59. Id. at 624.
60. Id.
61. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
62. The Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1982), provides a FLSA defendant with
a defense against liquidated damages when he can show good faith and reasonable
grounds for believing the challenged conduct was not in violation of the FLSA.
63. See generally EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1172-73
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 312 (1985) (future damages in lieu of reinstatement);
Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984) (prospective damages);
Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 727 (2d Cir. 1984) (front pay is damages
for loss of future earnings).
64. See Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass n, 763 F.2d at 1172 (legal and equitable reme-
dies in ADEA are not limited to those enumerated in Act); Davis, 742 F.2d at 922 (consis-
tent theme among the circuits is that front pay award is in the discretion of trial court); cf.
Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 874 n.4 (lst Cir. 1982) (no future damages for time
after which plaintiff has secured a higher paying job).
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limitation" language of the Act 6 5 and the "make whole" purpose attrib-
uted to it.
6 6
The major concern courts have expressed in allowing front pay is its
inherently speculative nature.6 7 Circuits that recognize front pay as a
remedy have not been deterred by its speculative nature, but rather have
used it reasonably by formulating limitations on its applicability. 68 Most
courts have awarded front pay only in lieu of the preferred remedy of
reinstatement when reinstatement is not feasible.6 9 Where hostility ex-
ists between the parties70 or where the defendant cannot offer a position
comparable to plaintiff's previously held one, 7 1 front pay has been
awarded as a viable alternative. At least one court has disallowed front
pay where substantial liquidated damages were sufficient to make the
plaintiff whole. 72 Since there is no per se rule for awarding front pay, the
use of this remedy is usually left to the sound discretion of the trial court
in the calculation of damages.
73
3. Smith v. Consolidated Mutual Water Company
Eugene Smith was fired from his job with Consolidated Mutual
Water Company (Consolidated), allegedly for falsifying water meter
tests.74 Smith was not confronted with the falsification charge before
the decision was made to discharge him. His supervisor, who was twenty
years his junior, replaced him with a younger worker. Smith sued Con-
solidated, claiming that it had violated his rights under the ADEA by
firing him because of his age. At trial, Smith presented evidence that he
had been discriminated against both verbally and through job perform-
ance evaluations.
The district court entered judgment on a jury verdict which in-
65. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982); see supra note 50.
66. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
67. E.g., Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d at 1173; Cancellier v. Federated
Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982). For a dis-
cussion of the problem of speculation in front pay awards, see Note, Front Pay: A Necessary
Alternative to Reinstatement Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 53 FORDHAM L. REV.
579, 603-06 (1984).
68. See supra note 67.
69. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d at 1172-73; Davis v. Combustion Eng'g,
Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724,
728 (2d Cir. 1984); Cancellier, 672 F.2d at 1319-20; Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695
F.2d 1093, 1100-01 (8th Cir. 1982); cf. O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748
F.2d 1543, 1550 (11 th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff's unreasonable refusal of reinstatement pre-
cludes recovery of both back pay and front pay).
70. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d at 1172; Dickerson v. Deluxe Check
Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 281 (8th Cir. 1983); Cancellier, 672 F.2d at 1319-20.
71. See EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 634 F.2d 1273, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981) (front pay awarded until plaintiff is reinstated in "rightful
place"); cf. Dickerson, 703 F.2d at 280-81 (defendant's policy is against reinstatement to a
"high level" position).
72. Cancellier, 672 F.2d at 1319. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that a substantial verdict of over two million dollars had made the
plaintiffs whole. Id. at 1320.
73. See, e.g., Davis, 742 F.2d at 922-23 (award of front pay to 41 year old until age of
retirement is probably unwarranted).
74. Smith v. Consolidated Mut. Water Co., 787 F.2d 1441, 1441-42 (10th Cir. 1986).
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cluded an award of front pay in lieu of reinstatement. 75 Consolidated
appealed, maintaining that the evidence was insufficient for a prima facie
ADEA claim and that the award of front pay was in error.76 Smith cross-
appealed, claiming that Consolidated's actions constituted a willful vio-
lation of the ADEA and therefore liquidated damages should also have
been awarded.
7 7
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's award of front pay in
lieu of reinstatement. 78 It concluded that the evidence was sufficient to
support the jury's verdict. However, Smith's cross-appeal for liquidated
damages was denied based on the "thin and circumstantial" nature of
the evidence.
79
Judge Barrett filed a dissent in which he argued that liquidated
damages are designed to compensate for nonpecuniary or highly specu-
lative losses and that front pay, having a similar purpose, is simply a
form of liquidated damages.8 0 Characterizing front pay as a legal rem-
edy rather than an equitable one, he argued that the legal remedies
under the ADEA are those specifically enumerated - unpaid wages, un-
paid overtime, and liquidated damages. Judge Barrett concluded that if
front pay is allowable at all, it is necessarily as a liquidated damage. 8 '
Therefore, he reasoned, since Smith was ineligible for liquidated dam-
ages because no willful violation had been established, he was equally
ineligible for front pay.
8 2
4. Analysis: The Status of ADEA Remedies in the Tenth Circuit
Judge Barrett's argument that front pay is simply a form of liqui-
dated damages fails to take into consideration the Supreme Court's re-
cent portrayal of liquidated damages under the ADEA as punitive. 83
This "punitive nature" colors liquidated damages with a purpose some-
what different than that of front pay. 84 Thus, Judge Barrett's fear of a
"double-barrel" approach, though not unfounded, 8 5 goes too far.
Judge Barrett is not alone in the Tenth Circuit in his analysis of the
front pay issue. In Bum v. Western Electric Co., 8 6 ChiefJudge Seth wrote a
separate opinion opposing the use of this remedy. He argued that even
though the ADEA grants broad equitable powers, these cannot be used
to expand the legal remedies specifically enumerated in the Act. 8 7
75. Id. at 1443.
76. Id. at 1442.
77. Id. at 1443.
78. Id.
79. Id. Consolidated's conduct was not found to be "willful" under the Thurston stan-
dard; see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
80. Id. at 1444 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1444-45 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1446 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
83. Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985).
84. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
85. Smith, 787 F.2d at 1443 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
86. 731 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. !11 (1984).
87. Id. at 1481 (Seth, CJ., concurring and dissenting).
19871
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The language of the ADEA belies such an argument. When read as
a whole it gives the courts wide discretion in fashioning legal and equita-
ble relief to effectuate its purposes. 88 Judge Barrett's depiction of front
pay as a legal rather than an equitable remedy is of no assistance in de-
termining how these purposes can best be served. Since the Tenth Cir-
cuit has recognized front pay only in lieu of the equitable remedy of
reinstatement, its application is more equitable in nature than it is legal.
Therefore, an award of front pay should not be dependent upon meet-
ing the standard for an award of liquidated damages. Through Smith,
the Tenth Circuit has reaffirmed its alignment with other circuits that
have held that front pay and liquidated damages are not interdependent
remedies under the ADEA.8 9
II. SECTION 1983
A. Sufficiency of Civil Rights Complaints Against Municipalities
1. General Sufficiency
Liberal federal pleading requirements 9 ° and the broad scope of civil
rights statutes allow for a low threshold of sufficiency for civil rights
complaints. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Section 1983)91 is the
broadest piece of legislation in federal civil rights law.9 2 Instead of pro-
viding substantive rights, section 1983 ensures a private right of action
for constitutional violations. 93 To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff
must allege that some person, acting under color of state law, has de-
prived him of a federal right.94 Of course, factual allegations in support
88. See supra text accompanying notes 46-53. For a discussion of the differences be-
tween the legal and equitable remedies available under the ADEA, see Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575 (1977).
89. See, e.g., Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 726-28 (2d Cir. 1984);
Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1983); O'Donnell v. Georgia Os-
teopathic Hosp., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 214, 223 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd in part on other grounds,
748 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1984); see also Note, Front Pay: A Necessary Alternative to Reinstatement
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 579, 607-08 (1984) (ar-
guing that front pay and liquidated damages should be regarded independently).
90. One only needs to include a jurisdictional statement, unless the court already has
jurisdiction, a short and plain statement to show entitlement, and a demand for judgment.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
91. The pertinent portion of section 1983 is:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State, . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
92. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966) (section 1983 should be
interpreted with sufficient liberality to fulfill its purpose of providing a federal remedy in
federal court for protection of a federal right).
93. See, e.g., Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979) (a
litigant cannot claim a violation of section 1983; section 1983 merely provides a remedy).
94. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); see Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013,
1016 (2d Cir. 1983); Brantley v. Surles, 718 F.2d 1354, 1357-58 (5th Cir. 1983); Wirth v.
Surles, 562 F.2d 319, 321 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978); Flemming v.
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of the claim must also be advanced. 9 5 Generally, a civil rights complaint
will not be dismissed summarily unless it appears beyond doubt that a
plaintiff cannot prove any facts which would support the claim.
9 6
2. Municipal Liability
A 1978 Supreme Court decision has had significant impact on civil
rights litigation. In Monell v. Department of Social Services,9 7 the Court
expressly overruled Monroe v. Pape9 8 by holding that local governing
bodies can be sued under section 1983.9 9 This decision has raised a
question as to what sort of act or conduct of a municipal employee will
create liability on the part of a municipality.
The Monell Court went far towards defining the outer reaches of
municipal liability. Even though a municipality may be subject to sec-
tion 1983 claims, the court held that a municipality will not be liable
solely because an employee has committed a tort. 10 0 Relying on the
language of section 1983 itself, the Court found that if the challenged
conduct does not occur under the color of an ordinance or regulation, a
plaintiff must show that it rises to a level of policy, custom, or usage.
10 1
A custom or usage is inferred from any edict or act which "may be said
to represent official policy."
0 2
Adams, 377 F.2d 975, 977 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 898 (1967). Compare State ex rel.
Gore v. Wochner, 620 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875 (1980) (transgres-
sion of specific and articulable constitutional right and cognizable claim for relief must
appear on face of pleadings) with Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (civil rights com-
plaint need only set forth facts giving rise to cause of action). But cf. Keniston v. Roberts,
717 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1983) (section 1983 complaint need not set out particular
constitutional or statutory basis for claim so long as court can ascertain that claimed rights
exist); Bonner v. Circuit Ct., 526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 946
(1976) (court has duty to determine if allegations could support relief on any possible
theory).
95. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
96. E.g., Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1983); District 28 United Mine
Workers v. Wellmore Coal Corp., 609 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1979); Johnson v. Wells, 566
F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1978); Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 991 (1970).
97. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
98. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The Court overruled this case to the extent that it held
municipalities were not "persons" for section 1983 purposes and, therefore, were not sub-
ject to suit. However, it left the Monroe "intent" requirements of a section 1983 claim
intact.
99. Monett, 436 U.S. at 700-01.
100. Id. at 691.
101. See id. at 690-91, 694. Quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68
(1970), the Court recognized that certain practices of local officials could easily be so prev-
alent as to carry the force of written law. MoneUt, 436 U.S. at 691.
For language emphasizing the importance of alleging a policy or custom, see Powe v.
City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 652 (7th Cir. 1981) (civil rights action against city cannot
be maintained without adequate allegation of policy by either direct or implied charge of a
practice); Glaros v. Perse, 628 F.2d 679, 683 (1st Cir. 1980) (section 1983 claim not stated
against a municipality in absence of allegation of official policy); Walters v. City of Ocean
Springs, 626 F.2d 1317, 1323 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (city cannot be held liable
where it is not alleged that injury resulted from the carrying out of municipal policy or
custom); see generally Note, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: The Meaning of "Policy or
Custom, " 79 COLUM. L. REv. 304 (1979).
102. Monett, 436 U.S. at 694. For a discussion on what persons acting in which capacity
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After a custom or usage has been established, the plaintiff must
clear another hurdle by showing a nexus between the municipal policy
and the act or conduct which caused an injury.10 3 If a causal connection
is not sufficiently shown, the court will not hold the municipality liable
for the employee's acts. 10 4 In City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 10 5 the Sup-
reme Court reversed a Tenth Circuit decision that a single unconstitu-
tional act by a police officer was sufficient to establish municipal
liability. 10 6 The Tenth Circuit had upheld a jury instruction which al-
lowed a finding of liability where an officer's acts were so egregiously
out of accord with accepted practices that a policy of inadequate training
or supervision could be inferred.' 0 7 The Supreme Court made clear
that no liability should attach absent a finding that some fault can be
attributed to municipal policymakers.t°8 Thus, it is insufficient to infer
a policy from a single incident which itself gave rise to the cause of
action.
However, upon proving an unconstitutional policy, a single act
based on this policy may breed section 1983 liability.10 9 In Garcia v. Salt
Lake County," l0 the court found that the combined actions of the jail em-
can be deemed acting for government, see Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (1979).
103. See Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983). The Batista court
found that a plaintiff in a Monell-type case must "plead and prove three elements: (1) an
official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a
constitutional right." Id. The mere allegation of a pattern without a causal link will not
suffice. Id.
See also Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227, 1241 (11 th Cir. 1985) (causal connection
between official's acts and deprivation of rights may be shown where widespread abuse
puts official on notice; personal involvement is not required); Espino v. City of Kingsville,
676 F.2d 1075, 1078 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (city not liable for death of Mexican-
American inmate in absence of showing of policy of discrimination). Compare Rankin v.
City of Wichita Falls, 762 F.2d 444, 449 (5th Cir. 1985) (decedent's attempt to rescue co-
worker not attributable to any misuse of power by city) with Cameo Convalescent Center,
Inc. v. Senn, 738 F.2d 836, 846 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985) (nexus
between harmful act and infringement of rights too attenuated for liability to attach).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01; see also Ross v. Reed, 719 F.2d 689, 698
(4th Cir. 1983) (doctrine of respondeat superior has no place in section 1983 litigation);
Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1335 (10th Cir. 1981) (city not liable under theory of re-
spondeat superior for police officer's civil rights violations).
105. 105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985) (plurality opinion). Tuttle sued Oklahoma City under sec-
tion 1983 after a city police officer shot and killed her husband.
106. See Tuttle v. City of Oklahoma City, 728 F.2d 456 (10th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S.
Ct. 2427 (1985).
107. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. at 2435.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2436. Though not deciding the issue, the Court indicated that it may be
possible to base municipal liability on a constitutionally sound policy. This would require
much more proof than a single incident in order to show municipal fault and a causal
connection between the policy and the constitutional deprivation. Id. See also id. at 2441
n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (finding no need for the "metaphysical distinction"
between unconstitutional policies and policies which cause constitutional violations).
110. 768 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1985). The widow and parents of Ronald Garcia brought
a section 1983 action against Salt Lake County and the jail employees following Garcia's
death in the countyjail. The decedent had ingested an overdose of a prescription barbitu-
rate which was legally in his possession. Pursuant to a practice of the jail, the officers,
believing him to be only under the influence of alcohol, admitted him to jail in an uncon-
scious state. The jail and the sheriff had written policies prohibiting this practice. Id.
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ployees formed an unconstitutional policy which created municipal lia-
bility even though no one individual employee's acts or omissions
violated a right."' The "cumulative effect" of the individual acts or
omissions was attributable to the defendant county's unconstitutional
practices.1 1 2 Shortly thereafter, the Tenth Circuit addressed the suffi-
ciency of a municipal liability complaint which alleged a causal connec-
tion between a policy and a failure to act."
13
3. State ex rel. Candelaria v. City of Albuquerque
Billy Candelaria, a Mexican youth, drowned in an inadequately
maintained syphon culvert in the South Valley region of Albuquer-
que. 114 Plaintiff sued the City of Albuquerque, Bernalillo County, and
the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District, alleging that the drowning
was a violation of Billy Candelaria's civil rights." 5 The plaintiff based
his civil rights claim on an alleged custom of discriminatory failure to
provide services in the area because the area was populated mostly by
persons of Mexican-American descent.' 16 The plaintiff alleged that the
defendants neglected and refused to maintain the syphon culvert in
which Candelaria drowned and that it was the defendants' policy not to
provide adequate services to the South Valley area."
17
The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.* 18 It found that there was no causal
connection between the allegation of defendants' failure to maintain the
culvert and the claim of a custom of discrimination. 119 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit found that the complaint could be read as alleging inten-
tional discrimination based on race, and therefore, the plaintiff's claim
under section 1983 was sufficient.l
2 0
In finding the plaintiff's complaint sufficient to state a cause of ac-
tion under section 1983, the Tenth Circuit relied on the rule that "the
complaint should be construed liberally in favor of an interpretation
which states a cause of action." 12l The court did not specifically reach
the issue upon which the district court dismissed the action. 122 Instead,
it merely concluded that the complaint could be reasonably interpreted
to allege "that the defendants discriminated against an area of the city
predominately occupied by Mexican-Americans because it is occupied by
Mexican-Americans." 123
111. Id. at 310.
112. Id.
113. State ex rel. Candelaria v. City of Albuquerque, 768 F.2d 1207 (10th Cir. 1985).
114. Id. at 1208.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1209.
118. See id. at 1208.
119. Id. at 1209.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1210.
122. See supra text accompanying note 119.
123. Candelaria, 768 F.2d at 1209 (emphasis added). The majority opinion quoted a
lengthy portion of the complaint, which alleged inter alia, that the defendants' failure to
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4. State ex rel. Candelaria v. City of Albuquerque: An Analysis
By reversing the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit has af-
forded this plaintiff an opportunity to prove that an unconstitutional
custom or policy exists. If the plaintiff is able to meet the burden of
proof, the nexus between the unconstitutional custom or policy and the
violation of Billy Candelaria's rights is much stronger than the connec-
tion found in Garcia.124 Here, since the policy would be one of failure to
act, the only actors involved are those who set the policy or allow it to
exist. The policy and the harmful omission merge and the policy itself
could trigger liability. As the Garcia court found, "gross deficiencies and
deliberate indifference" in procedures can serve to form a custom or
policy. 125
The Tenth Circuit has remained open-minded on the question of
municipal liability despite Tuttle. Garcia demonstrates this by its finding
of municipal liability based on a single incident which resulted from an
underlying unconstitutional policy. Candelaria confirms the trend by rec-
ognizing a cause of action based on an alleged unconstitutional policy of
omission. Regardless of whether a unity of discriminatory policy and
failure to maintain the culvert is found to have existed in Candelaria, the
"single incident" of such failure can still cause liability to attach based
on Garcia.
B. Enforcement of Due Process Interests in Employment
Enforcement of constitutional rights is one of the many purposes of
section 1983.126 Its broad language allows for a private right of action
against any person who under color of law deprives an injured party of
any federally protected right.12 7 Section 1983 has played its most signif-
icant civil rights role as enforcer of the fourteenth amendment's liberty
and property interest guarantees.'
2 8
1. Property Interests
The seminal property interest cases are Board of Regents v. Roth 129
maintain the culvert was a "direct result of a custom and usage" of defendants' failure to
provide services to the general area. Id. This language asserts a causal connection be-
tween the policy and the harmful omission. The court found that the complaint was
sufficient.
124. In Garcia, there were identifiable actors involved who were initially named as de-
fendants. See Garcia v. Salt Lahe County, 768 F.2d 303, 309 n.6 (10th Cir. 1985).
125. See Garcia, 768 F.2d at 308.
126. See supra note 91.
127. See id. For an in-depth analysis of the elements of a prima facie section 1983 claim,
see J. MAHONEY, SECTION 1983: SWORD AND SHIELD 119-36 (R. Freilich & R. Carlisle ed.
1983).
The "color of law" requirement of section 1983 is met by any conduct constituting
state action. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982), rev g 639 F.2d
1058 (4th Cir. 1981).
128. Section 1983 began as section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. That section's
purpose was to enforce the fourteenth amendment. For a description of the purposes of
section 1983, see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972).
129. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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and Perry v. Sindermann .130 These provided the Supreme Court with the
opportunity to delineate the types of interests that are of sufficient im-
portance to be deemed constitutionally protected.
In Roth, the respondent sued a state university at which he had been
an untenured professor. Without notice or hearing, the university de-
cided not to renew Roth's employment contract. Roth claimed a pro-
tected interest had been violated but the Court found that since his one-
year contract had terminated he had no protected interest.1 3 1 To ac-
quire a property interest in a benefit, a person must have a "legitimate
claim of entitlement" to it. 13 2 An abstract desire or unilateral expecta-
tion is not sufficient.' 3 3 The Court left open, however, a broad spec-
trum of conditions which could qualify an interest as protected by due
process. These protected interests can be created and defined by rules
or understandings based on state law that support "legitimate claims of
entitlement." 1
34
In Perry, the Court clarified the extent to which it will recognize
property interests. Like Roth, Sindermann was an untenured teacher at
a state institution. Unlike Roth, however, Sindermann was found to
have a case for a property interest in his employment. The Court found
that a college manual and state tenure guidelines may have created a
legitimate expectation of continued employment; if so, Sindermann was
entitled to a due process hearing on allegations against him. 13 5 Ex-
panding on Roth, the Court indicated that implied contracts, circum-
stances, and unwritten understandings and practices could create




The fourteenth amendment requires due process for governmental
deprivation of liberty interests.138 In employment actions there is a fine
line between the twin concepts of liberty and property. Many times, a
due process analysis will properly include an examination of both liberty
and property interests.139 However, property cases generally are more
dependent on the legitimate expectancy, while liberty cases focus more
on a measure of damage to individual reputation sufficient to foreclose
130. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
131. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578. The Court also found that Roth had no liberty interest. Id.
at 575.
132. Id. at 577.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Peny, 408 U.S. at 600-03.
136. Id. at 601-02.
137. Id. at 603.
138. "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
139. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1972); Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist., 530 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir.
1976).
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some future opportunity. 140 Liberty interest cases, therefore, usually
arise from a claim of deprivation of rights due to a state-created
stigma. 141
In Wisconsin v. Contantineau, 142 the appellee challenged the constitu-
tionality of a state statute which allowed authorities to post her name as
an "excessive drinker" who could not be sold liquor. 143 In finding her
claim valid, the Supreme Court stated broadly that where a person's
good name or reputation is impugned by government conduct, due pro-
cess is required. 
144
In Paul v. Davis,14 5 however, the Court did not find that a liberty
interest had been violated when the police department distributed a
brochure to local businesses containing respondent's picture and the
designation "active shoplifter."' 146 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, distinguished and limited the broad language of Constantineau.
He wrote that in Constantineau the appellee's future right to purchase
liquor was deprived by the stigma and, therefore, a violation of her lib-
erty interests rose to constitutional status. The stigma alone would have
been insufficient to require the procedural protection of due process. 1
47
Since most discharges or non-retentions will reflect negatively on
an employee's character, courts must take care to find a protected liberty
interest only when a state-created stigma seriously damages an individ-
ual's ability to be reemployed.14 8 The Tenth Circuit has recognized that
liberty interests of public employees involve two particular aspects:
(1) the protection of reputation, and (2) the freedom to pursue employ-
ment opportunity."49 Further, the Tenth Circuit has found valid liberty
interests to exist even though an employer alleges willful neglect and
incompetence, 150 but nonexistent under charges of improper job per-
formance.' 5 ' Similarly, employer accusations involving correctable fail-
ures are not so stigmatizing so as to foreclose job opportunities.'
52
140. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 571-75.
141. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 753 F.2d 1092, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (describing
the "reputation plus" standard used in liberty interest cases); Martin v. Unified School
Dist., 728 F.2d 453, 455 (10th Cir. 1984) (noting that "[t]he liberty interest protected by
the Constitution is the individual's good name and his freedom to work") (citations omit-
ted); Bartel v. F.A.A., 725 F.2d 1403, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (where government, by injur-
ing a person's reputation effects a removal or significant change of an interest protected by
law, due process is required).
142. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 437.
145. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
146. Id. at 711-12.
147. Id. at 708-09.
148. See Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist., 530 F.2d 1335, 1339 (10th Cir.
!976).
149. Weathers, 530 F.2d at 1338 (citing Lipp v. Board of Educ., 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir.
1972)). Weathers treated the two aspects as severable; the case was decided before the
Supreme Court decided against such a view in Paul; see supra text accompanying notes 145-
47.
150. See Staton v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 908, 911 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 907 (1977).
151. See Abeyta v. Town of Taos, 499 F.2d 323, 327 (10th Cir. 1974).
152. See Garcia v. Board of Educ., 777 F.2d 1403, 1419 (10th Cir. 1985).
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Recently, the Tenth Circuit had the opportunity to decide whether a lib-
erty interest claim should be upheld when there was a decline in busi-
ness rather than a discharge or non-retention.
3. Corbilt v. Andersen
Corbitt was employed by a Wyoming school district as a school psy-
chologist. Additionally, he had a private practice for which he gained
clientele by referrals from two state agencies. He brought a section 1983
suit against Andersen, the director of Southwest Counseling Service, a
political subdivision of the county. He claimed that Andersen, acting
under color of state law, campaigned to discredit his professional stand-
ing, defamed him, and caused him to lose.his referral clients. 153 The
jury found in Corbitt's favor and Andersen appealed, claiming insuffi-
cient evidence to establish a section 1983 claim. The Tenth Circuit af-
firmed the jury's verdict.
The Tenth Circuit decided that Paul v. Davis '54 did not require a
reversal of the district court's judgment. The majority held that the jury
could reasonably find that Andersen had not only defamed Corbitt, but
also that he had created a stigma which foreclosed Corbitt's freedom to
find other employment.'
55
Judge Bohanon disagreed in an extensive dissent. He argued that
Corbitt had no contracts, and thus no legally protected right to his refer-
ral work. 156 Judge Bohanon claimed that the majority had stated in con-
clusory language that contracts existed between the state agencies and
Corbitt and that the jury had found intentional, improper interference
with such contracts.' 
5 7
Judge Bohanon also took exception to the court's reliance on
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners.158 In Schware, the Supreme Court
found that a liberty interest had been violated when the petitioner was
denied the opportunity to take the New Mexico bar examination. 159
Judge Bohanon noted that Schware's claim was based upon his being
completely precluded from practicing his profession. 160 In the instant
case, Corbitt was merely subjected to an adverse influence which re-
duced the number of his referrals.
16
4. Corbitt v. Andersen: An Analysis
In Corbitt there was no question of whether a defamation occurred.
Rather, the central issue was whether the defamation infringed upon a
153. Corbitt v. Andersen, 778 F.2d 1471, 1473 (10th Cir. 1985).
154. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
155. Corbitt, 778 F.2d at 1475 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573
(1972)).
156. Id. at 1476-77 (Bohanon,J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1481 (Bohanon, J., dissenting).
158. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
159. Id. at 246-47.
160. See Schware, 353 U.S. at 234.
161. Corbitt, 778 F.2d at 1480 (Bohanon, J., dissenting).
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liberty interest held by Corbitt. The majority held that it did, by fore-
closing his freedom to engage in work opportunities, 16 2 but did not ex-
plain the nature of such interest. The majority sidestepped the
threshold issue of whether Corbitt's referral business rose to the level of
a protected liberty interest. Apparently, the court was content to leave
undisturbed the jury's finding that Corbitt's "contractual relations" had
been violated. 1
63
The dissent pointed out that Corbitt's own testimony tended to re-
fute the existence of a contract. 16 4 It may be that the majority saw no
need to base its decision on the existence vel non of a contract. 16 5 It
merely concluded that there was sufficient evidence of a decline in the
value of Corbitt's private practice to support a finding of a violated
interest. 166
The outcome of the case is not clearly incorrect. Corbitt had more
than a "mere subjective expectancy" 167 in his referral work. 168 Even so,
the majority's deference to the trial court and jury has added confusion
to the state of liberty interest law in the Tenth Circuit. While the court
has in the past tried to provide some guidance as to a minimum type of
foreclosure of employment opportunity required to sustain such a case,
here it has failed to provide any clarification. The incisive dissent cor-
rectly takes the court to task for its deferential and conclusory analysis.
III. ATTORNEY'S FEES IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
A. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976 (the Act or sec-
tion 1988) 169 provides that in federal civil rights actions "the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs."'1 70 The Act was drafted in direct response to a
1975 Supreme Court case which denied an attorney's fee award to civil
rights plaintiffs. 171
162. Id. at 1475.
163. See id. at 1474.
164. Corbitt testified that he had understandings with the state agencies, but that they
were under no obligations. Id. at 1476 (Bohanon, J., dissenting).
165. The Supreme Court has recognized that an interest of constitutional magnitude
can arise from mutually explicit understandings. See supra text accompanying notes 134-
37.
166. Corbitt, 778 F.2d at 1475.
167. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972); cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (to determine whether due process requirements apply, courts must
look to the nature and not the weight of the interest at stake).
168. Corbitt had an ongoing relationship with the state agencies through which he ob-
tained referrals. Corbitt, 778 F.2d at 1473.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
170. Id.
171. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (plaintiffs
winning an injunction against issuance of permits authorizing construction of trans-Alaska
oil pipeline). Alyeska was simply a re-affirmance of the "American Rule" which generally
prohibits an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing civil litigant absent express statutory
authority to do so. See id. at 247, 269.
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The policy behind section 1988 is based on a recognition that the
protection of civil rights is strongly dependent upon private enforce-
ment, which is too often deterred by the high cost of litigation. 172 Sec-
tion 1988 is intended to insure effective access to the courts for civil
rights claimants.17 3 Awards of attorneys' fees are an essential part of
vindicating civil rights grievances. 174 In effect, a plaintiff is compen-
sated for his efforts as a "private attorney general."
1 75
Two major issues pervade section 1988 litigation. The first con-
cerns what constitutes a "prevailing plaintiff." After a court has deter-
mined that a plaintiff has prevailed, the second issue involves what
standard should be used to determine a fees award amount.
1. Defining Success
In order to meet the threshold requirement for a fees award, a
plaintiff must prevail.1 76 He must "succeed on any significant issue...
which achieves some of the benefit . . . sought in bringing suit."'1 7 7 A
plaintiff has been found to prevail when a consent decree has been en-
tered into prior to final judgment. 178 A plaintiff has also prevailed when
his case, although mooted before judgment, was catalytic in prompting
civil rights reform. 17 9 The Tenth Circuit, following the lead of the
Supreme Court, has recognized that where civil rights are vindicated, a
plaintiff need not obtain formal relief to be considered prevailing for
section 1988 purposes.' 8 0
2. Degrees of Success
After a plaintiff has prevailed, the amount of reasonable fees owing
must be determined on the facts of the case.' 8 ' General guidelines for
the computation of fees are provided in the legislative history of section
1988.182 These include the much-contested factor of the relationship
172. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 5908, 5910 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
173. H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976).
174. SENATE REPORT, supra note 172 at 2.
175. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam);
Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1041 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979).
176. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
177. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978), quoted in Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
178. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980); Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 791-
92 (10th Cir. 1980).
179. Williams v. Miller, 620 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Fischer v. Adams,
572 F.2d 406 (1st Cir. 1978); see also Martin v. Heckler, 773 F.2d 1145, 1148-49 (11 th Cir.
1985) (vindication of rights does not depend on the necessity of litigation); Morrison v.
Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669, 671 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981)
(when defendants cease their challenged conduct, the fact that the plaintiffs dismiss the
action makes no difference in the award of attorneys' fees).
180. Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 792 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing Maher v. Gagne, 448
U.S. 122, 129 (1980)).
181. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983).
182. Both the House and Senate approved of the twelve factors listed in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). The factors are:
(1) time and labor required; (2) novelty and difficulty of issues; (3) skill required; (4) pre-
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between the potential award and the actual results obtained. Generally,
it has been held that a plaintiff advancing multiple claims and prevailing
on less than all of them is entitled to attorneys' fees, so long as the
award is adjusted to reflect the degree of success realized.' 8 3 The
Supreme Court recently has affirmed this view in Hensley v. Eckerhart.
184
In Hensley, the Supreme Court attempted to provide reasonable
guidelines to alleviate the disparity in standards and computation meth-
ods used by the various circuits. It stated that after a plaintiff is deemed
to have prevailed, a product of reasonable hours multiplied by reason-
able rates must be found. 18 5 The trial court must then engage in an
adjusting computation by addressing two questions: (1) did the plaintiff
fail to prevail on all claims that were unrelated to his successful claims,
and (2) was the plaintiff's degree of success such that hours reasonably
expended are a satisfactory basis for making a fees award. 18 6 The first
question is useful for mechanically cutting out a proportion of an award
which is allocable to distinct unsuccessful claims. The second reaches
the situation in which a plaintiff's several claims "involve a common
core of facts or [are] based on related legal theories."' 8 7 In "such a law-
suit" the Court asserted, the trial court must consider the significance of
the relief obtained in relation to hours expended.' 88
A more difficult issue arises when a plaintiff has technically pre-
vailed in a single-claim case but is not awarded the relief requested. It
has been held that an award of nominal damages does not constitute
special circumstances and in such cases attorneys' fees are available.18 9
clusion of other employment due to the case; (5) customary fees for similar work;
(6) whether fees are fixed or contingent; (7) time constraints imposed by client or circum-
stances; (8) amount involved and results obtained; (9) experience, reputation, and ability
of the attorneys; (10) undesirability of the case; (11) nature and length of professional
relationship with the client; and, (12) amounts awarded in similar cases. See Thome, The
Court's Discretion in Assessing Fees Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 2 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 283 (1979). The Tenth Circuit has stated that the trial court need not
consider all of these factors in determining an award. Littlefield v. Deland, 641 F.2d 729,
732 (10th Cir. 1981).
183. See Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1026 (5th Cir. 1979) (plaintiffs gaining in-
junctive relief but not monetary damages are entitled to attorneys' fees), cert dismissed sub
nom., Ledbetter v. Jones, 453 U.S. 950 (1981); see also Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275,
278-79 (1st Cir. 1978) (fees award is based on work performed on successful claims). But
see Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1977) (winning on only one of six claims is
not sufficient to obtain attorneys' fees), reh'g en banc, cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978).
184. 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983) (unrelated claims must be treated separately so that no
fee is awarded for work on failed claims).
185. Id. at 434.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 435.
188. Id. at 434-35 (emphasis added).
189. See Milwe v. Cavuota, 653 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1981) (trial court abused discretion
in denying fees award to plaintiff winning one dollar in damages); Skoda v. Fontani, 646
F.2d 1193, 1194 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (jury verdict of one dollar entitles plaintiffs
to attorneys' fees); Perez v. University of P.R., 600 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1979) (fees award is
not inconsistent with award of nominal damages); Burt v. Abel, 585 F.2d 613, 616-18 (4th
Cir. 1978) (recovery of nominal damages does not diminish eligibility for fees award,
though it is a factor in determining amount); cf. Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 557 (10th
Cir. 1983) (rejecting practice of reducing fees awards because of limited recovery). But cf.
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. City of Hallandale, 742 F.2d 590, 591 (11 th Cir. 1984) (it
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In Ramos v. Lamm,' 90 the Tenth Circuit made its position clear that an
award of attorney's fees in civil rights litigation should not be reduced
solely because the damages awarded were nominal.' 9 ' The Ramos court
declared that a fees award should not be required to have a particular
relationship to a recovery amount.'
9 2
During this survey period, the Tenth Circuit dealt with the issue of
whether fees awards should be reduced in a case in which plaintiffs pre-
vailed on their single claim but were awarded only nominal damages.
B. Nephew v. City of Aurora
Plaintiffs sued Aurora police officers under the Civil Rights Act,'
93
alleging that they were assaulted, battered, and falsely arrested, and that
it was the custom of the city to discriminate against blacks. 194 They
sought relief in the form of compensatory and punitive damages in the
amount of two million dollars.
Two of four plaintiffs prevailed and were awarded damages of one
dollar each. The plaintiffs moved for an attorneys' fees award pursuant
to section 1988. In calculating the amount of the award, the court re-
duced the amount sought by subtracting for time spent on a state
claim 19 5 and also to account for the fact that only two of the original
four plaintiffs prevailed. 19 6 The defendants requested that the court re-
duce the fees award further based on the nominality of the damages
awarded. The court denied this request and the defendants appealed.
The Tenth Circuit subsequently agreed with the defendants and re-
versed and remanded the case to reduce the attorney's fees award.
19 7
Although Ramos v. Lamm 198 is applicable, the Nephew court wrote that "it
ha[d] yet to address the precise issue."1 99 The Tenth Circuit reasoned
that because Nephew sought damages and Ramos sought declaratory
and injunctive relief, the Ramos language was dicta and should not con-
trol.2 00 Judge Barrett, writing for the majority, quoted Cooper v.
Singer2 0 1 to emphasize that the Act's purpose is not merely to encourage
private enforcement of civil rights, but to encourage meritorious civil
is insufficient that claims were not rejected on their merits, the primary relief sought must
be obtained).
190. 713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1983).
191. Id. at 557.
192. Id.; see also City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(attorneys' fees award not required to be proportionate to amount of damages civil rights
plaintiffs recovered).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
194. Nephew v. City of Aurora, 766 F.2d 1464 (10th Cir. 1985).
195. The police officers had filed suit against the plaintiffs in state court alleging assault
and battery. This suit was later dismissed by stipulation and is irrelevant for purposes of
this article. Id. at 1465 n.l.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1467.
198. 713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1983).
199. Nephew, 766 F.2d at 1465.
200. Id. at 1465-66.
201. 719 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
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rights claims.20 2 The court concluded that "results obtained" is an im-
portant factor that must be considered in determining the reasonable-
ness of a fees award.
20 3
In a forceful dissent, Judge McKay argued that civil rights suits seek
to vindicate constitutional rights and their success should not be a func-
tion of the amount of damages awarded. 20 4 He viewed the court's reli-
ance on Hensley and Cooper as misplaced. According to Judge McKay,
Hensley and Cooper both dealt with multiple claims and stand for the prin-
ciple that a reduction in fees awards is required when plaintiffs prevail
on less than all of the claims they have asserted. 20 5 In Nephew, the plain-
tiffs prevailed on their only claim.
C. Nephew v. City of Aurora: An Analysis
The Nephew court erroneously relied on Hensley v. Eckerhart.
2 06
Hensley did not address the problem of single-claim cases. Therefore,
the Nephew court should have relied on Ramos and its correct statement
of Hensley that the results-obtained factor should be used to reduce fees
awards only in cases where multiple claims are brought and some of the
claims have failed.
20 7
The Hensley rationale withstands closer scrutiny. If a plaintiff ad-
vances five claims and is successful on only two, the question of whether
he has prevailed in the case as a whole is inextricably intertwined with
how close the results obtained are to the results sought. Success in such
a case is necessarily a matter of degree and the only equitable measure
of that degree lies in a qualitative examination of the results obtained.
Fairness to a defendant requires that an award be adjusted so that
the degree of success can be measured and limited proportionately.
Fairness to a plaintiff requires that the time and effort expended to the
extent of success realized be rewarded. To mechanistically disallow an
award because of partial success would create unnecessary apprehen-
sions in bringing multiple, possibly meritorious claims.
In a single-claim action, however, success and vindication of civil
rights grievances are immediately discernible by a jury verdict or court
judgment. The fact that actual damages are nominal in no way detracts
from the social benefit achieved from a plaintiff's efforts in bringing a
suit, or from the fact that a constitutional wrong was committed. It fol-
lows that nominal awards in multiple-claim suits should not be consid-
ered in reducing a fees award. The victory in Nephew demonstrates as
much. Aurora police officers should be deterred from engaging in the
202. Id. at 1502 (emphasis added). The Cooper court viewed section 1988 as "strik[ing]
a delicate balance, encouraging civil rights litigation where success can be achieved
through a reasonable expenditure of legal services." Id.
203. Id. at 1466 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)).
204. Id. at 1467-68 (McKay, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 1467 (McKay, J., dissenting).
206. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
207. See Ramos, 713 F.2d at 556.
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type of behavior that gave rise to discriminatory practices following this
case despite the fact that only nominal damages were awarded.
Judge McKay correctly noted in his dissent that a civil rights "inter-
est is vindicated whenever a plaintiff proves, in open court, that he or
she has suffered discrimination. '20 8 Section 1988 was enacted to en-
courage just such vindication.
20 9
Hugh S. Pixler
208. Nephew, 766 F.2d at 1467 (McKay, J., dissenting).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 169-75.
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COMMERCIAL AND CORPORATE LAW
OVERVIEW
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ana-
lyzed a variety of issues within the scope of commercial and corporate
jurisprudence. The court considered tort claims arising from competi-
tive takeover bids,I the applicability of "force majeure" clauses, 2 and the
preemptive nature of federal copyright statutes. 3 In the sphere of cor-
porate governance, the Tenth Circuit discussed piercing the corporate
veil,4 and post-dissolution liability for criminal acts committed by corpo-
rations and partnerships.5 Cases in the banking area resulted in a dis-
cussion regarding the subtle distinctions between a bank and a "non-
bank" bank, 6 and limitations on the use of the ultra vires defense by bank
officers. 7 This article will examine these significant Tenth Circuit
decisions.
I. CLAIMS OF TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT AND WITH
PROSPECTIVE BUSINESS ADVANTAGE PROVIDE No PROTECTION
TO TAKEOVER BIDDERS OUTDONE BY COMPETITIVE
TENDER OFFERS
R-G Denver, Ltd. v. First City Holdings of Colorado, Inc. ,8 involved com-
peting efforts to purchase the assets of the Denver Real Estate Invest-
ment Association ("DREIA"), a business trust with assets consisting of
real and personal property. 9 R-G Denver was a limited partnership
formed for the purpose of acquiring the assets of DREIA. First City
Holdings was a corporation that owned, together with other parties, ap-
proximately six percent of DREIA's stock.' 0 Like R-G Denver, First City
Holdings was interested in taking control of DREIA. 1
A. Factual Background
On July 17, 1980, R-G Denver entered into a contract with DREIA
to purchase DREIA's assets for $42,540,000.12 The value of this offer to
1. R-G Denver, Ltd. v. First City Holdings of Colorado, Inc., 789 F.2d 1469 (10th
Cir. 1986).
2. International Minerals and Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879 (10th Cir.
1985).
3. Ehat v. Tanner, 780 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1985), cert.denied, 107 S. Ct. 86 (1986).
4. Inryco, Inc. v. CGR Bldg. Sys., 780 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1986); and McCulloch Gas
Transmission Co. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 768 F.2d 1199 (10th Cir. 1985).
5. United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 776 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1986).
6. Oklahoma Bankers Ass'n v. Fed. Reserve Bd., 776 F.2d 1446 (10th Cir. 1986).
7. Ries Biologicals, Inc. v. Bank of Santa Fe, 780 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1986).
8. 789 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1986).
9. Id. at 1471.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1472.
12. Id. at 1471.
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DREIA shareholders was $32.00 per share, with a possibility for $34.00
per share if certain conditions were met.
1 3
The agreement specifically required: 1) that a majority of DREIA
shareholders approve the takeover at a meeting called for that purpose;
2) that DREIA pursue favorable tax rulings from the Internal Revenue
Service; and 3) that DREIA consult with R-G Denver's counsel when
preparing the necessary proxy materials. 14 If shareholder approval was
not obtained by October 15, 1980, the contract provided that either
party could terminate the agreement by providing written notice; other-
wise, termination would automatically occur on December 31, 1980.15
On August 12, 1980, First City Holdings filed a Schedule 13D 16
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, indicating that it had ac-
quired over five percent of DREIA's common stock and that it might be
interested in obtaining control of DREIA or its assets. On September
15, 1980, First City Holdings informed DREIA of its intention to make a
tender offer at $35.00 per share. 17 First City Holdings withdrew its
tender offer on September 18, 1980, but two weeks later offered $36.00
per share for DREIA's assets with terms similar to those proposed by
R-G Denver.' 8 In light of these developments, the DREIA trustees con-
cluded that updated proxies should be solicited. The October fifteenth
shareholders' meeting was therefore adjourned to a later date (January
6, 1981), and no vote was taken on the pending R-G Denver proposal. 19
Shortly thereafter, First City Holdings increased its offer to $37.15
per share. 20 Proxies were again sent out, the DREIA board announced
its support for this new offer, and, at a price of $37.15 per share, First
City Holdings was able to acquire nearly 80% of the outstanding DREIA
shares. 2 1 Then, at the rescheduled shareholders' meeting on January 6,
1981, First City Holdings, now in control of DREIA, abstained from vot-
ing on R-G Denver's proposed acquisition. As a result, that plan was not
approved.
2 2
In its suit, R-G Denver first asserted that First City Holdings tor-
tiously interfered with a contract by making bad faith tender offers for
the sole purpose of manipulating the fiduciary duties of DREIA's trust-
ees. 23 The trial court, 24 relying on Great Western Producers Cooperative v.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1472.
16. Id. A Schedule 13D is required to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission when any entity acquires more than 5% beneficial ownership of a company. The
schedule must be filed within 10 days of the acquisition and a copy must be given to the
issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(d)(l) (1982).
17. R-G Denver, 789 F.2d at 1472.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1473.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. Also at that meeting, DREIA, controlled by First City Holdings, paid $200,000
to R-G Denver as a mutual release of liability.
23. Id. For a general discussion of tender offer litigation, see Loewenstein, Tender
Offer Litigation and State Law, 63 N.C.L. REV. 493 (1985).
[Vol. 64:2
COMMERICAL LA W
Great Western United Corp. ,25 held that there was no breach of agreement
where a contractual duty became inconsistent with fiduciary duties, re-
gardless of tortious interference.
26
R-G Denver's second cause of action was a claim for tortious inter-
ference with prospective business and economic advantage. 27 R-G Den-
ver asserted that First City Holdings' actions were in bad faith and that
the "now you see it, now you don't" tender offer was made with the
express intent of preventing the October fifteenth shareholder vote.
28
The trial court, granting summary judgment in favor of First City Hold-
ings, reasoned that First City Holdings' actions were within the bounds
of proper competition.
2 9
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
Judge Cook, 30 writing for the Tenth Circuit, affirmed the trial
court's decision. The court enumerated five elements necessary to
prove a claim of tortious interference with a contract:
(1) an existing valid contract between plaintiff and a third
party; (2) knowledge by the defendant of this contract, or
knowledge of facts which should lead him to inquire as to the
existence of same; (3) intent by the defendant to induce a
breach of contract by the third party; (4) action by defendant
which induces a breach of the contract; and (5) damage to the
plaintiff.
3 1
The Tenth Circuit found that the instant case failed to meet all of these
elements and that the DREIA trustees had a clear fiduciary duty to in-
form their shareholders of the competing offers from First City
Holdings.
32
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit noted that their decision was based
24. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado, Judge John P.
Moore presiding.
25. 200 Colo. 180, 613 P.2d 873 (1980). In Great Western, the board of directors of a
sugar-refining corporation, organized under Delaware law, entered into an agreement with
a group of sugar beet producers for the sale of Great Western's wholly owned subsidiary.
Under the agreement, Great Western was obligated to use its "best efforts" to obtain
shareholder approval of the sale. Although the Colorado Supreme Court held that under
Delaware law the "best efforts" obligation required Great Western to make a "reasonable,
diligent and good-faith effort" to secure shareholder approval, the "best efforts" clause
did not bind the board to continue recommending approval of the sale in the face of esca-
lating sugar prices. Approval of the sales agreement under these improved circumstances
would be detrimental to the shareholders, and accordingly, Great Western was not sanc-
tioned for eventually ceasing its efforts to obtain shareholder approval. Id. at 180-84, 613
P.2d at 874-76.
26. R-G Denver, 789 F.2d at 1473.
27. Id. at 1475-76.
28. Id. at 1476.
29. Id. at 1476-77.
30. Honorable H. Dale Cook, ChiefJudge, United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. Other members of the court were Circuit
Judges Barrett and Anderson.
31. R-G Denver, 789 F.2d at 1474 (citing Control, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., 32 Colo. App. 384, 513 P.2d 1082 (1973)).
32. Id. at 1474-75.
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on prior case law. In an affirmation of the trial court's holding, Judge
Cook cited Great Western Producers Cooperative v. Great Western United
Corp. 33 where the Colorado Supreme Court held that there is no breach
of an agreement where a board of directors prioritizes its fiduciary du-
ties over its contractual obligations.3 4 The Tenth Circuit further rea-
soned that the R-G Denver/DREIA agreement was not breached by the
failure of the shareholders to conduct a vote on October 15, 1980. The
shareholder approval was merely a prerequisite to be satisfied before the
contemplated transaction could take place. Accordingly, it did not carry
the same consequences as an unfulfilled promise.
35
R-G Denver's second claim - tortious interference with prospec-
tive business and economic advantage - also fell on deaf ears. This
claim was supported by the assertion that First City Holdings' privilege
to compete was lost by its wrongful and improper conduct. The tort of
interference with a prospective business advantage has been previously
established.3 6 However, under these circumstances, the court simply
did not believe that First City Holdings' sole purpose was wrongful, in
bad faith or improper.
3 7
The Tenth Circuit further found that the only breach which may
have been induced was the failure of the shareholders to vote at the
October fifteenth meeting.3 8 However, that vote was not required re-
gardless of intervening events. Shareholder approval was a condition,
not a promise. Therefore, no actual breach - whether induced or not
- occurred. 3 9 The summary judgment of the district court was
affirmed.
C. Analysis
This decision upholds the basic principles of the free enterprise sys-
tem. Once a tender offer is made, the target company is essentially
placed upon an auction block. Shareholders are given the option of
choosing between bidders, and the board of directors has a fiduciary
33. 200 Colo. 180, 613 P.2d 873 (1980).
34. R-G Denver, 789 F.2d at 1475 (relying on the analysis in Great Western, 613 P.2d at
878).
35. Id. at 1474.
36. Id. at 1476. See Dolton v. Capitol Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 642 P.2d 21 (Colo.
App. 1981). See generally Comment, Interference with a Prospective Business Relationship: An Old
Tort for the New Marketplace, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 123 (1983).
Colorado courts have adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768(1) (1977),
which provides in pertinent part:
(1) One who intentionally causes a third person not to enter into a prospective
contractual relation with another who is his competitor . . . does not interfere
improperly with the other's relation if
(a) the relation concerns a matter involved in the competition between the actor
and the other and
(b) the actor does not employ wrongful means and
(c) his action does not create or continue an unlawful restraint of trade and
(d) his purpose is at least in part to advance his interest in competing with the
other.
37. R-G Denver, 789 F.2d at 1477.




duty to inform the shareholders of all offers. The current trend of
"shark repellents ' 4 0 and "poison pills"' 4 1 may inhibit the initial offeror,
but for a company that wants to deter takeovers, once the initial offer is
made, there is nothing to prevent it from winding up on the auction
block, thereby allowing shareholders to take advantage of the highest
offer.
4 2
The principle of free market competition in tender offers was also
upheld by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hanson Trust PLC v.
SCM Corp.4 3 SCM, a prime target for a takeover, became the subject of a
bidding contest. SCM sought a preliminary injunction barring purchas-
ers, their officers, agents, and employees from acquiring shares in SCM
and also from exercising any voting rights with respect to shares previ-
ously acquired.
4 4
The Second Circuit acknowledged the legislative intent of the Wil-
liams Act,4 5 which was to avoid favoring either existing corporate man-
agement or outsiders seeking control through tender offers. The
Second Circuit stated that: "In this context the preliminary injunction,
which is one of the most drastic tools in the arsenal ofjudicial remedies,
must be used with great care, lest the forces of the free-marketplace,
which in the end should determine the merits of take over disputes, are
nullified." 
46
II. THE DISTINCTION IN APPLICABILITY BETWEEN "FORCE MAJEURE"
AND ADJUSTMENT CLAUSES WHEN SUPERVENING
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS AFFECT
PERFORMANCE UNDER A CONTRACT
In International Minerals and Chemical Corp. v. Llano, Inc. ,47 the Tenth
40. The expression "shark repellent" refers to the defensive tactic employed by some
vulnerable companies whereby stock repurchase programs are implemented in order to
strengthen the control of friendly shareholders. T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGU-
LATION 380 (1985). See, e.g., LTV v. Grumman Corp., 526 F. Supp. 106 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(corporation and pension plan made market purchases of more than I million shares of
corporation's own stock in a single day to prevent tender offeror from acquiring majority
control).
41. The term "poison pill," used to describe the most recent defensive mechanism in
the arsenal of corporate take over weapons, refers to preferred stock or warrants, issued by
the board of directors without shareholder approval. These new securities have the com-
mon characteristic that the rights of their holders are materially increased if any person
acquires more than a certain fraction of the corporation's common shares. R. HAMILTON,
CORPORATIONs 834 (3d ed. 1986); see, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346
(Del. 1985).
42. In a less positive vein, an argument could be made that this decision seems to
encourage non-disclosure of takeover offers and negotiations in an era where disclosure
has previously been encouraged, if not required. See Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185
(7th Cir. 1985); Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986); see aLso NEW YORK
STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL § 202.05 (1983); AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE GUIDE
§ 401 (1983); NASD MANUAL Schedule D, Part II.
43. 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985).
44. Id. at 50.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1), (6) (1982).
46. Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 60.
47. 770 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1985).
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Circuit reversed the district court and remanded with directions to allow
a buyer, under a "take or pay" natural gas requirements contract, the
protection of a payment-adjustment clause when the contract's "force
majeure" clause was deemed inapplicable due to the lack of timely noti-
fication to the seller. The buyer had raised the "force majeure" defense
when subsequently-enacted state environmental regulations resulted in
modification to the buyer's mine processing facility.
48
A. Factual Background
International Minerals and Chemical Corporation ("IMC") oper-
ated a potash mine and processing facility near Carlsbad, New Mexico.
4 9
Llano supplied IMC with the natural gas required to operate the mine's
processing facility.50 Under the contract, IMC was obligated to take, at
a minimum, a daily average of 4800 million Btu's of Llano's gas. 5 1 IMC
was further committed to pay for this minimum amount of gas, whether
it was accepted or not.5 2 The contract also contained a "force majeure"
clause, which provided for certain unexpected exigencies.
5 3
At the commencement of the contract, emissions from IMC's mine
were not regulated. However, in December 1978, the New Mexico Envi-
ronmental Improvement Board promulgated Regulation 508, 54 which
limited emissions from potash processing equipment. Compliance was
required "as expeditiously as practicable, and not later than December
31, 1982." 5 5 Following extensive study and testing, IMC determined
that its best hope for compliance with Regulation 508 was to experiment
with a "salting out process" 5 6 which required less gas consumption.
Llano was notified that IMC's gas consumption would be 50 to 60 per-
cent of normal usage during the testing period. 5 7 However, this notifi-
cation did not inform Llano that the reduction was in response to
environmental regulations, or that the reduced gas consumption might
48. See generally J. Becker, Force Majeure and State Intervention in U.S. Law, Ir'L Bus.
LAW, 283-86 (June 1985). See also Note, Force Majeure Clause as Defense In Gas Delivery Con-
tract, 112 PUB. UrsL. FORT. 60 (July 21, 1983).
49. International Minerals, 770 F.2d at 881.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 881-82. This is a typical "take and or pay" provision used throughout the
natural gas industry. The purpose is to compensate the seller for being ready to deliver at
all times, frequently at the exclusion of other customers. Id.; see also Utah Int'l, Inc. v.
Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, 425 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Colo. 1976) ("take or pay" coal purchase
contract); Mobile Oil Corp. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 387 F. Supp. 498 (N.D. Ala. 1974)
("take or pay" electricity contract).
53. International Minerals, 770 F.2d at 882, 885. The "force majeure" clause provided
that either party would be excused from performance if failure or delay in performance
was occasioned by events such as fire, flood, acts of God, or the interference of civil and/or
military authorities. The party seeking to be excused from performance was required to
provide immediate notice of all pertinent facts and to take reasonable steps to prevent the
problem. Further, the seller was to be entitled to six months' notice before the buyer
could be excused. Id.






become permanent due to a "force majeure" situation. 58
IMC was in compliance with Regulation 508 on March 20, 1981,
twenty-three months before the regulation deadline. As a result, during
the last eighteen months of the contract, IMC did not accept its mini-
mum obligation of gas from Llano.
5 9
IMC sought relief in the form of a declaratory judgment, hoping to
release the company from the contractual obligation to pay for the un-
used natural gas. Llano counterclaimed for the amount due under the
contract, $3,564,617.12.6o The trial court found that IMC was liable to
Llano for the full value of the gas not accepted, despite the fact that
Llano had been able to sell the gas elsewhere for a higher price than
IMC's purchase price. 6 1 The trial court reasoned that the U.C.C. doc-
trine of impossibility/impracticability, as codified in N.M. STAT. ANN. §
55-2-615 (1978),62 was not applicable in this case because, by its terms,
it applies only to sellers. 6 3 Additionally, the trial court based its deci-
sion on Official Comment 9,64 which limits the section's applicability to
buyers, "where the buyer's contract is in reasonable commercial under-
standing conditioned on a definite and specific venture or assump-
tion."'6 5 The trial court also held that the "force majeure" clause could
not excuse the buyer's contractual obligation unless Regulation 508 ab-
solutely prohibited IMC's daily purchase of 4800 million Btu's of gas.
6 6
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit rejected IMC's argument for relief based upon
the "force majeure" clause. The court predicated its decision on two
factors: first, IMC's notice to Llano, stating its intention to decrease
consumption, was inadequate because no explanation of the environ-
mental issues was included; and second, Regulation 508 did not, in and
of itself, constitute an obstacle to IMC's ability to pay.
67
However, the Tenth Circuit found relief on another basis, allowing
58. Id. at 884.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 881.
61. Id. at 884.
62. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-615 (1978), titled "Excuse by failure of presupposed con-
ditions," provides in pertinent part:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the
preceding section . . .on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or nondelivery in whole or in part by a seller ... is not a
breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been
made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency, the non-occurrence of
which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, or by compliance
in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or
order whether or not it later proves to be invalid; ...
International Minerals, 770 F.2d at 885 n.2. For a discussion of § 2-615 of the U.C.C., see
Prance, Commercial Impracticability: A Textual and Economic Analysis of Section 2-615 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 19 IND. L. REV. 457-95 (1986).
63. International Materials, 770 F.2d at 885 n.2.
64. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-615 (Official Comment 9, 1978).
65. International Minerals, 770 F.2d at 884.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 885.
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protection for IMC under the "minimum bill" or payment-adjustment
provision of the contract. This clause provided that, "in the event the
buyer is unable to receive gas as provided in the Contract for any reason
beyond the reasonable control of the parties, then an appropriate adjustment
in the minimum purchase requirements . . .shall be made."'6 8 Having
determined this provision to be applicable, the court then defined the
issue as: "[d]id the promulgation of Regulation 508 constitute an event
beyond the reasonable control of IMC that rendered IMC 'unable' to
receive its minimum amount of gas under the contract?"
6 9
The Tenth Circuit, in this circumstance, defined "unable" as being
synonymous with "impracticable," thereby allowing the court to take ad-
vantage of common law and statutory interpretations of "impracticabil-
ity." 70 In Wood v. Bartolino,7 1 the New Mexico Supreme Court, relying
on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981),72 described
the doctrine of impracticability as applying when "the promised per-
formance was . . .[made] impracticable owing to some extreme or un-
reasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss."' 73 The unanticipated
circumstances must make performance "vitally different from [the origi-
nal] contemplation of both parties." 74 The critical issue in applying the
doctrine of impracticability, as determined by the Third Circuit's hold-
ing in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Commission,7 5 is "whether the cost of
performance has in fact become so excessive and unreasonable that the
failure to excuse performance would result in grave injustice."
'76
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 264 (1981), and §
55-2-615 N.M. STAT. ANN., also allow for performance to be excused
when made impracticable by required compliance with a supervening
governmental regulation. This principle was illustrated in Kansas City,
Missouri v. Kansas City, Kansas,77 where the district court held that the
obligation of one city to accept another city's sewage was excused by the
enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
78
The Tenth Circuit found that there was "no technically suitable way
for IMC to comply" 79 with the environmental regulation without de-
creasing gas consumption, and therefore the payment-adjustment provi-
sion of the contract was properly triggered. The court said that the
adjustment clause should result in a minimum bill to IMC, based upon
68. Id. at 886 (emphasis in original).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 48 N.M. 175, 146 P.2d 883 (1944).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 comment d (1981). For a general
discussion on the doctrine of impracticability, see D. Jacobs, Legal Realism or Legal Fiction?
Impracticability Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 87 CoM. L. J. 289-98 (1982).
73. Wood, 146 P.2d at 886.
74. Id. (quoting 6 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1931 (1938)).
75. 563 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978).
76. Id. at 599.
77. 393 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
78. See also City of Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 45 Cal. 2d 710, 290 P.2d 841
(1955).
79. International Minerals, 770 F.2d at 886-87.
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the difference between IMC's minimum purchase obligation and the
value of the gas actually accepted.
8 0
Llano argued that there was no supervening impracticability be-
cause IMC was in final compliance with Regulation 508 long before the
required date. Llano contended that IMC should have delayed compli-
ance in order to take and use the gas as required by the contract. 8 ' The
court emphatically rejected this argument, first on public policy
grounds, and second "as a matter of law, [declaring that] government
policy need not be explicitly mandatory to cause impracticability."
'8 2
C. Analysis
In International Minerals, the court implicitly balanced the enforce-
ability of commercial contracts against the public need for environmen-
tal regulation. IMC was required by law to meet the standards of
Regulation 508 and as a good corporate citizen it endeavored to abide
by the law. If the court had additionally required IMC to fulfill its previ-
ous contractual obligations, the costs involved would have made compli-
ance with this type of governmental regulation an even more difficult
pill for the corporation to swallow.
It is important for the drafters of commercial contracts to include
both a "force majeure" clause and a payment-adjustment clause. These
clauses should be skillfully drafted in light of the contract they support,
the intentions of the contracting parties, and with a wary eye toward
unexpected future exigencies. The terms of the "force majeure" clause,
if triggered, will be strictly construed. If the "force majeure" clause is
deemed inapplicable, then the outcome of any dispute may likely be de-
termined by the underlying adjustment clause.
The actions of the corporation after execution of the contract, and
after some exigency has arisen, is also critical. IMC's mistake was in its
failure to fully notify Llano as to the reasons for its reduction in con-
sumption. As a result, the adjustment clause was triggered instead of
the "force majeure" clause. In the final analysis, however, equity was
served. IMC was not required to pay for gas which Llano never deliv-
ered and, in fact, sold elsewhere.
The applicability of a "force majeure" clause was similarly ex-
amined by the Second Circuit, in Phillips Puerto Rico Core, Inc. v. Tradax
Petroleum, Ltd.8 3 There, the Coast Guard's detention of a cargo ship did
not frustrate the purpose of the contract, nor did it prevent the buyer
from carrying out his obligation. The seller's only obligation was to de-
liver the goods to the carrier; any event that occurred after delivery to
the cargo ship was of no concern to the seller. Here, as in the Interna-
tional Minerals decision, the "force majeure" clause did not excuse
performance.
80. Id. at 887.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 782 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1985).
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III. PREEMPTION BY FEDERAL COPYRIGHT LAWS
In Ehat v. Tanner,84 the Tenth Circuit upheld the efficacy of 17
U.S.C. § 301 (a), 8 5 the federal copyright preemption statute, and denied
relief to an individual whose action was based on state common law
claims. The court reasoned that the common law rights were equivalent
to "exclusive rights" within the scope of the federal copyright statutes,
and were thus preempted.
A. Factual Background
Ehat was a scholar doing post-graduate research on the history of
the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints (the LDS Church).
8 6
In the process of his research, Ehat took quotes from and made written
notations on the William Clayton Journals. 87 Ehat gave this information
to a colleague. The materials were surreptitiously taken from the col-
league's office, copied and returned.8 8 One of the unauthorized copies
was obtained by the Tanners, who blacked out Ehat's comments, repro-
duced the journal quotes and sold them to the public.8 9
Ehat's suit was based on a claim under the federal copyright stat-
utes, and on state common law claims for unfair competition and unjust
enrichment. 90 The trial court granted summary judgment for the de-
fendants on the claim under the federal copyright statutes. 9 1 However,
a bench trial was conducted on Ehat's state common law claims and Ehat
prevailed. 92 The Tanners appealed and the Tenth Circuit reversed.
B. Legal Background
The Copyright Act of 197693 amended federal copyright law to pre-
empt state law. The amendment was intended to prevent "the States
from protecting .. .[a work] even if it fails to achieve federal statutory
copyright because it is too minimal or lacking in originality to qualify, or
84. 780 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 86 (1986).
85. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982) provides:
On and afterJanuary 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102
and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or un-
published, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled
to any such rights or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or
statutes of any State.
86. Ehat, 780 F.2d at 877.
87. William Clayton was the private secretary to Joseph Smith, the first president of
the LDS Church. The journals were maintained by Clayton between 1842 and 1846. Id. at
877 n. I.





93. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-305, et seq. (1982); see supra note 85.
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because it has fallen into the public domain."' 94 In Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc.,95 the Supreme Court established that a state law for-
bidding others to copy an article "unprotected ...by a copyright ...
would interfere with the federal policy, found in art. I, section 8, cl. 8, of
the Constitution, and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing
free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave
in the public domain." 96
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,97 the Second
Circuit held that 17 U.S.C. § 301 preempted state common law or state
statutory claims when two conditions were present. First, the work in
question must be within the scope of the "subject matter of copyright"
as defined in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103;98 and second, the rights
granted under state law must be equivalent to any exclusive rights within
the scope of federal copyright as provided in 17 U.S.C. § 106.99 Rely-
ing on the parameters of Compco and Harper & Row, Judge Seymour ren-
dered the opinion for the Tenth Circuit.10 0
C. The Tenth Circuit Decision
Applying the criteria set forth under section 301, the court deter-
mined that Ehat's work was within the subject matter of the copy-
94. Ehat, 780 F.2d at 877 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 131,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5747).
95. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
96. Id. at 237; see also Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1980).
97. 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
98. Copyright protection is afforded to "works of authorship," including:
(1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dra-
matic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreo-
graphic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures
and other visual works; and (7) sound recordings.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). In addition, 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1982) provides:
The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations
and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in
which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such
material has been used unlawfully.
17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1982) sets forth that:
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting
material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the
preexisting material.
99. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) states:
[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies
or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in
the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly; and (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreo-
graphic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including
the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display
the copyrighted work publicly.
See infra note 103; see also Schuchart & Assoc. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928 (W.D.
Tex. 1982); I.M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 1.01[B] at 1-19 (1985).
100. Seymour, Circuit Judge, authored the opinion for the three-judge panel including
Chief Justice Holloway and Judge Babcock.
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right,' 0 ' and that the state common law rights asserted by Ehat and the
exclusive rights encompassed by the federal copyright laws were
equivalent.' 0 2 Accordingly, Ehat's claims were denied.
In its decision, the court cited the federal copyright law, specifically
17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1) and (3), which create an exclusive right to the
owner of the copyright " 'to reproduce the copyrighted work' " and " 'to
distribute copies' " to the public for sale.' 0 3 However, the court noted
that Ehat's materials had not been copyrighted, nor was his claim based
upon any deprivation of rights in the works as "physical matter and
property."'1 0 4 Instead, Ehat's claims were for damages flowing from Tan-
ners' reproduction and distribution. 10 5 The court intimated that had
Ehat's cause of action been based on a state law claim of conversion -




Federal copyright law will preempt any state common law or statu-
tory claims which may fall within the "exclusive rights" scope of the
copyright law. One must carefully structure claims to be outside of this
scope when attempting to utilize state statutory or common law and,
even then, the likelihood for a successful outcome is uncertain.
IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. Piercing the Corporate Veil
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit reviewed two cases re-
garding piercing of the corporate veil. In McCulloch Gas Transmission Co.
v. Kansas-Nebrasha Natural Gas Co., 107 the Tenth Circuit refused, in an
alter ego situation,' 0 8 to pierce the corporate veil absent a showing that
failure to do so would "defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect
101. Ehat, 780 F.2d at 878. "Literary works, including compilations and derivative
works, are within the subject matter of copyright if they are original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression." Id.; see supra note 98.
102. Ehat, 780 F.2d at 878.
103. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 200.
When a right defined by state law may be abridged by an act which, in and of
itself, would infringe one of the exclusive rights, the state law in question must be
deemed preempted .... Conversely, when a state law violation is predicated
upon an act incorporating elements beyond mere reproduction or the like, the
rights involved are not equivalent and preemption will not occur.
Id.
104. Ehat, 780 F.2d at 878.
105. Id. The court's view of Ehat's claim was based in part on the $960 damages
awarded (improperly) by the trial court. This amount represented the Tanners' profit
from distribution of the copies. Id.
106. Id.
107. 768 F.2d 1199 (10th Cir. 1985).
108. The alter ego doctrine fastens liability on the individual who uses a corporation
merely as an instrumentality to conduct his or her personal business, and such liability
arises from fraud or injustice perpetrated on persons dealing with the corporation. The
corporate form may be disregarded only where equity so requires. I W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41 (1983 & Supp. 1986).
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fraud, or defend crime." 109 In Inryco, Inc. v. CGR Building Systems, Inc., 
0
the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite result and allowed a creditor to
pierce the corporate veil of an under-capitalized corporation.
1. McCulloch Gas Transmission Co. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas
Co. - The Alter Ego Situation
a. Factual Background
The McCulloch suit was the result of an alleged breach of a gas
purchase contract. In 1969, McCulloch Gas entered into a 20-year con-
tract with Northern Utilities."1I The contract contained a "take or pay"
clause which eventually came into dispute. 1 2 In August 1974, Northern
Utilities assigned the contract to Northern Gas. One month later, Kan-
sas-Nebraska Natural Gas Company acquired all the stock of Northern
Utilities and Northern Gas. It is not disputed that Kansas-Nebraska is
the alter ego of its wholly owned subsidiaries, Northern Utilities and
Northern Gas.' 13 In 1982, McCulloch Gas brought this breach of con-
tract action against Kansas-Nebraska and Northern Gas. The trial
court,' 14 relying on the alter ego relationship, pierced the corporate veil
of the wholly owned subsidiaries of Kansas-Nebraska. 1 15
b. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Russell, 1 6 re-
versed, holding that alter ego status alone is insufficient for piercing the
corporate veil. Instead, the court set forth a two-prong test. In addition
to a finding of alter ego - the first prong - the Tenth Circuit, relying
on Langdon v. Lutheran Brotherhood, 1 7 established a second prong requir-
ing a showing that failure to pierce the corporate veil would "defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime."
1 18
The instant case gave no indication that McCulloch would suffer any
hardship by a failure to pierce the corporate veil. 119 Therefore, the case
was reversed and remanded.
109. McCulloch, 768 F.2d at 1199, 1200.
110. 780 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1986).
111. McCulloch, 768 F.2d at 1200.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming.
115. McCulloch, 768 F.2d at 1200.
116. Sitting by designation, the Honorable David L. Russell, United States District
Judge for the Northern, Eastern and Western Districts of Oklahoma. Other members of
the panel included Chief Justice Holloway and Judge McKay.
117. 625 P.2d 209, 213 (Wyo. 1981).
118. McCulloch, 768 F.2d at 1200 (citing Langdon v. Lutheran Bhd., 625 P.2d 209
(Wyo. 1981)). The court in Langdon quoted 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 108. See also Wyo-
ming Constr. Co. v. Western Casualty and Sur. Co., 275 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 976 (1960); State v. Nugget Coal Co., 60 Wyo. 51, 144 P.2d 944 (1944).
119. McCulloch, 768 F.2d at 1201.
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c. Analysis
Generally speaking, courts are extremely reluctant to pierce the cor-
porate veil.120 The general rule, subject to various exceptions, has been
that a corporate entity will be recognized, not disregarded.' 2 1 This the-
ory will govern as long as it is utilized for legitimate purposes. 122 In the
past, the alter ego theory has been employed where the corporate entity
was used as a subterfuge. 12 3 In McCulloch, the Tenth Circuit has main-
tained the traditional reluctance to pierce the corporate veil by estab-
lishing an additional requirement of showing that if the corporate veil is
not pierced, the result will "defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud, or defend crime."1 24 The protective corporate shield, ab-
sent this showing, remains resilient.
2. Inryco, Inc. v. CGR Building Systems, Inc. - Notification of
Partnership's Creditors Required Upon Incorporation.
In contrast to the result reached in McCulloch Gas, the Tenth Cir-
cuit's Inryco decision allowed a creditor to pierce the corporate veil of an
under-capitalized corporation, thereby exposing the shareholders to lia-
bilities which they had incurred earlier as partners in a prior general
partnership.
a. Factual Background
CGR was originally formed in May of 1980, as a general partner-
ship. 125 The partnership's primary business was selling building sup-
plies. Soon after starting operations, CGR became a dealer for products
supplied by Inryco.1
2 6
The original CGR partnership interests were evenly divided in
thirds among the Reiman family and two other partners. 127 Inryco ex-
tended credit to CGR based upon the financial strength of the partners,
with particular reliance on the Reimans. In 1982, the other two partners
withdrew from CGR. 12 8 CGR then incorporated with little change in
operation; the same personnel, letterhead, logo and accounts were em-
ployed by the new corporation. 129 Additionally, at the time of incorpo-
120. H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, LAWS Or CORPORATIONS 344, 346 (3d ed. 1983).
121. United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (E.D. Wis.
1905).
122. Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 473, 480-82 (1953).
123. McCulloch, 768 F.2d at 1200 (quoting 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 108). See generally
Lopez, The Alter Ego Doctrine: Alternative Challenges to the Corporate Form, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
129 (1982); Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law,
95 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1982).
124. McCulloch, 768 F.2d at 1200.
125. Inryco, 780 F.2d 879, 880 (10th Cir. 1986).






ration, CGR had serious cash flow problems 130 and some corporate
formalities were not observed. Adequate books of accounts were not
maintained and the board of directors' meetings and shareholder meet-
ings were not held. 13 1 Moreover, although CGR had been instructed to
discuss all credit-related matters with a Mr. Petrie of Inryco, he never
received notice of CGR's incorporation.1
32
By 1983, CGR owed Inryco $40,000, of which $25,000 was incurred
after incorporation.13 3 Inryco brought suit to collect this debt,134 nam-
ing CGR Building Systems, Inc. and its three shareholders, the Reimans,
as defendants. There was no dispute that the Reimans were personally
liable for that part of the debt incurred under the general partner-
ship. 13 5 However, in addition to that amount, Inryco contended that
the CGR corporate veil should be pierced, and that the Reimans should
also be liable for the $25,000 debt incurred after incorporation. 13 6 The
trial court agreed with Inryco's contentions and entered judgment ac-
cordingly.' 3 7 The Reimans and CGR appealed.
b. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion by Circuit Judge William E.
Doyle, 13 8 affirmed the trial court decision. Relying on Wyoming case
law, the Tenth Circuit set forth a variety of factors to be considered
when determining the propriety of piercing the corporate veil. The
court said that each determination should be made on a case by case
basis in light of the particular facts presented therein.13 9 The separate
corporate identity will be disregarded, if necessary, to promote public
policy, to further justice, or to prevent unjust or inequitable conse-
quences.' 40 The court noted that actual corporate fraud is not required;
however, gross undercapitalization or complete domination of corpo-
rate affairs by individual shareholders will greatly increase the possibility
of the corporate veil being pierced.' 4 1 On this basis, the Tenth Circuit
130. Id. At incorporation, CGR "had approximately $1,500 in its checking account,
owned no assets of significant value, and had accounts payable far in excess of the com-
bined value of its assets." Id. at 882.
131. Id. at 881.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming,
Chief Judge Clarence A. Brimmer, Jr.
135. Inryco, 780 F.2d at 881.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 880. Inryco was awarded $39,999.76 by the trial court. Id.
138. Sitting as member of a three-judge panel comprised ofJudge Barrett, Judge Mc-
Williams and Judge Doyle.
139. Inryco, 780 F.2d at 881 (citing Yost v. Harpel, 674 P.2d 712 (Wyo. 1983); Opal
Mercantile v. Tamblyn, 616 P.2d 776 (Wyo. 1980)).
140. Yost, 674 P.2d at 712; AMFAC Mechanical Supply Co. v. Federer, 645 P.2d 73
(Wyo. 1982); Opal Mercantile, 616 P.2d at 776; Peters Grazing Ass'n v. Legerski, 544 P.2d
449 (Wyo. 1975), reh'g denied, 546 P.2d 189 (Wyo. 1976).
141. AMFAC Mechanical Supply, 645 P.2d at 79; State v. Nugget Coal Co., 144 P.2d 944
(Wyo. 1944); Caldwell v. Roach, 44 Wyo. 319, 12 P.2d 376 (1932). For a succinct analysis
of AMFAC Mechanical Supply, see Note, A Prima Fade Case for Piercing the Corporate Veil,
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determined that the trial court was correct in piercing the corporate
veil. 1
4 2
CGR had asserted that since notice of the incorporation was con-
veyed to Inryco's sales agent, Mr. Reedy, the corporate veil should not
be pierced, because Reedy's knowledge should be imputed to Inryco.143
At the time, however, Reedy was also a CGR shareholder. 14 4 Although
a general rule of agency law provides that the knowledge of an agent
may be imputed to his principal, 14 5 where an agent is found to have
engaged in transactions which are adverse to the principal, knowledge
or notice will not be imputed. 14 6 Reedy, with financial interests of his
own, failed to communicate notice of CGR's incorporation to Inryco
and, accordingly, the court did not impute notice.
14 7
c. Analysis
During the process of incorporating, and subsequent to actual in-
corporation, it remains of the utmost importance to strictly observe all
corporate formalities and to be adequately capitalized. 148 Additionally,
AMFAC Mechanical Supply Co. v. Federer, 645 P.2d 73 (Wyo. 1982), 18 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 823 (1983).
142. Inryco, 870 F.2d at 882.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 883.
145. W. SEAVEY, AGENCY 174 (1964); see Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. Hauf, 32
Wyo. 127, 230 P. 539 (1924). Generally speaking, corporations will be bound by knowl-
edge acquired by, or notice given to, its agents or officers which is within the scope of their
authority. American Standard Credit v. National Cement Co., 643 F.2d 248 (5th Cir.
1981); Ritchie Grocer Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1970).
146. Inryco, 780 F.2d at 883 (citing Commercial Bank, 32 Wyo. at 129, 230 P. at 540); see
also SEAvEY, supra note 145, at 184.
147. Inyco, 780 F.2d at 883.
148. Provisions for adequate capitalization and the observance of proper corporate for-
malities will minimize the probability that the corporate entity will be disregarded. The
following checklist, recommended by David H. Barber in his article entitled "Piercing the
Corporate Veil," may assist the practitioner in maintaining a corporation's limited liability:
a. At the time of incorporation:
(1) file articles of incorporation with the proper state and local authorities;
(2) issue stock, providing certificates to all shareholders of record;
(3) provide at least the minimum capital required by law and make sure that all
subscribed shares are actually paid for;
(4) establish a separate bank account in the corporation's name.
b. After incorporation:
(1) hold the annual shareholders' meetings;
(2) hold regular meetings of the board of directors (also include a non-
shareholder on the board);
(3) keep accurate records of all such meetings;
(4) do not commingle corporate and personal funds;
(5) document all loans to the corporation by the shareholders - show the pur-
pose for the loan and the reason that funds were not obtained from outsiders;
(6) if possible, pay regular dividends which represent a reasonable return on
investment;
(7) always use the corporation's name in dealing with the public and require
that authorized parties sign all documents as agents for the corporation, stating
their relationship to the corporation.
c. Capitalization:
(1) document the reason for selecting a given capital structure, including any
comparable businesses studied (and past operating experience, if the entity was
established prior to incorporation);
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when transforming a partnership to a corporation, proper notice to all
creditors is imperative. 14 9 Failure to give notice of the incorporation
can expose individuals to personal liability, thereby defeating one of the
primary advantages of incorporation.
Other circuits have also dealt with this issue recently. The Eighth
Circuit, in Kapp v. Naturelle,150 considered a fact pattern where partners
in a partnership became the shareholders in a subsequent corporation,
and no notice of the incorporation was provided to the partnership's
creditors. The business carried on as it had as a partnership and main-
tained its original name, but with the addition of the word "com-
pany."' 15 1 In Kapp, the corporate veil was pierced and the individual
shareholders were estopped from denying personal liability. 152 The
Seventh and Sixth Circuits have reached similar decisions. 153 There-
fore, the Tenth Circuit's Inryco decision follows precedent from the
other circuits dealing with similar issues.
(2) provide a fixed maturity date and reasonable interest rate for any loan made
to the corporation by a shareholder;
(3) prior to incorporation, discuss the range of contemplated activities and spe-
cifically evaluate the reasonable risks of torts liability associated with the business,
document reasons for selection of the amount of liability insurance, and consult a
competent insurance broker for advice in assessing the risks and getting
insurance;
(4) provide all contracting parties with accurate financial data prior to any con-
tractual agreements;
(5) maintain a balance between debt and equity which is in line with the debt-
equity ratio of other businesses of the same type.
d. Other factors:
(1) avoid diversion of corporate assets or funds to shareholders, parent corpo-
rations, or related entities for other than corporate uses;
(2) do not allow any shareholders or agents of the corporation to represent that
they will be personally responsible for the obligations of the corporation;
(3) do not establish a separate corporation for conducting a single business ven-
ture (particularly one with high risk) unless adequate capital or insurance is pro-
vided for the venture;
(4) make the names of all shareholders available to those who deal with the
corporation.
Barber, Piercing The Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETrE L.J. 371, 402-03 (1981).
149. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text. See generally 8 FLETCHER CYc. CORP.
§§ 4019-20 (1966).
150. 611 F.2d 703, 709 (8th Cir. 1979).
151. Id. at 705-06.
152. Id. at 709.
153. Kingsberry Homes v. Corey, 457 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1972); Northway Lanes v.
Hackley Union Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 464 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1972); see also Melikian v.
Corradetti, 791 F.2d 274 (3d Cir. 1986), where the Third Circuit upheld the sufficiency of
a complaint which expressly alleged that corporate officers, through their single economic
enterprise, used a corporate form to defraud other parties to a contract for the sale of
corn. The case, which involved fraudulent misrepresentations of the corporation, resulted
in the piercing of the corporate veil and held the corporation's principals to be liable on a
judgment against the corporation for breach of the contract. Id. at 281. Cf Kashi v. Grat-
sos, 790 F.2d 1050, 1056-57 (2d Cir. 1986) (principals held individually liable where they
participated in using corporation to perpetrate fraud while disregarding usual corporate
formalities).
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B. Criminal Liability of Corporations and Partnerships for Acts Committed
Prior to Dissolution
The case of United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc. 154 presented the
sole issue of whether dissolved corporations and partnerships may be
prosecuted for crimes committed prior to dissolution.
1. Factual Background
Mobile Materials, Inc. had been in the Oklahoma highway construc-
tion business since 1967.155 The Philpot brothers were the sole share-
holders, directors and officers of the corporation. 15 6 Additionally, these
two brothers did business as Mobile Materials Company, a general part-
nership. 157 Both the corporation and the partnership were dissolved in
1982, after Mobile was served with a subpoena duces tecum issued by a
grand jury investigating bid-rigging on Oklahoma highway construction
projects. In August of 1984, the grand jury returned indictments
against the partnership and corporation, and against one of the Philpot
brothers.158 The indictments included violations of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act, 1 59 the mail fraud statute' 60 and the fraud and false statement
statute. 161
Mobile moved to dismiss the charges on grounds that the compa-
nies had been formally dissolved before the indictments were returned.
The district court, 16 2 relying on United States v. Safeway Stores, 163 dis-
missed the action against both companies on grounds that criminal pro-
ceedings cannot be maintained against Oklahoma corporations and
partnerships which have been dissolved prior to indictment. 164
In Safeway Stores, the Tenth Circuit held that criminal prosecutions
were not encompassed by a California statute, similar to the Oklahoma
statute at issue in this case, which allowed for the continuation of a cor-
poration after dissolution "for the purpose of prosecuting and defend-
ing actions."' 6 5 In Safeway Stores, the court also determined that the
criminal prosecution exception was permissible under the corporate dis-
solution statutes of Nevada and Delaware. 166 Two subsequent cases,
United States Vanadium Corp. v. United States 167 and United States v. Line
Material Co.,168 had upheld the Safeway Stores decision, thereby abating
154. 776 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1986).
155. Id. at 1477.
156. Id.
157. Mobile Materials Company leased heavy equipment to Mobile Materials, Inc. Id.
158. Id.
159. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
162. The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.
163. 140 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1944).
164. Mobile Materials, 776 F.2d at 1477.
165. Safeway Stores, 140 F.2d at 837.
166. Id. at 838.
167. 230 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1956) (criminal action abated upon dissolution).
168. 202 F.2d 929 (6th Cir. 1953) (criminal action abated upon dissolution). But see
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criminal action against corporations upon dissolution.
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
In an opinion by Circuit Judge John P. Moore, the Tenth Circuit
reversed, holding that Melrose Distillers v. United States, 169 overruled
Safeway Stores. In Melrose, the Supreme Court resolved the discrepancies
among the circuits and expanded the Maryland and Delaware statutes to
allow for the continued existence of dissolved corporations so that crim-
inal actions, pending under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, could pro-
ceed.170 It specifically rejected the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the
California statute discussed in Safeway Stores. 171 Mobile argued that Mel-
rose should not be dispositive because that indictment was handed down
prior to dissolution; in Safeway Stores and the instant case, the indictments
were handed down following dissolution. In spite of this distinction, the
Tenth Circuit found Melrose to be controlling and held that the indict-
ment against Mobile must stand. 172 The pivotal inquiry, according to
the court, is whether a statute implies "sufficient vitality" to post-disso-
lution corporate life to subject that corporation to criminal prosecu-
tion. 173 The language of the statute in question provided sufficient
vitality. 174
The Tenth Circuit justified expansion of the statute by interpreting
"actions," as it appears in the statute, 175 to include criminal prosecu-
tion. It also noted that the Oklahoma statute provided for service of
process on dissolved corporations. 176 Accordingly, the court reasoned
that the corporation could be criminally prosecuted.
Moreover, the court determined that the timing of the indictment
was not a deciding factor in the Melrose case. 177 As additional support,
the Tenth Circuit relied on Wewoka Petroleum Corp. v. Gilmore,' 78 where
United States v. P.F. Collier & Son Corp., 208 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1953) (reaching the
opposite result).
169. 359 U.S. 271 (1959).
170. Id. at 273-274.
171. Mobile Materials, 776 F.2d at 1478. "IfSafeway Stores retains any vitality, it is limited
to the proposition that corporate existence following dissolution must be determined
under state law." Id. Safeway Stores has also been rejected in several other cases. See
United States v. BBF Liquidating, Inc., 450 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972); United States v. San Diego Grocers Ass'n, 177 F. Supp. 352
(S.D. Cal. 1959).
172. Mobile Materials, 776 F.2d at 1478. Cf United States v. 2.61 Acres of Land, 791
F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1985) (where the court held that a delinquent corporation could not
bring suit, could not defend a legal action, and could not appeal an adverse ruling. How-
ever, once the corporate powers were reinstated, the corporation's existence was again
recognized and it was then permitted to defend such an action).
173. Mobile Materials, 776 F.2d at 1479.
174. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1.188 (1981) provides that the corporate form remains in-
tact: "[F]or the purpose of winding up its affairs, prosecuting and defending actions by or
against it, and enabling it to collect and discharge obligations."
175. Mobile Materials, 776 F.2d at 1478 n.5.
176. Id. at 1479 (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 1.198b (1981)).
177. Id. at 1476.
178. 319 P.2d 285 (Okla. 1957).
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the Oklahoma Supreme Court refused to dismiss a civil action which was
filed after the corporation dissolved.
One of the last factors cited by the Tenth Circuit in the Mobile Mater-
ials opinion was that of policy rationale. Noting that the Mobile indict-
ment was "not entirely unanticipated" and that dissolution was not
prevented by the threat of criminal prosecution, 179 the court concluded
that it would not be equitable to immunize a corporation from criminal
action by simply allowing dissolution.
3. Conclusion
One "escape hatch" of corporate liability, under Oklahoma law, has
been closed by this case: a corporation can no longer hide behind disso-
lution when seeking protection from criminal prosecution. 180 Further-
more, it is apparently irrelevant whether the indictment is handed down
before or after dissolution. 18 1
The Tenth Circuit's Mobile Materials decision should assist law en-
forcement personnel and prosecutors in their pursuit of corporate
criminals. To rule otherwise would probably create an atmosphere
where corporate criminals could advantageously rely upon the conven-
ience of dissolution any time they sought to avoid responsibility for their
illegal corporate acts.
V. BANKING
A. "Bank" vs. "Nonbank Bank ". Acquisition of a "Nonbank Bank" by an
Out-of-State Holding Company Under the Bank Holding Company
Act
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 ("BHCA")18 2 was enacted
to regulate federally chartered banks, so as to prevent the concentration
of commercial banking activities and to separate banking from com-
merce. 18 3 Among other things, the BHCA restricts the type of out-of-
state subsidiaries which a bank holding company may own. In Oklahoma
Bankers Association v. Federal Reserve Board,184 the Tenth Circuit examined
the subtle parameters governing a bank holding company's acquisition
of out-of-state subsidiaries.
1. Factual Background
The BHCA prohibits a bank holding company from acquiring a
179. Mobile Materials, 776 F.2d at 1480-81.
180. For a historical perspective on the evolution of corporation liability, see Brickley,
Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 393-423
(1982).
181. Mobile Materials, 776 F.2d at 1481.
182. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1982).
183. Wilshire Oil Co. v. Board of Governors, 668 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1981); see also S.
REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2482, 2483.
184. 766 F.2d 1446 (10th Cir. 1985).
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bank located in any state outside of the bank holding company's princi-
pal place of business. 185 Citicorp, the intervenor in this case, met the
definitional requirements for a bank holding company as set forth under
the BHCA. 186 With its principal place of business located in New York,
Citicorp sought to acquire an inactive Oklahoma trust company for the
purpose of operating subsidiary offices in Tulsa and Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma. I8 7 The subsidiaries were to be known as Citicorp Savings
and Trust Company ("CSTC") and were to be managed from the offices
of Citicorp's existing consumer finance subsidiary, Citicorp Person to
Person, in New York. 18 8
In March 1983 Citicorp filed, with the Federal Reserve Board of
New York, its application to purchase the inactive Oklahoma trust com-
pany.' 8 9 Through CSTC, Citicorp proposed to offer de novo services,
consumer and commercial lending and thrift deposits. 190 However, in
an effort to avoid being categorized as a "bank" under the BHCA, Cit-
icorp sought "nonbank bank" status and submitted an application which
expressly stated that demand deposits or other transactional accounts
would not be accepted at CSTC. 19 1
The Oklahoma Bankers Association petitioned the Federal Reserve
Board in opposition to the Citicorp proposal, but the Board approved
Citicorp's application nonetheless, finding that CSTC's limited indus-
trial banking functions fell within the definition of a "nonbank bank"
185. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982). The statute provides that:
[N]o application . . . shall be approved under this section which will permit any
bank holding company or any subsidiary thereof to acquire, directly or indirectly,
any voting shares of, interest in, or all or substantially all of the assets of any
additional bank located outside the State in which the operations of such bank
holding company's bank subsidiaries were principally conducted on July 1, 1966,
or the date on which such company became a bank holding company, whichever
is later, unless the acquisition of such shares or assets of a State bank by an out-
of-State bank holding company is specifically authorized by the statute laws of the
State in which such bank is located, by language to that effect and not merely by
implication. [T]he State in which the operations of a bank holding company's
subsidiaries are principally conducted is that State in which total deposits of all
such banking subsidiaries are largest.
186. A "bank holding company" is defined as "any company which has control over
any bank .... 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1982). A company is deemed to have control over
a bank if (1) it has the power, directly or indirectly, to vote 25 per centum or more of any
class of the bank's stock; (2) it controls - in any manner - the election of a majority of
the bank's directors; or (3) the Board determines that it exercises a controlling influence
over the bank's management or policies. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(A)-(C) (1982).
187. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1448.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. The charter for one of Citicorp's proposed acquisitions listed industrial bank-
ing services which included the:
making or acquiring of loans and other extensions of credit, secured or un-
secured, for consumer and other purposes; the sale of credit related life and acci-
dent and health insurance by licensed agents or brokers, as required; the issuing
of thrift certificates and thrift passbook certificates; [and] the sale of consumer
oriented financial management courses.
48 FED. REG. 14,756 (1983). "Thrift certificates" are defined as "fixed time certificates,
redeemable only after a minimum maturity period." Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1448.
191. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1448.
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under the BHCA. 192 Oklahoma Bankers brought this action after failing
to convince the Board that its approval of Citicorp's application should
be reversed. Citicorp joined as an intervenor.
193
Oklahoma Bankers raised two primary objections to Citicorp's pro-
posed acquisition and CSTC's designation as a "nonbank bank." First,
the association alleged that CSTC was actually a bank under the BHCA,
based upon a theory that characterized CSTC's thrift certificates as de-
mand deposits. 19 4 Second, Oklahoma Bankers contended that since
Oklahoma banking law permits trust companies to accept demand de-
posits, CSTC must necessarily be a bank under the BHCA.I
9 5
The BHCA defines a bank as "[1] an institution which makes com-
mercial loans and [2] accepts 'deposits that the depositor has a legal
right to withdraw on demand.' "196 Oklahoma Bankers contended that
the thrift deposit accounts offered by CSTC qualified as "demand de-
posits" under section 2(c), and that, accordingly, Citicorp should not be
granted "nonbank bank" status. 19 7 Citicorp admitted that CSTC in-
tended to make commercial loans, thereby fulfilling the first require-
ment of the BHCA's two-part "bank" definition. Accordingly, the
primary issue became whether the thrift deposit accounts were deemed
to be "demand deposits" as argued by Oklahoma Bankers. If this was
the case, then the second criteria would also be fulfilled, and CSTC
would be a "bank" under section 2(c).19 8
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
Judge Seth, writing for the three-judge panel,19 9 rejected the argu-
ments raised by Oklahoma Bankers and affirmed the decision of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board.20 0 The court noted that for the purposes of federal
regulation Congress has narrowed the BHCA's original definition of a
"bank," 20 1 and that in recent years numerous institutions have qualified
for "nonbank bank" status under the exceptions created by Con-
gress. 2 02 The court stated that "[fWederal law under the non-bank ex-
ception . . .expressly envisions the operation of industrial banks in
192. Id. at 1449.
193. Id. at 1446.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1450 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, § 1001(A)(1) (1981)). Oklahoma Bankers
raised this claim even though Citicorp's proposal stated that demand deposits would not
be accepted by CSTC. Id. at 1448.
196. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982) (emphasis added by the Tenth Circuit).
197. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1449.
198. Id.
199. The panel included Judge Holloway, Judge McWilliams and Judge Seth.
200. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1446.
201. On two occasions Congress has modified the definition of a "bank" under the Act.
Originally, the definition included all national banks, state banks and savings banks. Act of
May 9, 1956, ch. 240, § 2(c), 70 Stat. 133. The definition was narrowed in 1966 to govern
only those domestic institutions which "[accept] deposits that the depositor has a legal
right to withdraw on demand." Act of July 1, 1966, § 3, 80 Stat. 236, 237. The current
definition was enacted in 1970. See supra note 196 and accompanying text; see also Wilshire,
668 F.2d at 733.
202. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1449 (citing the Tenth Circuit's earlier decision in
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Oklahoma by out-of-state bank holding companies. ' 20 The Tenth Cir-
cuit also affirmed the Board's finding that the limited functions of CSTC
qualified it for "nonbank bank" status.
20 4
The court specifically rejected Oklahoma Bankers' first conten-
tion, 20 5 and held that the thrift certificate deposits proposed by Citicorp
to be offered by CSTC were not demand deposits under the BHCA. 20 6
"Demand deposits" are defined as those which "the depositor has a legal
right to withdraw on demand.''207 Utilizing a theory similar to the one
employed by the Federal Reserve Board, the court determined that
CSTC's thrift deposits were not payable upon demand. 20 8 In First Ban-
corporation v. Board of Governors,2 09 the Tenth Circuit reached a similar
determination regarding interest-bearing "NOW" accounts. 2 10 The de-
terminative factor in both First Bancorporation and Oklahoma Bankers is
whether a restriction exists on the immediate withdrawal of a depositor's
money. 2 1 1 In First Bancorporation, the restriction was statutory; in
Oklahoma Bankers, it was contractual.
In First Bancorporation, Utah law specifically required industrial loan
companies to reserve the right to demand notice from a depositor prior
to withdrawal. 2 12 Oklahoma law, however, is silent on this issue, and
Oklahoma Bankers contended that this loophole would allow depositors
to make immediate, transactional-type withdrawals from the Citicorp
subsidiaries. However, the court acknowledged that Citicorp's applica-
tion expressly stated that CSTC's thrift certificate deposits would be
governed by "specific, legally enforceable, contractual agreements" ex-
plicitly requiring depositors to provide CSTC with 14 or more days no-
tice prior to withdrawal. 2 13 The court upheld the enforceability under
Oklahoma law of this restrictive type of private contractual arrangement
Dimension Fin. Corp. v. Board of Governors, 774 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir. 1984), af'd, 106 S.
Ct. 681 (1986)).
203. Id. at 1451. The court reviewed the legislative history of the Act and observed
that the Senate Banking Committee chairman, Senator A. Willis Robertson, stated that a
1966 amendment to section 2(c) of the Act "clearly exclude[d] industrial banks" from
definition as a "bank." 112 CONG. REC. 12386 (June 6, 1966) (statement of Sen.
Robertson).
204. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1449.
205. See supra text accompanying note 194.
206. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1450.
207. Id. at 1449 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982) (emphasis added by the Tenth
Circuit)).
208. Id. at 1450.
209. 728 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1984).
210. Id. at 435. "NOW" account is an acronym for "negotiable order of withdrawal"
account. ld.
211. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1449-50.
212. First Bancorporation, 728 F.2d at 436. Accord, Pennsylvania Bankers Ass'n v. Secre-
tary of Banking, 481 Pa. 332, 392 A.2d 1319 (1978) (drafts were not "payable on demand"
and not considered "checks" under the Uniform Commercial Code where NOW accounts,
offered by savings bank, required depositors to give 14 day notice prior to withdrawal or
payment of a draft); Savings Bank of Baltimore v. Bank Comm'r, 248 Md. 461, 237 A.2d 45
(1968) (accounts subject to withdrawal by check, which required 30 day notice prior to
withdrawal, negated assumption that such accounts could be characterized as "demand
deposits").
213. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1449.
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between a depositor and a financial institution, 21 4 and concluded that
such an agreement would prohibit depositors from withdrawal upon de-
mand.2 15 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit upheld the Board's finding
that the thrift certificates were not demand deposits, and CSTC avoided
being characterized as a "bank" under the BHCA.
2 t 6
The court also rejected Oklahoma Bankers' second contention that
since Oklahoma banking law permits trust companies to "receive depos-
its of trust monies" 2 17 which are withdrawable upon demand, a trust
company such as CSTC is clearly a "bank" under the BHCA.2 18 The
court agreed that the Oklahoma trust charters sought by CSTC permit-
ted traditional banking services to be offered,2 t 9 and it acknowledged
the opinion of the Oklahoma bank commissioner who characterized
trust deposits as being withdrawable upon demand. 22 0 Despite these
acknowledgments, the court stood by its previously stated pronounce-
ment from Dimension Financial Corp.
We no longer look to the possible powers an institution may
exercise under a state charter but rather decide whether it
meets both the deposit and commercial lending elements of the
statutory test. An organization which has voluntarily limited its
functions in order to conform to the Act's definition of a non-
bank simply cannot use all the powers granted by a state
charter.
2 21
On its own initiative, Citicorp's CSTC application specifically re-
frained from including the full menu of traditional banking services,
2 2 2
thereby complying with the limitations imposed by the statute. In addi-
tion, the Tenth Circuit further noted that, despite the fact that the trust
charter granted CSTC the power to offer traditional banking services,
the approval of Citicorp's CSTC proposal by the Federal Reserve Board
carried with it no right to exercise traditional banking power.2 23 The
Board's order allowed CSTC to operate as a "limited purpose industrial
bank," restricted to the services permitted by nonbank banks. 224 Any
violation of these restrictions or any alteration or expansion of CSTC's
214. Id. at 1449-50. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Duncan v. Anderson, 120
Okla. 194, 250 P. 1018, 1019 (1926), that a deposit "may be subject to any agreement
which the depositor and the bank may make with respect to it."
215. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1449-50.
216. Id. at 1450.
217. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, § 1001(A)(1) (1981)).
218. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1450.
219. Id. "The powers granted to trust companies by Oklahoma law are substantially
similar to the powers granted banks." Id. Compare OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, § 402 (1981) with
OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, § 1001 (1981) (Banks and trust companies are granted the same general
powers under these statutes.).
220. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1450.
221. Id. (citing Dimension Fin. Corp., 774 F.2d at 1404). For a critical analysis of Dimen-
sion see Note, Nonbank Banks: Who's Minding the Store? 46 LA. L. REV. 1087 (1986); Com-
ment, Banking Law: A Bank is a Bank is a Bank: Dimension Financial Services v. Board of
Governors, 11J. CORP. L. 277 (1986).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 190 and 191.




limited areas of operation, would result in an enforcement action by the
Board.
22 5
The court also considered and rejected Oklahoma Bankers' allega-
tions that the services to be offered by CSTC failed to meet the BHCA's
requirements of (1) being closely related to banking and (2) benefiting
the public. 2 26 A list of activities deemed to be "closely related" to bank-
ing is codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a). 22 7 The Tenth Circuit found the
services proposed by Citicorp to be within these statutory bounda-
ries. 2 28 The court also determined that CSTC could "reasonably be ex-
pected to produce benefits to the public." '22 9 The court rejected
Oklahoma Bankers' contention that Citicorp's sheer size alone could
produce monopolistic tendencies that would be detrimental to the pub-
lic good. 230 Moreover, this theory had been previously struck down in
Connecticut Bankers Association v. Board of Governors.23 1 Congress has not
established aggregate size as a factor for the Board to weigh. 232 In-
stead, the court considered the public benefit issue within the scope set
forth by Congress. 23 3 After weighing "public benefit factors such as
'greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency,'
against 'possible adverse effects, such as undue concentration of re-
sources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interest, or un-
sound banking practices,' ",234 the Tenth Circuit agreed with the
determination of the Federal Reserve Board that CSTC's operation in
Oklahoma would benefit the public.
2 35
225. Id. Enforcement actions are brought under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(3) (1982). "The
Board is authorized to issue such regulations and orders as may be necessary to enable it
to administer and carry out the purposes of this chapter and prevent evasions thereof." 12
U.S.C. § 1844(b) (1982); see Wilshire, 668 F.2d at 738 (discussion of enforcement
considerations).
226. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1451-52 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982)).
227. "Closely related" activities include:
(1) Making or acquiring . . . loans and other extensions of credit . . . such as
would be made, for example, by a mortgage, finance, credit card, or factoring
company;
(2) Operating as an industrial bank... in the manner authorized by State law so
long as the institution does not both accept demand deposits and make commer-
cial loans;
(3) Servicing loans and other extensions of credit for any person; and
(4) Acting as insurance agent or broker in offices at which the holding company
or its subsidiaries are otherwise engaged in business ....
12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(l)-(3), (9) (1983). The Federal Reserve Board's determination of
which activities are "closely related" to banking is entitled to the "greatest deference."
Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 56 (1981).
228. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1450-51.
229. Id. at 1451 (quoting the statutory language of 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982)).
230. Id. Citicorp is the second largest commercial banking organization in the United
States, with total consolidated assets of $130.2 billion. The largest Oklahoma bank hold-
ing company has total consolidated assets of $3 billion. Id.
231. 627 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
232. Western Bancshares, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 480 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1973).
233. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1451.
234. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982)).
235. Id.
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3. Conclusion
It may be argued, at least from the perspective of the Oklahoma
Bankers Association, that the distinction between a "bank" and a "non-
bank bank" is merely one of semantics. Although the BHCA was en-
acted, in part, to prevent the "concentration of commercial banking
activities,"-23 6 the Tenth Circuit's decision does not appear to support
this meritorious goal. By affirming the Federal Reserve Board's decision
to allow Citicorp to offer numerous financial services in Oklahoma (al-
beit no transactional type accounts), the court has indeed created an-
other participant in the local banking marketplace - the industrial bank
operating as a nonbank bank. 23 7 Although Citicorp will not compete
"service for service" with local Oklahoma banks, 238 several avenues of
competition will be opened by Citicorp's entry into the marketplace, es-
pecially in the realm of consumer and commercial lending. Addition-
ally, some deposits heretofore invested with local, small town banks will
undoubtedly find their way to the coffers of Citicorp's CSTCs.
From the consumer's point of view, at least for the short term, the
increased competition may be welcomed. 2 39 In the long run however,
and from the perspective of the small town banker, the decision in
Oklahoma Bankers poses a threat. It represents another hurdle for the
local bank to overcome and thereby makes moot the lofty ideals of the
BHCA.240 In an era when rural small town banks are struggling to hold
on - in the face of depressed oil prices and decreasing farm product
prices - the Tenth Circuit's decision is likely to be viewed with skepti-
cism by the small town banker in Oklahoma. To him, the distinction
between "bank" and "nonbank bank" is irrelevant.
B. Limitations on the Ultra Vires Defense
1. Ries Biologicals, Inc. v. Bank of Santa Fe
In Ries Biologicals, Inc. v. Bank of Santa Fe, 24 t the Tenth Circuit held
that a bank may not employ the shield of the ultra vires242 defense when
its guarantee to pay the debts of a third party is made to benefit the
pecuniary interests of the bank.
236. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
237. For a critical discussion of the contradictory policy considerations surrounding
nonbank banks, see Felsenfeld, Nonbank Banks - An Issue in Need of a Policy, 41 Bus. LAw 99-
123 (1985).
238. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
239. For an article illustrating the consumer advantages derived from nonbank banks,
see L.A. Daily Journal,Jan. 23, 1986, at 1, col. 6. Cf Victor, Nonbank Bank Options Get Mixed
Reviews, Legal Times, June 10, 1985, at 2, col. 1.
240. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
241. 780 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1986).
242. "Ultra vires" refers to acts beyond the scope or in excess of the legal power or
authority vested in a corporation, an official, or a legislative body. BLACK's LAw DICTION-




Ries Biologicals was a distributor of medical supplies. 2 4 3 One of
Ries' customers, Dialysis Management Systems, Inc. ("DMS"), was a
health care provider specializing in kidney dialysis.2 4 4 During the time
in question, DMS was experiencing financial problems and had out-
standing loans with its bank, the Bank of Santa Fe, in excess of
$620,000.245 DMS was also delinquent on payments due to Ries. When
DMS's outstanding balance with Ries reached $42,000, Ries notified
DMS that all future orders to DMS would be shipped on a C.O.D. basis
only. 24 6 A few months later, however, Mr. Levitt, a senior vice president
for the Bank of Santa Fe, made an oral agreement with Ries to guarantee
payment by the bank of all DMS orders approved by the bank in advance
of shipment. 24 7 Relying on Mr. Levitt's oral guarantee, Ries resumed
shipments of medical supplies to DMS. All orders were approved in ad-
vance and all invoices were sent directly to Mr. Levitt at the bank.
2 48
Despite the oral guarantee and Ries' full compliance with Mr. Lev-
itt's instructions, Ries was not paid in full for medical supplies shipped
to DMS. Ries filed suit against the bank, and the trial court 24 9 entered
judgment in favor of Ries for approximately $27,000, together with
costs and attorneys' fees. 250 On appeal, the bank denied liability and
asserted, among other things, that Ries' claim was barred by the New
Mexico statute of frauds, 25 ' and that the oral guarantee of Mr. Levitt
was void as an ultra vires act.
2 52
b. The Tenth Circuit Decision
Judge Crow,2 5 3 writing for the Tenth Circuit, affirmed the lower
court decision. 2 54 The court held that the New Mexico statute of frauds
did not prohibit Ries' recovery, despite the fact that an oral agreement
243. Ries Biologicals, 780 F.2d at 890.
244. Id.
245. Id. $500,000 of this amount was guaranteed by the Small Business Administra-
tion. However, the trial court found that the bank still had a substantial amount outstand-
ing at great risk. Id. at 891.
246. Id. at 890.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.
250. Ries Biologicals, 780 F.2d at 890.
251. The New Mexico statute of frauds provides that:
"[A] contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforcea-
ble ... unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale
has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom en-
forcement is sought .... "
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-201 (1978).
252. In addition to its primary contentions, the bank also raised evidentiary and ac-
counting issues. The Tenth Circuit quickly disposed of those issues. Ries Biologicals, 780
F.2d at 890-91.
253. Honorable Sam A. Crow, United States District Judge for the District of Kansas,
sitting by designation. Other members of the panel were judge Holloway andJudge Seth.
254. Ries Biologicals, 780 F.2d at 889, 892; see also Martin Roofing, Inc. v. Goldstein, 469
N.Y.S.2d 595 (1983) (enforceability of oral guarantees).
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to guarantee the debts of a third party is not ordinarily enforceable. 2 5
5
The statute of frauds will not apply, the court said, where "the main
object of the agreement is to serve pecuniary interests of the prom-
isor. ' '2 56 In addition, the court relied on Aragon v. Boyd,25 7 which held
that full performance by one side is sufficient to satisfy the statute of
frauds.
The bank also failed to escape liability under its ultra vires theory.
The court refused to deny Ries' right to recovery on the bank's conten-
tion that Mr. Levitt's oral guarantee was a violation of the bank's statu-
tory powers. 2 58 The court pointed out that "[t]he New Mexico Supreme
Court has held that a bank may not avoid a guarantee as ultra vires where
the transaction is for the bank's benefit in the furtherance of legitimate
banking business." 25 9 The Tenth Circuit found that the Bank of Santa
Fe's involvement in the activities of DMS was an effort to prevent bank
losses which would result from a DMS failure. According to counsel for
the Bank of Santa Fe, the bank would not have become so involved if no
incidental benefit could be received.2 60 Therefore, the court rejected
the bank's attempt to avoid payment.
c. Conclusion
Ries Biological stands for the simple proposition that a bank may not
hide behind an ultra vires defense when the bank's guarantee to pay the
debts of a third party is made for the overall benefit of the bank.
2 6 1
Under the circumstances in Ries Biologicals, the outcome of this case is
the only one which is equitable. To allow the Bank of Santa Fe the op-
tion of raising an ultra vires defense anytime a guarantee goes sour,
would be to create havoc in the business marketplace. Similarly, suppli-
ers like Ries should be entitled to rely on a bank's guarantee made by a
senior vice-president. Banks must be cognizant of the guarantees they
make, and the standards for extending those guarantees should be the
same as for other banking agreements which are clearly not ultra vires.
Molly Myer
255. Ries Biologicals, 780 F.2d at 891. The rule was stated in Beacon Supply Co. v.
American Fiber Corp., 75 N.M. 29, 35, 339 P.2d 927, 931 (1965), however, in Beacon no
benefit was found for the promisor and that statute of frauds was enforced.
256. Abraham v. H.V. Middleton, Inc., 279 F.2d 107 (10th Cir. 1960). The pecuniary
interests of the promisor, the Bank of Santa Fe, were significant. Only $500,000 of the
$620,000 owed by DMS to the bank was guaranteed by the Small Business Administration.
The remaining $120,000 was unsecured. Accordingly, the bank had a substantial interest
in getting DMS back to profitability. Ries Biologicals, 780 F.2d at 891.
257. 80 N.M. 14, 450 P.2d 614 (1969).
258. Ries Biologicals, 780 F.2d at 891.
259. Id. (citing Ellis v. Citizen's Nat'l Bank of Portales, 25 N.M. 319, 183 P. 34 (1918)).





The Tenth Circuit charted a moderate course during this survey pe-
riod in decisions involving constitutional issues. As is increasingly com-
mon, the court was faced with several cases arising from 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claims. On appeal from a case originating in New Mexico, the
Tenth Circuit ruled that in a section 1983 action, involving the depriva-
tion of familial association, the plaintiff must allege in his complaint that
the defendant intended to deprive him of this right. In a case involving
a dispute between Oklahoma police and a local pawnbroker, the Tenth
Circuit wrestled with the difficult issue of what constitutes "state action"
for purposes of section 1983. In an opinion arising out of a products
liability action in Utah, the court expanded the definition of "minimum
contacts" to include interstate manufacturers as well as distributors and
retailers. Finally, in a case of particular interest to an increasingly credit-
dependent society, the court delineated a privacy standard regulating
the dissemination of an individual's credit and financial history by a
credit reporting agency.
I. FAMILIAL ASSOCIATION UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983: TRUJILLO V. BOARD
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF SANTE FE
A. Facts
Appellants, Rose Trujillo and her daughter Patricia Trujillo,' filed
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 19832 alleging the wrongful death of their
son/brother while he was incarcerated in a New Mexico county jail. Ap-
pellants contended that the various public officials and bodies of the
City and County of Sante Fe had deprived them of their constitutional
right of familial association. 3 The federal district court in New Mexico
dismissed appellants' complaint, holding that the Trujillos had not al-
leged a constitutional right compensable under section 1983. 4
B. The Tenth Circuit's Holding
As a preliminary matter, the court first addressed the issue of
whether the Trujillos had standing to bring a section 1983 action. Find-
1. Trujillo v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Santa Fe, 768 F.2d
1186, 1187 (10th Cir. 1985).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, or any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action in law,
suit at equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1186.
4. Id. at 1187.
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ing that the Trujillos clearly alleged an injury to their own constitutional
rights, 5 that these rights in no way derived from the decedent's personal
rights, and that the Trujillo's did not sue on the decedent's behalf, the
Tenth Circuit held that the Trujillos had standing to assert a section
1983 claim.
6
Turning to the issue of whether the Trujillos had a constitutionally
protected interest in their relationship with their son/brother, the Tenth
Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's holding in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees.7 Citing this case for the proposition that familial relation-
ships warrant constitutional protection,8 Judge Seymour held that the
Trujillos did allege a deprivation of the constitutionally protected rela-
tionship with their son/brother.
9
Finally, the Tenth Circuit turned to the issue of whether the appel-
lants were required to allege that the defendants intended to deprive
them of their rights. Citing Parratt v. Taylor 10 for the proposition that
section 1983 itself does not require a specific state of mind for action-
ability, the Tenth Circuit nevertheless pointed out that courts must
closely examine the nature of the underlying constitutional right to de-
termine whether any intent is required to deprive an individual of that
right. " Finding that interference with a relationship protected by the
freedom of intimate association required an allegation of intent, the




The United States Constitution makes no explicit mention of a right
to association.' 3 The Supreme Court, however, has determined that the
first amendment contains the theoretical underpinnings upon which a
5. Id.
6. Id.; see also Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1241 (7th Cir. 1984); Angola
v. Civiletti, 666 F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1981); White v. Talboys, 573 F. Supp. 49, 51 (D. Colo.
1983).
7. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
8. The son/brother relationship the decedent had with the plaintiffs easily fell into a
category of relationships which courts have found to be constitutionally protected. For
cases in which the court has recognized liberty interests other than strictly parental or filial
ones, see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion) (zoning
ordinance could not prohibit grandmother from living with her grandsons who were cous-
ins); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (foster parents have a
liberty interest in their relationship with foster children); Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539
(11th Cir. 1984) (interference with dating relationship held actionable under section
1983); Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016, 1024-25 (2d Cir. 1982) (half-sister and foster
mother had protected interest in relationship with siblings); Drollinger v. Milligan, 552
F.2d 1220, 1226-27 (7th Cir. 1977) (deprivation of grandfather's relationship with
grandchild actionable under section 1983).
9. Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1189.
10. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
11. Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1189.
12. Id. at 1190.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I. While making no reference to a right of association, the
Supreme Court has found that the first amendment phrase "[C]ongress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
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peripheral right of association exists. 14 This peripheral right takes two
forms, the right of intimate association, and the right of expressive asso-
ciation. Though these two rights are derived from the same source, the
nature and degree of constitutional protections afforded them differ. 15
1. The Right To Intimate Association
The right to intimate association is a "fundamental element of per-
sonal liberty" 16 which, from a historical viewpoint, is based on one's sta-
tus as a person. 17 It protects one's right to freely enter into and
maintain "certain intimate human relationships."' 8 These relationships
are characterized by "relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in
decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others
in critical aspects of the relationship."' l9 Consistent with this characteri-
zation, the Supreme Court has found the right of intimate association
present in cases involving parent/child relationships,
20 family relation-
ships, 2' marital relationships, 22 and a host of other circumstances in-
volving intimate inter-personal relationships .
2
3
2. The Right To Expressive Association
The foundation of the right to expressive association is found in the
first amendment's speech and assembly clauses. 24 Expressive associa-
to assemble" is a basis for finding a right of association. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
14. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462.
15. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609, 618.
16. Id.
17. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462. In the classic DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, Alexander de
Tocqueville said:
The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for himself, is that
of combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures and of acting in
common with them. The right of association appears to me almost as inalienable
in its nature as the right of personal liberty. No legislator can attack it without
impairing the foundation of society.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 203 (Bradley ed. 1954).
18. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
19. Id. at 620.
20. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
21. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20. "Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep
attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one
shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences and beliefs but also distinc-
tively personal aspects of one's life," and therefore must be secured against undue intru-
sion by the state. Id.
22. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
23. See, e.g., Cleveland Board of Education v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (mandatory
termination of pregnant school teachers unconstitutional); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Wil-
liamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (mandatory sterilization of habitual criminals violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment); Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (statute forbidding school children below eighth grade from studying German lan-
guage is unconstitutional).
24. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,460-61 (1958); Staub v. City
of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1937); Sigma Chi
v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado, 258 F. Supp. 515, 524 (D. Colo. 1966); see also Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (where the Court explained, "It was not by accident or
coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guar-
anty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of
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tion is said to protect "the right to express one's attitudes or philoso-
phies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it."' 25 Whether
these goals are political, economic, social, or cultural has no bearing on
the right's existence.
2 6
3. Section 1983 and the Freedom of Association
A significant number of actions alleging the deprivation of intimate
or expressive association have been brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 was designed to provide a remedy for those who were de-
prived of their fundamental constitutional rights by persons acting
under color of law.2 7 Section 1983 operates as a device enabling the
private citizen to seek redress for unconstitutional acts committed by
public officials. It pierces the cloak of governmental immunity. Under
the statute, only civil liability may be imposed against the violating pub-
lic official.
28
grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable."). For a concise note on the
development of the right of expressive association, see Sloan, Constitutional Law - First
Amendment Right Of Association -Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 771
(1985).
25. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
26. See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460-61, wherein the Court held that "it is immaterial
whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic,
religious, or cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing the
freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny."
27. Comment, Actionability of Negligence Under Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 533 (1978). Black's Law Dictionary defines "color of law" as: "[a]cts 'under
color of any law' of a State include not only acts done by state officials within the bounds
or limits of their lawful authority, but also acts done without and beyond the bounds of
their lawful authority .. " BLACKs LAw DICTIONARY 241 (5th ed. 1979). For judicially
created definitions of "color of law," see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (misuse of
power made possible only because wrongdoer is clothed with authority of state law is ac-
tion under "color of law"), overruled on other grounds by Monnell v. Dept. of Social
Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Addickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144 (1970) (person acting under "color of law" must do so with knowledge of and pursu-
ant to a state statute); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (plaintiff must establish
not only that defendant acted under color of the statute, but also that defendant's actions
are properly attributable to the state whose law was involved).
For a list of individuals and institutions which can and cannot act under under "color
of state law," compare Lamb v. Farmer's Ins. Co., 586 F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1978) (Attorney's
conduct in representing client does not constitute action under color of state statute) with
Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1983) (attorney who used state's unconstitu-
tional garnishment procedures against civil rights plaintiff was acting under "color of state
law"); compare Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (public defender does not act
"under color of state law" when performing lawyer's traditional functions as counsel in
criminal proceedings) with Smith v. Bacon, 699 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1983) (allegations that
public defender ineffectively represented civil rights plaintiff because of agreement with
state court judge implies actions "under color of state law"); compare Meredith v. Allen
County War Memorial Hospital Comm., 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968) (hospitals action in
dismissing physician from staff may be "under color of law" where hospital is only one in
county) with Kaczananowski v. Medical Center Hospital, 612 F. Supp. 688 (D.C. Vt. 1985)
(hospital receiving federal funding, tax exemption, and licensing privileges does not act
"under color of law" in denying staff privileges).
28. Section 1983 is the civil provision of the 1871 act. See Comment, Actionability of
Negligence Under Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 533 (1978). 18
U.S.C. § 242 (1983) is the criminal provision.
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Section 1983 provides a mechanism to rectify official misconduct, 29
yet it does not contain language describing the conduct required to trig-
ger the mechanism. There are no express standards delineating what
elements must be present in an official's conduct before a section 1983
action can be initiated by a private citizen.3 0 The task of developing
such criteria has largely been left to the courts.
Neither the actual provisions of section 1983 nor the legislative his-
tory of the Act indicate that a defendant must act with intent before be-
ing subject to a section 1983 action. 3 1 In spite of this, the courts'
decisions prior to the Supreme Court's findings in Monroe v. Pape32 were
almost uniform in requiring that the defendant's conduct be accompa-
nied by an intent to deprive the defendant of a constitutionally pro-
tected right.
3 3
In Bottone v. Lindsey,34 the Tenth Circuit held that a defendant must
have acted with intent to deprive a plaintiff of a right protected by either
federal law or the Constitution. The court noted that as a condition
precedent to recovery, the plaintiff must show that "the state court pro-
ceedings [which led to the alleged violation] must have been conducted
with a purpose to deprive a person of his property without due process of
law."
3 5
An additional rationale underlying the courts' intent requirement
was revealed as one of judicial economy. The First Circuit has com-
mented that to literally interpret section 1983 would "reach results so
bizarre and startling that the legislative body would probably be shocked
into the prompt passage of amendatory legislation."' 36 One such "bi-
zarre" result was a burgeoning number of civil rights cases being
brought in federal court.3 7 The courts have also noted that allowing
section 1983 actions which do not require intent would require the de-
velopment of a substantial body of federal tort law which would signifi-
cantly undermine the original understanding of the proper balance
29. Section 1983 provides for "action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed-
ings for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
30. A facial examination of the language of section 1983 uncovers no standard of
conduct requirements. See Note, Basis of Liability in a § 1983 Suit: When is the State-of-Mind
Analysis Relevant?, 57 IND. L.J. 459 (1982).
31. See Comment, Actionability of Negligence Under Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 533 (1978).
32. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of
City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (overruling the holding in Monroe that a municipal
corporation is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
33. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1943) (intent required to bring an equal pro-
tection action under section 1983); Cobb v. City of Malden, 202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1953)
(section 1983 liability exists only where defendant subjectively realized acts would deprive
plaintiff constitutional rights); Bottone v. Lindsey, 170 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1948).
34. 170 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 944 (1949).
35. Id. at 707 (emphasis added).
36. Francis v. Lyman, 216 F.2d 583, 587 (lst Cir. 1954).
37. The First Circuit's fear appears well-founded. The number of civil rights suits
brought in federal courts under section 1983 has increased from 296 in 1961 to 12,944 in
1980. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 61 (1980).
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between the national and state governments.3 8
An alternative explanation for the court's insistence that there be a
"purposeful" intent may be found in the language of section 1983's
criminal counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 242.3 9 In order to pursue a remedy
under section 242, the plaintiff is required to allege that the defendant's
acts were "willful." Thus, in Screws v. United States,40 the Supreme Court
threw out a defendant's conviction because the trial judge failed to in-
struct the jury that the defendant's conduct had to be willful in order to
be culpable under section 242. 4 1 It is possible that because of the simi-
larities between section 242 and section 1983, the courts have applied
the intent standards interchangeably.
In Monroe v. Pape,42 however, the court changed direction and made
it abundantly clear that purposeful intent was no longer the requirement
for section 1983 actions. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas
stated:
In the Screws case we dealt with a statute that imposed criminal
penalties for acts "wilfully" done. We construed that word in
its setting to mean the doing of an act with "a specific intent to
deprive a person of a federal right .... We do not think that
gloss should be placed on § 1979 which we have here. The
word "wilfully" does not appear in § 1979. Moreover, § 1979
provides a civil remedy, while in the Screws case we dealt with a
criminal law challenged on the ground of vagueness.
43
Twenty years later the Supreme Court echoed Monroe in Parratt v.
Taylor 44 by holding that section 1983 affords a civil remedy for depriva-
38. For an in-depth analysis of the repercussions of section 1983 on the federal courts
see Brockett, Federalism, Section 1983 And State Law Remedies: Curtailing The Federal Civil Rights
Dockets By Restricting The Underlying Right, 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1035 (1982).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982) provides: "Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or
District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by
the Constitution or laws of United States ... shall be fined ... or imprisoned..." (empha-
sis added).
40. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
41. Id. at 104.
42. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In Monroe, plaintiff alleged that police broke into his home
without a warrant, forced him and his family to get out of bed, beat him and his family,
ransacked his home, and held him in custody for ten hours without filing any charges. The
police did not allow Monroe to make a phone call to his attorney or to appear before a
magistrate. Monroe's holding that municipal corporations were not "persons" within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was overruled by Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), wherein Justice Brennan held that municipalities and
other local governmental units are included among those "persons" to whom 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 does apply. The holding in Monroe concerning the role intent plays in section 1983
actions seems to have escaped intact.
43. Id. at 187. Section 1979 was incorporated into 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in 1979. Thus,
the Screws discussion of the requisite elements for a section 1979 action applies also to
section 1983. The impact of Monroe on the relationship between the federal judiciary and
the American citizen was inestimable. It acted to bring the federal court system down
from its ivory tower and into the mainstream of American life. Professor BernardJ. Ward
of the University of Texas observed that "prior to [the Monroe] decision the work of the
federal courts had as much importance in the life of the average American citizen as did
the poetry of Algernon Swinburne." Powell, BernardJ Ward, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1982).
44. 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (lack of due care does not rise to the level of a constitutional
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tions of federally protected rights "without any express requirement of a
particular state of mind."' 4 5 Yet, in spite of this reaffirmation, Monroe
and Paratt have proven to be unhelpful. "State of mind" remains an
important element in section 1983 actions. A particular state of mind
may be required to make out a violation of the constitutional right in-
volved. As pointed out by the Tenth Circuit in Trujillo, it is well-estab-
lished that recovery for deprivations of equal protection requires proof
of discriminatory intent on the part of the state actor.46 Deprivations
under the eighth amendment require a showing of deliberate indiffer-
ence, 4 7 and some infringements of first amendment rights require proof
that the state's action was intended to deprive an individual of his pro-
tected speech or right of association.
48
In Baker v. McCollan,4 9 the Court noted that some constitutional vio-
lations may, by their nature, require an element of intent. 50 As such, the
relevant inquiry must focus not on what state of mind section 1983 re-
quires, but on what state of mind, if any, is required to prove a violation
of the underlying constitutional right. 5 1 Under this analysis, the allega-
tion of wrongful intent is required only when recovery for the underly-
ing deprived right is dependent upon a showing of wrongful intent.
D. Analysis
In Trujillo v. Board of County Commissioners of County of Sante Fe,52 the
Tenth Circuit correctly identified the underlying intent analysis as the
proper approach. It cited McKay v. Hammock 5 3 for the proposition that a
court must closely examine the nature of the underlying constitutional
right to determine if the section 1983 deprivation of that right requires
intent. Yet, in spite of recognizing the proper test, the court actually
performed very little analysis along the McKay guidelines. In fact, the
Tenth Circuit never determined if the deprivation of intimate associa-
tion, by itself, requires intent.
Instead, the court stated that the freedom of intimate association
can be juxtaposed with the freedom of expressive association in order to
deprivation under section 1983), revd on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662
(1986).
45. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535.
46. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (discriminating impact of hiring
practices in light of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause).
47. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (standard of care in medical claims
brought pursuant to the eighth amendment).
48. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (section
1983 claim can be brought only if employer's decisive motive behind terminating employ-
ment was to punish for the exercise of constitutional rights).
49. 433 U.S. 137 (1979), on remand, 601 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1979).
50. Id. at 140.
51. See Comment, The Evolution Of The State Of Mind Requirement Of Section 1983, 47
TUL. L. REV. 870 (1973); Kirkpatrick, Defining A Constitutional Tort Under Section 1983: The
State Of Mind Requirement, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 45 (1977).
52. 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1985).
53. 730 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984).
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determine the necessity of intent. 54 Stating that deprivations of expres-
sive association must require intent, Judge Seymour completed the anal-
ogy by holding that deprivations of intimate association must also
require intent. Yet the manner in which the Tenth Circuit arrived at its
conclusion, that deprivations of expressive association require allega-
tions of intent, is unclear. Nowhere in its decision does the Tenth
Circuit cite an authoritative source for its conclusion that the depriva-
tion of expressive association requires allegations of intent. Rather, the
Tenth Circuit observed in a footnote that since the common law torts of
invasion of privacy and interference with the marital relationship re-
quired allegations of intent, so too must interference with expressive
association.
5 5
The court's selection of expressive association as an analogy to inti-
mate association is equally confusing in light of the Supreme Court's
holding in Roberts v. United StatesJaycees.5 6 In Roberts, theJaycees argued
that their choice to exclude women from the ranks of their membership
was protected by their freedom of association.5 7 The Court's first step
in deciding the case was to determine the nature of the constitutional
claims and their attendant protections. 58 The Supreme Court held, con-
sistent with its earlier decisions, 59 that the degree of constitutional pro-
tection given freedom of association varies depending upon whether the
claim involves expressive 60 or intimate association. 6 1 Finding that the
Jaycees' claims involved expressive association, the Court held that the
states' compelling interest in prohibiting gender discrimination justified
any adverse impact that the Jaycees would suffer by admitting women.
62
Disturbingly, the Tenth Circuit cited Roberts in support of its deci-
sion to analogize intimate with expressive association. The Tenth
Circuit cited Roberts for the proposition that " '[t]he intrinsic and instru-
mental features of constitutionally protected association may, of course,
coincide.' "63 Indeed, they may. However, a closer reading of Justice
Brennan's decision in Roberts reveals that the majority viewed the two
54. Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1189-90.
55. Id.
56. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
57. Id. at 621.
58. Id. at 617-18.
59. Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) with Railway Mail Association v.
Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945). See generally, Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (Powell,
J., concurring).
60. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Larsen v. Va-
lente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
61. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1973); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Justice Brennan clearly views family relation-
ships as falling under intimate expression, commenting that the relationships which are
entitled to the protections attendant to intimate association are "those that attend the
creation and sustenance of a family ..." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
62. Speaking for the majority, Justice Brennan disposed of the action by holding that
the "[Ilaycees chapters lack the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional
protection to the decision of its members to exclude women." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621.
63. Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1190 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618).
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types of associations as falling into two distinct categories. The validity
of equating two rights which the Supreme Court has held to be distinct
from one another is at best, questionable.
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit's result herein is also questionable
in light of other circuit courts' holdings, namely, that section 1983 ac-
tions may be based upon gross negligence claims which, by definition,
do not require intent.6 4 In Jenkins v. Avrett, 65 wherein a police officer
negligently shot the plaintiff, the Fourth Circuit held that a section 1983
action could be based on a claim of gross negligence. The Fifth Circuit
in Roberts v. Williams66 followed the Fourth Circuit's lead by finding that
a section 1983 claim could be brought against a grossly negligent prison
superintendent. If, as the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held, section
1983 claims may be based on causes of action which do not require in-
tent, then the Tenth Circuit's discussion of whether the deprivation of
familial association requires intent appears to be ill-considered.
Even though the Tenth Circuit's analysis conflicts with those of the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits, it does comport withJustice Rehnquist's state-
ment that section 1983 should not be interpreted to "result in every
legally cognizable injury, which may have been inflicted by a state official
acting under 'color of law.' "67 Therefore, the 1970 and 1971 decisions
of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits may no longer follow the Supreme
Court's section 1983 philosophy because they do not conform to the
spirit of Justice Rehnquist's warning in Paul v. Davis.6 8
E. Conclusion
It is apparent that Trujillo represents an extension of the judiciary's
current trend towards limiting the availability of section 1983 actions.
This reaction is understandable. In the last decade, the analysis adopted
in Monroe v. Pape has created problems unforeseen by the Monroe court.
The creation of a tremendous backlog of cases, a dual system of reme-
dies available to the injured plaintiff, and a threat to the principles of
federalism are significant policy considerations that may have influenced
the Tenth Circuit's holding in Trujillo.69
64. It should be noted that gross negligence involves a particularly high probability of
foreseeable injury and is thus only a short step away from intentional conduct. For a more
detailed discussion of the amenability of gross and simple negligence claims to section
1983 actions, see Kirkpatrick, supra note 51.
65. 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970).
66. 456 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 83 (1972).
67. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 699 (1976) (Police Chief's distribution of flyers hav-
ing petitioner's name and photograph which warned area merchants against shoplifters
held not to violate fourteenth amendment).
68. Id.
69. For an insightful article on these criticisms, see, Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal
Protection of Individual Rights - Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(1985).
Blackmun finds the "backlog of cases" argument least persuasive. Asserting that all
must agree with the proposition that any case load burden is worth bearing when the
action is meritorious, Blackmun concludes that the critics are necessarily assuming that
most section 1983 suits are without merit. Blackmun is not ready to make this conclusion,
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However, the fundamental fairness with which the Tenth Circuit
treated the Trujillos' case is questionable. In deciding this issue of first
impression, the court held that intent must be specifically plead in sec-
tion 1983 claims alleging the deprivation of familial association. Yet in-
stead of remanding the case and allowing the Trujillos' the opportunity
to amend their complaint in conformity with the holding, the Tenth Cir-
cuit took a harsher course and upheld the dismissal of the action.
II. DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF A PAWNBROKER IN CONSIGNED PROPERTY:
WOLFENBARGER V. WILLIAMS
A. Facts
Appellant, Margaret Wolfenbarger, operated a pawnshop in Law-
ton, Oklahoma. Acting on a report of stolen property, police entered
appellant's shop and discovered the allegedly stolen property. 70 In ac-
cordance with then-current police policy, a "hold" was placed on the
property. 7 1 This "hold" was an official police request that the pawn-
shop not sell or dispose of items that might be needed in criminal
investigations 72
Subsequently, the Lawton District Attorney issued a directive to the
police department advising that a new procedure was to be followed
when stolen property was discovered in pawnshops. 73 The directive
stated that all suspected stolen property was to be seized, placed on
property receipt with the police department, and then, pursuant to Title
22, sections 1321 of the Oklahoma Statutes, 74 disposed of in accordance
knowing no statistics or reports showing section 1983 actions to be more frivolous than
actions not involving section 1983.
Addressing the concern over the creation of a dual system of remedies available to an
injured plaintiff, Justice Blackmun believes that the combined effect of the Court's hold-
ings in Parratt, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), and Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), allays these fears. These cases have made it
difficult for a plaintiff who has only a state-law tort claim against a state official to hale the
official into federal court under the guise of a section 1983 action.
Turning to section 1983's effects on federalism, Blackmun reminds us that it is impor-
tant to remember that section 1983 is but one source of protection in the "legal universe."
Justice Blackmun goes on to say that much of the criticism aimed at section 1983 is misdi-
rected. What critics are really concerned with is the breadth of the constitutional rights
underlying the section 1983 action - a separate action which, according to Blackmun, de-
serves to be debated on its own grounds.
70. Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 774 F.2d 358, 359 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 1376 (1986).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 359-60.
73. Id. at 360.
74. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1321 (1986) provides:
Stolen property to be held by officer. When property alleged to have been stolen
or embezzled, comes into the custody of a peace officer, he must hold it subject to
the order of the magistrate authorized by [section 1322] to direct the disposal
thereof.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1322 (1986) provides:
Stolen property - Magistrate to order delivery, when. On satisfactory proof of the
title of the owner of the property, the magistrate before whom the information is
laid, or who examines the charge against the person accused of stealing or em-
bezzling the property, may order it to be delivered to the owner on his paying the
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with a magistrate's determination of proper title.
Acting on this directive, police returned to appellant's pawnshop
and seized the property previously placed on "hold." Police Officer
Williams, upon direct orders from the Lawton assistant district attorney
turned the property over to the party who reported it stolen. 75 This
action, however, did not follow the procedure set forth in sections 1321
and 1322, as there was no judicial determination as to who held proper
title to the disputed property before it was released.
76
Appellant filed a replevin action against Officer Williams in state
district court.7 7 The state court found the action moot because Williams
was no longer in possession of the property. 78 Appellant then filed this
action under 42 U.S.C. § 198379 in federal district court alleging that
the defendants' conduct had deprived her of constitutionally protected
due process rights. The federal district court held that a pawnbroker
does not have any property interest in stolen goods which have been
consigned for sale.80 Absent a property interest, no due process rights
were present 81 and the court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment.
8 2
B. The Tenth Circuit's Holding
The Tenth Circuit, Judge Seth dissenting, reversed the judgment of
the federal district court and remanded the cause for proceedings con-
sistent with its opinion. 83 The Tenth Circuit held that the district court
erred on both issues presented: whether a pawnbroker has a property
interest in stolen property acquired in good faith, 84 and whether the
post-deprivation remedies available pursuant to Oklahoma law were ad-
equate to prevent a violation of Wolfenbarger's due process rights.
8 5
The court, relying upon Snethen v. Oklahoma State Union of Farmer's
Educational & Cooperative Union,8 6 held that a good faith purchaser of sto-
len property, while unable to hold title against the true owner, has a
"qualified possessory interest" in the property and has "lawful posses-
sion against all the rest of the world."'8 7 In light of this, the appellant
was held to have a substantial economic interest in the stolen items and
reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in its preservation, to be certified by
the magistrate. The order entitles the owner to demand and receive the property.
75. Wolfenbarger, 774 F.2d at 360.
76. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
77. Wolfenbarger, 774 F.2d at 360.
78. Id. at 360-61.
79. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
80. Wolfenbarger, 774 F.2d at 361.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 365.
84. Id. at 362.
85. Id. at 365.
86. 664 P.2d 377 (Okla. 1982) (a person can have an insurable interest in stolen
property).
87. Wolfenbarger, 774 F.2d at 361 (citing Snethen, 664 P.2d at 381).
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was therefore entitled to due process protections."8
The panel's decision regarding the applicability of post-deprivation
procedures to remedy potential due process violations was guided by
Lavicky v. Burnett.8 9 There, the court reasoned that where an official's
conduct, resulting in the invalid deprivation of property, was planned and
authorized, post-deprivation remedies were not sufficient to prevent a vio-
lation of due process.9 0
Adopting this line of thought, the Tenth Circuit held that because
the nature of the district attorney's directive and the assistant district
attorney's order were planned and authorized, 9 ' the post-deprivation
remedies available to Wolfenbarger could not prevent her from bring-
ing an action under the due process clause.
92
C. Background
1. Pawnbroker's Property Interest In Pledged Items
All due process queries must involve a two-step analysis. It must
first be determined if the action involves an interest worthy of due pro-
cess protections. Then, if the first requirement is met, it must be deter-
mined whether the procedures protecting the interest comply with the
due process clause.
93
The Tenth Circuit relied upon Oklahoma statutory law9 4 and com-
mon law in determining the nature and extent of Wolfenbarger's prop-
erty interest in the stolen property. According to the Oklahoma Pawn
Shop Act,9 5 a pawnbroker is merely the pledgee of property consigned
to her until thirty days after the date fixed as the maturity date in the
pawn agreement.9 6 As such, the pawnbroker holds no title to the
pledged property until those thirty days have expired.9 7 Rather, the
pawnbroker has a special property interest in the items pledged.9 8
This special property interest was held to be sufficient to merit due
process protections when the Oklahoma Supreme Court held: "[a]
good faith purchaser for value acquires an interest that is lawful and
enforceable against all the world but the legal owner. Although it is only
a qualified and possessory interest, it is lawful and enforceable to a very
88. Id. at 362.
89. 758 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 882 (1986).
90. Id. at 477.
91. Wotfenbarger, 774 F.2d at 365.
92. Id.
93. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. NELSON YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 477 (1978).
94. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 1321, 1322 (1986); see supra note 74.
95. OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, §§ 1502-12 (1972).
96. OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 1510(d) (1972).
97. OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 1511(b) (1972) states that "pledged goods not redeemed
within thirty (30) days following the last fixed maturity date may thereafter, at the option
of the pawnbroker, be forfeited and become property of the pawnbroker."




large extent." 9 9 Therefore, Wolfenbarger's possession of the consigned
items vested in her a lawful interest in those items.
In deciding which deprivations require a prior hearing and which
do not, the Supreme Court has employed a balancing test, weighing the
property interest affected and the added protection a predeprivation
hearing would give that interest against the government's interest in not
providing such a hearing.10 0 By form, the outcome of this test depends
upon the fact patterns entered into these categories. Thus, the determi-
nation of whether post-deprivation procedures are adequate in meeting
due process requirements is very fact-specific and largely turns upon the
nature of the depriving act.' 0 '
In Parratt v. Taylor,10 2 the Supreme Court held that random, unau-
thorized acts of public officials negligently depriving an individual of
property would not violate that individual's due process rights if the
state provided for meaningful post-deprivation hearings. The Court
recognized that absent either a practical opportunity to provide
predeprivation hearings or a necessity for quick action, post-deprivation
procedures satisfied due process. 0 3 Keeping in mind that the conduct
complained of is unauthorized and random, the Court reflected that it
would be untenable to require the state to provide a predeprivation
hearing when the state had no way of knowing when or where the depri-
vation would occur. The Court stated that:
[i]t is difficult to conceive of how the State could provide a
meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes place. The
loss of property, although attributable to the State as action
under 'color of law,' is in almost all cases beyond the control of
the State. Indeed, in most cases it is not only impracticable, but
impossible, to provide a meaningful hearing before the
deprivation. 1
0 4
However, where the random and unauthorized deprivation caused
by the official, was not momentary, but rather occurred over a substan-
tial period of time, the courts have held that post-deprivation proce-
99. Snethen v. Oklahoma State Union of the Farmer's Educational & Cooperative
Union, 664 P.2d 377, 381 (Okla. 1983).
100. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see also, Foley, Unauthorized Conduct
of State Officials Under The Fourteenth Amendment: Hudson v. Palmer and the Ressurection of Dead
Doctrines, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 837 (1985) (criticizing the Court's balancing approach in
Mathews).
101. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455
U.S. 422 (1982); Lavicky v. Burnett, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Parratt v. Taylor, 758 F.2d 468
(10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom., Moore v. Lavicky, 106 S. Ct. 982 (1986); Coleman v.
Turpen, 697 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir. 1982).
102. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). Parratt involved a state prisoner suing prison officials under
section 1983 alleging that the officials had negligently lost Parratt's noncontraband prop-
erty. Their negligence, according to the prisoner, deprived him of due process under the
fourteenth amendment. But see supra note 44.
103. Lavicky, 451 U.S. at 539. The Court said that "either the necessity of quick action
by the State or the impracticality of providing any meaningful predeprivation process,
when coupled with the availability of some meaningful means by which to assess the pro-
priety of the State's action at some time after the initial taking ... satisflies] the require-
ments of procedural due process." Id.
104. Id. at 541.
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dures are not a valid remedy. In Coleman v. Turpen, 10 5 the Tenth Circuit
held that a prisoner may assert a claim under section 1983 where the
state not only improperly seized the individual's property but retained it
as well. The court, instead of focusing on whether the official's acts were
random or unauthorized, stressed the practicability with which the state
could have held a predeprivation hearing.' 0 6 Because the retention of
the prisoner's property spanned some two and a half weeks, the court
found that a prehearing to determine the validity of the retention was
practical.
In Hudson v. Palmer,10 7 the Supreme Court extended its rationale in
Par-att to cover not only cases of negligent conduct by officials but also
intentional conduct. 10 8 The Court realized that a state could no better
foresee its employees' random and unauthorized intentional acts then it
could foresee their random and unauthorized negligent acts. 10 9 In dis-
missing petitioner Palmer's assertion that post-deprivation hearings are
inadequate to protect against a violation of due process where an agent
of the state is in a position to provide a predeprivation hearing, the
Court stressed that "[w]hether an individual employee himself is able to
foresee a deprivation is simply of no consequence. The controlling in-
quiry is solely whether the state is in a position to provide for
predeprivation process."" 10
In spite of whether the state official's conduct is negligent or inten-
tional, where the conduct complained of is held to be authorized by the
state, the courts have been consistent in holding that post-deprivation
105. 697 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir. 1983).
106. The court stated: "It might have been impractical for the State to give Mr. Cole-
man a hearing before it seized the [property] during his arrest. However, the deprivation
Mr. Coleman challenges is not the seizure of the [property], but its retention by the State
until his execution. A hearing to determine the propriety of this retention is not impracti-
cal." Id. at 1344.
107. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
108. Thus, implicitly affirming the Tenth Circuit's holding in Coleman on the practica-
bility of hearing test. In Hudson prison guards conducted a shakedown search of petition-
ers. During the search the guard found a ripped pillowcase in the cell's trashcan.
Thereupon, charges were filed against petitioner Palmer for destruction of state property.
The Supreme Court held that a prisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
cell entitling him to the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches. Id.
at 536.
109. The court explained:
The underlying rationale of Parratt is that when deprivations of property are ef-
fected through random and unauthorized conduct of a state employee, pre-
deprivation procedures are simply 'impracticable' since the state cannot know
when such deprivations will occur. We can discern no logical distinction between
negligent and intentional deprivations of property insofar as the 'practicability' of
affording predeprivation process is concerned. The state can no more anticipate
and control in advance the random and unauthorized intentional conduct of its
employee than it can anticipate similar negligent conduct.
Id. at 533. For a fuller discussion on the rationale underlying the Parratt decision, see
Erickson, Negligent Deprivation of Property, 7 NAT'LJ. CRIM. DEF. 2290 (1981).
110. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 534. For an alternative analysis asserting that the Court's deci-
sion in Hudson turned upon the nature of the inmate's property interest, see Note, Prisoners'




proceedings do not suffice to prevent due process violations.I' This
reflects the basic proposition that once a state has conferred a property
interest upon an individual, it may not strip that interest away without
appropriate procedural safeguards. 1 2 The Supreme Court expressly
adopted this proposition in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company,' l by
holding that Parratt does not apply to section 1983 actions when the
deprivation was caused by an established state procedure.
D. Analysis
The pertinent question asked by the Tenth Circuit in Wolfenbarger
was "are the acts of state officials which violate that state's laws 'author-
ized' acts of that state?" Speaking for the majority, Judge Seymour ar-
gued that the courts have extended "authorized state conduct" to
include instances where the official's conduct violates both due process
safeguards and the state procedures conforming with those safe-
guards. 14 As support, Seymour noted that the Second Circuit rejected
the notion that authorized state conduct involves only the legislative
promulgation of procedures, and found that individual conduct could
constitute state conduct.' 15
Previously, in Lavicky v. Barnett,'1 6 the Tenth Circuit followed a sim-
ilar conceptual framework, and held that a sheriff's and prosecutor's acts
which were in contravention of established state procedures were never-
theless "planned and authorized" state action. Finding that the acts in-
volved several state officials and were first planned and then acted upon,
the court held that these types of acts are "not the sort of action for
which postdeprivation process will suffice."' 17
Holding the facts of Wolfenbarger to be clearly analogous to those in
Lavicky, the Tenth Circuit found the district attorney's, assistant district
attorney's, and police officer's acts to be "authorized" state conduct
under the Lavicky standard. Since the conduct leading to the deprivation
of Wolfenbarger's property interest was "authorized" state conduct,
post-deprivation remedies did not suffice in preventing a due process
violation.
This result appears to be sound, particularly in view of Lavicky's re-
alistic interpretation of the relationship between states and state offi-
111. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982); Garcia v. Salt Lake
County, 768 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1985); Hewitt v. City of Truth Or Consequences, 758
F.2d 1375 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 131 (1985).
112. Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)).
113. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
114. Wolfenbarger, 774 F.2d at 364-65.
115. See Patterson v. Coughlin, 761 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 879
(1986). Coughlin points out that allegations of procedural due process violations by certain
individual government employees, as opposed to direct challenges to state procedures or
the lack thereof, have long been accepted as constituting state action and forming the basis
for a claim under the civil rights statutes. Id.
116. 758 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 882 (1986).
117. Id. at 473.
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cials. As recognized in Patterson v. Coughlin,ll 8 the mere promulgation of
regulations by a state does not ensure their enforcement. As the mecha-
nism of enforcement, the state official is the medium through which the
state manifests itself. Therefore, state officials assume the position of
the state -. they become the state. Following this to its logical conclu-
sion, the state official's actions become the state's actions.
Rejecting this argument in his dissent, Judge Seth distinguished the
conduct of the state and its actors, stating that the district attorney "is
not the 'state' for the purpose of the fourteenth amendment." ' 19 Accus-
ing the majority of viewing the facts from the point of view of the state
employees rather than the state itself, Judge Seth said that the majority's
opinion ignored the holdings of Hudson and Parratt. However, Seth
failed to address the majority's interpretation of Coughlin. It is from this
case that the rationale extending "authorized" state conduct to individ-
ual state actors is gleaned.
The Tenth Circuit also correctly addressed Hudson's directive that
the controlling factor in determining the necessity of predeprivation
hearings is whether the state is in a position to provide such a hearing.
The majority followed this line of reasoning by pointing out that
Oklahoma was not only in a position to provide a predeprivation hear-
ing, but had expressly done so through the passage of sections 1321 and
1322. 120
The ease with which the Tenth Circuit treats this issue, however, is
unsettling because section 1321 does not provide for any predeprivation
hearing. Rather, as the majority itself points out, sections 1321-22 are a
recognition by the Oklahoma legislature that the most "timely and effi-
cient" point at which to adjudicate property interests is "after police ini-
tially take possession of property and before they release it."'1 2 1 The
deprivation Wolfenbarger suffered occurred the moment Officer Wil-
liams confiscated the allegedly stolen property. Sections 1321 and 1322
come into play only after the confiscation has occurred. It is difficult to
understand how the statute provides for a predeprivation hearing when
it becomes operational only after the deprivation has occurred.
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit's holding represents a logical ex-
tension of decisions on the adequacy of post-deprivation hearings. The
court not only addressed Parratt's authorized/unauthorized act test, but
also took into account the reasonableness standard of Hudson. Firmly
embedded in federal appellate court precedent and armed with a realis-
tic interpretation of the relationship between the state and state actors,
the Tenth Circuit's outcome here appears to be both sound and just.
118. 761 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 879 (1986).
119. Wolfenbarger, 774 F.2d at 367 (Seth, J, dissenting).




III. MINIMUM CONTACTS: FIDELITY AND CASUALTY CO. OF NEW YORK V.
PHILADELPHIA RESINS CORP.
A. Facts
Appellant, Philadelphia Resins Corporation (PRC), was a manufac-
turer/distributor of synthetic fiber cables chartered under the laws of
Pennsylvania. 122 Appellee Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York
was the insurer of Compagnie Generale de Geophysique (CGG).
123
CGG was involved in a Utah project using seismic equipment to lo-
cate oil fields. CGG contracted with Randall Rogers, a helicopter pilot
who resided in Arkansas, to transport CGG's equipment and personnel
to and from sites in Utah. 12 4 Upon seeing PRC's advertisement for lift-
ing cables in a national trade magazine, Rogers contacted PRC from
Arkansas and ordered their "Phillystran" cables. 125 When ordering,
Rogers informed a PRC employee that the cable was to be used in the
"rocky mountain region."' 126 PRC shipped the cables to Rogers' Arkan-
sas address whereupon Rogers took them to Utah. While lifting CGG's
equipment with his helicopter, the "Phillystran" cable snapped, causing
the equipment to fall and sustain approximately $120,000 in dam-
ages. 1
27
CGG brought suit against both Rogers and PRC in the United
States District Court in Utah. 128 CGG's insurer, Fidelity and Casualty
Company of New York, was substituted for CGG and the case then tried
before a jury.' 29 The jury's special verdict found Rogers not negligent,
CGG 12% negligent, and PRC 88% negligent for selling a defective
product unreasonably dangerous to the user. 130 PRC appealed, chal-
lenging the validity of Utah's assertion of in personam jurisdiction over
it. 131 The Tenth Circuit granted certiorari, considering only the issue of
in personam jurisdiction. 1
32
B. The Tenth Circuit's Holding
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's entry ofjudgment in
favor of the appellee and dismissed the action. 133 Looking first to the
law of the forum,' 34 the Tenth Circuit found that PRC fell under Utah's
122. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. Philadelphia Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 440,
441-42 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 853 (1986).




127. Id. at 442.






134. The question of whether a federal court has in personam jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant in a diversity case is determined by the law of the forum state. Yar-
brough v. Elmer Bunker & Associates, 669 F.2d 614 (10th Cir. 1982).
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long-arm statute.1 3 5 Then the court turned to the dispositive issue of
this case: Were PRC's contacts with Utah sufficient to support the exer-
cise of in personam jurisdiction?
The circuit's determination of this issue hinged upon the quality
and extent of PRC's contacts.1 3 6 Factual findings by the trial court that
PRC had never sold any "Phillystran" cable to any customer in Utah,
13 7
and that sales to customers in Utah accounted for less than one tenth of
one percent of PRC's gross revenue, 138 led the Tenth Circuit to hold
that PRC's contacts with Utah were insufficient to support the exercise
of in personam jurisdiction under the due process clause.
13 9
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Seymour argued that the majority's de-
cision, expanding World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson 140 to include manu-
facturers as well as distributors, misinterpreted the Supreme Court's
holding. 14 ' In view of this, Judge Seymour would have found PRC's
contacts with Utah sufficient to exercise in personam jurisdiction pursu-
ant to the stream of commerce theory.'
4 2
135. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24 (Supp. 1983) states that:
Any person, notwithstanding § 16-10-102, whether or not a citizen or resident of
this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the following enumer-
ated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from: 1) The transac-
tion of any business within this state; 2) Contracting to supply services or goods
in this state; 3) The causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by
breach of warranty; 4) The ownership, use or possession of any real estate situ-
ated in this state; 5) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located
within this state at the time of contracting; 6) With respect to actions of divorce
and separate maintenance, the maintenance in this state of a matrimonial domi-
cile at the time the claim arose or the commission in this state of the act giving
rise to the claim; or 7) The commission of sexual intercourse within this state
which gives rise to a paternity suit under Chapter 45a, Title 78, to determine
paternity for the purpose of establishing responsibility for child support.
The Utah legislature has specifically directed that the statute "should be applied so as to
assert jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due
process clause." Philadelphia Resins, 766 F.2d at 442.
136. Philadelphia Resins, 766 F.2d at 443.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides in part: "No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
140. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
141. Philadelphia Resins, 766 F.2d at 448 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
142. Judge Seymour argued that the Court's decision in World-Wide Volkswagen applied
only to relatively local distributors and retailers. The judge arrived at this conclusion
through a strict reading of World-Wide Volkswagen wherein mention is made only to "re-
tailer," "seller," and "concessionaire," in its discussion of the propriety of asserting per-
sonal jurisdiction over non-residents. Id. at 448 (Seymour, J., dissenting); see World-Wide
Volkswagen 444 U.S. at 296.
Thus, Judge Seymour argued that World-Wide Volkswagen left the standards governing
the assertion of personal jurisdiction over manufacturers intact. That standard, first seen
in Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 221 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961), states that where a manufacturer introduces his products into the stream of
commerce with the reasonable expectation that the product might be used by the con-
sumer of the forum state, and the product injures that consumer, the forum state shall





It is widely recognized that the assertion of in personam jurisdiction
must comport with the principles of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 143 The leading case in the area of "minimum con-
tacts" is International Shoe Co. v. Washington. 144 In this decision, the
Court held that a state could assert in personam jurisdiction over a non-
resident party when that party had "certain minimum contacts"' 14 5 with
the forum state such that assertion of personal jurisdiction would "not
offend notions of fair play and substantial justice." 1
46
The Court, however, was not specific in announcing what kinds of
"minimum contacts" would suffice:
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary
line between those activities which justify the subjection of a
corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply
mechanical or quantitative....
Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather on the
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and or-
derly administration of laws. 1
47
In effect, the Supreme Court was giving notice that the determination of
whether "minimum contracts" existed was to be very fact-specific.
One consideration in determining whether "minimum contacts" are
present is whether the defendant's contacts are related or unrelated to
the plaintiff's claim. 1 48 In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., '
14 9
the Court made it clear that in personam jurisdiction over a corporation
may be supported by sufficient contacts which are entirely unrelated to
143. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84 (1978). For a detailed analysis tracing the pre-International Shoe origins of authority
to assert jurisdiction from the Magna Carta to Pennoyer, see Whitten, The Constitutional Limi-
tations On State Court Jurisdiction: A Historical Interpretive Reexamination of the Full Faith and
Credit and Due Process Clauses, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 735 (1981).
144. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
145. Id. at 316.
146. Id. The court stated: "[D]ue Process requires only that in order to subject a de-
fendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Id. (citing Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the state of Washington initiated proceedings
against a Delaware-based shoe company seeking unpaid contributions to the state's unem-
ployment compensation plan. The company had salespeople in Washington who were
authorized only to exhibit samples and solicit orders. Orders were filled directly F.O.B.
from distribution points outside of Washington. Through the efforts of the Washington-
based salespeople more than $30,000 dollars worth of business was generated from cus-
tomers inside the state.
The company maintained no office, stock of merchandise, or agent for service in
Washington and was not involved in the interstate delivery of its goods. Nevertheless, the
Court, through Justice Stone, found the contacts to be sufficient to warrant in personam
jurisdiction.
147. Id. at 319.
148. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
149. Id.
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the plaintiff's claim. The Court held, though, that these contacts must
be more substantial than if the contacts are actually related to the
claim. 1
50
In Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corporation,15 1 the
Illinois Supreme Court laid down guidelines for the assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction in products liability actions. Gray held that where a
manufacturer places its products in the stream of commerce with the
reasonable expectation that some of these products will reach another
state, it is within the forum state's power to assert in personam jurisdic-
tion over the non-resident manufacturer.
1 52
In World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 1' s the U.S. Supreme Court
further refined the requirements governing "minimum contacts" in a
products liability action. Involving an out-of-state distributor, the Court
decided whether jurisdiction could be based upon an isolated incident
between the non-resident defendant and forum state. 154 Applying the
facts of the case to the concept of "minimum contacts," the Court found
that a single fortuitous incident between the plaintiff and defendant
would not support jurisdiction over the foreign party. The Court re-
jected the plaintiff's theory that because it was foreseeable that the de-
fendant's product would reach the forum state, the assertion of
jurisdiction would conform to the requirements of the due process
clause. 155 Rather, the Court held that the critical point was whether the
defendant could "reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there."1 5 6 The Supreme Court determined that in light of the paucity of
contacts with Oklahoma, World-Wide could not have reasonably antici-
150. Id. at 445-47.
151. 22 Il. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
152. For a more detailed examination of Gray in the personal jurisdiction context, see
Heldman,Jurisdiction - Foreign Defendants and Their Defective Products: An Application of World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 585 (1981).
153. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). This case sprung from the sale of an automobile by a New
York distributorship, World-Wide Volkswagen, to the plaintiffs. While plaintiffs were driv-
ing through Oklahoma they were involved in an accident which left the plaintiff's wife and
two children severely burned. Plaintiff sought to obtain jurisdiction over World-Wide in
the Oklahoma court where a suit based on a products liability theory had been initiated.
The trial court found that there were sufficient contacts to merit jurisdiction: defendants
appealed. The Supreme Court found that the paucity of contacts coupled with World-
Wide's inability to anticipate being sued in Oklahoma rendered the assertion of personal
jurisdiction unconstitutional. Id. at 295, 297.
154. Id. at 295. World-Wide had sold no automobiles in Oklahoma, did not advertise
in Oklahoma, and had no agent for service in Oklahoma. The record reflects that the only
contact World-Wide had with Oklahoma was that a car it sold had been involved in an
accident in that state. Id.
155. Id. at 295-97. The Court stated: "It is argued, however, that because an automo-
bile is mobile by design and purpose it was 'foreseeable' that the [plaintiff's car] would
cause injury in Oklahoma. Foreseeability alone has never been the benchmark for per-
sonal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause." Id. at 295.
156. Id. at 297. "This is not to say ... that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. But the
foreseeability that is critical to Due Process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a prod-
uct will find its way into a forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum state are such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there." Id.
212 [Vol. 64:2
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
pated being haled into Oklahoma's courts and was therefore not amena-
ble to Oklahoma's jurisdiction.
Via the "minimum contacts" test, the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment regulates the jurisdiction of state and federal
courts. While the "minimum contacts" test is conceptually an easy one
to grasp, it has defied consistent application since its 1945 introduction
in International Shoe. It is against this backdrop that the analysis of Fidelity
and Casualty Co. of New York v. Philadelphia Resins Corp. 157 proceeds.
D. Analysis
1. Does World-Wide's "Single, Fortuitous Event Test"
Apply To Manufacturers?
Philadelphia Resins is a products liability action, a field which has
proven to be fertile to jurisdictional disputes. Products liability law
seeks to secure an adequate remedy for the injured plaintiff158 and to
require manufacturers and sellers who put products in channels of com-
merce to bear the costs of injuries resulting from their defective prod-
ucts. 1 59 The seminal cases in this area, and the cases upon which the
Tenth Circuit relied herein, are World-Wide Volkswagen and Gray.
World-Wide Volkswagen's departure from the Gray reasoning and to
the "single, fortuitous event" test is easily explained. Whereas Gray in-
volved the manufacturer of a product which was involved in the nation-
wide sale of its products, World-Wide Volkswagen involved a distributor of
manufactured products operating in a three-state area.
To apply the World-Wide "single, fortuitous event" test to a manu-
facturer, as the Tenth Circuit does here, seems inappropriate. It should
be recognized that the analyses in Gray and World-Wide Volkswagen were
specifically tailored to the fact patterns of their respective cases: Gray's
"stream of commerce" test originally applied only to manufacturers,
although later expanded by World-Wide Volkswagen to include distribu-
tors; World-Wide Volkswagen's "single, fortuitous event" test applied only
to distributors and has never been explicitly expanded.,
The point at which the majority and dissenting opinions analytically
diverge is in the interpretation of World-Wide Volkswagon effect on the
stream of commerce theory. The majority held that World-Wide Volk-
swagon narrowed the theory by refusing to allow personal jurisdiction to
be based only upon a "single, fortuitous event" between plaintiff and
non-resident defendant. Thus, the Tenth Circuit applied the "single
fortuitous events" test regardless of whether the non-resident was a
manufacturer, distributor, or retailer.
Attacking the majority's commingling of these three parties, Judge
157. 766 F.2d 440 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 853 (1986).
158. See Henegan, Long-Arm jurisdiction in Products Liability Actions: An "Effect Test" Analy-
sis of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 45 ALB. L. REv. 179 (1980).
159. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 337 P.2d 897, 901,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
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Seymour pointed out in her powerful dissent that the Court in World-
Wide Volkswagen was "careful to differentiate between defendants who
sought to serve a national market [manufacturers] and defendants who
sought to serve a local market [distributors]."' 60 Seymour noted that
the Court's language in World-Wide Volkswagon spoke of retailers, sellers,
and concessionaires. 16 1 This deliberate choice of classes by the
Supreme Court vividly illustrates that the Court never intended that
World-Wide Volkswagon be applied to manufacturers. The majority opin-
ion here chose to ignore this differentiation.
A review of state supreme court decisions since World-Wide Volk-
swagon lends additional support to Seymour's stance. 162 These opinions
continue to adhere to the Gray standard and hold manufacturers ac-
countable for injuries resulting from their defective products where the
manufacturer has no direct contacts with the state. Utah's Supreme
Court indicated in Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill 168 that they too would
apply the minimum contacts test in the Gray tradition.
The court dismissed the assertion of jurisdiction under the stream
of commerce theory as "too attenuated,"'16 4 finding that PRC's knowl-
edge of the general destination of its product, national advertising of its
product, and previous sales to Utah customers did not prove that PRC
had made an effort to sell or transport its products to Utah. t 65 This
finding is clearly at odds with the Supreme Court's in World-Wide Volk-
swagen which noted that "one persuasive indication that a manufacturer
seeks to serve a market for its product in the forum state is its solicita-
tion of business 'through advertising reasonably calculated to reach the
state.' "166 It is clear that PRC's national advertising places it within this
framework.
The Tenth Circuit's analysis of the significance of PRC's contacts
with Utah is also unsettling. The Supreme Court has recently held in
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine 167 that a plaintiff's lack of contacts does not
always operate to defeat otherwise proper jurisdiction. 16 8 Thus, there
are certain occasions when personal jurisdiction can be based upon a
lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be re-
quired.'16 9 The Tenth Circuit does not address this issue in Philadelphia
Resins.
Particularly disturbing is the court's treatment of PRC's previous
160. Philadelphia Resins, 776 F.2d at 448 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
161. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
162. For other Tenth Circuit region state supreme court decisions following the Gray
analysis, see Le Manufacture Francaise des Pneumatiques Michelin v. District Court, 620
P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1980); State ex. rel. Hydraulic Servocontrols Corp. v. Dale, 294 Or. 381,
657 P.2d 211 (1982).
163. 608 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980).
164. Philadelphia Resins, 766 F.2d at 447.
165. Id.
166. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295.
167. 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
168. Id. at 1478-79.
169. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
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sales to Utah customers. The court dismisses these sales as inadequate
to meet the "minimum contacts" standard in view of the fact that the
sales accounted for only one-tenth of one percent of PRC's gross reve-
nues. Because of the demographic realities of the states that comprise
the Tenth Circuit, this analysis is inequitable. Tenth Circuit states are
sparsely populated 170 and will rarely account for a large percentage of a
manufacturer's revenue. 17 1 Thus, the Tenth Circuit plaintiff, being in-
significant in terms of the percentage of a manufacturer's sales ac-
counted for, may be required to bring the action to the manufacturer's
home forum, while the resident of a more populous state can force that
same manufacturer into his state's courts to defend. The practical result
of the court's treatment of PRC's previous sales to Utah customers is to
create a heavy burden for Tenth Circuit residents seeking to bring prod-
ucts liability action against foreign corporations.
E. Conclusion
For businesses, the Tenth Circuit's holding lessens their exposure
to potential liability claims by limiting the injured plaintiff's access to the
courtroom. One possible ramification of this is that businesses will pre-
fer to operate, without establishing an actual presence, in those states
where the standards governing the assertion of in personam jurisdiction
over foreign corporations are strict. In light of this, it could be expected
that civic and business leaders wanting to attract new business might
indirectly pressure the judiciary to tighten the requirements governing
personal jurisdiction over non-resident corporations.
The overall result of the Tenth Circuit's holding in Philadelphia
Resins is to significantly limit a plaintiff's ability to bring a products lia-
bility action in his home state. The expansion by the circuit allowing
manufacturers to come under the penumbra of the "single, fortuitous
event" test destroys the rationale underlying Gray's "stream of com-
merce" test. Gray was designed with the recognition that manufacturers,
distributors, and retailers are inherently different. Philadelphia Resins, by
diluting this distinction, denudes the Gray rationale.
170. The six states comprising the Tenth Circuit; Kansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, Wyo-
ming, Utah, and New Mexico contain 11,489,000 residents, or approximately 5% of the
nation's population of 226,505,000. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, (10th
ed. 1986).
171. The converse of this is not true. For example, although the sale of ten lifting
cables in Utah accounts for only one-half of one percent of PRC's corporate sales, those
ten cables may represent 50% of all lifting cables purchased by Utah customers. The
smaller populations of the Tenth Circuit states tend to magnify the effect, in terms of
market share, of the sale of a single product.
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IV. COMMON LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO PRIVACY
REGARDING CREDIT REPORTING: POLIN V.
DUN & BRADSTREET, INC.
A. Facts
Appellants Paul and Marsha Polin filed an action against Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. (Dun & Bradstreet) in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma alleging an invasion of their con-
stitutional right to privacy. 172 Appellants complaint also alleged that
Dun & Bradstreet was in violation of the Oklahoma Credit Rating
Act. 173
The circumstances giving rise to this action occurred some twenty
years ago. 174 The Polins worked as business and financial consultants as
well as insurance agents. 17 5 In response to a 1966 inquiry from the
Minnehoma Financial Company, Dun & Bradstreet prepared a credit re-
port on Mr. Polin. 176 This report was sent to eight businesses., 7 7 Pur-
suant to a 1968 request from the Dallas Aero Service Company, Dun &
Bradstreet prepared a similar report regarding the Polins which was sent
to seven businesses. 17 8 In 1969, Dun & Bradstreet updated its report
on the Polins and sent the new information to two other companies.
179
The record indicates that the businesses which received the credit
reports on the Polins did so pursuant to Dun & Bradstreet's standard
subscription agreement. 180 The defendant never obtained the Polins'
172. Polin v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 768 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1985).
173. Id.; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 81-82 (1987). Sections 81 and 82 provide:
§ 81. Persons furnishing ratings to request statement of assets and liabilities.
Any person, firm or corporation engaged in or purporting to furnish retail
merchants the financial or credit rating of any person who is the actual or pro-
spective customer of such retail merchant shall, before furnishing such rating,
submit, either in person or by mailing to his last known postoffice address to the
person whose rating is about to be reported, a request asking for a statement of
the assets and liabilities of such person.
§ 82 Copy of opinion furnished person to whom it relates whenever an opinion
in writing upon the financial or credit standing of any person is about to be sub-
mitted for the purpose of establishing a financial or credit rating of customers, to
be used by the retail business concerns, the person, firm or corporation submit-
ting such opinion shall first mail a copy of such opinion to the person about
whom the opinion is given, at his proper postoflice address.
174. Polin, 768 F.2d at 1206.
175. Id. at 1205.
176. Id.
177. Id. This report listed four lawsuits filed against Polin for money due on accounts.
Id. The Tenth Circuit's discussion does not indicate whether the information supplied by
Dun & Bradstreet to its subscribers was incorrect. However, appellants asserted in their
brief to the Tenth Circuit that the information sent to the Polin's creditors "contained
false light half truths [and] misleading information about the personal and private lives of
the [Polins] and concerning the conduct of [Polin's] business activities." Brief for Appel-
lant at 2, Polin v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 768 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1985).
178. Polin, 768 F.2d at 1205.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1205-06. The agreement provided in pertinent part:
1. All information furnished to the subscriber by Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. is
for the exclusive use of the subscriber as a basis for credit, insurance, marketing
and other business decisions and for no other purpose. Such information shall be
held in strict confidence and shall never be reproduced, revealed, or made acces-
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permission to investigate their financial background. Nor did the Polins
ever receive copies of the reports before subscribers received them.1
8 1
In 1966, the Polins requested that Dun & Bradstreet cease and desist
from preparing these documents without first following Oklahoma law
on making credit reports.' 8 2 Dun & Bradstreet, however, refused to fol-
low the Polins' directive. The appellants renewed this request in 1968,
again to no avail.1
8 3
The Polins initiated this action in 1970. In 1977, at the request of
the parties, the district court referred the case to a Special Master. 18
4
The Special Master granted Dun & Bradstreet's motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), 185 and the district court en-
tered judgment "in conformity with" the Special Master's order. 18 6 In
1980, the Tenth Circuit (en banc), held that the district court had failed
to review the Special Master's finding as mandated by Rule 53(e)(4) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18 7 and remanded the case.18 8
Upon remand, the district court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment. 1
8 9
B. The Tenth Circuit's Holding
Reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment for the
defendant, the Tenth Circuit held that the Polins failed to state a cause
of action for invasion of privacy under Oklahoma law in Count I of their
complaint.19 0 Finding that Dun & Bradstreet had not made the Polin
information "public" for the purposes of section 652(D) of the Second
sible in any matter whatever to the persons reported upon or to any others. It is
expressly understood that the subscriber shall neither request information for the
use of others, nor permit requests to be made under this subscription by others.
Id. at 1206.
181. Id.
182. Id. The Polin's claimed at that time that Dun & Bradstreet was violating OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 81-82 (1987).
183. Polin, 768 F.2d at 1206.
184. Id.
185. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) pursuant to the following language allows the special master
to grant summary judgment:
Motion and Proceedings Thereon.
The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of the hearing may serve opposing
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answer to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
186. Polin, 768 F.2d at 1206.
187. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(4) states:
Stipulations as to Findings.
The effect of a master's report is the same whether or not the parties have
consented to the reference; but, when the parties stipulate that a master's find-
ings of fact shall be final, only questions of law arising upon the reports shall
thereafter be considered.
188. Polin, 768 F.2d at 1206.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1206-07.
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Restatement of Torts, Judge Doyle, speaking for the majority, dismissed
the deprivation of privacy allegation.' 9 '
Reviewing Count I further, the Tenth Circuit accepted the district
court's contention that Oklahoma law did not require Dun & Bradstreet
to obtain the consent of the Polins prior to distributing their credit re-
ports.' 9 2 The Tenth Circuit then held that since the constitutional right
of privacy applies only to protect from acts perpetrated by the federal or
state government, 19 3 the Polins' claim against the private firm of Dun &
Bradstreet must fail.'
94
Finally, turning to Count II of the Polins' complaint, Judge Doyle
held that sections 81 and 82 of the Oklahoma Credit Ratings Act, 19 5
under which the Polins' claims for monetary damages were brought,
simply did not provide for monetary recovery. 19 6 Thus, the Tenth Cir-




1. The Warren and Brandeis Tort: Invasion of Privacy
The tort of invasion of privacy, initially unknown at common law,1 98
first gained recognition from an 1890 law review article authored by Sa-
191. Id. at 1207.
192. The Tenth Circuit declined to explain exactly how the district court decided that
Oklahoma law did not require Dun & Bradstreet to obtain the Polin's consent before dis-
tributing the reports. Rather, the Tenth Circuit, citing Colonial Park Country Club v.Joan
of Arc, 746 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1984), merely stated that a "district court's understanding
of unsettled law of its state is entitled to deference." Polin, 768 F.2d at 1207.
193. Polin, 768 F.2d at 1207. For this proposition, the Tenth Circuit cited Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
194. Polin, 768 F.2d at 1207. The Tenth Circuit held that the fact that Dun & Brad-
street's reporting operations were regulated by federal and state law was insufficient to
create state action. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
195. See note 173 and accompanying text.
196. Polin, 768 F.2d at 1207. The Tenth Circuit determined that the district court,
relied upon Derryberry v. Retail Credit Co., 550 P.2d 942 (Okla. 1976), and correctly
concluded that only section 83 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides for monetary recovery.
Therefore, since the Polins alleged violations of only sections 81 and 82, no monetary
recovery was forthcoming.
Section 83 provides:
False Rating - Damages - Misdemeanor - Penalty
Any person, firm or corporation who knowingly promulgates or publishes a
false opinion or statement in any book or list as to the credit or financial standing
of any person, and circulates such book or list among wholesale or retail business
concerns, shall be liable in damages to the person about whom the false opinion
or statement is made, for the full amount of injury sustained, and in addition
thereto for exemplary damages in any sum to be fixed by the jury, and shall also
be guilty of a misdeameanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined in any
sum not exceeding twenty-five dollars.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 83 (1987).
197. Polin, 768 F.2d at 1207.
198. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905), Rober-
son v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). England and the
other common-law jurisdictions of Australia, New Zealand, and Canada still have not rec-
ognized invasion of privacy as an actionable tort. See generally Baxter, Privacy in Context:
Principles Lost or Found?, 8 CAMBR. L. REV. 7 (1977); Davis, What Do We Mean by "Right To
Privacy?," 4 S.D. L. REV. 1, 4 (1959); Winfield, Privacy, 47 LAw Q REV. 23 (1931).
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muel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis.' 9 9 In this article Warren and
Brandeis proposed that the judiciary create a right to privacy in order to
protect the private individual's "inviolate personality ' 20 0 from journal-
istic abuse. 20 1 Receiving little initial acknowledgment, 20 2 Warren and
Brandeis' proposed tort remained largely unacted upon.20 3 However,
beginning with a Georgia Supreme Court case, 20 4 state courts began
increasingly to recognize this new tort and incorporate it into American
jurisprudence.
20 5
Section 652(A) of the Second Restatement of Torts sets forth four
distinct categories of invasion of privacy. 20 6 The right to privacy may be
invaded by an unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another,
20 7
199. Warren and Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). This arti-
cle has been referred to as an "outstanding example of the influence of legal periodicals
upon the American law." Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). For a recent
discussion of Warren and Brandeis' seminal work, see Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The
Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 875 (1979).
200. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 199, at 211. Several commentators have astutely
pointed out that since corporations have neither "inviolate personality" nor feelings, they
have no right to an invasion of privacy action. See Clinton Community Hosp. Corp. v.
Southern Md. Medical Center, 374 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd, 510 F.2d 1037 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1048 (1975); see also Frazer, Tort Law-Invasion of Privacy-Public
Disclosure of Public Facts-Nevada Supreme Court Expands Newsworthiness Defense. Montesano v.
Downey Media Group, 668 P.2d 1081 (Nev. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2172 (1984), 15
CUM. L. REV. 211 (1985).
201. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 199, at 196. Commenting on the characteristics
of the late nineteenth century press, the two commentators observed that:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety
and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious,
but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To
satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the
columns of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is
filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic
circle. The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civiliza-
tion, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the
refining influences of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that soli-
tude and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modem enter-
prise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to
mental pain and duress, greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.
202. For early decisions acknowledging a right to privacy, see, e.g., Corliss v. E.W.
Walker Co., 64 Fed. 280 (D. Mass. 1894); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22
(1895); Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. ':90, 26 N.Y.S. 908 (1893), Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral
Springs, Co., 27 Abb. N. Cas. 4022, 18 N.Y.S. 240 (Sup. Ct. 1891).
203. See, e.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442
(1902) (unauthorized lithograph of a woman cannot be enjoined unless it is libelous); At-
kinson v.John E. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285 (1899) (commercial use of a
name of likeness of deceased person is not actionable unless it is libelous).
204. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
205. See, e.g., Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So.2d 118 (1948); Hinish v. Meier &
Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91
(1931); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911).
206. The Restatement has closely followed Professor Prosser's lead in establishing the
categories of invasion of privacy. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). This
article is another "outstanding example of the influence of legal periodicals upon the
American law" of which Prosser himself spoke. It should be noted that Professor Prosser's
propositions in Privacy have not been universally accepted. For a spirited rebuttal to Pros-
ser's article, see Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 962 (1964).
207. The intrusion tort usually involves a physical invasion of a party's privacy. See, e.g.,
1987] 219
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an appropriation of another's likeness or name,20 8 unreasonable public-
ity given to another's private life, 20 9 or publicity that unreasonably
places the other in a false light before the public.
210
Focusing on false light invasion of privacy, the Restatement re-
quires that first the matter placing the plaintiff in the false light be made
public.2 1' The Restatement then requires that the false light in which
the objecting party was placed be "highly offensive" and that the actor
who placed the objecting party in the false light have knowledge or have
acted with reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter.
D. Analysis
1. Privacy Right in Tort
It is the first requirement, that of publication, which the Tenth Cir-
cuit focused on to determine the validity of the Polin's common law
claim of privacy. 2 12 Finding that the objectionable material had been
sent to only seventeen different parties, 2 13 the Tenth Circuit mysteri-
ously concluded that Dun & Bradstreet did not make the information
Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (intrusive nature of photographer's con-
duct was actionable despite plaintiff's status as a public figure); Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,
449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (hidden camera and microphones were a physical invasion of
privacy); Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.) (forced entry onto plaintiff's prop-
erty), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969).
208. The tort of appropriation usually occurs when a party's property interest in the
commercial value of his name or likeness is misappropriated by an unauthorized party.
See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (statutory pro-
vision that protected a performer's right was violated when the defendant videotaped the
entire act of plaintiff being shot out of a cannon).
209. The tort of publication of a private fact usually appears in the context of the media
deeming some fact "newsworthy" and the plaintiff claiming emotional harm for the publi-
cation of that fact. See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App.
1931) (public screening of a movie depicting the licentious past of the plaintiff invaded her
right to privacy); Brents v. Morgan, 201 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927) (the posting of a
sign in a store window stating that plaintiff owed the storeowner on an account overdue
was actionable).
210. It has been stated that the tort of false light invasion closely parallels the torts of
libel and slander. Whereas libel and slander compensate for injuries to a person's reputa-
tion, false light invasion of privacy compensates for injuries to a person's feelings. See, e.g.,
Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (feature story on impact on
family of father's accidental death sustains "false light" theory); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967) (a play depicting an actual kidnapping of a family as extremely violent
when in fact it was, is not actionable). For an insightful article, see Wade, Defamation and
the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (1962).
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(E) (1976) defines false light invasion of
privacy as:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the fal-
sity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be
placed.
212. Polin, 768 F.2d at 1206.
213. The record indicates that eight reports were sent in 1966, seven reports in 1968,
and two reports in 1969. Id. at 1205.
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public. 2 14 This is particularly confusing when apropos of libel, the act
of publication is said to involve "the act of making the defamatory mat-
ter known publicly, or disseminating it or communicating it to one or
more persons."
2 15
It has been contended, and the Tenth Circuit would certainly seem
to agree, that since the publication of information in a credit report does
not involve communication to the public at large, no real publication
exists. 21 6 This narrow-sighted view fails to take into account that in this
case the recipient of the misleading or unauthorized credit report is the
one member of the public who requires an accurate portrayal of the con-
sumer. A consumer whose reputation is injured by the report is viewed
as damaged goods by the very sector of the public he seeks to impress -
the current or potential creditor.
2 17
The publication of the information to the relatively few number of
creditors causes considerably more harm than if it had been made to the
general masses. It would thus seem reasonable to conclude that the
publication requirement is met in a situation having such potentially
harmful consequences for the victim of the credit report. 2 18
2. Constitutional Privacy Right
The Tenth Circuit's treatment of the Polins' constitutional right to
privacy appears to be on firmer footing. The constitutional right to pri-
vacy, as the Tenth Circuit noted, first appeared in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut. 2 19 Though perhaps best characterized as confusing, 22 0 Justice
Douglas' decision recognized the importance of securing the "sanctity
of a man's home and the privacies of life" 22 1 from governmental intrusion.
A perusal of cases involving the constitutional right to privacy decided
subsequent to Griswold, indicates that Justice Douglas' concern and em-
phasis on governmental intrusion remains intact. 2 2 2
In order to be considered governmental or "state" action, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that either the private entity must be engaged
in what is deemed to be a "public function, ' 22 3 which requires some
214. Id. at 1206.
215. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1105 (5th ed. 1979).
216. See Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 458 Pa. 124, 327 A.2d 133 (1974).
217. This cogent line a reasoning was gleaned from Comment, Misleading Credit Reports:
Alternatives for Recovery, 15 U. TOL. L. REv. 877, 911 (1984).
218. Id.
219. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
220. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion of the Court. Justice Goldberg wrote a concur-
ring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan. Justices Harlan and
White delivered separate concurring opinions. Justices Black and Stewart each dissented
in an opinion joined by the other.
221. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886)).
222. For Supreme Court holdings involving allegations of governmental intrusion into
the individual's right to privacy since Griswold, see Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (en
banc); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971); and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
223. See Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan
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symbolic nexus between the state and private entity, 2 24 or a symbiotic
relationship between the private entity and the state.2 25 The Tenth Cir-
cuit analyzed Dun & Bradstreet's actions in the context of the "public
function" category. Relying upon Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. ,226
Judge Doyle pointed out that where a private party engages in activities
not exclusively reserved to the state, no state action will be found.
22 7
The mere fact that the activity is regulated by the state does not make it
state action. 22 8 As the court found, since Dun & Bradstreet's actions
were not state action, their conduct vis-a-vis the Polins could not consti-
tute governmental intrusion. Thus, as the Tenth Circuit holds, the
Polins' claim asserting the deprivation of their constitutional right to
privacy must fail.
3. Monetary Damages under Oklahoma Law
In conclusion, the court turned to Count II of the Polins' complaint
which alleged that Dun & Bradstreet violated the Oklahoma Credit Rat-
ings Act. 22 9 Noting that neither of these sections provide for any mone-
tary damages, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the complaint failed to
state a claim under sections 81 and 82.230 A reading of the statutory
language of section 82, however, clearly reveals that Dun & Bradstreet
was in violation of this part of the Oklahoma Credit Rating Act.2 3 ' Sec-
tion 82 requires that the credit reporting firm mail a copy of the pre-
pared report to the party whom the report refers to. The record
indicates that the Polins never received a copy of the reports prepared
by the defendant.
23 2
Instead of addressing this violation, the Tenth Circuit approved the
district court's reliance upon Denyberry v. Retail Credit Co.,233 and con-
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
224. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964);
Pennsylvania v. Board of Trust., 353 U.S. 230 (1957); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948).
225. See Gilmore v. Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
226. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
227. Polin, 768 F.2d at 1207.
228. Speaking for the majority, and quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934),
Justice Rehnquist stated in Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353 that
[I]t is clear that there is no closed class or category of business affected with a
public interest .... The phrase 'affected with a public interest' can, in the nature
of things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to
control for the public good. He further stated that doctors, optometrists, law-
yers, Metropolitan [the utility in the case], and Nebbia's upstate New York gro-
cery selling a quart of milk are all in regulated businesses, providing arguably
essential goods and services, 'affected with a public interest.' We do not believe
that such status converts their every action, absent more, into that of the State.
229. Polin, 768 F.2d at 1207; see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 81-82 (1987).
230. Polin, 768 F.2d at 1207.
231. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
232. Polin, 768 F.2d at 1206. The record is not clear as to whether or not Dun & Brad-
street complied with the section 81 requirement that a request asking for a statement of
assets and liabilities be sent to the Polins.
233. 550 P.2d 942 (Okla. 1976).
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cluded that the monetary damages sought by the Polins 23 4 could only be
provided by the unpled section 83 of the Act. 23 5 Due to their failure to
incorporate section 83 in their complaint, the Polins' claim for damages
was dismissed, despite their showing of Dun & Bradstreet's violations.
E. Summary
In Polin v. Dun & Bradstreet, the Tenth Circuit promulgated an ineq-
uitable standard for determining if a matter has been made public.
Rather than following a quantitative approach where the sheer number
of persons receiving the publication determines whether the matter has
been publicized, the Tenth Circuit should adopt a more qualitative ap-
proach. The major emphasis of this approach should focus on the publi-
cation's affect on the plaintiff. As was the case herein, the publication of
the objectionable material to only seventeen parties caused more harm
to the plaintiffs than if the matter had been publicized to five thousand
fishermen in Florida. 236 This is not to suggest that the dissemination of
the matter to the five thousand does not satisfy the publication require-
ment, or that the number of people reached is irrelevant. Rather, it sug-
gests that along with the number of people reached, the reaction of the
people and the resulting impact of the reaction on the person about
whom the publication concerns should be taken into account.
Theodore Wells Rosen
234. The Polins sought $1,000,000 actual and $500,000 punitive damages on each
count of their complaint. Polin, 768 F.2d at 1206.
235. The Tenth Circuit again, as they did in Trujillo, refused to remand the case and
allow the plaintiffs to bring their complaint in compliance with the Tenth Circuit's holding.
The defendant, as alleged by the Polins, was in violation of section 82 of the Oklahoma
Crediting Rating Act. The usefulness of a statute, such as section 82, which describes
illegal conduct, but provides no mechanism for either punishing the illegal conduct or
allowing a party to recover from one engaging in the illegal conduct, is questionable.
236. This assumes that none of the five thousand Florida fishermen were current or





"Steady as she goes" was obviously the motto of the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals during the period of time covered by this survey arti-
cle. The Tenth Circuit neither wandered far afield from previous deci-
sions nor forged ahead into unknown legal waters. As a result, the cases
examined in this article were chosen more for their factual intrigue than
for the legal significance of the court's reasoning.
The survey article covers two areas of criminal law: habeas corpus
proceedings and convictions on appeal. The habeas corpus section dis-
cusses two cases representing opposite extremes in how juveniles are
treated. In the first case, the Tenth Circuit granted the writ of habeas
corpus. The court held that a juvenile's right to parental notice of his
criminal offense is a right which is not waivable by a juvenile offender,
even where the right was not recognized by the courts at the time the
right was allegedly waived. In the second case, the Tenth Circuit denied
the writ of habeas corpus, holding that a juvenile who violates his parole
loses any rights he may have been entitled to under the Federal Youth
Corrections Act.
The second section, covering convictions on appeal, discusses three
convictions, two of which were vacated by the Tenth Circuit. In the first
case, the court vacated a conviction for making a threat to kill the Presi-
dent. In the second case, the court reviewed the heat of passion defense
and vacated the conviction based on the inadequacy of the jury instruc-
tions relating to the defense. Finally, the court upheld a conviction
while applying the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) to the activities of a county sheriff.
I. HABEAS CORPUS
A. Juvenile Rights in Criminal Courts
1. History of the Juvenile Court Movement in the United States
The Juvenile Court movement in the United States began with the
juvenile court statute adopted in Illinois in 1899.1 Since the passage of
that statute every state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have
enacted similar statutes.
2
The move to create a juvenile court system through statutory
change was a reaction to unacceptable conditions in the handling of
young criminals. Early reformers were dismayed by the adult criminal
1. 1899 111. Laws 131; see 2 G. ABBOTr, THE CHILD AND THE STATE 330 (1938); R.
PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 940-949 (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter PERKINS & BOYCE];
Kean, The History of the Criminal Liability of Children, 53 L. Q. REV. 364 (1937).
2. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 1, at 940; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967).
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procedures and penalties to which children were subjected.3 Equally
appalling was the fact that children received long prison sentences and
were placed in jails with hardened criminals. 4 Reformers believed that
society's role was not to ascertain a child's guilt or innocence, but rather
to discover "[w]hat is he, how has he become what he is, and what had
best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him
from a downward career." 5 Using adult criminal procedures for chil-
dren was viewed negatively.6 These people thought the child was essen-
tially good and should be made "to feel that he is the object of [the
state's] care and solicitude," not that he was under arrest or on trial.
7
They wished to abandon the idea of crime and punishment in favor of
treatment and rehabilitation.
8
The reformers felt that the state, acting in its role as parens patriae,
had a right to deny to the child procedural rights available to adults. 9
The state's right to deny due process evolved from the theory that a
child had a right to custody, but not liberty.' 0 If the child's parents
failed to supervise and care for the child, the state could intervene on his
behalf." Through intervention, the state provided the supervision to
which the child was entitled. 12 By characterizing juvenile proceedings
as "civil" and not "criminal," these proceedings were then not governed
by the same constitutional requirements of due process as mandated in
adult criminal proceedings.
13
The justification for this denial of due process was that the benefits
received by juveniles from these special proceedings outweighed the
constitutional guarantees of conventional criminal proceedings.
14
These benefits included processing and treating the juvenile separately
from adults,' 5 keeping confidential the juvenile's record of deviant be-
havior,16 and classifying the juvenile as a "delinquent" and not a "crim-
inal."1 7 In addition, the classification of the child as a delinquent would
not affect his eligibility for civil service appointment.'
8
3. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15.
4. Id.
5. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119-120 (1909).
6. Id. at 120.
7. Id.
8. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16.
9. Id. at 17; see also Mack, supra note 5, at 109. Parens Patriae, translates into "parent
of the country," and refers to the traditional role of the sovereign as "guardian of persons
under a legal disability." BLACKs LAw DICrIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979) (quoting State of
W. Va. v. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1971)).
10. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 17.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.; see also Appendix B to the opinion ofJudge Prettyman in Pee v. United States,
274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (listing of constitutional guarantees which do not apply to
juvenile proceedings).
14. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 21.
15. Id. at 22.
16. Id. at 24.
17. Id. at 23.
18. Id. at 24.
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These benefits, however, were also accompanied by increased juve-
nile misbehavior, violence, and brutality.' 9 Studies were conducted
showing a high percentage of repeat juvenile offenders. 20 These high
percentages and the increased crime rate led some people to believe
that the juvenile system, functioning free of constitutional inhibitions,
was ineffective in reducing crime or rehabilitating offenders.
2 '
Studies attacking the basic premise of the juvenile system - a fa-
therly judge or a benevolent institution providing guidance and help to
an erring youth - began to appear. 22 These studies pointed out that
fairness and impartiality, rather than paternal advice and admonition,
would have a more inspiring and rehabilitative impact on the juvenile.
23
For example, sociologists Wheeler and Cottrell noted that the contrast
between the paternal attitude of the judge as adjudicator and the impar-
tial attitude of the judge as disciplinarian may adversely affect the
child.2 4 The child may feel that he has been betrayed.2 5 Wheeler and
Cottrell reasoned that "[u]nless appropriate due process of law is fol-
lowed," the juvenile "may not feel that he is being fairly treated and may
therefore resist the rehabilitative efforts of court personnel."
'26
Studies such as these, as well as the apparent inability of the juve-
nile court system to reduce the juvenile crime rate, led to the landmark
decision of In re Gault.27 The Supreme Court held that in a juvenile
delinquency hearing the following must occur:
19. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 1, at 944. According to the National Crime Commis-
sion Report, "[i]n 1965, persons under 18 accounted for about one-fifth of all arrests for
serious crimes and over half of all arrests for serious property offenses, and in the same
year some 601,000 children under 18, or 2% of all children between 10 and 17, came
before juvenile courts." In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 20 n.26 (citing Report of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration ofJustice, "The Challenge of Crime
in a Free Society," 55 (1967) [hereinafter National Crime Commission Report]).
20. A study of repeat offenders or recidivism was conducted by the Stanford Research
Institute for the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia. The Court,
quoting the Commission's Report, stated:
In fiscal 1966 approximately 66 percent of the 16- and 17-year-old juveniles re-
ferred to the court by the Youth Aid Division had been before the court previ-
ously. In 1965, 56 percent of those in the Receiving Home were repeaters. The
SRI study revealed that 61 percent of the sample Juvenile Court referrals in 1965
had been previously referred at least once and that 42 percent had been referred
at least twice before.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 22.
21. Id. at 22.
22. Id. at 26.
23. Id.
24. Id.; seeJUVENILE DELINQUENCY-ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL (Russell Sage Foun-
dation 1966) [hereinafter JUVENILE DELINQUENCY] (juveniles are likely to resent uneven
court treatment). Quoting this study, conducted by Wheeler and Cottrell, the Court
stated:
[T]here is increasing evidence that the informal procedures, contrary to the origi-
nal expectation, may themselves constitute a further obstacle to effective treat-
ment of the delinquent to the extent that they engender in the child a sense of
injustice provoked by seemingly all-powerful and challengeless exercise of au-
thority by judges and probation officers.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26 n.3 7 .
25. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26 (citingJUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 24, at 33).
26. Id.
27. 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 1, at 947.
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1. The juvenile must have timely notice of the specific issues
he must address.
2. The child and his parents must be notified of the child's
right to be represented by counsel. If he is unable to afford
counsel, he must have counsel appointed to represent him.
3. The juvenile has the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against him.
4. The court has a duty to advise the child of his privilege
against self-incrimination, and this right to counsel. The
court may not consider any confession or admission if such
advice has not been given.
2 8
The Court took great pains to emphasize that the requirement of these
procedural safeguards was not, in any way, to repudiate the basic theory
of juvenile legislation.2 9 The methods of avoiding undue publicity of
the trial and treatment ofjuveniles would remain part of the law's policy
"to hide youthful errors from the full gaze of the public and bury them
in the graveyard of the forgotten past."
3 0
2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion: Ball v. Ricketts
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Ball v. Ricketts 3 1 focused on the ret-
roactive application of the rights recognized in Gault. The court held
that the rights to parental notice recognized in Gault were not waivable
by a juvenile offender, even though the Gault rights were not recognized
by courts at the time they were allegedly waived.
3 2
Richard Lee Ball was charged with being a habitual criminal under
Colorado's habitual criminal statute. 33 If a person has three prior felony
convictions, the Colorado statute requires a sentence of life imprison-
ment.34 In determining whether Ball was a habitual criminal, the jury
heard evidence concerning Ball's commission of four prior felonies,
3 5
including a burglary, to which Ball had pleaded guilty in 1957 in Colo-
rado state court.
3 6
Ball petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to set aside his conviction
as a habitual criminal. 3 7 As a basis for his petition, Ball relied on the
circumstances surrounding his 1957 guilty plea.3 8 In 1957, Ball was six-
teen years old but claimed that he was seventeen.3 9 Additionally, he lied
28. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 31-57.
29. Id. at 21. The Court stated that "the observance of due process standards, intelli-
gently and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel the States to abandon or displace
any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process." Id.; see also Note, Rights and Rehabil-
itation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COL. L. REv. 281 (1967).
30. State v. Guerrero, 58 Ariz. 421, 430, 120 P.2d 798, 802 (1942).
31. 779 F.2d 578 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Riveland v. Ball, 107 S. Ct. 236
(Oct. 6, 1986).
32. Id. at 581.
33. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-13-101(2) (1973).
34. d.







to the court when he explained that his parents were aware that he was
in jail.40 Ball also refused the court's offer to appoint an attorney to
assist him.4 1 In contending that his conviction was invalid, Ball asked
the court to consider these factors, as well as the transcript of his 1957
arraignment, and his current testimony that he was unable to under-
stand the charges and court procedures at the time he pleaded guilty.
42
The district court granted the writ, which was immediately appealed to
the Tenth Circuit by the State of Colorado.
43
Because Ball was sixteen at the time of the disputed guilty plea, the
Tenth Circuit could not uphold the 1957 state court decision.4 4 The
court, following Gault, recognized that "special procedural protections"
were required in juvenile court proceedings. 4 5 One such procedural
protection was giving notice of the offense to ajuvenile's parents.4 6 The
court noted that the record was silent as to whether Ball's parents were
notified that their son was incarcerated or that an arraignment hearing
was being held. 4 7 In rendering its decision, the court also considered
the allegation that Ball had never told his parents about his arrest.
48
The Tenth Circuit indicated that, because Ball had lied to him
about his age, the state court judge should also have assumed that Ball
was not telling the truth about whether his parents knew he was in jail.49
In light of the fact that there were no special procedural protections in
the 1957 juvenile process, the court thought it understandable that the
state court judge failed to take further precautions to protect Ball's in-
terests. 50 Nevertheless, the court held that notice to the juvenile's par-
ents is a right that could not be waived, regardless of whether the right
was recognized by the courts at that time.
5 '
The Tenth Circuit justified its opinion by citing cases where the
rights recognized in Gault have been retroactively applied. 52 The court
recognized that in these cases, the rights, or rather, the absence of the
40. Id. The 10th Circuit court observed that this statement may have been a
fabrication. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. Ball also asserted that his guilty plea was involuntary and that his waiver of
counsel was ineffective. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 580.
45. Id.; see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-57 (1967).
46. Ball, 779 F.2d at 580.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. The court stated: "We realize that Ball told the state court judge conducting
his arraignment that his parents knew he was in jail; but he also told the judge that they
were taking no steps to get him out or to obtain an attorney for him." Id.
50. Id. at 580-81.
51. Id. at 581. Ball was arraigned in 1957, and the In re Gault decision was handed
down in 1967.
52. Id.; see United States v. Slipka, 735 F.2d 1064, 1066 (8th Cir. 1984) (juvenile's
right to counsel in juvenile delinquency proceeding); Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F.2d 169,
175-77 (4th Cir. 1970) (juvenile's right to counsel and notice in juvenile jurisdiction waiver
proceeding); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396-97 (10th Cir. 1968) (juvenile's right to
counsel in involuntary commitment proceeding).
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rights, "affect[ed] the integrity of the truth-finding process." 53 In Ball,
the court thought it likely that, if the parents had been notified of their
son's arrest, the parents would have attempted to help him.54 Thus, the
court concluded that the absence of proper notice may have "affected
the ultimate outcome" of Ball's case.
5 5
3. Analysis and Conclusion
In Ball, the Tenth Circuit failed to address whether "affecting the
integrity of the truth-finding process" 5 6 was the same standard as "af-
fecting the ultimate outcome of the case."' 57 By implication, the appel-
late court has declared that these two standards are the same. 58 By
analytical reasoning, however, one could conclude that these two stan-
dards are not the same. For example, lying on the witness stand affects
the integrity of the truth-finding process. Yet, this lie may or may not
affect the ultimate outcome of the case. 59 Therefore, by failing to ad-
dress the relationship between the two standards, the court's decision
may have limited precedential impact.
60
The Tenth Circuit did, however, demonstrate the importance of
due process and its constitutional requirements whenever a juvenile is
involved in a criminal court proceeding. The decision appears to indi-
cate that the Tenth Circuit would seriously consider retroactive applica-
tion of any of the rights recognized in Gault, if the rights or absence of
the rights would have an impact on the truth-finding process or on the
outcome of the case.
53. Ball, 779 F.2d at 581.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The court stated that "[t]he rights recognized in Gault have been applied ret-
roactively in a variety of settings because they affect the integrity of the truth-finding pro-
cess." Id.
57. The court stated that "the lack of such notice [in Ball] may well have affected the
ultimate outcome of the case .... But the rights to parental notice that Gault created are
not waivable by a juvenile offender." Id.
58. The court held that the In re Gault rights should be applied retroactively where to
do so would affect the outcome of the case; by citing cases where the rights recognized in
In re Gault have been applied retroactively because they affect the integrity of the truth-
finding process, the Tenth Circuit has implied that the two standards are the same. Id.
59. See generally F. DINKINES, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL LOGIC 36-53 (1964).
Putting the court's reasoning in mathematical terms can show the invalid inference of the
court more clearly. The court held, basically that if an absence of the In re Gault rights
affects the integrity of the truth-finding process, then the In re Gault rights should be retro-
actively applied, which can be represented as if "A, then B." The court also held that if
such an absence affects the ultimate outcome of the case, then it should be retroactively
applied, or if "C, then B." Then, by using the cases of the first proposition to support its
second proposition, the court drew the inference that A = C, which is not a valid inference
to draw.
60. Because the court never gave guidance as to what happens when the integrity of
the truth-finding process is affected but the outcome of the case is not affected, nor what
happens when the situation is reversed, one must be careful in using this case as a prece-
dent for retroactive application of rights, unless there is no doubt that the ultimate outcome




B. Mandates of the Federal Youth Corrections Act
1. History of the Act
Enacted in 1950, the Federal Youth Corrections Act (YCA)6 1 was a
reaction to the inordinate amount of crime committed by youthful of-
fenders62 and the obvious breakdown of the modern penal system in
attempting to rehabilitate these young men and women. 63 The YCA in-
creased the sentencing alternatives for youthful offenders by specifying
treatment 64 in certain facilities 6 5 separated from the harmful influence
of adult inmates.6 6 Under the YCA, an offender usually received an in-
determinate sentence, not to exceed six years. 6 7 The guidelines for re-
habilitation mandated by the YCA were regarded as "comprising the
quidpro quo for a longer confinement but under different conditions and
terms than a defendant would undergo in an ordinary prison."
68
The YCA was repealed in 198469 in an attempt to provide for com-
prehensive and consistent sentencing for similarly situated offenders.
70
Behind Congress' action was the doubt that rehabilitation could be in-
duced reliably in a prison setting and the certainty that no one could
really detect whether or when a prisoner was actually rehabilitated. 7 1
2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion: Scott v. United States
Even though the YCA was repealed, courts are still addressing the
issues which have been generated by the statute. The Tenth Circuit
faced one of these issues in Scott v. United States.7 2 The question in Scott
was whether an offender sentenced under the YCA, who violated his
parole, had a right to the same equitable remedy as offenders who have
61. Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1982) (repealed 1984).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 5006 (1982) (repealed 1984). "Youth offender" is defined in the Act
as "a person under the age of twenty-two years at the time of conviction." Id. at § 5006(d).
63. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 433 (1974); Watts v. Hadden, 651
F.2d 1354, 1356 (10th Cir.), reh'g denied, 686 F.2d 841 (1981); H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1950); Note, Sentencing of Youthful Misdemeanants Under the Youth Correc-
tions Act: Eliminating Disparities Cr ated by the Federal iagistrate Act of 1979, 51 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1254 (1983) [hereinafter Sentencing Misdemeanants].
64. 18 U.S.C. § 5006 (1982) (repealed 1984). "Treatment" is defined in the Act as
"corrective and preventive guidance and training designed to protect the public by cor-
recting the anti-social tendencies of youth offenders." Id. at § 5006(f).
65. 18. U.S.C. § 5011 (1982) (repealed 1984). The YCA required that "[i]nsofar as
practical, such institutions and agencies shall be used only for treatment of committed
youth offenders, and such youth offenders shall be segregated from other offenders" and
from each other according to their treatment needs. Id.
66. See Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 207-08 (1981); Watts, 651 F.2d at 1354,
1357, 1365; Sentencing Misdemeanants, supra note 63, at 1255.
67. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5010(b), 5017(c) (1982). An indeterminate sentence was given re-
gardless of the maximum sentence an adult could serve for the very same offense. See
Sentencing Misdemeanants, supra note 63, at 1255.
68. Carter v. United States, 306 F.2d 283, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
69. Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1840 (1984).
70. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3182, 3220-23.
71. Id. at 3221.
72. 778 F.2d 1444 (10th Cir. 1985).
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not violated the terms of their parole.
73
In 1979, Ricardo Scott was convicted of burglary. 74 He was sen-
tenced under the YCA 75 to a 0-6 year indeterminate term. 76 Scott was
imprisoned at the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) at Lompoc,
California. 7 7 The FCI at Lompoc did not segregate YCA offenders from
adult inmates.
78
In 1981, Scott was paroled. 79 Also in 1981, the Tenth Circuit ruled
that administrators could not hold youthful offenders sentenced under
the YCA in institutions which failed to separate such youths from adult
inmates.8 0 The court held that the benefits of the YCA would be denied
to youthful offenders if there was no separation between the youths and
older inmates.
8 '
Subsequently, the parole board held a revocation hearing in Janu-
ary of 1984.82 The board revoked Scott's parole and reinstated his orig-
inal sentencing term.8 3 Scott was incarcerated at the FCI at Englewood,
Colorado until September of 1984.84 He was then transferred to the
FCI at Lompoc, where he remained until his sentence expired in June of
1985.85 At no time since his parole revocation hearing was Scott incar-
cerated with adult inmates in violation of the YCA.
8 6
Scott filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus contending that he
was entitled to good-time credits on his sentence for the period of time
that he was incarcerated at the FCI in Lompoc in violation of the YCA.
8 7
The United States District Court dismissed the habeas corpus petition88
and Scott appealed.
8 9
In affirming the district court's dismissal, the Tenth Circuit reaf-
firmed its earlier holding in Staudmier v. United States9" that allowing
good-time credits for time served in an unsegregated facility was "tech-
nically inconsistent with the YCA framework." 9 1 The court also recog-
73. Id. at 1445.
74. Id.






80. Watts v. United States, 651 F.2d 1354, 1366 (10th Cir. 1981). The court was
directing its holding to the Bureau of Prisons.
81. Id.
82. Scott, 778 F.2d at 1445. The hearing was held to consider Scott's burglary convic-






87. The period of time that Scott was incarcerated with adult inmates in violation of
the YCA was from November of 1974 until March of 1981. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 496 F.2d 1191 (10th Cir. 1974).
91. Scott, 778 F.2d at 1446 (citing Staudmier, 496 F.2d at 1192). An offender sentenced
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nized the appropriateness of granting such credits as an equitable
remedy where the youth sentenced under the YCA was deprived of any
of its benefits.
9 2
Because the allowance of good-time credits is an equitable remedy,
the court stated that it "should only be granted where 'in equity and
conscience' the petitioner is so entitled. ' '9 3 The Tenth Circuit went on
to agree with the district court's conclusion that the equities did not
favor the granting of such relief.9 4 By violating his parole, Scott was not
entitled to equitable relief, and therefore, could not receive good-time
credits for time already served. 95
3. Conclusion
In Scott v. United States, the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of stat-
utory rights of a juvenile and the conditions under which those rights
may be lost. By holding that good-time credits can be forfeited if one
violates his parole, the court gave an example of a situation where a
statutory right can be lost. The court's decision serves as a reminder
that statutory rights, in contrast to constitutional rights, are not
guaranteed.
II. CONVICTIONS ON APPEAL
A. Making a Threat to Kill the President
1. Background
The statute imposing criminal liability for making a threat to kill the
President is located at 18 U.S.C. § 871.96 The statute states:
Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits ... any letter... con-
taining any threat to take the life of, to kidnap, or to inflict bod-
ily harm upon the President . .. or knowingly and willfully
otherwise makes any such threat against the President... shall
be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
9 7
The Supreme Court has had the opportunity to interpret this stat-
ute. In Watts v. United States,98 the Supreme Court held that section 871
requires that a "true threat" must have been made.99 In Watts, the
Court reversed the conviction of an 18-year-old who allegedly
under the YCA is not eligible for good-time credit since the indicator for early release is
not the sentence as reduced by good time, but demonstrated progress toward rehabilita-
tion. See Staudmier, 496 F.2d at 1192.
92. Scott, 778 F.2d at 1446 (citingJohnson v. Rodgers, 756 F.2d 79 (10th Cir. 1985)).
93. Id. at 1446 (citing Johnson, 756 F.2d at 81).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Threats Against President and Successors to the Presidency, 18 U.S.C. § 871
(1982).
97. Id.
98. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
99. Id. at 708.
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threatened to kill President Lyndon Johnson.10 0 The alleged threat oc-
curred during a discussion of police brutality and the draft, following a
rally at the Washington Monument.' 0 ' The Court classified the com-
ment as "political hyperbole," which did not constitute a true threat.
10 2
In deciding the case, however, the Court declined to address whether
the government must prove actual intent to carry out the threat.'
0 3
Since Watts, the statute has been interpreted by several circuit
courts. The Second Circuit has held that, in order to show that the
speech in question is not protected by the first amendment, the govern-
ment must demonstrate that a threat "according to [its] language and
context conveyed a gravity of purpose and likelihood of execution so as to
constitute speech beyond the pale of protected 'vehement, caustic ...
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.' ",104
The Fourth Circuit has held that when a "threat against the person of
the President is uttered without communication to the President in-
tended, the threat can form a basis for conviction under . . . section
871(a) only if made with a present intention to do injury to the Presi-
dent."' 1 5 The Tenth Circuit has held that a defendant can be convicted
under section 871 without proof of actual intent to carry out the
threat.1
0 6
2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion: United States v. Crews
The Tenth Circuit examined section 871 in United States v. Crews. 10 7
In the opinion, the court reiterated that section 871 does not require
intent to kill the President. The court held, however, that a "true
threat" was made by Crews, but it vacated his conviction on other
grounds.1
0 8
Marvin Arnesto Crews, Jr., was a patient in the psychiatric ward of
the Veteran's Hospital in Sheridan, Wyoming. 10 9 He was extremely up-
set after watching several evening television programs and was, thus,
administered a large dose of antidepressant medication."10 Crews
100. Id. at 705-06.
101. Id. at 708.
102. Id. at 707-08.
103. Id. at 708.
104. United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir.) (emphasis added) (quoting
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1022 (1976.)
105. United States v. Patillo, 431 F.2d 293, 297-98 (4th Cir. 1970) (emphasis added),
aff'den banc, 438 F.2d 13 (1971).
106. United States v. Welch, 745 F.2d 614 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Dysart,
705 F.2d 1247 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Hart, 457 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 861 (1972).
107. 781 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1986).
108. Id. at 835-36. The Tenth Circuit vacated Crews' conviction on the basis of his fifth
claim: that the district court wrongly refused to appoint a psychiatrist to aid defendant's
attorney.
109. Id. at 829.
110. Id. Crews watched the television broadcast of "The Day After," a movie depicting
the nuclear destruction of a midwestern town, Lawrence, Kansas. Warnings about the dis-
turbing nature of the movie's content accompanied the presentation. A televised panel
discussing the movie's implications followed the movie. Being extremely upset after
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stated to a nurse "[i]f Reagan came to Sheridan, I would shoot him."' Il
After the nurse reported this statement to her superiors, the hospital
contacted the Secret Service.
112
Crews was indicted for making a threat to kill President Ronald Rea-
gan in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871.1 l 3 He was found guilty by a jury
and sentenced to four years in prison. 1 4 On appeal, Crews claimed that
the purported threat came within a psychotherapist-patient privilege,
that the statement came within the protection of the first amendment as
political speech, and that the court erred by not instructing the jury that
Crews must have intended to carry out his threat."1 5 The Tenth Circuit
disagreed with all of these claims.' 16
Crews claimed that his statement to the nurse, the purported threat,
was privileged communication between a psychotherapist and the pa-
tient. 117 The Tenth Circuit, having never addressed the privilege be-
tween a psychotherapist and a patient, again declined to decide whether
to adopt the privilege.1 8 The court stated, " [e]ven if we were to recog-
nize it, we would have to hold that defendant waived his right to the
privilege."'l9 The court did not formally recognize the privilege,120 but
argued that Crews had waived any privilege he might have had, because
he had openly discussed the comment that he made to the nurse with
the Secret Service Agent.
12 1
watching both programs, Crews requested sedatives from one of the hospital's psychiatric
nurses.
111. Id. at 829-30. Crews denied making that precise statement, but admitted an ex-
treme dislike for President Reagan. Crews claimed to have told the nurse that it "would be
in the best interest of this nation if that red-necked, bigoted, war-mongering mother-
fucker were shot." Id. at 830. In addition, it was found that Crews owned a shotgun and a
rifle as well as several other weapons. Crews had these weapons and other personal prop-
erty delivered to him from a hospital in Garden City, Kansas, where he had received prior
treatment. Apparently Crews had requested their delivery before the purported threat, but
the exact time as to when he arranged for the weapons to be sent was unclear. Crews did
not have control over the weapons at the Veteran's Hospital, but if he had left the hospital,
he could have taken the weapons with him. Id. at 830 n.1.
112. Id. at 829-30.
113. Id. at 829.
114. Id.
115. Id. Crews also claimed that (1) the prosecution failed to satisfy its burden to prove
defendant was sane at the time of the alleged threat; (2) the district court erred in denying
defendant a competency hearing and in not making findings required by statute; (3) that
the district court wrongly refused to appoint a psychiatrist to aid defendant's attorney; and
(4) cross-examination of the psychiatrists who examined defendant to determine compe-
tency violated the evidentiary rules.
116. Id. at 835-36. The Tenth Circuit did agree with one of the defendant's conten-
tions, vacated his conviction, and remanded for a new trial.
117. Id. at 830. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not recognize a psychotherapist-
patient privilege explicitly. See FED. R. EvID. 501. Some federal courts have adopted it.
See, e.g., In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 638-39 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 426 (1983); see
generally Note, Evidence - The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege - The Sixth Circuit Does the Decent
Thing: In re Zuniga, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 385 (1985).
118. Crews, 781 F.2d at 830-31.
119. Id. at 831.
120. Id.
121. Id.; see also Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 581 F. Supp. 51, 52-53
(W.D. Okla. 1982); United States v. Mierzwicki, 500 F. Supp. 1331, 1334 (D. Md. 1980)
(disclosure of privileged communication is a waiver of privilege).
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Crews also claimed that his statement was political speech protected
by the first amendment. 12 2 The Tenth Circuit disagreed and found that
Crews' statement was more like a common threat made in cases of extor-
tion.' 25 Although the statement followed a panel discussion and televi-
sion program with political overtones and concerned a political figure, it
was reasonably clear to the court that Crews was not engaged in political
advocacy. 1
2 4
The court also discussed whether the instruction given to the jury
sufficiently informed the jury as to the content of an unprotected
threat. 12 5 The instruction given to the jury was that "[a] threat is a
statement expressing an intent to kill or injure the President, and a true
threat means a serious threat as distinguished from words uttered as
mere political argument, talk, or jest.' 1 26 The Tenth Circuit was satis-
fied that this instruction adequately informed the jury of the difference
between protected political speech and unprotected threats.
127
The final argument made by Crews was that the court erred in in-
structing the jury that defendant could be convicted absent proof of an
intention to carry out the threat. 12 8 Because the Tenth Circuit had re-
jected the same substantive contention in earlier cases, the court again
rejected the idea that the government must prove intent.' 2 9 The court
reasoned that "[t]he statute speaks of the requirement being that the
threat is 'knowingly and willfully' made, and, of course, it must be made
in terms of a 'true threat'.'..30 The majority rejected Crew's conten-
tion that the statute requires proof of intent when the threat is not made
directly to the President or in such a manner as to reach him or his se-
curity personnel.' 1
3
3. The Opinion of Judge Logan
Judge Logan concurred with the majority opinion except for the
question of whether section 871 requires intent for conviction.' 3 2 If a
122. Crews, 781 F.2d at 830-31.
123. Id. at 832. The court found the statement analogous to that made in United States
v. Welch, 745 F.2d 614, 615-16, 618 (10th Cir. 1984). In Welch the defendant, distraught
about the unavailability of vocational training, stated that he would kill President Reagan if
he had the opportunity. The court found that the first amendment did not protect the
statement. See also United States v. Howell, 719 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (5th Cir. 1983) (state-
ment that "It's too bad thatJohn Hinkley did not get him. I will kill the President ifI get a
chance" not protected by first amendment), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2683 (1985); United
States v. Lincoln, 589 F.2d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1979) (letter containing explicit threats un-
protected by the first amendment).
124. Crews, 781 F.2d at 832; see also Welch, 745 F.2d at 618-19.
125. Crews, 781 F.2d at 832.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 834-35.
129. Id. at 835; see United States v. Welch, 745 F.2d 614 (10th Cir. 1984); United States
v. Dysart, 705 F.2d 1247 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Hart, 457 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 861 (1972).
130. Crews, 781 F.2d at 835.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 836 (Logan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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threat was made directly to the President, or in such a way that one
could reasonably expect that it would reach the President or those
charged with his protection, then Judge Logan agreed that the govern-
ment need not prove that a defendant actually intended to carry out the
threat.13 3 However, if a threat was made that was not intended to reach
the President or his security personnel, and in such a manner that it was
highly unlikely to be so communicated, then Judge Logan found that it
would be necessary for the government to prove intent. 134
Judge Logan stated that, when a threat against the President was
made to a companion, or, as in the Crews' case, the declarant's psychiat-
ric nurse, the statement was probably idle chatter or political criti-
cism.' 35 Second, by punishing the utterance of a statement without
further proof of intent to carry out the threatened action, Logan be-
lieved that the court would be bordering on punishing mens rea alone
- punishing an individual for merely having evil thoughts. 136 Finally,
Judge Logan argued that a threatening comment made to one not in-
tended to relay the message, and under circumstances where it was im-
probable that the comment would be so communicated, could not




On the surface, Judge Logan's arguments sound logical, but after
closer examination one can clearly see the difficulties. In his first argu-
ment, Judge Logan gave no support for his comment that the declarant's
statement "is much more likely to be idle talk or political commen-
tary."13 8 He claimed that "[w]e must recognize this is so," even though
he approved of charging the jury that it must measure the "true" nature
of the threat by how the hearer would interpret it. 13 9
Second, it is clear that the statute punishes the utterance of a threat
and not just the thinking of evil thoughts.140 Because it is the President
which is the subject of the threat, mere voicing of the evil thoughts in
the form of a threat is enough to warrant protection through imposition
of criminal liability. 14'
Third, the statute does not speak in terms of actual intent to carry
out the threat. 14 2 The statute speaks to "knowingly and willfully" mak-
133. Id.
134. Id. at 836-37.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 837.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 836-37.
139. Id.
140. See 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1982). Note thatJudge Logan agreed that the very utterance
of a threat is punishable under the statute. Crews, 781 F.2d at 837 (Logan,J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
141. Crews, 781 F.2d at 832.
142. See 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1982).
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ing a threat. 14 3 Because of the plain language of the statute, the major-
ity would be justified in not considering the actual intent of the
declarant in determining criminal liability.
An argument which was not presented by the dissenting judge, and
not discussed by the majority, is that by definition, a "true threat" may
require actual intent. 14 4 In future cases, rather than arguing a dichot-
omy in the statute, the court, hopefully, will be more explicit in defining
the elements of a "true threat."
5. Conclusion
Crews v. United States leaves the viability for the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege in question. In addition, Crews serves as an example of
what is not protected political speech under the first amendment. It ap-
pears that the appellate court will continue to hold that proof of actual
intent to carry out a threat to kill the President is not necessary.
B. The Heat of Passion Defense
1. Background
The heat of passion defense has been a part of the American legal
system since the 1800's.145 The defense reduces the charge in a homi-
cide from murder to manslaughter. 146 In order for the heat of passion
defense to exist, there are four requirements. 14 7 First, adequate provo-
cation must have existed. 148 Second, one must have killed in the heat of
passion. 149 Third, there must not have been a reasonable opportunity
for the passion to cool.150 Fourth, the provocation, the passion, and the
fatal act must have had a connection.'
5'
If heat of passion is the theory of defense, then the prosecution's
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt becomes an issue. For ex-
ample, to obtain a murder conviction, the prosecution must prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully killed another
with malice aforethought. 15 2 In comparison, a voluntary manslaughter
conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
unlawfully killed another without malice and acting "[u]pon a sudden
quarrel or heat of passion."' 5 3 Because of this distinction between mal-
143. Id.
144. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). The Supreme Court stated that
it would not express an opinion as to whether the court of appeals was correct in holding
that a "true threat" did not require proof of intent, thus leaving the door open for pre-
cisely that argument.
145. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 1, at 85.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.; see Note, Manslaughter and the Adequacy of Provocation: The Reasonableness of the
Reasonable Man, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (1958).
149. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 1, at 85.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 18 U.S.C. § l1ll(a) (1984 & 1985 Supp.).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (1982).
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ice and heat of passion, the Supreme Court held in Mullaney v. Wilbur
that the prosecution must prove absence of the heat of passion on sudden
provocation in order to obtain a murder conviction. 154 The Court
stated that failure to impose this requirement would unlawfully exempt
the prosecution from its burden of proving the defendant guilty of mur-
der beyond a reasonable doubt.
155
2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion: United States v. Lofton
The distinction between malice and heat of passion as well as the
requisite jury instructions were the subject of an appeal to the Tenth
Circuit. 15 6 The court held that the trial court failed to adequately in-
struct the jury on the heat of passion defense and its effect on the gov-
ernment's burden of proof.1
5 7
Jessica Mae Lofton fired a .22 caliber revolver into the back of her
husband's head on the morning ofJune 5, 1984; four days later, he died
from the gunshot wounds.' 5 8 The shooting occurred at the Fort Riley
Military Reservation in Geary County, Kansas. 159 Lofton claimed that
she acted in the heat of passion on adequate provocation. 160 She was
found guilty of murder in the second degree under 18 U.S.C. § 11 1 1.161
Lofton appealed her conviction to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 1
6 2
Lofton's first argument was that there was insufficient evidence of
malice to uphold a second-degree murder conviction. 163 Lofton's mo-
tion for ajudgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecution's case was
denied. 16 4 Lofton did not renew the motion at the close of all the evi-
dence. 16 5 The Government argued that Lofton's failure to renew the
motion waived her objection to denial of the motion. 166 The Tenth Cir-
cuit held that even if Lofton had renewed the motion, the record re-
vealed enough evidence of malice to sustain the conviction, without
requiring the court to examine the Government's waiver argument.
167
Lofton's second argument concerned the adequacy of the jury in-
154. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-98, 704 (1975), limited by U.S. ex rel. God-
dard v. Vaughn, 614 F.2d 929 (3rd. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 844 (1980).
155. Id.
156. United States v. Lofton, 776 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1985).
157. Id. at 919.
158. Id.
159. Id.








167. Id. Lofton testified that several days before the shooting, she placed the gun in
the car. There was also evidence that she returned to her house to "pick something up"
just before the shooting. In addition, there was testimony that Lofton had told two differ-
ent people shortly before the shooting that she might kill her husband.
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structions concerning her heat of passion defense. 168 Because a crimi-
nal defendant has a right to jury instructions on any defense theory
finding support in the evidence and the law, failure to so instruct would
be reversible error. 169 The Tenth Circuit had previously held that
[A] defendant in a federal murder case who has sufficiently
raised a heat of passion defense is entitled to instructions in-
forming the jury of the theory of defense and of the Govern-
ment's duty to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of
heat of passion in order to obtain a murder conviction.
170
The record established and the Government conceded that Lofton suffi-
ciently raised a heat of passion defense and was entitled to an
instruction. '
7 '
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit examined the instructions to deter-
mine if the jury was advised of Lofton's defense and its effect on the
prosecution's burden of proof.' 72 The Tenth Circuit found that the in-
structions did not inform or even suggest to the jury that Lofton's sole
defense to murder was that the killing of her husband was in the heat of
passion. 17 3 The manslaughter instruction was the only instruction
which referred to the heat of passion defense, but it did not advise the
jury that this was Lofton's sole defense to murder.' 74 In addition, the
court found that there was no instruction to the jury regarding the Gov-
ernment's burden when a heat of passion defense is raised: that the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of heat of
passion. 17 5 Although both "heat of passion" and "malice" were de-
fined, the court was concerned that the instruction did not differentiate
between the two or explain to the jury that finding one necessarily pre-
vented the finding of the other.1
7 6
3. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit has sent a warning to all counsel and trial courts
not to blindly rely on pattern jury instructions. The court expressly af-
168. Id.
169. Bird v. United States, 180 U.S. 356, 361-62 (1901).
170. Lofton, 776 F.2d at 920.
171. Id. at 919. Lofton had testified that her daughter was sexually abused by a friend
while the family was stationed in Germany. Lofton had threatened the abuser with a gun.
Also at that time, Jessica's daughter told her that Ronald, Lofton's husband, had also
abused her, a story which Lofton did not believe. The testimony presented at trial tended
to show that Ronald had sexually assaulted his stepdaughter in January of 1983 in Kansas,
in addition to the Germany incident. Lofton unsuccessfully tried criminal prosecution,
therapy, and separation. Several weeks before the shooting, Lofton found her husband,
Ronald, lifting up her daughter's nightgown. An assistant county attorney declined to
refile aggravated incest charges against Ronald on the morning of the shooting. Angered
by this information, Lofton had asked a friend to take her to her husband. While the
friend drove them around, Lofton and her husband had argued. In the middle of the
argument, Lofton fired a revolver into the back of her husband's head, not once but twice.
d.
172. Id. at 921.






firmed that pattern instructions which may provide valuable guidance to
the courts must still be tailored to the peculiar facts of each case and to
the constitutional minimums required by case law. Trial courts must ex-
plain jury instructions in clear detail so that jurors will know what is
expected of them. Additionally, lawyers must tailor instructions to make
them understandable to the jury.
C. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
1. Background of the RICO Act
Congress has attempted to address the problems presented by or-
ganized crime in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO). 177 The concept of organized crime, which is normally con-
sidered a multi-faceted criminal undertaking, does not fit neatly into the
common law of conspiracy. 178 In large criminal organizations, similar to
large corporations, each of the members operate on different levels. 179
Therefore, depending on which level the member operates, it is highly
probable that different responsibilities for each member of the conspir-
acy exist. 180 The possibility of different responsibilities and objectives
existing for each level of the organization, requires that each level be
punished according to what each level has sought to accomplish.' 8 1
Otherwise, individual defendants may be prosecuted for the acts of
others, the significance of which the individual defendant might not
have comprehended.1 82 Thus, no matter how large the criminal organi-
zation, criminals could thwart prosecution by playing only a small part in
the larger conspiracy.
Since general conspiracy laws could not curtail such conduct, Con-
gress enacted RICO to stop large scale criminal activity. RICO prohibits
a person from using income derived "from a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity" to acquire, establish, or operate any enterprise which is engaged
in or which affects interstate commerce. 1 83 Second, RICO makes it un-
lawful for any person through a "pattern of racketeering activity" to ac-
quire or maintain any interest in or control over any enterprise which is
engaged in or which affects interstate commerce. 184 Third, RICO for-
bids any person to conduct or participate in managing the enterprise's
177. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). Congress responded to the inadequate enforce-
ment of laws against organized crime by enacting RICO as part of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). See McClellan, The Organized
Crime Act (S.30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 55
(1970). See generally Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM
L. REV. 165 (1980); Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REv. 291 (1983).
178. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 1, at 705. See also Rex v. Meyrick, 21 Crim. App. 94,
102 (1929) (English case); Atkinson, "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, " 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968: Broadest Of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1 (1978).
179. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 1, at 705.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 706.
182. Id.
183. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982).
184. Id. at § 1962(b) (1982).
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affairs through a "pattern of racketeering activity."' 18 5 Finally, it is un-
lawful to violate any one of the above-mentioned provisions.
186
2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion: United States v. Hampton
Since passage of RICO, judicial interpretation of its broad, substan-
tive provisions has been required. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
faced such interpretation during the survey period in the case of United
States v. Hampton.
18 7
Gene Edward Hampton was indicted for misusing his position as
Sheriff of Bryan County, Oklahoma. 18 8 Sheriff Hampton allegedly
would not enforce liquor, gambling, and other laws in exchange for
money from bar owners and club operators. 18 9 A jury convicted Hamp-
ton on nine counts of a ten count indictment.' 90 On appeal, the Tenth
Circuit disagreed with all of Hampton's contentions and affirmed his
conviction. 1 9
Hampton based his appeal on issues involving the RICO conspiracy
count. 19 2 Hampton first argued that there was insufficient evidence
presented by the government proving that the designated co-conspira-
tor, Deputy Roy Harris, committed two of the necessary predicate of-
fenses. 193 Hampton claimed that such failure in proof meant that Harris
was not a member of a conspiracy.' 9 4 If Harris was not a member of a
conspiracy, then, Hampton argued, they could not have conspired
together. 1
95
In addressing Hampton's claim, the Tenth Circuit determined that
a substantive RICO provision must be violated in order for a RICO con-
spiracy to exist. 19 6 Using the Bryan County Sheriff's Office to conduct
racketeering activity constituted a substantive RICO offense. 19 7 Merely
conspiring to commit the predicate crimes which establish the pattern of
racketeering activity was not enough. 19 8 Rather, Hampton and Harris,
through the use of the sheriff's office, had to have conspired to engage
185. Id. at § 1962(c) (1982).
186. Id. at § 1962(d).
187. 786 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1986).
188. Id. at 978.
189. Id.
190. Id. The indictment also included six counts of conspiracy in violation of the Hobbs
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982) (counts 3-8) and two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512
(1982 & Supp. I1 1985) (counts 9-10). Hampton allegedly used a "bagman" to collect the
extorted payoffs as well as having the club owners make "donations" to a "Narcotic
Fund." The payments were to ensure non-harassment, remaining open beyond the re-
quired 2:00 a.m. closing time, and the safe operation of dice games. Sheriff Hampton
allegedly directed a deputy, Roy Harris, to terminate a gambling investigation and warned
participants in an ongoing dice game of an impending raid by authorities. Id.
191. Id. at 981.
192. Id. at 978.








in a pattern of racketeering activity.' 9 9 The evidence of the extortion
scheme, the involvement in the gambling operations, and the termina-
tion of an ongoing investigation was more than enough to satisfy the
Tenth Circuit that both conspirators intended to take advantage of the
sheriff's office through a pattern of extortion and other racketeering
activity.
20 0
Next, Hampton argued that serving consecutive sentences for vio-
lating both RICO and the Hobbs Act constituted double jeopardy in
violation of the fifth amendment. 20 1 The Tenth Circuit, in rejecting this
argument, relied on the statutory framework and the legislative history
of RICO. 20 2 According to the court, it was clear that Congress intended
to allow punishment for violations of the substantive RICO provisions as
well as for the commission of the underlying acts. 20 3 The court refused
to hold that a conviction on the underlying acts was absolutely necessary
before one could be convicted under RICO; 20 4 rather, it indicated that a
predicate crime for which the defendant had already been punished was
one of the possible bases for a RICO conviction and subsequent
sentence.
20 5
Hampton also argued the existence of separate conspiracies. 20 6 He.
contended that his mere participation in the conspiracies was not
enough to warrant combining them in a single count.20 7 Therefore, the
combination was, in fact, a charge of multiple conspiracies in a single
count, which is not allowed. 20 8 The Tenth Circuit rejected this argu-
ment by finding more than just participation as the common element. 20 9
The court found that "[t]he common denominator between the 'kick-
backs,' dice games and other schemes" involved Hampton's participa-
tion as well as the corruption of the Bryan County Sheriff's Office. 210
3. Conclusion
One of the purposes of RICO is to seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States. The Tenth Circuit has taken a hard-line ap-
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 980. For a discussion of the Hobbs Act, passed to punish interference with
interstate commerce by extortion, see Stern, Prosecution of Local Political Corruption Under the
Hobbs Act: The Unnecessary Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion, 3 SEXTON HALL L. REV. 1
(1971).
202. Hampton, 786 F.2d at 980. The court refered to the following cases to show Con-
gress' intent to permit cumulative punishment for substantive RICO violations: United
States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (1 1th Cir. 1982); United States v. Hawkins, 658 F.2d 279
(5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom.,
Little v. United States, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 923 (1970).
203. Hampton, 786 F.2d at 980.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 980-81.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 981; see Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
209. Hampton, 786 F.2d at 981.
210. Id.
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proach in support of the purposes of the Act. The Hampton decision is a
sample of the court's attitude toward patterns of racketeering activity,
regardless of the number of people involved and the scope of the impact
following from that activity. Because of the Tenth Circuit's concern with
organized crime, one should look for the court to continue to broadly




This article will discuss five criminal procedure cases decided by the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit during the survey period. In the
first case, United States v. Andrews, 1 the Tenth Circuit upheld the validity
of a guilty plea attacked on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The court held that representation need not be error free, but must be
what can be expected of a reasonably competent attorney. Furthermore,
the court held that the counsel's conflict of interest was not serious
enough to render representation ineffective. The Tenth Circuit, in
United States v. Broce,2 upheld a defendant's right to a double jeopardy
challenge of a charge even after the defendant had entered a counseled
plea of guilty to the charge. In United States v. Hooks,3 the Tenth Circuit
determined that a jury may find a defendant guilty even though only
circumstantial evidence has been presented.
Finally, this survey will examine two fourth amendment cases con-
cerned with privacy interests. In United States v. Remigio,4 the Tenth Cir-
cuit interpreted the "knock and announce" statute as permitting officers
in possession of a valid search warrant to enter through an open door
without having to announce their identity and purpose. In United States
v. Owens, 5 the court upheld a motel guest's right to a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy against a warrantless search. The Tenth Circuit held that
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, as enunciated in United
States v. Leon,6 would not be expanded to include a warrantless search.
I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND VALIDITY OF THE GUILTY
PLEA: UNITED STATES V. ANDREWS
A. Facts
Lee Travis Andrews was arraigned on October 6, 1983, and pled
not guilty to the following charges: conspiracy to transport stolen goods
in interstate commerce, transporting stolen meat in interstate com-
merce, transporting a stolen truck, and theft of meat from an interstate
shipment. On November 7, 1983, the jury was selected and court was
adjourned indefinitely. 7 On November 30, 1983, Andrews received no-
tification that trial was set forJanuary 23, 1984. Andrews filed a motion
1. 790 F.2d 803 (10th Cir. 1986).
2. 781 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1986).
3. 780 F.2d 1526 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1657 (1986).
4. 767 F.2d 730 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 535 (1985).
5. 782 F.2d 146 (10th Cir. 1986).
6. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). This article will not attempt to assess the correctness of the
Supreme Court's decision in Leon.
7. United States v. Andrews, 790 F.2d 803, 805 (10th Cir. 1986).
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to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act8 on December 22, 1983, which
was denied on January 3, 1984. 9
Mark Lee, the attorney for Andrews, was planning to leave the prac-
tice of law to pursue pre-medical studies; therefore, in early January, the
defendant asked that counsel be replaced since classes would most likely
conflict with Andrews' trial date.' 0 The court denied the request. A
plea bargain was arranged and Andrews pled quilty on January 23,
1984.11 At the sentencing hearing, Andrews' attorney was relieved of
further involvement. 1 2 No new attorney was appointed for the purposes
of appeal. 1
3
Andrews was ill, on medication, groggy and incoherent for the two
weeks following the sentencing.14 He never received the entry of judg-
ment; nevertheless, he mailed a notice of intent to appeal on March 12,
1984.15 It was received March 27, 1984 at the court of appeals and for-
warded to the district court where it was filed on March 30, 1984. Subse-
quently, Andrews, represented by new counsel, filed a motion for
extension to file an appeal due to excusable neglect. The district court
ruled that Andrews' filing of appeal was untimely, having been filed after
the thirty day extension period.
16
B. Background
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Until Dyer v. Crisp,17 the Tenth Circuit had followed the "sham and
mockery" test articulated in Gillihan v. Rodriguez,' 8 to determine effec-
tiveness of counsel's assistance under the sixth amendment. Most of the
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1982) provides: "In any case involving a defendant charged
with an offense, the appropriate judicial officer, at the earliest practicable time, shall ... set
the case for trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar... so as to assure a speedy
trial .... 18 U.S.C. § 3161(a) (1982) provides: "In any case in which a plea of not guilty
is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the com-
mission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date .
9. Andrews, 790 F.2d at 805.
10. Id.
11. Andrews pled guilty to conspiracy and misprision of felony. In return for the
guilty plea, the government dismissed the other charges, agreed to contact the state in
respect to any other charges, and to not pursue possible insurance fraud. Id. at 813.
12. Id. at 805.
13. Id. Andrews asked the court how to proceed, but his questions were never
answered.
14. Id.
15. Andrews appealed his conviction for conspiracy to transport stolen goods in inter-
state commerce and misprision of felony on the grounds that his rights were violated
under the Speedy Trial Act. He asserted that his guilty pleas did not waive his right to
assert his speedy trial claim, but even if they did, the guilty pleas were involuntary because
counsel was ineffective. Id.
16. Id.
17. 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1342 (1980). The Dyer court stated
that "indeed it is our belief that even though courts in this circuit have articulated the
'sham and mockery' test, they have in fact been applying the more stringent 'reasonably
competent' test, and that formal adoption of this standard represents a change in name,"
Id. at 278.
18. 551 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845 (1977); see Note, United States
Supreme Court Review of Tenth Circuit Decisions, 62 DEN. U.L. REV. 363 (1985).
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other circuits had been following McMann v. Richardson 19 which pro-
vided the higher standard of reasonably effective assistance of counsel.
20
In Dyer the Tenth Circuit held that "the [s]ixth [a]mendment demands
that defense counsel exercise the skill, judgment and diligence of a rea-
sonably competent defense attorney." 2 1 Dyer had petitioned the district
court for a writ of habeas corpus claiming a violation of his sixth amend-
ment right to effective assistance of counsel in his criminal trial. The
petition was denied and he appealed to the Tenth Circuit. The court
reviewed the standards used to determine effective assistance of counsel
in the various circuits and determined that the trend was toward the
more stringent "reasonably competent" test.
22
The test presently applied by the Supreme Court for ineffective
assistance of counsel can be found in Strickland v. Washington. 2 3 In Strick-
land, the Supreme Court adhered to the reasonableness test of Mc-
Mann2 4 but elaborated on the requirements, reiterating that the
purpose behind the sixth amendment is to "ensure a fair trial."'2 5 The
Court held that "the benchmark ... must be whether counsel's conduct
so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."' 26 The
test for ineffective assistance of counsel is twofold. The court outlined
that: "[flirst, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient .... Second, the defendant must show that the deficient per-
formance prejudiced the defense.''27
According to Strickland, prejudice is presumed when there is actual
or constructive denial of counsel, or when the state interferes with coun-
sel's assistance. 28 Prejudice is also presumed when counsel has an ac-
tual conflict of interest. However, prejudice is only presumed if the
defendant proves that counsel "actively represented conflicting inter-
ests" and "that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his law-
yer's performance. "29
The Strickland Court also noted that review is limited to the record,
and must encompass all of the circumstances contained in the record.
3 0
Scrutiny of the record must be highly deferential to counsel. 3 1 If the
19. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
20. Id. at 770-71.
21. Dyer, 613 F.2d at 278.
22. Id. at 275-78. The court discussed the trend away from the sham and mockery
standard to the reasonableness standard among the various circuits. For a discussion in
support of the fair trial guarantee and movement away from the sham and mockery test see
Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Sixth Amendment and the Fair Trial Guarantee, 50 U. Cm.
L. REV. 1380 (1983).
23. 466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984).
24. McMann, 397 U.S. at 770-71.
25. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 680.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 685.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 683.
31. Id.
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record reflects that the trial court was alerted to a possible disqualifying
conflict and yet failed to make further inquiry, then the case should be




The Tenth Circuit held that as a matter of law Andrews established
that the tardy filing of his notice of appeal due to his illness, was excusa-
ble neglect 33 and that he was entitled to the thirty day extension under
Rule 4(b). 34 The thirty day extension period did not expire until April
2. Andrews' appeal was filed on March 30.
3 5
Addressing Andrew's speedy trial appeal, the appellate court fol-
lowed the ruling in United States v. Gonzalez 36 and held that voir dire con-
stitutes the beginning of a trial for purposes of assessing the seventy day
period under the Speedy Trial Act.3 7 Consequently, a prolonged recess
between voir dire and the commencement of the actual trial is not in the
spirit of the Act and is thus improper. 38 In this case there was a delay of
over two and one-half months between voir dire and the actual trial
date. In holding that Andrews' right to a speedy trial was violated, the
court noted that trial was postponed due to a heavy criminal docket,
legal holidays, and the judge's absence for a judicial seminar. The
Speedy Trial Act specifically prohibits delay due to congestion of the
court's calendar or a judge's schedule conflicts.
39
The court, however, ruled that Andrew's guilty plea waived his
Speedy Trial Act claim. The majority pointed out that it is firmly en-
trenched in common law that a guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional
claims. 40 In order to preserve his speedy trial claim, Andrews needed to
enter a conditional plea of guilty reserving his right to attack the convic-
32. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981) (The Supreme Court remanded the
case in order to determine if the defendants were denied due process by having an attor-
ney representing conflicting interests. The attorney in this case was being paid by the
defendants' employer who had an interest that conflicted with that of the defendants.).
33. Andrews, 790 F.2d at 806.
34. "In a criminal case the notice of appeal by a defendant shall be filed in the district
court within 10 days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from .... Upon a
showing of excusable neglect the district court may, before or after the time has expired,
with or without motion and notice, extend the time for filing a notice of appeal for a period
not to exceed 30 days from the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by this subdivi-
sion." FED. R. APP. P. 4(b).
35. Andrews, 790 F.2d at 807.
36. 671 F.2d 441 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994 (1982).
37. Andrews, 790 F.2d at 808.
38. See Gonzalez, 671 F.2d at 444.
39. Andrews, 790 F.2d at 808. "No continuance under paragraph (8)(a) of this subsec-
tion shall be granted because of general congestion of the court's calendar...." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(8)(C) (1982).
40. Andrews, 790 F.2d at 809; see United States v. Yunis, 723 F.2d 795 (11th Cir. 1984)
(right to speedy trial is non-jurisdictional and waived by a plea of guilty); Mahler v. United
States, 333 F.2d 472 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1975) (a voluntary guilty
plea waives all non-jurisdictional defenses).
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tion on speedy trial grounds.
4 '
Finally, the majority held that Andrews' claim of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel was without merit. 42 The Tenth Circuit noted that the
record showed that the trial judge addressed the issue of a conflict of
interest and that the judge felt Andrews had received very good repre-
sentation.4 3 According to the majority, Andrews failed to show that he
was prejudiced by counsel's representation.
44
2. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Judge Seymour was in agreement with the majority in all aspects of
the case except Andrews' ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 4 5 Ac-
cording to Judge Seymour, there was a possiblity of a conflict of interest
that rendered counsel ineffective, and therefore, following the proce-
dure adopted in Wood v. Georgia,46 the case should have been remanded
for a hearing to determine if an actual conflict existed. 47 If an actual
conflict existed and rendered Andrews' guilty plea invalid due to ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, then his speedy trial claim would not have
been waived and the charges should have been dismissed.
48
D. Analysis
Two issues of ineffective assistance of counsel are presented here.
First, in requesting to be withdrawn, counsel actively represented that a
potential conflict of interest existed. This representation should have
resulted in the case being remanded for further fact finding regarding a
potential conflict. 49 Second, had counsel advised Andrews to enter a
conditional plea of guilty, Andrews would have had the charges dis-
missed since he would have retained the right to challenge the charges
on speedy trial grounds.
50
Admission by counsel of a conflict of interest does not create a pre-
sumption of prejudice per se, but prejudice will be found if the defend-
ant can show that counsel's "actual conflict of interest adversely affected
his lawyer's performance."' 5 1 Counsel for Andrews "actively repre-
sented" that there was a possibility of a conflict of interest. 5 2 The de-
fendant was never given the opportunity to show that the conflict
41. Id. at 809, 810; FED R. CRIM. P. 1 I(a)(2). The court rejected Andrews' argument
that he preserved his speedy trial claim by moving for dismissal prior to entering a plea of
guilty. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (by voluntarily pleading guilty
upon the evidence of counsel, the defendant avoids trial and all uncertainties that a trial
entails).
42. Andrews, 790 F.2d at 814.
43. Id. at 815.
44. Id.
45. Id. (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
47. Andrews, 790 F.2d at 817 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 811.
50. Id. at 809.
51. Id. at 817.
52. Id. at 811.
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adversely affected his lawyer's performance. A hearing should have
been held to determine if counsel sought to avoid trial by encouraging
Andrews to enter a guilty plea and, thus, relinquished Andrews' right to
a speedy trial claim.
53
The court asserted that Andrews' counsel's plans to enter school to
pursue a new profession presented a conflict with his representation.
54
Since trial would likely have interfered with counsel's schedule, it was in
counsel's best interest to have Andrews accept the plea bargain and thus
dispose of the case before trial. The question of counsel's conflict of
interest should have been explored more fully since counsel had peti-
tioned the court to be dismissed as counsel.
55
The dissent correctly pointed out that a hearing should have been
held to determine if an actual conflict of interest did indeed exist which
resulted in Andrews' premature guilty plea. At the hearing, the question
of ineffective assistance of counsel could have been more fairly as-
sessed. 5 6 The majority, following Strickland, relied solely on the record
as the basis for their determination that Andrews received effective
assistance of counsel. 5 7 However, the record cannot always be relied on
to show that counsel's assistance was ineffective or that there was actual
prejudice. It may be counsel's ineffectiveness which is the cause for the
absence of these elements from the record. A hearing on the matter is
necessary to investigate more thoroughly any oversights, especially con-
sidering counsel's explicit statements as to the presence of a conflict.
58
Had counsel preserved Andrews' speedy trial claim, Andrews would
not be facing a prison term. The right to a speedy trial is especially
important where, as here, the defendant is incarcerated for the entire
period before the trial due to his inability to raise bail.5 9 In failing to
preserve Andrews' speedy trial claim, counsel denied Andrews effective
representation. The defendant deserved the opportunity to prove that
an actual conflict existed and resulted in his proffering a plea of guilty.
II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY: UNITED STATES V. BROCE
A. Facts
The defendants, Raymond C. Broce and Broce Construction Com-
pany, Inc., were indicted on November 7, 1981 and charged with con-
53. See United States v. Hurt, 543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1976); seegenerally Note, Identify-
ing and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A New Look After United
States v. Decoster, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752, 772 & n.115 (1980).
54. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 520-21 (1972).
55. Andrews, 790 F.2d at 805.
56. See generally Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981) (due process is denied when an
attorney represents conflicting interests); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (the
trial court failed to take adequate steps in response to the defendant's and counsel's repre-
sentations that a conflict of interest existed).
57. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980).
58. Andrews, 790 F.2d at 810, 811.




spiracy in violation of the Sherman Act.60 Broce was also charged with
mail fraud.
6 1
A second indictment on February 4, 1982, charged Broce and Broce
Construction Company with another violation of the Sherman Act. Pur-
suant to a plea bargain arrangement, Broce entered guilty pleas to the
two indictments for both himself and for the corporation as its presi-
dent. The corporation received two separate $750,000 fines, one for
each indictment. Broce was sentenced to concurrent two year terms,
plus a $50,000 fine for each indictment.
6 2
One year after entering their guilty pleas, the defendants filed Rule
35(a) 63 motions to vacate their convictions on the second indictment as
violative of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.6 4 The
district court denied relief and the defendants appealed. The district
court decision was reversed by the Tenth Circuit. That opinion was va-
cated and a rehearing was granted in order to determine if the defend-
ants, by pleading guilty, waived their double jeopardy claims and
admitted that two separate conspiracies existed.
65
The Rule 35(a) motions were filed as a result of a decision in a com-
panion case, United States v. Beachner Construction Company, Inc. 66 The de-
fendants in the instant case and the Beachner Constuction Company
were engaged in the highway construction business in Kansas. They
were all indicted on charges of conspiracy to rig bids. Beachner Con-
struction was acquitted on the charge of conspiracy to rig bids on one
particular highway project. After acquittal, the company was charged
with conspiracy to rig bids on a different highway project. Beachner suc-
cessfully challenged the second indictment on double jeopardy
grounds. 6 7 The trial court found that a pervasive conspiracy to rig bids
had been going on for a period of over twenty years. The Tenth Circuit
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The Sherman Act provides that:
Every contract.., or conspiracy, in the restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who
shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby de-
clared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars ifa corporation, or, if
any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceed-
ing three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). This statute instructs that:
Whoever, having devised or intended to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud
... places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter
or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service ... shall be fined
not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
62. United States v. Broce, 781 F.2d 792, 793-94 (10th Cir. 1986).
63. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) provides: "[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any
time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time herein pro-
vided for the reduction of sentence." A motion to reduce sentence may be made within
120 days after the sentence is imposed.
64. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides that "[n]o person shall.., be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .
65. Broce, 781 F.2d at 794.
66. 555 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Kan. 1983).
67. Broce, 781 F.2d at 794.
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upheld the trial court's decision in Beachner.68 Unlike the defendants in
Beachner, however, the defendants in Broce were charged simultaneously
with two conspiracies.
B. Background
The Tenth Circuit has traditionally adhered to the principle that a
plea of guilty made intelligently and voluntarily waives all non-jurisdic-
tional defects including alleged violations of constitutional rights. 69
The prohibition against double jeopardy is found in the fifth amend-
ment. The double jeopardy clause protects individuals from the imposi-
tion of unlawful multiple punishments and successive prosecutions. 70 A
defendant is said to have been placed in jeopardy of successive prosecu-
tion, for purposes of the fifth amendment, in jury cases when the jury is
sworn, or in a bench trial when the first witness is called. Once either of
these events occur, a defendant may not be subjected to a successive
prosecution unless he is found guilty, appeals, and is retried.
7 1
In contrast, the prohibition against multiple punishments is statu-
tory. Generally speaking, the double jeopardy clause protects a defend-
ant from being punished twice for the same offense. 7 2 However, a
defendant may receive multiple punishments under two different stat-
utes if multiple punishments are specifically authorized by the legisla-
ture.73 If multiple punishment is not prescribed by statute, the court
must decide if the conduct constitutes a single offense or multiple of-
fenses which deserve separate punishments.
74
The right not to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense
has been considered a personal right which is subject to waiver. 75 The
Tenth Circuit has held in the past that a guilty plea waives the defense of
double jeopardy. 
76
These Tenth Circuit double jeopardy cases, however, appear to be
68. United States v. Beachner Construction Co., 729 F.2d 1278 (10th Cir. 1984).
69. See Mahler v. United States, 333 F.2d 472 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
993 (1965).
70. For a more thorough discussion of the double jeopardy clause and the use of
guilty pleas, see Comment, Ohio v. Johnson: Prohibiting the Offensive Use of Guilty Pleas to
Invoke Double Jeopardy Protection, 19 GA. L. REV. 159 (1984) (hereinafter Comment).
71. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). Other exceptions to the rule
against successive prosecution are invoked when a mistrial is granted at the request of the
defendant, see United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1982), and when a trial is bifurcated
and the defendant is to be tried on a greater or lesser charge, see Jeffers v. United States,
432 U.S. 137 (1977).
72. See Comment, supra note 70, at 164 nn.23-25.
73. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983) (cumulative sentences imposed in a
single trial do not violate double jeopardy if the sentences are shown to be prescribed by
clear legislative intent).
74. Blockberger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
75. Caballero v. Hudspeth, 114 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1940); see Special Project,
Criminal Law Survey, 18 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1, 500 (1985).
76. Cox v. Crouse, 376 F.2d 824, 825 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 865 (1967);
Caballero, 114 F.2d at 547.
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in conflict with a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court. 7 7
In Blackledge v. Perry,7 8 the Court upheld a defendant's right to challenge
his plea of guilty to a felony conviction as violative of the double jeop-
ardy clause. Again, in Menna v. New York, 79 which followed Blackledge,
the Court stated that "[w]here the State is precluded by the United
States Constitution from haling a defendant into court on a charge, fed-
eral law requires that a conviction on that charge be set aside even if the
conviction was entered pursuant to a counseled plea of guilty."'80 The
constitutional right against double jeopardy is intended to prevent the
prosecution from bringing an improper charge and unlawfully subject-
ing an individual to trial, and to prevent excessive punishment.
C. Instant Case
1. Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit, on rehearing en banc, decided the case in two
parts. Part 1 discussed whether a defendant's plea of guilty waives a
defense of double jeopardy, and Part 2 discussed whether the indict-
ments legitimately charged two conspiracies. In Part 1, the majority re-
jected the government's argument that an unconditional plea of guilty is
a waiver of the right to assert a double jeopardy claim.8 1 In addition, the
majority rejected the notion that since the judgment was final, collateral
attacks undermine the finality of the conviction. 82 Following the reason-
ing in Blackledge, the majority asserted that if the government had no
authority to file a charge in the first place, then a guilty plea cannot strip
a defendant of rights which are guaranteed by the constitution.
8 3
In Part 2 the majority rejected the government's contention that
since the defendants pled guilty to both charges, they had confessed to
taking part in two conspiracies. 84 Neither indictment contained specific
language alleging that the conspiracy in the first indictment was separate
from that contained in the second indictment. 8 5 The defendants, in
their counseled pleas of guilty, admitted only that their acts constituted
a conspiracy and not that there were two separate conspiracies.
8 6
The majority found that the trial court had made no factual deter-
77. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam); Blackledge v. Perry, 417
U.S. 21 (1974).
78. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
79. 423 U.S. 61 (1975).
80. Id. at 62.
81. Broce, 781 F.2d at 795.
82. The Tenth Circuit also rejected the government's argument that the plea bargain
estops the defendants from challenging the validity of the charge. Since the government
would be without authority in the second indictment if there is only one conspiracy, it
cannot raise an objection to the challenge. Id. at 796.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. The indictments did not specifically allege separate conspiracies. The second
indictment did not contain a specific charge that the conspiracy itself was separate from
that in the first indictment.
86. Id.
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mination as to whether one or two conspiracies existed. 8 7 Conse-
quently, the majority remanded the case to the trial court to determine
the number of conspiracies presented by the original evidence at trial.
8 8
2. McKay - Concurring
Judge McKay concurred in Part 1 of the majority's opinion. As to
Part 2, Judge McKay was of the opinion that the record established as a
matter of law that there was only one conspiracy and that the second
indictment was a violation of the double jeopardy clause. 89 He would
have vacated the judgment and argued for dismissal of the second
indictment.9 0
3. Seymour - Concurring in part and dissenting in part
Judge Seymour agreed that the defendants' guilty pleas were not a
waiver of their right to assert a claim of double jeopardy. The judge
disagreed, however, with the broad conclusion of the majority that the
double jeopardy clause is an absolute prohibition on the government to
bring any charges at all.9 1 Judge Seymour argued for retaining a de-
fendant's right to waive his constitutional right against double jeopardy
if the waiver is knowing, voluntary, affirmative and unambiguous. 9 2 He
contended, though, that a plea of guilty is not necessarily a waiver.
9 3
Judge Seymour contended that the double jeopardy clause was in fact
violated, and he would have vacated the second conspiracy conviction.
4. Barrett - Dissenting
Judge Barrett stated that he would have upheld the trial court's de-
nial of relief. He argued that the two indictments were not facially ille-
gal and that the majority's reliance on Menna was misplaced. In Menna,
the indictment was on its face violative of the double jeopardy clause.
9 4
Judge Barrett contended that the Tenth Circuit still has not addressed
whether a guilty plea waives the right to a double jeopardy challenge of
indictments not facially violative.
9 5
87. Id. at 797.
88. Id. at 798.
89. Id. (McKay, J., concurring).
90. However, Judge McKay had no objection to joining the majority opinion and giv-
ing the trial court the first opportunity to review the issue. Id. at 798 (McKay, J.,
concurring).
91. Id. at 799 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92. Id. at 800-802 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93. Judge Seymour also addressed Judge Barrett's dissenting opinion claiming that
failure to raise the issue below forfeited the double jeopardy claim. Judge Seymour
pointed out that FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2) excepts jurisdictional issues from those that
must be raised before trial. A 12(b)(2) motion asserts as a defense that the court lacks
jurisdiction over the defendant. The Supreme Court's opinion in Blackledge makes it clear
that failure to make a Rule 12(b)(2) motion is not a bar to raising a claim of double jeop-
ardy post-trial because the right asserted by the defendant is the right not to be haled into
court at all. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30.
94. Broce, 781 F.2d at 807 (Barrett, J, dissenting); see Menna, 423 U.S. at 62 n.2.
95. Broce, 781 F.2d at 807 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
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Since the defendants pled guilty to two separate indictments which
alleged two distinct conspiracies, Judge Barrett expressed the belief that
the defendants agreed with the government's contention that two sepa-
rate conspiracies existed. 96 He argued that the defendants waived their
double jeopardy claim by pleading guilty to the two indictments which
were charged as separate and distinct conspiracies. 9 7
Judge Barrett argued that the defendants waived their right to a
double jeopardy challenge by failing to preserve the challenge by a pre-
trial Rule 12(b)(2) 98 motion. In addition, the defendants, rather than
employing a pre-trial motion, could have instead entered conditional
pleas of guilty thereby preserving the right to a double jeopardy chal-
lenge.9 9 Judge Barrett asserted that the trial court's decision denying
the defendants' motion to vacate the second conspiracy conviction
should be affirmed.
5. Doyle - Dissenting
Judge Doyle contended that the defendants waived their rights
under the double jeopardy clause by voluntarily entering pleas of guilty.
Nonetheless, he believed that even if the guilty pleas did not constitute a
voluntary waiver, the pleas of guilty admitted that two separate conspira-
cies existed.' 00
D. Analysis
The double jeopardy clause mandates that no person shall be put in
jeopardy twice for the same offense. The question here is whether by
pleading guilty to two separately charged conspiracies the defendants
waived their right to challenge the second conspiracy as violative of the
double jeopardy clause.' 0 l
The dissenters contended that allowing defendants to attack their
sentences long after their pleas of guilty would undermine the finality of
convictions. They argued that defendants should not be allowed to walk
96. Id. at 808 (Barrett, J., dissenting). The dissent quotes extensively from Kerrigan
v. United States, 644 F.2d 47, 49 (lst Cir. 1981). In KertiganJudge Campbell held that by
pleading guilty to two separate conspiracies that appeared facially to be distinct, the de-
fendant accepted the government's theory that two separate conspiracies existed. Judge
Barrett's dissent further contended that the decision reached in Beachner should have no
effect on the validity of the two guilty pleas since it should not have retroactive applicabil-
ity. Furthermore, Judge Barrett expressed his belief that allowing defendants' challenges
to their guilty pleas would undermine the effectiveness of the criminal justice system and
the finality of a conviction and would discourage prosecutors from entering into plea
bargains.
97. Broce, 781 F.2d at 808 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
98. FED. R. CRIM P. 12(b).
99. Broce, 781 F.2d at 813, 814 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 823, 824 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
101. See generally Special Project, Fourteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1983-84, 73 GEO. L. J. 555 n.1755 (1984) (The
government by clever drafting could possibly create multiple conspiracies out of what is in
reality only one conspiracy) [hereinafter Special Project].
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away from a previously agreed upon plea bargain arrangement.10 2 Ac-
cording to Judge Barrett's dissent, the government refrained from pros-
ecuting other charges by the acceptance of these pleas.
l0 3
However, if the bid rigging conspiracy was as pervasive as the
Beachner trial court found, 10 4 then there would appear to be an ongoing
conspiracy which involved many different highway projects. In fact, the
Tenth Circuit held as such in Beachner.10 5 Therefore, Judge McKay's
concurring opinion correctly asserted that there was no need for a re-
mand to determine the validity of the second indictment because it was
void. Even though different highway projects were involved, the bid rig-
ging was part of one continuing conspiracy.'
0 6
The main concern in this case is whether defendants who have pled
guilty unconditionally should be allowed at a later date, even after the
completion of their prison sentence, to challenge the validity of their
guilty plea. Because the double jeopardy clause bars the government
from putting an individual twice in jeopardy for the same offense, the
courts have held that the clause is a bar to prosecution of a constitution-
ally duplicitous charge. 10 7 Hence, a judgment on a duplicitous charge
cannot be final and a guilty plea does not waive the right to sustain a
challenge.10 8 For a court to hold otherwise would allow the government
to act unconstitutionally.
The impact of the Blackledge ruling, as the Tenth Circuit points out
in Broce, is to provide the defendant with the constitutional right not to
be haled into court on a constitutionally duplicitous charge. Thus, a
guilty plea under these circumstances should be invalid as the govern-
ment had no authority to bring the charge in the first place. 109 The
government would obtain an unlawful advantage in plea bargaining
agreements if the prosecution could persuade defendants to plead guilty
102. Broce, 781 F.2d at 811, 821-22 (Barrett, J., Doyle, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 817 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
104. The Beachner trial court found that there was a pervasive conspiracy involving sev-
eral construction companies over a period of more than twenty-five years. Broce, 781 F.2d
at 794.
105. 729 F.2d 1278 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'g 555 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Kan. 1983).
106. The trial court in Beachner, 555 F. Supp. at 1277, following a three day evidentiary
hearing pursuant to Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), determined that there
had been a single pervasive conspiracy.
107. See Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1978). For a full discussion
on multiple charges and offenses, see Special Project, supra note 101. A constitutionally
duplicitous charge is one which is unlawful because it presents a situation when two
charges have been levied when only one is appropriate. See Broce, 781 F.2d at 796, 797.
108. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21
(1974).
109. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30-31. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977)
(defendant pleading double jeopardy argues that the government is without authority to
hale him into court). But see United States v. Herzog, 644 F.2d 713, 716 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981) (failure to raise challenge before entry of guilty plea waives all
nonjurisdictional defenses; double jeopardy is a personal defense and not jurisdictional);
Brown v. Maryland, 618 F.2d 1057, 1058 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 878 (1980) (plead-
ing guilty after entering into a favorable plea bargain waives right to double jeopardy
claim); United States v. Perez, 565 F.2d 1227, 1232 (2d Cir. 1977) (double jeopardy is a
personal right which must be affirmatively pleaded at trial or it will be regarded as waived).
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to the same charge twice, thereby subjecting defendants to multiple
punishments for the same offense. In finding that a guilty plea does not
waive a double jeopardy challenge, the Tenth Circuit upholds an indi-
vidual's fundamental right to be free from governmental harassment
once he has answered a charge.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE: UNITED STATES V. HOOKS
A. Facts
On the evening of July 28, 1984 in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Of-
ficer McLerran and his partner observed a pickup truck speeding and
changing lanes without signaling. The officers stopped the truck, and
the defendant, Wallace Hooks, got out of the truck and walked back to
the police car. I1 0 Hooks was unable to produce a driver's license in re-
sponse to Officer McLerran's request. The officer informed Hooks that
traffic citations would be issued and instructed him to sit in the police
car. Officer McLerran frisked Hooks and discovered a checkbook, which
he handed to his partner. "'1 Officer McLerran then asked for the de-
fendant's name and Hooks gave the name Wallace McConnell. McLer-
ran's partner, having looked at the checkbook, noted that it bore the
name Wallace Hooks. Hooks then admitted that he had lied about his
name and the officers put him under arrest." 1
2
Oklahoma City Police Department policy requires that the vehicle
of an arrested driver be impounded. Officer McLerran went to the truck
to take an inventory of its contents. As he approached the truck he be-
came aware of a very strong odor which he recognized as being
phencyclidine (PCP). Inside the truck he found a bottle containing grain
alcohol, a bottle of whiskey, and a quart jar containing a yellow liquid
which the officer suspected was PCP.1 1 3 Hooks was then informed that
he was under arrest for possession of a controlled substance. After be-
ing given his Miranda warnings, Hooks told the officers that he did not
own the truck and knew nothing about the quart jar found behind the
seat. At this point, Hooks was thoroughly searched. The officers found
a pocket knife and a plastic bag containing a white powder. The white
powder was subsequently found to be bicarbonate of soda, an element
used in the purification of PCP.
1 14
At trial, Officer McLerran testified about the events occurring on
the evening of Hook's arrest. A special agent of the Drug Enforcement
Agency certified the amount of PCP in the quart jar to be twenty-two
ounces with a street value of approximately $10,000.115 He stated that
110. United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1528 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1657 (1986).
111. Id.




115. Id. Hooks was convicted of intent to distribute on the basis of the large quantity of
PCP in the jar.
19871
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
the PCP in the jar was eighty-one percent pure and that PCP is usually
sold in quantities of one ounce or less and smoked by placing a small
amount on a cigarette. Finally, he testified that PCP gives off an odor
which makes one "extremely nauseous."
1 16
Hooks presented several witnesses who testified that he was not the
owner of the truck and in fact had borrowed the truck in order to move
some furniture. He had used the truck all day, returned it at five o'clock
in the evening, and borrowed it again around eight o'clock to move a
freezer." t 7 Hooks' mother testified that McConnell is the name on
Hooks' birth certificate but to her knowledge he never used that name.
His wife testified that Hooks used the name McConnell for traffic tickets,
and that she had never known him to use PCP or any other
hallucinogens. 118
B. Background
It is well settled that ajury verdict will be upheld if there is substan-
tial evidence to support the verdict. 1 19 Appellate courts must always
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee. 120 The
Tenth Circuit in United States v. Massey 121 explained that the reviewing
court must make all reasonable inferences and credibility assessments in
support of the jury verdict. It is not within the discretion of an appellate
court to make an independent determination of the sufficiency of the
evidence. 122 Further, the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia 12 3 set out
the appropriate scope of appellate review. An appellate court must de-
termine whether a reasonable jury could have found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 1
24
In an appellate court's review of the sufficiency of the evidence, the
same standard of review applies to both circumstantial and testimonial
evidence. 125 The Supreme Court warned in Holland v. United States 126
that testimonial as well as circumstantial evidence may lead to an incor-
rect result. It is for the jury, therefore, to weigh the evidence and the
jury's reasonable inferences are to be drawn from the evidence.
127
116. Id. at 1527.
117. Id.
118. Id. Despite the testimony of Hooks' witnesses, he was convicted of intent to dis-
tribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982).
119. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); Corbin v. United States, 253 F.2d
646, 648 (10th Cir. 1958).
120. Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80; see United States v. Massey, 687 F.2d 1348, 1354 (10th
Cir. 1982); Corbin, 253 F.2d at 648.
121. 687 F.2d 1348, 1354 (10th Cir. 1982).
122. See United States v. Downen, 496 F.2d 314 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897
(1974); Golubin v. United States, 393 F.2d 590 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 831 (1968).
123. 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979).
124. Id.; see Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282 (1966).
125. See United States v. Parrott, 434 F.2d 294, 297 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 979 (1971); United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 1969); Corbin v.
United States, 253 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1958).
126. 348 U.S. 121, 139 (1954).
127. SeeJackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
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Before Holland, the Tenth Circuit had held that in cases based on
circumstantial evidence, a criminal conviction could be reversed if the
evidence was consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.' 2 8
Since the Holland decision, the Tenth Circuit has rejected the reasonable
hypothesis of innocence standard.' 2 9 However, language in subsequent
opinions has indicated that a conviction cannot be based upon circum-




The Tenth Circuit held that there is only one standard of review
that applies in reviewing sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases and
that the standard of review for testimonial evidence is the same as that
for circumstantial evidence. 131 Following the Supreme Court's reason-
ing in Jackson v. Virginia, 13 2 the Tenth Circuit stated in Hooks that "the
evidence - both direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom - is sufficient if, when taken in the
light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."1
3 3
In reviewing the evidence, the Tenth Circuit noted that considering
each item of circumstantial evidence by itself would not have been suffi-
cient to sustain a conviction. However, viewed in its totality, with all the
inferences that could have been drawn, the circumstantial evidence was
legally sufficient for the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 134 The court held that the mere presence of the odor of
PCP in the truck did not establish that the defendant knew it was con-
cealed in the truck. 135 Considering all the other circumstantial evi-
dence, such as the defendant's possession of bicarbonate of soda, his use
of a fictitious name, and the large quantity of PCP possessed by the de-
fendant, the jury could have reasonably believed that the defendant had
the knowledge necessary for conviction of possession of a controlled
substance. '
36
128. Sapir v. United States, 216 F.2d 722 (10th Cir. 1954), aff'd, 348 U.S. 373 (1955);
Morgan v. United States, 159 F.2d 85 (10th Cir. 1947).
129. Corbin, 253 F.2d at 649 (the appropriate instruction to the jury is reasonable
doubt).
130. Lewis v. United States, 420 F.2d 1089, 1091 (10th Cir. 1970); Brumbelow v.
United States, 323 F.2d 703, 705 (10th Cir. 1963); Tyler v. United States, 323 F.2d 711,
712 (10th Cir. 1963).
131. Hooks, 780 F.2d at 1531.
132. 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
133. Hooks, 780 F.2d at 1531.
134. Id. at 1532.
135. Id. at 1531.
136. Id. at 1532. The majority pointed out that the value of the PCP supported the
jury's verdict that the defendant knowingly possessed PCP, as it is highly unlikely that a
substance of such value would be carelessly left in the truck. Id. Judge Baldock concurred
with the majority opinion with the exception that he regarded the strong odor of PCP in
the truck as establishing the defendant's familiarity with PCP. Id. at 1536 (Baldock, J.,
concurring).
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D. Analysis
Circumstantial evidence can be very damaging and not always relia-
ble. In some cases, however, it can be at least as reliable as direct or
testimonial evidence.' 3 7 In reviewing a jury's verdict, appellate courts
must give great deference to the jury's decision because the jury alone
has had the opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses at
trial.' 38 Since the reviewing court cannot make an independent deter-
mination of the validity of the inferences and beliefs of the jury, they
must review the record as a whole to determine if a reasonable jury
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'
3 9
The jury verdict will be reversed only if the appellate court finds that a
reasonable jury, as a matter of law, must necessarily have had a reason-
able doubt. 140 The Tenth Circuit in Hooks determined that a reasonable
jury could have found Hooks guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of pos-
session of PCP with intent to distribute.
14 1
The problem in Hooks is one that is pervasive in most cases that deal
with charges of possession of controlled substances. Possession may be
either constructive or actual; proof of possession may be based on nu-
merous factors and does not solely require that the substance be physi-
cally on the defendant, in his home, or in his automobile. 14 2 Mere
presence of an individual where controlled substances are found does
not necessarily constitute constructive possession by that individual.
14 3
The fact that PCP was in the truck driven by the defendant, therefore,
was not sufficient to prove possession. 14 4 But, all of the other surround-
ing circumstances such as Hooks giving a false name, the large quantity
of PCP found in the truck, the purity of the drug, and the substances
used to manufacture PCP that were found on Hooks, correctly served as
a basis for constructive possession.
Proof of possession with intent to distibute requires three elements:
1) knowledge; 2) possession; and 3) intent to distribute.' 4 5 Intent to
distribute may be inferred from possession of large quantities of a con-
137. Holland, 348 U.S. at 139; United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir.
1969).
138. Massey, 687 F.2d at 1354. See text accompanying notes 119-24.
139. See United States v. Niver, 689 F.2d 520, 529 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 156 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980).
140. United States v. Vergara, 687 F.2d 57, 62-63 (5th Cir. 1982).
141. See generally United States v. Ortiz, 445 F.2d 1100, 1103 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 993 (1971) (evidence sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt must be substantial; therefore, it must do more than raise a mere suspicion of guilt).
142. Compare United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir. 1983) (dominion
and control over a motor vehicle may be sufficient for constructive possession) with United
States v. Moreno, 649 F.2d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 1981) (presence where drug is found is not
sufficient for possession).
143. See United States v. Kincade, 714 F.2d 1064, 1065 (1 1th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Moreno, 649 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Stephenson, 474 F.2d 1353 (5th
Cir. 1973).
144. United States v. Freeze, 707 F.2d 132, 136 (5th Cir. 1983) (ownership or control
without knowledge will not support a conviction). But see Vera, 701 F.2d at 1358 (knowl-
edge may be imputed from surrounding circumstances).
145. Freeze, 707 F.2d at 135.
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trolled substance with substantial street value. 146 Courts have given
very few guidelines as to what quantity of a controlled substance is suffi-
cient for conviction of possession with intent to distribute. The Tenth
Circuit in Hooks gave this requisite quantity issue very cursory treatment,
assuming that twenty-two ounces of PCP with a street value of approxi-
mately ten thousand dollars is sufficient to support intent to distribute
without further analysis. The court relied on United States v. Gonzalez 147
for this proposition, claiming that no specified amount needs to be indi-
cated. However, in Gonzalez the defendant was driving a car containing
fifteen kilograms of herion valued at approximately $37,500 per kilo-
gram. This amount is far in excess of what was present in Hooks. 14 8
Although it is unlikely that the twenty-two ounces of PCP was in posses-
sion solely for personal use, guidelines as to what constitutes mere pos-
session and what constitutes a quantity sufficient to infer intent to
distribute have not been expressed in objective terms.
The mere presence of PCP in the truck and the odor in the truck did
not establish knowing possession. Faced with all the other circumstan-
tial evidence, the jury could have found that the defendant knowingly
possessed PCP; nonetheless, knowing possession does not constitute an
intent to distribute. More than mere quantity should be required to
prove intent to distribute, especially when only circumstantial evidence
is presented to convict a defendant.
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY INTERESTS
A. Application of the Knock and Announce Statute:
United States v. Remigio
1. Facts
The defendant, Patrick C. Remigio, was convicted of unlawfully
conspiring to manufacture methamphetamines and unlawfully attempt-
ing to manufacture methamphetamines.1 4 9 Remigio and two co-defend-
ants had been under investigation for five months prior to the day of the
search. 150 On the day that the search occurred, agents witnessed deliv-
ery to one of the co-defendant's residences of a substance necessary for
the production of methamphetamines.t 5 ! Later, the agents perceived
an odor of ether coming from the premises and, thus, suspected that the
occupants were involved with manufacturing methamphetamines. The
agents then obtained a federal search warrant. 15 2
The agents split into two groups, one group proceeding to the back
146. Id.; United States v. Gonzalez, 700 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1983).
147. 700 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1983).
148. Cf. United States v. Ortiz, 445 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1971) (size of containers with-
out proof of monetary amount or of sale was sufficient).
149. United States v. Remigio, 767 F.2d 730, 731 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 535
(1985).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 732.
152. Id.
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of the premises and one to the front. As the agents approached the back
of the residence, one of the co-defendants opened the back door. 15 3 An
agent quickly subdued the co-defendant. The others entered and pro-
ceeded through a second open door into the kitchen announcing "Po-
lice" and "FBI."' 15 4 They did not knock before announcing their
presence.
2. Background
The purpose of the knock and announce statute 155 is to protect the
privacy of citizens against unannounced intrusions by the government,
to ensure the safety of the officers and the occupants of a dwelling, and
to prevent unnecessary property damage. 15 6 There is disagreement
among the circuit courts as to whether an unannounced entry through
an open door, with a valid search warrant, constitutes an unlawful forci-
ble entry, that is, a "break," or whether such entry is permissible.
15 7
The majority of the circuits have held that this type of entry through an
open door is not a "breaking."' 158 The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Cir-
cuits have held that entry through an open door without permission is
reasonable under the fourth amendment. 159 In contrast, the D.C. Cir-
cuit has held that any entry without notification violates privacy inter-
ests. 160 The Second Circuit has held that a peaceable entry, though it
may constitute a trespass, is not a "breaking."' 16 1 The Supreme Court
has not addressed this issue.
3. Instant Case
In upholding the officers' entry as lawful, the court of appeals noted
that the officers entered the house through an open door in the pres-
ence of one of the defendants. 162 Therefore, there was no need to com-
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1982). "The officer may break open any outer or inner door or
window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search war-
rant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when neces-
sary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in execution of the warrant." Id.
156. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-08 (1958); State v. Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d
1, 3, 621 P.2d 1256, 1258 (1980) (en banc).
157. See generally United States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1966), vacated on other
grounds, 390 U.S. 204 (1968) ("breaking" means forcible entry); Dickey v. United States,
332 F.2d 773 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 948 (1964) (officers employed a ruse to in-
duce the occupants to open the door - court held no "breaking"); Keiningham v. United
States, 287 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (word "break" in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 3109
means to enter without permission).
158. Remigio, 767 F.2d at 732.
159. United States v. Lopez, 475 F.2d 537 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839 (1973);
Ng Pui Yu v. United States, 352 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Williams, 351
F.2d 475 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 917 (1966).
160. Hair v. United States, 289 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Keiningham v. United States,
287 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
161. United States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1966), vacated on other grounds, 390
U.S. 204 (1968).
162. Remigio, 767 F.2d at 733.
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ply with the knock and announce statute.16 3
The panel explained that this was a case of first impression in the
Tenth Circuit regarding the issue of whether police should knock and
announce their presence when the residence which they have a warrant
to enter has its door open. The court recognized that a majority of cir-
cuits have found that such an entry is not a "breaking" within the mean-
ing of the statute. 164 Since a defendant was at the door of the residence
when the police arrived and the door was open, the Tenth Circuit chose
to follow the majority of circuits and rule that this entry was not a
"breaking."
4. Analysis
The purpose of the knock and announce statute is well settled. The
safety of the officers and the occupants of the dwelling must be en-
sured.16 5 Where officers startle an individual there is a reasonable pos-
sibility that violence or unexpected behavior leading to unnecessary
violence may occur. 1 6 6 In addition, the statute entitles every citizen to
protection against unlawful invasions into their home.
167
Officers do not need to announce their purpose and identity when
the gesture would be futile. 16 8 Compliance with the knock and an-
nounce statute is a useless gesture when the officers are almost certain
that the occupants of the dwelling are aware of their presence, identity,
and purpose. 16 9 If police can be reasonably certain that all occupants of
the residence who may pose a threat to their safety are aware of their
identity and purpose, then there is no need to knock and announce their
presence.
It is not clear from the facts, however, that such was the case in
Remigio. To ensure the safety of all concerned, the officers should have
requested permission to enter and should have announced their identity
and purpose. 170 The other occupants were apparently unaware of the
officers' presence, and in failing to inform them of their presence the
officers could have endangered themselves and the other occupants of
163. Id.
164. Id. at 732.
165. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-08 (1958); State v. Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d
1, 3, 621 P.2d 1256, 1258 (1980).
166. Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d at 6, 621 P.2d at 1261 (compliance with the statute is necessary
unless the officers are certain that the occupants are aware of their identity and purpose).
167. "The requirement of prior notice of authority and purpose before forcing entry
into a home is deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging application
.... .Miller, 357 U.S. at 313.
168. Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d at 6, 621 P.2d at 1261. See also United States v. Lopez, 475 F.2d
537 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839 (1973)(facts of the case do not support compliance
with knock and announce statute).
169. Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d at 6, 621 P.2d at 1261.
170. Id. at 1259; Sears v. Oklahoma, 528 P.2d 732 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974) (The of-
ficers knocked and the pressure opened the door. They pushed the door open to enter,
entered, identified themselves and served the search warrant. The officers failed to an-
nounce their identity and presence and to ask permission to enter.); State v. Collier, 270
So.2d 451 (Fla. 1972) (The officers announced they were police and entered. They did not
comply with the statute as they did not knock or otherwise announce their purpose.).
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the house.171 Therefore, in this situation, the purpose of the knock and
announce statute was not adhered to. Knock and announce standards
must be followed in order to ensure that citizens' homes are not unlaw-
fully invaded and that the safety of all concerned is protected. Unfortu-
nately, the Remigio court failed to set forth strict standards governing
future applications of the knock and announce statute. The court simply
accepted the majority position and ignored the potential danger of their
decision.
Although the defendant who opened the door saw the officers ap-
proaching, there is no indication that he was aware of their identity and
purpose. Furthermore, the other occupants of the residence were not
likely to be aware of the presence of the approaching officers. More-
over, exigent circumstances did not excuse compliance. It is unlikely
that the manufacturing operation the FBI assumed to be taking place
could have been destroyed in the short time span that compliance would
have required. 17 2 Although it may appear absurd to require compliance
in a case where one of the defendants is aware that people are approach-
ing, 17 3 allowing increasing exceptions to the rule tends to foster
noncompliance. 174
B. No Good Faith Exception to the Excusionary Rule for Warrantless Searches:
United States v. Owens
1. Facts
Merle Ellis Owens checked into the Pebbletree Inn in Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma on September 8, 1983, and paid for a single occupancy
for one night. 175 He failed to check out by noon on September 9, 1983,
and was asked by motel personnel if he intended to stay another night.
At approximately 3:00 P.M. that day, an additional one hundred dollars
was deposited at the front desk as advance payment for the room. 176
On September 11, 1983, motel security became suspicious due to a
high volume of calls to the room. The security officer, an off-duty police
officer, watched the room from 10:30 P.M. until 7:00 A.M. He observed
171. Remigio, 767 F.2d at 732.
172. See United States v. Sabbath, 391 U.S. 585, 591 (1968) (agents had no basis for
assuming the defendant was armed, might resist arrest, or that danger existed). But see
United States v. James, 764 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (discusses issue of probable immi-
nent destruction of evidence after police knocked and announced their presence but were
not permitted to enter).
173. Compare Ng Pui Yu v. United States, 352 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1965) (Occupant
opened the door, saw officers and retreated. The officers entered without identifying their
purpose and without consent. The court held that consent was not required.) with Hair v.
United States, 289 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (The defendant opened the door, saw police
approaching, turned and ran upstairs. The officers, without announcing their authority or
purpose, opened the door and gave chase. The court held that the entry was illegal.).
174. Non-compliance could eventually lead to tragic consequences if the police are al-
lowed to barge in with guns drawn. The facts in Hair could have led to one such situation.
Hair, 289 F.2d at 894.
175. United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 147 (10th Cir. 1986).
176. Id. at 147-48.
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several people coming, staying only a short time, and then leaving. 177
The officer ran a police check to see if the car Owens was driving had
been stolen. The check showed that the car had not been stolen, but
that the license plate was stolen. 178 The officer again watched the room
from 7:30 A.M. until noon on September 12th.
At this time, a plain clothes officer went to Owens' room and re-
quested that he move his car. When Owens got to his car, he was ar-
rested for recieving stolen property. 17 9 He asked the officers not to
enter his room, because a female companion, Cheryl Jones, was asleep
on the bed and naked. However, the motel manager authorized police
entry into the room for the purpose of removing Owens' companion. 180
The police entered the room, observed Cheryl Jones sleeping, and
saw marijuana, cocaine, and drug paraphenalia in plain view. 18 1 The
officers, unsure of how to proceed, considered the situation for several
minutes, called their sergeant and waited for him. Finally, when the ser-
geant arrived twenty minutes later, Jones was awakened, told to get
dressed, removed from the room, and arrested. The officers, without
attempting to obtain a search warrant, made a complete search of the
room and the closed containers in the room. They discovered in excess




Hotel guests have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their hotel
rooms,' 8 3 and are afforded constitutional protection against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures. 184 It is well settled that a warrant is required
to conduct a search where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.1
85
There are, however, exceptions to the warrant requirement for
searches and seizures. Unwarranted searches may be justified if exigent
circumstances are present. 186 Following an arrest, the arresting officers
177. Id. at 148.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 148-49.
181. Id. at 149.
182. Id. Owens was subsequently charged with conspiracy to possess cocaine with in-
tent to distribute and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He was aquitted of
the conspiracy charge.
183. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966), reh'gdenied, 386 U.S. 940 (1967);
see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
184. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48
(1951); United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164,
reh g denied, 455 U.S. 984 (1982).
185. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
(1978); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483
(1964).
186. United States v. Riccio, 726 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1984) (The defendant shot at the
officers from different places in the trailer; therefore the officers could not be sure if the
defendant was alone. Exigent circumstances justified a sweep search.); United States v.
Irizarry, 673 F.2d 554 (1 st Cir. 1982) (possibility of another armed person inside the hotel
room hiding justified a warrantless sweep search).
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may make a protective sweep of the premises if they have reasonable
grounds to believe the sweep is justified. 18 7 A search of a person inci-
dent to arrest and the area within his immediate control is permitted.
1 88
If evidence is seized in an unconstitutional search it may be sup-
pressed under the exclusionary rule. 189 Historically, there have been
three reasons given for suppression of the evidence under the exclusion-
ary rule:190 protection of the individual's right to privacy;191 upholding
the integrity of the courts by eliminating tainted evidence;19 2 and deter-
rence of police misconduct.1
9 3
Over the past several years, the circuit courts and the Supreme
Court have gradually eroded the broad power of suppression under the
exclusionary rule 194 and the Supreme Court has recently recognized
limited exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Officers acting on the as-
sumption that the search warrant they have obtained is valid, if acting in
good faith, may have the evidence introduced at trial even if the warrant
is later ruled invalid. 19 5 In United States v. Leon, 19 6 a search warrant was
issued based on a faulty affidavit and therefore the warrant was not sup-
ported by probable cause. Leon held, however, that the officers acted
reasonably and with good faith in their reliance on the warrant. Simi-
larly, in Massachusetts v. Sheppard,19 7 the police were unable to find the
proper warrant form, but were assured by the judge that all the neces-
sary changes in the warrant had been made. Although the warrant was
defective, the officers had acted in good faith with a reasonable basis for
their belief that the warrant was valid. Consequently, the evidence was
admitted under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Inad-
missibility of the evidence under the exclusionary rule in these circum-
187. The protective sweep exception provides for a brief search to secure the safety of
people in the immediate area. See, e.g., United States v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991 (1982) (arresting officers have the right to check a suspect's
residence after an arrest even when arrest is outside the residence if police believe others
may be inside and present a security risk); United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom, Miller v. United States, 446 U.S. 912 (1980) (seizure of
address books was justified as they were in plain view of officers lawfully in the residence).
But see United States v. Kinney, 638 F.2d 941 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981)
(officers were not justified in conducting a security sweep as the only other suspect was in
custody).
188. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969).
189. United States v. Weeks, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (evidence seized in violation of the
fourth amendment is inadmissible).
190. For a brief discussion of the history of the exclusionary rule, see Comment, Crimi-
nal Procedure - Search and Seizure: The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule - How Should
Tennessee Decide?, 14 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 549, 550-53 (1984).
191. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961), limited by United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984).
192. Elkins v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
193. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
194. See Comment, United States v. Leon: The Long Awaited Good Faith Exception Has
Finally Arrived, 36 MERCER L. REV. 757 (1985).
195. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984).
196. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
197. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
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stances would not serve the purpose of protecting fourth amendment
rights through the deterrence of unlawful police conduct.
Another limited exception to the exclusionary rule is the inevitable
discovery rule recognized by the Supreme Court in Nix v. Williams,
198
and adopted by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Romero. 199 Under
this rule, evidence which would normally be suppressed is admissible if
the court finds that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered
through other constitutional procedures. "Inevitable discovery" there-




The Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's decision that Owens had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room and in the contents
of the bags found in his room, and suppressed admission of the illegally
obtained evidence. 2 0 1 In overruling the trial court, the Tenth Circuit
declined to expand the scope of the good faith exception to include war-
rantless searches. The court found the exception inapplicable to the cir-
cumstances in the instant case where the officers totally disregarded
repeated opportunities to obtain a search warrant. 20 2 The Tenth Circuit
declined to rule on whether the officers could rely on the protective
sweep exception to the warrant requirement, because this search clearly
exceeded the scope of a protective sweep.
20 3
The Tenth Circuit also found that the inevitable discovery excep-
tion was inapplicable to the facts of this case. There was no evidence
presented at trial of any independent investigation or of facts supporting
a theory of inevitable discovery.
20 4
4. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit was correct in reversing the trial court's decision.
The good faith exception formulated by the Supreme Court in Leon is
couched in terms of reasonableness. Yet, the reasonableness only ap-
198. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
199. 692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1982).
200. In Nix, the officers transporting Williams talked to him about an impending snow-
storm and the possibility that the body of the slain little girl might never be found and
afforded a proper Christian burial unless Williams directed them to the body. As they
approached the town where the body was located, Williams, without further conversation,
led the officers to the body. Search parties were scouring the area in the counties next to
where the body was found. Testimony indicated that had Williams not cooperated, the
searchers would have used the same techniques in the adjoining counties. This led the
Court to believe that discovery of the body was inevitable. Nix, 467 U.S. at 435.
201. Owens, 782 F.2d at 150.
202. Id. at 152. The officers watched Owens' motel room for five and one-half hours
without attempting to obtain a search warrant. Controlled substances were in plain view
of the officers upon entering the room, and they still failed to obtain a search warrant.
Even after the room was secured and the closed bags were in their possession, no attempt
was made to obtain a search warrant. Id.
203. Id. at 151.
204. Id. at 152, 153.
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plies to police action based on an appropriately obtained warrant. The
Court's decision not to further limit the scope of the exclusionary rule
was in keeping with fourth amendment individual rights and the deter-
rent effect of the rule.
20 5
The government argued in Owens, however, that the evidence seized
should have been admitted because the authorities reasonably believed
that Owens was no longer entitled to the use of the room. 20 6 According
to the manager, Owens' occupancy had been terminated for lack of pay-
ment and, additionally, an unregistered guest was using the room.
20 7
Previous cases have held that when tenancy has expired there is no enti-
tlement to use and no expectation of privacy .208
The government also contended that the officers could have reason-
ably assumed that they were proceeding legally since a motel manager is
free to consent to a search of the room if the tenancy has expired. How-
ever, the officers never obtained permission from the manager to search
the room, much less permission from Owens to search the contents of
closed containers. 209 Although the manager could give permission to
enter the room,2 10 a search founded on such permission could not in-
clude the closed containers over which the manager had no control.
2 11
As the Tenth Circuit pointed out, the officers disregarded several op-
portunities to obtain a search warrant choosing instead to proceed with
a warrantless search. 2 12 Once closed containers are in the possession of
the police there can be no excuse for their failure to obtain a search
warrant.
2 13
If the officers were legally in the room, the drug paraphenalia, mari-
juana, and cocaine in plain view could have been properly seized and
would have given the officers probable cause for a search warrant.
2 14
The room was easily secured and the government provided no reason-
able explanation for failing to follow the provisions of the fourth amend-
ment. 21 5 There is no question that the officers' suspicion that more
205. Leon, 368 U.S. at 919.
206. See generally United States v. Lee, 700 F.2d 424 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1122 (1983) (search of hotel room with owner's permission after rental has expired does
not require a search warrant); United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1970) (when
rental period elapses the former tenant has no right to use the hotel room and no reason-
able expectation of privacy).
207. Owens, 782 F.2d at 148-49.
208. See supra note 206.
209. Owens, 782 F.2d at 151.
210. Although the manager had given the officers permission to enter the room and
evict Cheryl Jones, he had not given permission for a search. Indeed, it was probably not
within his power to give the officers permission to search the room, since the Tenth Circuit
held that Owens had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his motel room and the closed
contents therein. Id. at 150.
211. See Lee, 700 F.2d at 424.
212. Owens, 782 F.2d at 152.
213. See Walter v. Unites States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980). But see United States v.Jacobsen,
683 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
214. Once officers are legally on the premises, items in plain view may be legally seized.
United States v. Irizarry, 673 F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d
1057 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991 (1982).
215. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
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drugs might be found in the room was reasonable; however, that does
not excuse their failure to obtain a search warrant.
21 6
The Tenth Circuit properly recognized that the extension of the
good faith exception to warrantless searches would open the door to the
type of police behavior that the exclusionary rule is designed to de-
ter.2 17 When courts suppress illegally obtained evidence, police are en-
couraged to secure search warrants and to exercise restraint when
considering a warrantless search. Admitting illegally seized evidence
through the good faith exception erodes the constitutional provisions of
the fourth amendment and discourages police from carefully assessing
the privacy interests of suspects. If the good faith exception to the ex-
clusionary rule is to be expanded to include warrantless searches, inno-
cent people may have their privacy rights violated simply because an
officer has a hunch and acts "reasonably" in pursuing that hunch. Pri-
vacy rights should not be infringed upon in this manner.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit embraced a fairly con-
servative path during this survey period. The court was extremely defer-
ential to counsel in reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the validity of Andrews' guilty plea despite
violation of the Speedy Trial Act, whereas in Broce the court held that a
guilty plea was not a waiver of the right to claim a double jeopardy viola-
tion. The court in Hooks showed extreme deference to the trial court
regarding evidentiary matters and allowed a conviction for possession
with intent to distribute to stand with only the magnitude of the quantity
constructively possessed as evidence of distribution. In Remigio, the
Tenth Circuit followed the majority of the circuits and limited the appli-
cation of the knock and announce statute, allowing police to enter with-
out knocking or announcing their presence when a defendant is at an
open door. The court disregarded the rights of a household dweller to
be informed as to the identity and purpose of officers attempting to
enter a private residence when the door is open. However, in Owens, the
Tenth Circuit showed restraint in not further expanding the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. This case is important in that it pro-
tects individual privacy rights and acts as a deterrent to police officers
considering a warrantless search. In the future, it is hoped that the court
will follow the precedents set forth in Owens and Broce in protecting the
rights of the defendant.
Joyce M. Bergmann
216. See generally Irizarry, 673 F.2d at 556, 559 (The officers seized contraband in plain
view, then noticing that a ceiling panel was loose, an officer searched above the panel and
found additional contraband. The First Circuit held that although the officer had a reason-
able belief that more contraband could be found on the premises, no exigent circum-
stances justified the exploratory search without the prior approval of a detached and
neutral magistrate.).
217. Owens, 782 F.2d at 152.
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LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
OVERVIEW
During the 1985-86 survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decided cases in a variety of areas of labor and employment law.
The court decided a workmen's compensation case based upon Utah law
involving the dual capacity exception' to the exclusive remedy princi-
ple.2 In another decision, the Tenth Circuit denied enforcement of a
Board order reinstating non-union employees who were allegedly dis-
criminated against by union activities. The court held that the Board's
decision was not supported by substantial evidence.3 This contrasts
with the 1984-85 survey period in which the court enforced all Board
orders.
4
The court construed Kansas wage statutes and determined that an
employee terminated for cause was not entitled to stock option benefits
because they were held not to be wages. 5 Also, the Tenth Circuit ana-
lyzed the rejection of collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy
court and remanded the case for further findings of fact. It concluded
that the bankruptcy judge had failed to make the factual findings re-
quired to reject collective bargaining agreements.
6
A dispute involving the timeliness of a grievance hearing raised the
issue of procedural versus substantive arbitration. The Tenth Circuit
distinguished between the two in a well-reasoned decision that affirmed
the lower court's summary judgment for the employer. 7 Although not
new law, this decision merits discussion in light of the United States
Supreme Court's recent reaffirmation of the principles of the Trilogy.
8
I. DUAL CAPACITY DOCTRINE EXCEPTION TO EXCLUSIVITY OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The Tenth Circuit decided a Utah case which turned upon whether
Utah recognized the dual capacity doctrine exception to the exclusive
remedy of workmen's compensation. The court upheld the lower
court's findings that the doctrine was inapplicable to the case at bar and
refused to certify the question of the dual capacity doctrine's acceptabil-
ity to the Utah Supreme Court.
1. See Worthen v. Kennecott Corp., 780 F.2d 856, 857 (10th Cir. 1985) (for a defin-
tion of the dual capacity exception); see also infra text accompanying note 13.
2. Worthen, 780 F.2d 856.
3. Glaziers Union 558 v. NLRB, 787 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1986).
4. See Beyerle, Labor and Employment Law, 63 DEN. L. REV. 395 (1986).
5. Weir v. Anaconda Co., 773 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1985).
6. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. IML Freight, Inc., 789 F.2d 1460 (10th Cir.
1986).
7. Denhardt v. Trailways, Inc., 767 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1985).
8. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communication Workers of America, 106 S. Ct. 1415
(1986), see infra note 157 and accompanying text.
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A. Dual Capacity Doctrine: Worthen v. Kennecott Corp.
In Worthen v. Kennecott Corp. ,9 Mr. Worthen was injured while work-
ing at Kennecott's Magna Concentrator plant when a hook from an
overhead crane fell and struck him. Worthen was given emergency
medical treatment by his fellow employees and was transported to the
hospital in a company-owned ambulance. Unfortunately, the events had
a "keystone cop" quality and Mr. Worthen died at about the time he
arrived at the hospital. Mrs. Worthen brought an action alleging that
the attempted rendering of medical services by Kennecott's employees
caused Mr. Worthen's death.
The district court granted Kennecott's motion for summary judg-
ment on the ground that Worthen's action was barred by the exclusive
remedy provisions of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act.' 0 The
primary issue raised on appeal was whether the trial court erred in rul-
ing that Utah law does not accept the dual capacity doctrine as an excep-
tion to the exclusive remedy provisions of the Utah Workmen's
Compensation Act.I A second issue raised on appeal was whether ap-
pellant's motion to certify the dual capacity question to the Utah
Supreme Court should be granted.
12
1. The Dual Capacity Issue
a. Background and the Tenth Circuit's Decision
The Tenth Circuit stated that under the dual capacity doctrine "an
employer normally shielded from tort liability by the exclusive remedy
principle [based on Workmen's Compensation Laws] may become liable
in tort to his own employee if he occupies, in addition to his capacity as
employer, a second capacity that confers on him obligations independ-
9. 780 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1985).
10. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-60 (1953) provides:
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for
injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the
exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy against
any officer, agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the employer
imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever,
at common law or otherwise, to such employee or to his spouse, widow, children,
parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any
other person whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or death, in any
way contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred by such employee in the course
of or because of or arising out of his employment, and no action at law may be
maintained against an employer based upon any accident, injury or death of an
employee.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62 (Supp. 1986) provides:
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this title
shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other than an
employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer, the injured employee, or
in the case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the injured
employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an action for dam-
ages against such third person.
11. Worthen, 780 F.2d at 857.
12. Id. at 860.
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ent of those imposed on him as employer."' 3 Although the Utah
Supreme Court has never adopted the dual capacity doctrine, the court
discussed it in Bingham v. Lagoon Corp. 14 The court set forth the test of
applicability of the doctrine as follows:
The decisive test to determine if the dual capacity doctrine is
invokable is not whether the second function or capacity of the
employer is different and separate from the first. Rather, the
test is whether the employer's conduct in the second role or
capacity has generated obligations that are unrelated to those
flowing from the company's or individual's first role as an em-
ployer. If the obligations are related, the doctrine is not
applicable. 15
The Bingham court concluded: first, that the doctrine did not apply to
the facts before it, and second, that the court did not decide that the
doctrine could ever be applied in Utah due to the restrictions of sections
35-1-60 and -62.16
The Tenth Circuit, in Worthen v. Kennecott Corp., pointed out that the
dual capacity doctrine, which the Utah Supreme Court cited in Bingham,
was subsequently restricted in other jurisdictions. 17 The Tenth Circuit
noted that Illinois had restricted the dual capacity doctrine to cases
where the second role "involved a separate legal entity or persona."' 8
Furthermore, the court stated that the only judicially created exception
to the exclusive remedy provisions, recognized by the Utah Supreme
Court involved deliberate, willful injuries inflicted on an employee.' 9
The Tenth Circuit, construing relevant sections of the Utah Workmen's
Compensation Act,2 0 found that the clear intent of the Utah legislature
was to hold employers immune from common law liability coterminous
with their liability under the Act.
2 1
The court found that Kennecott's employees did not deliberately or
willfully aggravate the injuries of their co-worker. Additionally, the dual
capacity doctrine exception was not applicable to the case at bar because
Kennecott's Magna Concentrator plant was not a separate legal entity.
Finally, the court found no merit in Mrs. Worthen's argument that there
was an unresolved factual question of whether her husband was injured
in the course and scope of his employment which would preclude sum-
maryjudgment. The Tenth Circuit held that the trial court had no alter-
13. Id. at 857 (quoting 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 72.80 (1976)).
14. 707 P.2d 678 (Utah 1985). In Bingham, a minor employee, injured at his em-
ployer's amusement park, was covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act and therefore
barred from recovering against the employer in tort.
15. Id. at 680 (quoting McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Il. 2d 352, 423
N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981)).
16. Id.; see supra note 10.
17. Worthen, 780 F.2d at 858 n.1.
18. Id. at 858 (quoting Sharp v. Gallagher, 95 Ill. 2d 322, 447 N.E.2d 786, 788
(1983)).
19. See Bryan v. Utah Int'l, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975) (holding that a fellow employee
may be sued for intentional misconduct that causes injuries).
20. See supra note 10.
21. Worthen, 780 F.2d at 859.
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native but to grant summary judgment in favor of the employer due to
the sweeping, inclusive construction of the Utah Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act and the absence of exceptions to the exclusivity principle of the
Act.
2 2
b. Other Jurisdictions' Reactions to the Dual Capacity Doctrine
States allowing dual capacity to serve as grounds for recovery in-
clude California, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio. 23 States rejecting the
dual capacity exception include Alaska, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and
Texas. 2 4 Courts rejecting the doctrine have been generally suspicious
that the dual capacity doctrine may be used as a vehicle to undermine
the exclusivity of workmen's compensation. Other courts allow the doc-
trine to be used on a restricted basis.
2 5
Attempts by employees to hold their employers liable in tort on the
basis of ownership of property or the unsafe maintenance of the work
facilities have been rejected. The employer's duty to maintain a safe
place to work has been held inseparable from the employer's general
duties as an employer. 26 The dual capacity doctrine has been recog-
nized, however, in the areas of medical malpractice where the doctor or
hospital is also the injured patient's employer. 2 7 Products liability,
where the employer manufactured the product which injured the em-
ployee, is another area in which the dual capacity doctrine has been fa-
22. Id. at 859-60.
23. See Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952) (where a chiropractor was
found liable for malpractice in the negligent aggravation of his employee's injury which
occurred during the course of her employment). See also Sharp v. Gallagher, 95 Ill. 2d 322,
447 N.E.2d 786 (1983); McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill. 2d 352, 423 N.E.2d
876 (1981); Panagos v. North Detroit Gen. Hosp., 35 Mich. App. 554, 192 N.W.2d 542
(1971); Grey v. Arthur H. Thomas Co., 55 Ohio St.2d 183, 378 N.E.2d 488 (1978). See
generally Comment, Workmen's Compensation and Employer Suability: The Dual-Capacity Doctrine,
5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 818 (1974); Note, Dual Capacity Doctrine: Third-Party Liability of Employer-
Manufacturer in Products Liability Litigation, 12 IND. L. REV. 553 (1979).
24. See State v. Purdy, 601 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1979); Needham v. Fred's Frozen Foods,
Inc., 171 Ind. App. 671, 359 N.E.2d 544 (1977); Borman v. Interlake, Inc., 623 S.W.2d 912
(Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Herbert v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 369 So. 2d 1104 (La. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 369 So. 2d 466 (La. 1979); Trotter v. Litton Sys., Inc., 370 So. 2d 244 (Miss. 1979);
Billy v. Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 152, 412 N.E.2d 934,432 N.Y.S.2d 879
(1980); Schlenk v. Aerial Contractors, Inc., 268 N.W.2d 466 (N.D. 1978); Kohr v. Raybes-
tos-Manhattan, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. Pa. 1981); McAlister v. Methodist Hosp. of
Memphis, 550 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1977); Mott v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 636 F.2d 1072
(5th Cir. 1981) (applying Texas law).
25. Annotation, Dual Capacity Doctrine-Tort Cases, 23 A.L.R.4th § 2[a] (1983).
26. See Kottis v. United States Steel Corp., 543 F.2d 22 (applying Indiana law), cert
denied 430 U.S. 916 (7th Cir. 1976); Stone v. United States Steel Corp., 384 So. 2d 17 (Ala.
1980) (in both decisions the courts held that, in addition to benefits already received
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, an employee could not hold an employer liable
in tort for breach of a duty to discover defects or dangerous conditions in the workplace).
27. See D'Angona v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 3d 661, 613 P.2d 238, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 177 (1980) (a physical therapist was allowed to bring a tort action against a county
hospital, for physicians' malpractice, after she received workmen's compensation benefits);
Duprey v. Shane, 38 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952) (where a nurse, employed by a chiro-







The Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's decision and denied ap-
pellant Worthen's motion to certify the dual capacity doctrine to the
Utah Supreme Court. At the time of the trial, no such procedure was
available under Utah law. The Tenth Circuit stated that certification of
state law should have been appealed to the Utah Supreme Court before
the case had been fully submitted and argued. The court held that the
clarity of the issue in the Worthen case and the amount of time that had
elapsed since the matter was first raised made the case inappropriate for
certification to the Utah Supreme Court.
29
B. Analysis: Effect of Court's Decision in Worthen v. Kennecott Corp.
No Utah case has directly addressed the dual capacity question cru-
cial to the resolution of the Worthen case. Utah remains without gui-
dance as to the applicability of the dual capacity doctrine. This is due to
the Tenth Circuit's refusal to certify appellant's question and the doc-
trine's inconsistent application in outside jurisdictions. The court also
gave short shrift to the argument that there was an unresolved question
of fact as to whether Worthen was injured in the course and scope of his
employment. The court assumed with minimal explanation that the
botched medical aid by fellow employees did occur within the course
and scope of employment.
II. THE NLRB's FAILURE TO FOLLOW ITS OWN CASE LAW
The Tenth Circuit refused to enforce the National Labor Relations
Board's cease and desist order against the Glaziers Union for violations
of section 8(b)(2) 30 and derivatively section 8(b)(1)(A)3 1 of the National
28. See Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc., 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P.2d 266, 179 Cal. Rptr. 30
(1981) (a salesman was allowed to sue his employer in tort when product he was delivering
exploded); Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 49 Ohio App.2d 279, 361 N.E.2d 492 (1976) (an em-
ployer was held liable in tort for a defective tire supplied to employee's delivery truck).
29. Worthen, 780 F.2d at 860; see Cantwell v. University of Mass., 551 F.2d 879, 880
(1st Cir. 1977) (Cantwel involved an injury to member of university gymnastics team,
where case was correctly decided on basis of sovereign immunity. The First Circuit held
that the purpose of certification is not to change state law and that one who chooses fed-
eral court is in a poor position to seek certification.); Buehler Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 495
F.2d 1211, 1214 (7th Cir. 1974) (The court held that retention of insurance premiums,
after a violation by insured of condition which renders entire policy voidable, constitutes
waiver of the violation by the insurer. The Seventh Circuit held that where no controlling
state precedent can be found, the appellate court must give great weight to the opinion of
the district judge experienced in the law of the state.); cf. United States v. Criterion Insur-
ance Co., 587 F.2d 39, 40 (10th Cir. 1978) (In Criterion, questions of state law regarding
the Colorado Automobile Accident Reparations Act were certified to the Colorado
Supreme Court because the Tenth Circuit found no controlling state precedents.); Krut-
singer v. Mead Foods, Inc., 546 F.2d 328, 331-32 (10th Cir. 1976) (Kmtsinger hinged upon
the unconstrued Oklahoma Fair Trade statute prompting the court to certify an interro-
gatory to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2)(1959) provides:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents -
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Labor Relations Act. The court found that the Board's presumption of
illegal Union conduct was not supported by substantial evidence as re-
quired by the Board's own case law. 32 The court's refusal to enforce the
Board's order contrasts with the 1984-1985 survey period in which all
Board orders were enforced.
3"
A. The Board's Specious Argument: Glaziers Local 558 v. NLRB
1. Facts
In Glaziers Local 558 v. NLRB, 34 Kenneth Orr, a temporary permit
holder hired during a shortage ofjourneymen glaziers, filed a complaint
with the National Labor Relations Board charging the Glaziers Local
Union 558 with unfair labor practices in violation of sections 8(b)(2) and
8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act. Orr alleged that the
Union caused PPG Industries to fire him and another nonunion em-
ployee, Gooch, when Union employees walked off the job. Orr con-
tended that the walkout was designed to pressure PPG into terminating
the nonunion temporary employees.
3 5
Customarily, permit men were issued permits for only thirty days
and were replaced with Union journeymen as they became available for
referral. Orr and Gooch commenced their temporary work in August,
1981. When they were still on the job in October, the Union repeatedly
requested that the permit men be replaced with available journeymen.
PPG refused to replace Orr and Gooch despite the Union employees'
growing dissatisfaction. On January 7, 1982, Union employees walked
off the job site even though the Union business representative told them
that the Union could not instigate a walkout or strike. The next day,
PPG decided to terminate the permit men and attempted to recall the




The case was brought before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
who found that there was no persuasive evidence to support the allega-
tion that the walkout was caused by the Union. The ALJ further held
that even if the Union was responsible for the job site walkout, the evi-
... (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to ... discriminate against an
employee with respect to whom membership in such organization had been de-
nied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender periodic dues
and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership ....
31. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(1959) states that:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents -
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in
Section 7 ....
32. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
33. See Beyerle, supra note 4.
34. 787 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1986).
35. Id. at 1411.
36. Id. at 1407.
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dence established that the Union's motive was to protect its apprentice-
ship and referral program and not to cause PPG to discriminate against
nonunion employees. Orr's complaint was dismissed.
3 7
The National Labor Relations Board ("the Board") reversed the
ALJ, concluding that the Union illegally caused PPG to dismiss Orr and
Gooch. Contrary to the findings of fact by the ALJ, the Board deter-
mined that there was sufficient evidence that the Union caused or at-
tempted to cause PPG to terminate Orr and Gooch. The Board
emphasized in support of its conclusion, requests by Union agents to
replace the permit employees with available journeymen, threats to
union members that they would have to quit if dissatisfied with condi-
tions at the PPG job site, and provisions in the Union bylaws for fines
against members working with the permit men beyond thirty days. The
Board found that the Union encouraged its members to quit the job site
and concluded that the Union, by making no effort to fill the vacant posi-
tions after the walk-out, ratified the employees' actions.
3
Satisfied that causation had been established, the Board applied the
presumption that a union acts illegally any time it prevents an employee
from being hired or causes an employee to be discharged and reached
the conclusion that the Union violated Section 8(b)(2).3 9 A union may
rebut this presumption by providing "evidence of a compelling and
overriding character" 40 establishing that its conduct "was referable to
other considerations, lawful in themselves, and wholly unrelated to the
exercise of protected employee rights or other matters with which the
Act is concerned. '4 1 The Board did not specifically dispute the ALJ's
findings that the Union's actions were motivated by its desire to protect
its traditional journeymen apprentice system, but it determined that
such a motivation was an insufficient justification to overcome the pre-
sumption of illegality. The Board ordered the Union to cease and desist
from violations of section 8(b)(2) and derivatively section 8(b)(1)(A).
Additionally, the Union was required to compensate Orr and Gooch for
any loss of earnings that resulted from the discrimination and to contact
PPG in writing to request their reinstatement.
42
3. Issues on Appeal
The case came before the Tenth Circuit on the Union's petition for
review and the Board's cross-application for enforcement of its cease
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1411.
39. Id. at 1410-11.
40. See Local 1102, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners (Planet Corporation), 144
N.L.R.B. 798 (1963) (holding that it was not unlawful discrimination by union to attempt
to persuade employer to discharge employee who refused benefits under collective bar-
gaining agreement).
41. See International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 18 v. NLRB, 204 N.L.R.B. 681
(1973) (ruling that removing employee from job-referral list for having been suspended
for bad conduct was not permissible union conduct), enf denied on other grounds, 496 F.2d
1308 (6th Cir. 1974).
42. Glaziers, 787 F.2d at 1411.
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and desist order. The Union contended on appeal that the Board's pre-
sumption of illegality ignored the true purpose or motive for hiring or
firing an employee. 4 3 Additionally, the Union argued that requiring
compelling and overriding evidence to rebut the presumption of illegal-
ity was an impermissible burden.4 4 Thus, the primary issue on appeal
was whether the Board correctly applied a presumption that a union acts
illegally any time it causes an employee to be discharged in violation of
section 8(b)(2). The court closely examined the record to determine
whether the presumption of illegality was supported by substantial
evidence.
45
4. Examining the Presumption of Illegality:
The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
A reviewing court may reverse a decision of the Board if the court
cannot conscientiously find substantial evidence supporting the Board's
decision. Such a reversal can only be made after a complete examina-
tion of the record, including the body of evidence that opposes the
Board's decision.4 6 Findings of the ALJ, whether contrary to or in sup-
port of the Board's decision, are part of the record to be fully consid-
ered by the reviewing court. 4 7 The standard of review does not change,
even if the ALJ and the Board reach opposite conclusions.
48
The Tenth Circuit stated that it recognized the Board's authority to
apply general presumptions. 4 9 According to the court, however, only
rational presumptions may be sustained. The presumption must also
follow statutory guidelines and the application of the presumption must
be based on substantial evidence.
50
The validity of the Board's presumption of illegality was then con-
sidered by the court in light of other guidelines and criteria espoused by
the Supreme Court. Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
NLRB 5 1 set forth that for a court to find a section 8(b)(2) violation, it
must analyze the "real motive" or "true purpose in hiring or firing."
The court also noted that certain employer actions contain an intent to
discriminate and that the consequences of those actions warrant such an
43. Id. (the Union cited Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667
(1961) (holding that the true purpose or motive in hiring or firing is the test of a section
8(b)2 violation)).
44. Id. at 1411.
45. Id. at 1408.
46. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,488 (1951) (involving a Board
order reinstating an employee who was discharged because he gave testimony in another
proceeding).
47. See id. at 492-96.
48. See Pennypower Shipping News, Inc. v. NLRB, 726 F.2d 626, 629 (10th Cir. 1984)
(company sought to set aside Board order reinstating nine employees after company ter-
minated their employment due to participation in strike).
49. Glaziers, 787 F.2d at 1412-13.
50. Id.; see also NLRB v. American Can Co., 658 F.2d 746, 752-53 (10th Cir. 1981)
(upholding Board order against employer and union for applying a superseniority clause
to union officers).
51. 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
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inference. 5 2 The Supreme Court has divided such employer's conduct,
which is equally applicable to union conduct, 5 3 into two categories:
Some conduct is so "inherently destructive of employee inter-
ests" that it carries with it a strong inference of impermissible
motive. In such a situation, even if an employer comes forward
with a nondiscriminatory explanation for its actions, "the
Board may nevertheless draw an inference of improper motive
from the conduct itself and exercise its duty to strike the proper
balance between the asserted business justifications and the in-
vasion of employee rights in light of the Act and its policy." On
the other hand, if the adverse effect on employee rights is
" 'comparatively slight', an anti-union motivation must be
proved to sustain the charge if the employer has come forward
with evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifica-
tions for the conduct."
54
The Tenth Circuit, in Glaziers found that the Board had apparently
classified the Union's conduct in the first category, conduct which "car-
ries a strong inference of impermissible motive."'5 5 The court noted
that the Board cut off its inquiry into the Union's motivation by summa-
rily rejecting the Union's assertion that it acted out of a desire to protect
its apprenticeship program when it requested the replacement of the
permit employees. The court concluded that the Board's application of
the presumption of illegality lacked rationality and was not supported by
substantial evidence.
5 6
The court came to this conclusion for several reasons. The record
did not indicate any expectation on the part of permit workers that they
enjoyed anything other than a temporary status. The Union's efforts to
replace permit men could not have "so dramatically demonstrated its
power over employees and their livelihood that the effect was to en-
courage union membership among employees witnessing the exercise of
power." 57 There was no evidence presented that the Union acted in bad
faith in seeking to replace Orr and Gooch. Evidence was presented that
the Union informed members that it could not instigate a walk-out and
that it would not impose fines on members working with the temporary
employees. As the ALJ stated, if the Union wanted to encourage union
membership, it could have invoked the union security clause in its con-
tract. 58 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Union met its burden in
rebutting the presumption. 59
52. Id. at 675.
53. See id.; American Can, 658 F.2d 746 (both decisions involved discrimination by
union).
54. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967) (quoting NLRB v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287, 289 (1965); NLRB v. Erie Resister Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 229
(1965)).
55. Glaziers, 787 F.2d at 1413-14.
56. Id. at 1414.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1416.
59. Id.
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B. Analysis: The Swinging Pendulum: The Current Board's Attitude Toward
Labor
There has been much recent discussion about the direction taken by
the Board under President Reagan. Labor has charged that Chairman
Dotson's Board has gutted employee rights. 60 Management has coun-
tered that the Board has restored the appropriate balance between labor
and management. 6 1 How does the Board's presumption of illegality
and its holding in Glaziers fit into this debate?
Justice Frankfurter stated that the Board moves "incrementally" to-
wards the solution of problems in the light of accumulated experience. 62
Frankfurter warned us to be wary of sudden shifts in doctrine for they
suggest the rejection, rather than the accumulation, of wisdom. 63 By
ignoring evidence of the Union's real motive the Board's holding in Gla-
ziers is a rejection of years of accumulated case law on evidentiary stan-
dards which marks a move toward instability. Dramatic shifts in the
Board's positions lead to speculation that decisions are result-oriented,
rather than the result of logically applied principles of law. Apparently,
the Tenth Circuit heeded Justice Frankfurter's advice by rejecting the
Board's dramatic shift.
III. STOCK OPTIONS ARE HELD NOT TO BE WAGES
In Weir v. Anaconda Co. ,64 a former employee brought an action
against his employer alleging that he was improperly denied benefits
due under his employer's stock option and savings fund plans. The
lower court granted summary judgment for the employer on the stock
option claim and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 65 The contested stock op-
tion benefits were held not to be "wages," 66 but a benefit subject to a
condition precedent which the plaintiff had not fulfilled.
A. Stock Option Rights are Not Absolute: Weir v. Anaconda
1. Facts
In Weir v. Anaconda Co., plaintiff Robert Weir, an Anaconda em-
ployee for 22 years, was the marketing manager for telephone cables
and small wire sales. In 1978, Jerry White became Weir's supervisor.
Weir and White did not have a good working relationship, and in Janu-
ary, 1979, White gave Weir a poor performance evaluation. The
60. See Phalen, The Destabilization of Federal Labor Policy Under the Reagan Board, 2 LAB.
LAw. 1 (1986).
61. See Batten, Recent Decisions of the Reagan Board: A Management Perspective, 2 LAB. LAW.
33 (1986).
62. Rabin, Editor's Page, 2 LAB. LAw. (1986).
63. Id.
64. 773 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1985).
65. Id. at 1075.
66. Id.; see Lawson & Robison, Incentive Stock Options: An Area of Change and Opportunity
- But Potential Problems Exist, 12 TAX'N FOR LAw. 40 (1983); McDonnell, Incentive Stock Op-
tions, 10 COLO. LAw. 2835 (1981) (for information regarding stock option plans); Note,
Kast v. Commissioner: Disposition Rules for Statutory Stock Options, 3 VA. TAX. REV. 385 (1984).
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problems between the two men continued until Weir was terminated
effective November 30, 1979.
Anaconda's stock option plan gave Weir the right to purchase Ana-
conda stock at a fixed price per share for ten years, and if his employ-
ment terminated, for three months after termination. The agreement
also stated that: "If, however, you are dismissed from the employ of the
company or a subsidiary for cause, of which the Committee shall be the
sole judge, this option shall forthwith expire."' 67 Weir attempted to ex-
ercise his option on January 23, 1980. The Compensation Policy Com-
mittee denied the exercise of the option, holding that Weir was
terminated for cause.
2. The District Court Opinion
Weir brought an action against Anaconda to recover benefits under
the stock option plan and savings fund plan, alleging four counts.
Under Count I, the plaintiff asserted a claim for benefits under the stock
option plan. In Count II he claimed some savings plan benefits were
unjustly withheld. In Count III he claimed tortious interference with
contractual rights. Count IV averred that benefits under the stock op-
tion plan and savings plan were wages under Kansas law.
68
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted An-
aconda summary judgment on Counts I, III and IV. Weir was granted
summary judgment on Count 11.69 The savings fund benefits were paid
to Weir after a remand to the Committee and its subsequent ruling that
he was contractually entitled to savings benefits.
As to the other three counts, the lower court stated that it must
uphold the action of Anaconda's Compensation Policy Committee in de-
nying Weir's attempt to exercise his stock option unless it acted arbitrar-
ily, in bad faith, or fraudulently. 70 Since Weir had offered no evidence
to establish such behavior, the district court granted Anaconda's sum-
mary judgment motion. 7 1 The court found that there was sufficient evi-
dence for the Committee to determine that Weir was terminated for
cause. An affidavit attached to Anaconda's motion for summary judg-
ment stated that the committee had relied upon a memorandum written
by Weir's supervisor which stated that Weir was hostile, argumentative,
and unable to provide the necessary level of professional
management.
7 2
The district court also rejected Weir's arguments under Count IV
that stock option and savings fund benefits were wages under Kansas
law and that Anaconda's failure to pay violated section 44-315 of the
67. Weir, 773 F.2d at 1076.
68. Id. at 1075-76.
69. Id. at 1076.
70. Id. at 1078; see M. Melbinger, Negotiating a Profit-Sharing Plan: A Survey of the Options,
10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 684, 697-98 (1984) (for a discussion regarding the inapplicability of
grievance procedures to Compensation Policy Committee decisions).
71. Weir, 773 F.2d at 1076.
72. Id. at 1077.
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Kansas Statutes. 73 Kansas law defines wages as "compensation for labor
or services rendered by an employee, whether the amount is determined
on a time, task, piece, commission or other basis less authorized with-
holding and deductions."'74 The lower court refused to hold benefits
under the stock option plan equivalent to commissions or vacation pay,
which were both clearly within the definition of wages.
75
3. Issues on Appeal
On appeal, Weir challenged only the district court's decision grant-
ing Anaconda summary judgment on his stock option claim under
Count I and his Count IV claim that benefits under the stock option and
savings fund plans were statutory wages. Weir argued that public policy
should require that the equivalent of due process safeguards constrain
Anaconda from denying him stock option benefits. The plaintiff alleged
that the district court should have reviewed the Committee's decision de
novo due to the lack of due process safeguards. He further contended
that benefits under the stock option and savings plans were wages under
Kansas law and that he was entitled to payment for stock option benefits
and penalties for delay in payment of savings benefits.
7 6
B. The Tenth Circuit's Decision
1. The Compensation Policy Committee's Decision: Evidence of
Termination for Cause
The Tenth Circuit quickly disposed of the plaintiff's due process
argument, disagreeing that he was entitled to a de novo hearing in the
district court. The court, citing abundant case law, 77 held that Kansas
courts do not favor de novo review in such cases. The court endorsed
the lower court's ruling that the Committee decision must be upheld
unless arbitrary, in bad faith, or fraudulent.
78
The Tenth Circuit stated that Weir did not present any evidence to
show that the Committee had acted fraudulently or in bad faith. On the
73. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-315(a) (1981) provides that when an employee quits, resigns
or is terminated, "the employer shall pay the employee's earned wages not later than the
next regular payday." If an employer knowingly fails to pay an employee wages as re-
quired under § 44-315(a), the employer is liable for statutorily specified penalties "except
that such penalty shall apply only in the event of a willful violation" as provided in KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-315(b) (1981).
74. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-313(c) (1981).
75. Weir, 773 F.2d at 1077 (citing Holder v. Kansas Steel Built, Inc., 224 Kan. 406,
582 P.2d 224 (1978)).
76. Id. at 1077.
77. Id. at 1078 (citing Brinson v. School Dist. No. 431, 223 Kan. 465, 576 P.2d 602,
606 (1978); Imler v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 8 Kan. App. 2d 71, 72-73, 650 P.2d 712,
714-15 (1982); Moore v. Adkins, 2 Kan. App. 2d 139, 576 P.2d 245 (1978)).
78. Id.; see Pioneer Container Corp. v. Beshears, 235 Kan. 745, 747, 684 P.2d 396, 398
(1984) (district court's standard of review of administrative action is restricted to whether
as a matter of law: (1) the tribunal acted fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously; (2) the
administrative order was supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the tribunal's actions
were within the scope of its authority); see also Brinson v. School Dist. No. 431, 223 Kan.
465, 576 P.2d 602 (1978).
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other hand, the court found that White's single memorandum was suffi-
cient evidence that Weir, an employee of 22 years, was terminated for
cause and was therefore ineligible to exercise his stock option benefits.
The Tenth Circuit defined "cause" as a "shortcoming in performance
which is detrimental to the discipline or efficiency of the employer."
79
Plaintiff Weir failed to controvert Anaconda's affidavits showing that he
was terminated for cause with affidavits as required by Rule 56(e) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 0 The Tenth Circuit concluded that
the district court correctly granted summary judgment on Count I for
Anaconda.
8 '
2. Wages, Stock Options and Conditions Precedent
The Tenth Circuit next analyzed plaintiff's allegations in Count IV,
that benefits under both the stock option and savings fund plans were
"wages" under Kansas law.8 2 The Kansas Supreme Court in construing
Kansas wage statutes stated that "[in] determining the rights which oc-
cur under an employment contract, the entitlement thereto or eligibility
therefore, the terms of the contract control so long as they are not un-
reasonable or illegal."8 3 Kansas employers may impose a condition pre-
cedent on its obligation to pay an employee a benefit; however, once an
employee's right to a benefit becomes absolute, a condition subsequent
cannot impose a forfeiture.8 4 The Tenth Circuit had to determine if the
stock option agreement placed a condition precedent on entitlement to
the benefit or whether it attempted to impose a condition subsequent. If
a condition precedent existed, then the benefits could not be considered
"wages" under Kansas law.
Kansas courts have defined a condition precedent under the Kansas
wage statutes as follows:
79. Weir, 773 F.2d at 1080.
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides in part:
[A]n adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his plead-
ing, but his response, by affadavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
81. Weir, 773 F.2d at 1081.
82. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-313 (1981); see also text accompanying note 74.
83. Weinzirl v. Wells Group, Inc., 234 Kan. 1016, 1020, 677 P.2d 1004, 1008 (1984)
(holding that earned commi!.sions cannot be withheld as liquidated damages).
84. Weir, 773 F.2d at 1084; see Weinzirl, 234 Kan. at 1020-21, 677 P.2d at 1008-09;
Sweet v. Stormont Vail Regional Medical Center, 231 Kan. 604, 609-10, 647 P.2d 1274,
1279-80 (1982) (failure to give required notice was an unfulfilled condition precedent and
employee was not entitled to payment for unused vacation time); Morton Buildings, Inc. v.
Department of Human Resources, 10 Kan. App. 2d 197, 200, 695 P.2d 450, 453 (1985)
(requirement that employee be on payroll at time of profit-sharing distribution upheld as
enforceable condition precedent); Mid America Aerospace, Inc. v. Department of Human
Resources, 10 Kan. App. 2d 144, 694 P.2d 1321 (1985) (where contract stated that no
accumulation of vacation time allowed, no contractual right to vacation pay existed after
discharge); Yuille v. Pester Marketing Co., 9 Kan. App. 2d 464, 469, 682 P.2d 676, 681
(1984) ("bonuses" were really wages wrongfully withheld; deductions from managers' bo-
nuses for gas station losses were a condition subsequent and a "forbidden forfeiture");
Richardson v. St. Mary Hospital, 6 Kan. App. 2d 238, 627 P.2d 1143 (1981) ("earned
time" not wages; right to earned time pay may be conditioned upon continuous
employment).
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[S]omething that is agreed must happen or be performed
before a right can occur to enforce the main contract. It is one
without the performance of which the contract entered into be-
tween the parties cannot be enforced. A condition precedent
requires the performance of some event after the terms of the
contract, including the condition precedent, have been agreed
on before the contract shall take effect.
8 5
The Tenth Circuit found that the right to receive benefits under the
stock option and savings fund plans was not absolute because both plans
were subject to a condition precedent.8 6 Under the terms of the agree-
ment, an employee leaving the company must exercise the option within
three months of termination and he or she must not have been dis-
charged for cause.
8 7
The court held that when Weir attempted to exercise his option, he
was not eligible under the terms of the stock option agreement because
he had been discharged for cause. His rights to receive benefits under
the stock option plan were subject to a condition precedent with which
he failed to comply. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit found that the condi-
tion precedent in Anaconda's stock option agreement was not uncon-
scionable. A lump sum payment for a benefit of this kind may be
conditioned on the giving of notice, length of service, or any other term
which is not unconscionable.
8 8
In reaching its decision the court discussed another Kansas case
which held that a profit sharing benefit conditioned upon continuous
employment was not an earned wage even though the employer had
fired the employee before the distribution date. 89 The Tenth Circuit
thereby concluded that the district court properly held that the stock
option benefits were not "wages" under Kansas wage statutes.90 There-
fore, because the stock option benefits were not wages, Weir's claim for
payment was rejected. Finally, the court denied Weir's claim for penal-
ties under the Kansas wage statutes for delay in payment of his savings
fund benefits. As with the stock option plan, the court held such bene-
fits were not "wages" because they were subject to a valid condition pre-
cedent, the requirement of contribution to the savings fund plan.9 '
3. Other States' Views on Wages, Conditions
Precedent and Forfeitures
In Colorado, a terminated employee has a right to immediate pay-
ment for "labor or service earned and unpaid at the time of. . .dis-
charge."19 2  Profit-sharing, bonus plans and other deferred
85. Weinzirl, 234 Kan. at 1020, 677 P.2d at 1008.
86. Weir, 773 F.2d at 1084-85.
87. Id. at 1085.
88. Id. at 1084 (quoting Sweet, 231 Kan. at 609-10, 647 P.2d at 1279-80).
89. Morton Bldgs., Inc. v. Dep't of Human Res., 10 Kan. App. 2d 197, 695 P.2d 450
(1985).
90. Weir, 773 F.2d at 1085-86.
91. Id. at 1086.
92. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-4-104(1) (1986).
[Vol. 64:2
LABOR LA W
compensation plans are expressly excluded from statutory coverage.
Commissions on sales which close after the employee's termination do
not fall within the scope of the statutes.
9 3
Colorado case law, however, displays a willingness to recognize an
implied contractual right to commissions and benefits. 94 In Montgomery
Ward and Company v. Reich,9 5 the employee was a store manager who was
contractually entitled to a percentage of the net profits of the store. The
contract provided that in the event of termination, entitlement to the
current year's bonus was entirely at the discretion of the Bonus Commit-
tee. When Reich voluntarily resigned, the Committee denied him his
share of the bonus. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's award of the bonus by deciding that the payment was an uncalcu-
lated addition to salary not subject to forfeiture.
9 6
In Steidtmann v. Koelbel and Co. ,97 another Colorado decision, the em-
ployee was a real estate salesman under a contract which provided for
yearly bonuses, conditioned upon continuing employment. Steidtmann
voluntarily left the company in May, 1970 and was denied his 1969 bo-
nus that was to be distributed in September 1970. The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's award of the bonus. The court held that the
employer could not avoid bonus payments by setting the distribution
date after the employee's termination.98
Where part of the consideration for deferred compensation is con-
tinued service by the employee, the Colorado employer's freedom to
terminate at will is limited. 99 However, the employee may forfeit bene-
fits if he voluntarily terminates or is discharged for cause. 10 0 The em-
ployer may not bring about a forfeiture by discharging the employee
without cause.' 0 1
Conditions precedent have received similar treatment in other juris-
dictions. Courts in the Sixth Circuit, Illinois, Michigan and Oregon have
held that an employee will lose an earned bonus or incentive if he quits,
is discharged for cause, or fails to satisfy a condition required for that
benefit. 10 2 In Compton v. Shopko Stores, Inc., 10 3 the Supreme Court of
93. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-4-105(3) (1986).
94. See Branting, Employees' Right to Compensation Accruing After Termination, 13 CoLo.
LAw. 1643 (1984).
95. 131 Colo. 407, 282 P.2d 1091 (1955).
96. Id.
97. 32 Colo. App. 94, 506 P.2d 1247 (1973).
98. Cf. Morton Bldgs. Inc. v. Dep't of Human Res., 10 Kan. App. 2d 197, 695 P.2d
450 (the Kansas court refused to award a bonus to an employee fired before the distribu-
tion date).
99. Branting, supra note 94, at 1645 n.101.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. DeGiuseppe, The Effect of the Employment-at-Will Rule on Employee Rights to job Security
and Fringe Benefits, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 63 (1981); see Hainline v. General Motors
Corp., 444 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1971) (employee who quit lost undistributed portion of
previously awarded bonuses, but employee who is involuntarily terminated without cause
is entitled to bonus); Keefner v. Super X Drugs of Ill. Inc., 21 Ill. App. 3d 394, 315 N.E.2d
35 (1974) (provision in employment contract that employee would lose bonus if dis-
charged for cause or quits); Tobin v. General Motors Corp., 17 Mich. App. 475, 169
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Wisconsin held that an executive who was discharged for cause prior to
the eligibility date for a bonus was not entitled to the bonus. The court
reasoned that he performed no services for the employer after the date
of the discharge. His severance pay on the last day of the fiscal year did
not extend his employment to the last day of the fiscal year as required
for eligibility. 1
0 4
C. Analysis: Conditions Precedent and Termination for Cause
The Tenth Circuit's reasoning was sound in its review of Kansas law
and its application of the law to the particular stock option plan in ques-
tion. The benefits were not absolute and the employment contract
clearly stated that the departing employee must exercise his option
within three months of termination and the employee must not have
been discharged for cause. Conversely, the issue of whether Weir's ter-
mination was for cause is troublesome.
Weir, a 22-year employee, was found to have been discharged for
cause on the basis of a single unsatisfactory memo written by an incom-
patible supervisor. It seems odd that the court found one document a
sufficient basis for the Compensation Policy Committee's decision that
termination was for cause. Perhaps the actual basis for the court's deci-
sion was Weir's failure to produce controverting affidavits.
IV. REJECTIONS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN
BANKRUPTCY COURT
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded an order of the bank-
ruptcy court permitting a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession to reject his
collective bargaining agreements without adequate factual findings.
The court applied the United States Supreme Court's NLRB v. Bildisco
and Bildisco l05 standards to the case at bar. Under Bildisco, the debtor
must first show that the collective bargaining agreement burdens the es-
tate. 10 6 Second, the equities must balance in favor of rejecting the labor
contract.° 7 Section 1113 of Chapter 11108 was not applicable since the
case was filed prior to its enactment.
N.W.2d 644 (1969) (employee who quit to work for rival auto manufacturer lost bonus
where employer's stock option and bonus plan provided that employee would lose bonus
if he engaged in competitive activities); Walker v. American Optical Corp., 265 Or. 327,
509 P.2d 439 (1973) (employee who quit was not entitled to semi-annual bonus under
employer's "sales incentive plan").
103. 93 Wis. 2d 613, 287 N.W.2d 720 (1980).
104. Id. at 722 (the executive was discharged because "his performance was substan-
dard," he "lacked leadership qualities," and his department's sales were below the com-
pany budget).
105. 465 U.S. 513 (1984); see infra text accompanying notes 112-117 & 121-123.
106. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 527.
107. Id.; see also Comment, The Collective Bargaining Agreement in Bankruptcy: Rejection and
its Consequences, 36 ARK. L. REV. 469 (1983); Note, The Bankruptcy Law's Effect on Collective
Bargaining Agreements, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 391 (1981) (for excellent discussions of pre-
Bildisco case law and balancing of equities).
108. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1986) addresses the procedures required for a debtor-in-pos-
session to reject a collective bargaining agreement. See infra note 131.
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A. IBT v. IML Freight
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. IML Freight, Inc. ,109 IML
filed a petition for voluntary reorganization under Chapter 11 on July
15, 1983. The bankruptcy court authorized the company to continue its
business as a debtor-in-possession. IML also filed a petition to reject 33
collective bargaining agreements with 66 local unions. On August 11,
1983, the bankruptcy judge granted the petition to reject the executory
collective bargaining agreements. The employees went on strike shortly
thereafter and IML went into Chapter 7 liquidation. The district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court's order on June 25, 1984.110 Subse-
quently, the Teamsters appealed contending that the district court erred
in affirming the rejection of the collective bargaining agreements.
1. Burdens to the Estate: The First Prong of Bildisco
Collective bargaining agreements are executory contracts within the
meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1984). The bankruptcy court may permit
rejection upon a showing by the debtor-in-possession that the agree-
ment burdens the estate. I The Supreme Court's burden to the estate
test is not the same test as the "business judgment"' 12 test used to re-
ject other types of contracts in bankruptcy.
Under the burden to the estate test, the debtor-in-possession must
establish that he is acting in good faith as required by the National La-
bor Relations Act before the court will examine the contract as a burden
to the estate.' 13 Bildisco adopted the standard prescribed in In re Brada
Miller Freight System, Inc.,1 1 4 which represented a compromise between
the lenient "business judgment" test and the stringent "reject-or-fail"
test. 1 5 Brada Miller listed a number of factors to be considered by a
bankruptcy court when considering a motion to reject: 1) the possibility
of liquidation; 2) the claims that will result from the rejection of the
collective bargaining agreement; 3) the cost-spreading abilities of the
parties; and 4) the good faith of the unions and the debtor in seeking to
resolve their mutual problems.
1 1 6
109. 789 F.2d 1460 (10th Cir. 1986).
110. Id. at 1462.
111. Id. (citing Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 525-26).
112. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 523 (citing Group of Inst. Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St.
P. & Pac. R. Co., 318 U.S. 523, 550 (1943) (the rejection of a lease was a question of
business judgment)).
113. Id. at 534.
114. 702 F.2d 890, 899 (11th Cir. 1983).
115. See Brotherhood of Ry., Airline, and S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and
Station Employees, AFL-CIO v. REA Express, 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1017, 1073 (1975) (under REA Express "reject or fail" standards, the debtor-in-possession
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that forced liquidation is a certainty with-
out the rejection of the collective bargaining agreement); see also Note, Bankruptcy Law and
Labor Law-Resolving the Conflict Between the Bankruptcy and Labor Laws in Reecting Collective
Bargaining Agreements: NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 191, 209 (1984).
116. Brada Miller, 702 F.2d at 899-900.
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a. Instant Case
The Tenth Circuit stated that bankruptcy judges must make de-
tailed findings to support the rejection of collective bargaining agree-
ments. A "'doomsday' argument," that the contracts are so
burdensome that performance would result in liquidation, was held by
the court not to be controlling.' 17 The Tenth Circuit discussed factors
which the bankruptcy judge must carefully consider: the consequences
of liquidation for the debtor; the reduced value of the creditors' claims
following affirmance; and the impact of rejection on the employees. 1 8
The bankruptcy judge concluded that IML Freight's liquidation was
inevitable without rejection of the contracts and that the presumed sav-
ings were the only available sources of relief for the debtor. The Tenth
Circuit found this conclusion unsupported by the necessary findings of
fact. For example, the court pointed out that no comparison was made
between the amount of IML management's salary expense and the
union employees' wages and benefits. Also, findings of fact showed that
IML expended a disproportionate amount for supervisors' salaries, but
the bankruptcy court made no reference to this fact in its decision. The
finding that the debtor's management employees were paid below mar-
ket value was insufficient to justify the conclusion that a reduction in
their salaries would not assist IML's reorganization. Because the bank-
ruptcy court's conclusions were not supported by the required detailed
findings the Tenth Circuit found it necessary to remand the case to make
the appropriate findings of fact. ' 19
2. Balancing the Equities Among the Parties: The Second Prong
of Bildisco
The standard announced in Bildisco is a modified Kevin Steel 120 stan-
dard, where the interests of the affected parties-debtors, creditors, and
employees-are to be balanced. In Bildisco, Justice Rehnquist stated:
The bankruptcy court must consider the likelihood and conse-
quences of liquidation for the debtor absent rejection, the re-
duced value of the creditors' claims that would follow from
affirmance and the hardship that would impose on them, and
the impact of rejection on the employees. In striking a balance,
the bankruptcy court must consider not only the degree of
117. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. IML Freight, 789 F.2d 1460, 1462 (10th Cir.
1986).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1463.
120. Shopman's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir.
1975). In Kevin Steel, the company filed for bankruptcy after its ironworkers' union filed
unfair labor practice charges against it. The company was allowed to reject its collective
bargaining agreement and the union appealed. The Second Circuit reversed the district
court's affirmance of the rejection. It held that a test much stricter than "benefit to the
estate" applied to collective bargaining agreements, and that rejection was permitted
"only after thorough scrutiny and a careful balancing of the equities on both sides." Id. at




hardship faced by each party, but also any qualitative differ-
ences between the types of hardship each may face.
12 1
The Supreme Court stated that the bankruptcy court must focus on the
ultimate goal of Chapter 11 reorganization when considering these eq-
uities and relate the equities to the success of the reorganization.'
22
a. Instant Case
The Tenth Circuit held that the controlling question is whether the
hardships imposed on the parties are outweighed by a reasonable expec-
tation of successful reorganization. 123 The Tenth Circuit noted, how-
ever, that one of the unusual aspects of IML Freight is that the bargaining
unit employees constituted a major class of creditors because the com-
pany owed them $11.7 million under wage loan programs. The very
real possibility of a union strike against IML was dismissed by the bank-
ruptcy court with the hope that the debtor would reach an agreement
with its employees. 124 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit could not accept
the bankruptcy judge's balance because the hope for a settlement be-
tween IML and employees, its creditors, appeared unrealistic.
The court concluded that the bankruptcy proceeding was funda-
mentally flawed by its narrow focus. Many factors must be considered
when striking an appropriate balance among the important policies in-
volved with labor agreements and bankruptcy. 12 5 Contrary to Bildisco's
holding that the debtor-in-possession has a duty to bargain with the
union under section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, the
bankruptcy judge concluded that rejection would lead to negotiation.
The bankruptcy court's decision was held to be inconsistent with the
history of judicial intervention in labor disputes and with the court's
duty to balance the equities. For this additional reason, the Tenth Cir-
cuit reversed and remanded the case for additional findings of fact.
126
3. The Bildisco Dissent
Bildisco produced a heated dissent on the issue of whether a debtor-
in-possession commits an unfair labor practice when he unilaterally
changes the terms of an existing collective bargaining agreement after
filing a bankruptcy petition but before the court has ruled on the rejec-
tion petition. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, in dis-
sent, stated that "the Court has completely ignored important policies
that underlie the NLRA .... ,,127 The dissent argued that Congress did
not intend the filing of a bankruptcy petition to affect the applicability of
121. NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984).
122. Id.
123. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. IML Freight, 789 F.2d 1460, 1462 (10th Cir.
1986).
124. Id. at 1463.
125. See Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984) (for a complete discussion of the balancing of the
conflicting policies of bankruptcy and labor agreements).
126. IML Freight, 789 F.2d at 1464.
127. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 535 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Section 8(d) of National Labor Relations Act and noted that Section
8(a)(5)1 2 8 imposes the duty to bargain on a debtor in possession.129
4. Statutory Codification of The Bildisco Standards,
11 U.S.C. § 1113
Congressional response to Bildisco was swift. Section 1113 of chap-
ter 11 was added to the Bankruptcy Code to codify Bildisco's standard for
rejection of collective bargaining agreements and to eliminate the
debtor in possession's ability to unilaterally reject such agreements.'
8 0
In order for a proper rejection to occur, 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b) requires a
two-step process to be performed within a strict time frame.'
3 '
The first step' 3 2 requires the debtor, after he files the bankruptcy
petition and before he petitions the court for rejection, to give the em-
ployees' authorized representative a proposal "based on the most com-
plete and reliable information available at the time of such proposal." 
3 3
The proposal is to provide for "those necessary modifications in the em-
128. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) provides that:
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the em-
ployer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964) provides that:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - . (5) to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ....
129. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 547 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1984) provides:
(a) The debtor in possession .... may assume or reject a collective bargaining
agreement only in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(b)(1) Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an application seeking
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor in possession or trustee
(hereinafter in this section "trustee" shall include a debtor in possession), shall-
(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees cov-
ered by such agreement, based on the most complete and reliable information
available at the time of such proposal, which provides for those necessary modifi-
cations in the employees benefits and protections that are necessary to permit the
reorganization of the debtor and assures that all creditors, the debtor and all of
the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably; and
(B) provide, subject to subsection (d)(3), the representative of the employ-
ees with such relevant information as is necessary to evaluate the proposal.
(2) During the period beginning on the date of the making of a proposal pro-
vided for in paragraph (1) and ending on the date of the hearing provided for in
subsection (d)(1), the trustee shall meet, at reasonable times, with the authorized
representative to confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory
modifications of such agreement.
(c) The court shall approve an application for rejection of a collective bargain-
ing agreement only if the court finds that-
(1) the trustee has, prior to the hearing, made a proposal that fulfills the
requirements of subsection (b)(1);
(2) the authorized representative of the employees has refused to accept
such proposal without good cause; and
(3) the balance of the equities clearly favors rejections of such agreement.
131. See Ehrenwerth & Lally-Green, The New Bankruptcy Procedure For Rejection of Collective
Bargaining Agreements: Is the Pendulum Swinging Back?, 23 DuQ. L. REV. 939, 950-51 (1985)
(for an excellent discussion of § 1113).
132. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(l) (1984).
133. Id. at § 1113(b)(l)(A).
[Vol. 64:2
LABOR LAW
ployees' benefits and protections that are necessary to permit the reor-
ganization of the debtor" ' 3 4 and to assure that "all creditors, the debtor
and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably."' 3 5 The
debtor-in-possession is required to furnish the employees' representa-
tive with information necessary to evaluate the proposal' 3 6 and is obli-
gated to meet at reasonable times with the authorized representative to
confer in good faith.' 3 7 The second step, in seeking a valid rejection,
requires the Bankruptcy Court to find that the debtor has complied with
step one, that the employees' representative refused to accept the pro-
posal "without good cause," and that a "balance of the equities clearly
favors rejection."'
3 8
5. Analysis: Considerations in Future Bankruptcy Cases
The Tenth Circuit ably applied the Bildisco standards in IML Freight
in a well-reasoned opinion. The Tenth Circuit will also have to apply
section 1113 in future bankruptcy cases involving petitions filed after
June 29, 1984, when debtors seek to reject their collective bargaining
agreements. 139 The court will have to adhere to the procedural require-
ments of section 1113 and ascertain that the debtor-in-possession tried
to reach a modified agreement with the labor union before rejection will
be allowed.
Many questions of interpretation are bound to arise as this new con-
gressional legislation is construed. For example, the courts may have to
decide the meaning of the key terms in section 1113, such as "necessary
modifications," "to confer in good faith," and "without good cause."
Until these provisions of section 1113 have been analyzed by the judici-
ary, the validity of rejecting collective bargaining agreements will remain
uncertain.
V. PROCEDURAL V. SUBSTANTIVE ARBITRATION
In Denhardt v. Trailways, Inc., 140 an employee objected to a late
grievance hearing and, after losing at the hearing and at arbitration,
brought an action in Oklahoma District Court. He alleged that due to
the company's failure to comply with the time requirements for the ini-
tial hearing, the case was forfeited and arbitration was inappropriate.141
The trial court granted the company's request for summary judgment
and the employee appealed.' 4 2 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower
court, finding that the procedural question was for the arbitrator alone
and that the employee's sole remedy was contractual arbitration.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at § 1113(b)(1)(B).
137. Id. at § 1113(b)(2).
138. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
139. See Ehrenwerth & Lally-Green, supra note 131, at 939.
140. 767 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1985).
141. Id. at 688.
142. Id.
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A. Form Does Not Triumph Over Substance. Denhardt v. Trailways
Denhardt, a bus driver, was suspended by Trailways and the union
filed a grievance on his behalf. Under the terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, Denhardt was entitled to a hearing within ten days
after the filing of the grievance. 143 The hearing date was set after the
ten day time limit by a mutual agreement between the company and the
union due to the unavailability of a witness. 14 4 Denhardt asserted that
the contract relieved him of the necessity of submitting his dispute to
arbitration due to the failure to comply with the time requirements for
the hearing.'
4 5
Trailways' representative rejected Denhardt's arguments at the ini-
tial hearing and rendered a decision in favor of Trailways. Although
Denhardt asked the union not to arbitrate, the union submitted the case
to arbitration. The arbitrator found that the grievant's discharge was for
just cause and the union decided not to take the case to the next step in
the arbitration process. Denhardt then brought an action in district
court under 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1984).146
The only issue before the trial court was whether the time require-
ment in the contract was subject to arbitration.' 4 7 The trial court found
that the procedural issue was a matter for the arbitrator and granted
summary judgment in favor of Trailways. The Tenth Circuit found that
procedural matters are subject to arbitration to the same extent as sub-
stantive complaints, and affirmed the lower court's decision.
B. Procedural and Substantive Arbitration Examined
The Tenth Circuit found no evidence, in the contract, of any pur-
pose to exclude procedural disputes from arbitration. The language of
the arbitration clause was broad and the forfeiture provision contained
in the time requirements section was for the arbitrator alone to apply.
148
Collective bargaining agreements are more than mere contracts and
doubts will be resolved in favor of arbitration. 14 9 The court found that
Denhardt had failed to acknowledge the interrelation of procedural and
substantive issues in labor disputes. It is well-settled that procedural
questions are arbitrable if the underlying substantive question is also
143. Id. The collective bargaining agreement, Article 16, § 8, provides: "Within ten
(10) days after the written grievance has been delivered to the Company representative,
the aggrieved Employee will be accorded a hearing, if requested .
144. Denhardt, 767 F.2d at 689.
145. Id. at 688. Article 16, § 12(A) of the contract provided:
The failure of the Company or the Union to comply with the time limits as here-
tofore set out in Article 15 and this Article, unless the parties agree in writing to
extend or waive the limitations, will result in the forfeit of the case and it will be
deemed closed.
146. Denhardt, 767 F.2d at 688 (under 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), an employee has standing to
bring an action in district court for an alleged violation of a collective bargaining
agreement).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 689.





Procedural arbitrability addresses issues such as "whether grievance
procedures or some part of them apply to a particular dispute, whether
such procedures have been followed or excused, or whether the unex-
cused failure to follow them avoids the duty to arbitrate."'' The
Supreme Court in Wiley held that because procedural questions are
often inextricably bound up with the merits of the dispute, they should
also be decided by the arbitrator. 152 Secondly, the adjudication of the
procedural issues by the court would greatly delay resolution of the dis-
pute. The court's role is limited to determining whether the parties sub-
mitted the subject matter of the particular dispute to arbitration. If they
did, any procedural issues are for the arbitrator to decide.'53
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the procedural dispute concern-
ing compliance with time limits for conducting a hearing was a matter
for the arbitrator. The arbitration clause was broad and no specific ex-
clusion exempted such procedural matters from arbitration. Denhardt's
sole remedy was arbitration of his substantive and procedural claims
under the collective bargaining agreement. The appellant could not ask
the federal courts to resolve issues contractually reserved for the arbitra-
tor.' 54 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Trailways.
1. The Trilogy Revisited: AT&T Technologies, Inc. v.
Communication Workers of America
Although Denhardt is not new law, it is a well written opinion worth
examining in light of AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communication Workers of
America. 155 The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in AT&T held
that questions of whether a collective bargaining agreement creates a
duty for the parties to arbitrate a particular grievance is an issue for de-
termination by the court, and not by the arbitrator, unless the parties
clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise. The opinion cited the
Steelworkers Trilogy' 56 cases and stated that:
These precepts have served the industrial relations community
well, and have led to continued reliance on arbitration, rather
than strikes or lockouts, as the preferred method of resolving
disputes arising during the term of a collective-bargaining
agreement. We see no reason either to question their continu-
150. See International Union v. Folding Carrier Corp., 422 F.2d 47, 49 (10th Cir. 1970);
Nelson v. Great W. Sugar Co., 440 F. Supp. 928, 929 (D. Colo. 1977).
151. Denhardt, 767 F.2d at 690 (quoting John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543,
557 (1964)).
152. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 557.
153. Denhardt, 767 F.2d at 690 (quoting Wiley, 376 U.S. at 557).
154. Id.; see also Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965); NLRB v. Northeast
Oklahoma City Manufacturing Co., 631 F.2d 669, 673 (10th Cir. 1980).
155. 106 S. Ct. 1415 (1986).
156. See Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v. War-
rior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (for the three cases that are referred to as the Steelworkers
Triology).
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ing validity, or to eviscerate their meaning by creating an ex-
ception to their general applicability.
15 7
2. Analysis: Denhardt and Procedural Arbitrability
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Denhardt is a clear, well-written ex-
position on the potential applicability of both procedural and substan-
tive arbitration that is worth reading carefully. The legal principles are
not new, but contribute to a concise understanding of what is the prov-
ince of the court as opposed to the province of the arbitrator. The
reemphasis of Trilogy principles in the Supreme Court's AT&T case
makes Denhardt timely reading.
Vicki L. Jones
157. AT&T, 106 S. Ct. at 1418.
[Vol. 64:2
LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OVERVIEW
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
handed down five lands and natural resources opinions which merit re-
view. The first case revisits a controversial Indian reservation boundary
dispute.' A pair of cases address navigational waters issues: the first
concerns the impact of a navigational servitude on Indian lands, 2 the
second deals with a quiet title argument. 3 The fourth case resolves a
mineral patent question. 4 The final case surveyed deals with an environ-
mental impact statement related to a major water diversion project. 5
These five lands and natural resources decisions reflect an inconsis-
tent approach taken by the Tenth Circuit: two of the cases adhere to the
Tenth Circuit's traditional approach in protecting the regulatory power
which governmental agencies wield over lands and natural resources,
while three of the cases demonstrate a departure from the traditional
deference to governmental authority.
I. BOUNDARY DISPUTES
A. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah
1. Background
The primary issue before the United States District Court for the
District of Utah was whether the historic Uncompahgre and Uintah In-
dian Reservations were disestablished 6 by congressional enactments
7
which opened the unallotted and unsettled lands of those reservations
for entry and settlement. 8 The case focused on determining what por-
tions of those reservations were to be considered "Indian Country"
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. section 1151.9
1. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct.
3291 (1986).
2. Cherokee Nation v. United States, 782 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1986).
3. Utah v. United States, 780 F.2d 1515 (10th Cir. 1985).
4. Poverty Flats Land & Cattle Co. v. United States, 788 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1986).
5. Lidstone v. Block, 773 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1985).
6. Disestablishment indicates termination of the reservation and total relinquish-
ment of Indian interests in the land. Diminishment refers to a change in boundaries and
subsequent reduction in the size of the reservation. Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F. Supp. at 1085-
92 (D. Utah 1981).
7. See infra note 10.
8. The district court first discussed the threshold issue of criminal jurisdiction over
members of the Ute Indian Tribe. See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1078
(D. Utah 1981). Significant jurisdictional relationships between the State, local govern-
ments and the Tribe are dependent upon whether lands retain reservation status. Exclu-
sive federal and tribal jurisdiction over the criminal conduct of tribal members extends
only to "Indian Country." See infra note 9. If the lands are outside of "Indian Country,"
the State and its local government agencies have criminal jurisdiction over tribal members.
See, e.g., DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 (1975).
9. The term "Indian Country" includes "all land within the limits of any Indian res-
295
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The district court determined that the Uncompahgre Reservation
had been disestablished, but the Uintah Reservation had only been di-
minished to the extent of certain gilsonite, forest, and reclamation with-
drawals made by the federal government.' 0 The Ute Indian Tribe
appealed this adverse judgment to the Tenth Circuit. I The Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed and reversed in part the lower court's decision.' 2 Upon
motion for rehearing, however, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district
court, holding that the Uncompahgre Reservation had not been dises-
tablished and the Uintah Reservation was not diminished by the with-
drawal of forest lands. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
decision in all other respects.
13
2. The Decision of the Tenth Circuit
In Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah,14 the first of several boundary issues
presented to the court concerned a boundary-line dispute involving the
Uintah Reservation.' 5 The second issue before the court dealt with the
Uintah Forest Reserve and its relationship to the Uintah Reservation.16
ervation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issu-
ance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation." 18
U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1982).
10. Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F. Supp. at 1153-54. The district court concluded that (1)
Congress disestablished the original Uncompahgre pursuant to the Act of June 7, 1897,
ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62, 87 (1899); (2) the original Uintah Reservation had been diminished by
Congress through the withdrawal of a 7,040-acre tract known as the Gilsonite Strip, Act of
May 24, 1888, ch. 310, 25 Stat. 157 (1889), through the withdrawal of approximately one
million acres for inclusion in a national forest reserve pursuant to the Act of March 3,
1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1048, 1070 (1906), and through the extinguishment of approxi-
mately 56,000 acres for the Strawberry Reclamation and Irrigation Project under the Act
of April 4, 1910, ch. 140, 36 Star. 269, 285 (1911); (3) except as expressly diminished, the
Uintah Reservation lands retained continuing status as reservation land, and as "Indian
Country" as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1982); and (4) the reservation
boundaries of the former Uintah reservation were subsequently extended by Congress to
include the lands known as the Hill Creek Extension by the Act of March 11, 1948, ch. 108,
62 Stat. 72 (1949). Id.
11. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 716 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1983).
12. ChiefJudge Seth, writing for the court, affirmed the trial court's holding as to the
disestablishment of the original Uncompahgre reservation, the diminishment of the Uin-
tah Valley reservation, and the incorporation of the 510,000-acre Hill Creek Extension
within the Uintah and Ouray reservation. Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1315. However, the
court reversed the district court's decision "that the unallotted lands at the opening [of the
reservation] remained part of the reservation." Id. Instead, the court held that the Indian
Appropriations Acts of 1902, 1903, 1904 and 1905, opening the Uintah reservation re-
tracted reservation status and, therefore, the unallotted lands became part of the public
domain. Id. at 1308-13; see Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 245, 263-64 (1903); Act
of March 3, 1903, ch. 994, 32 Stat. 982 (1903); Act of April 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat.
189, 207 (1904); Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Star. 1048 (1905). Judge Doyle dis-
sented. Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1315-22 (Doyle, J., dissenting). For an insightful
overview of the Tenth Circuit's earlier opinion in this case see note, Eleventh Annual Tenth
Circuit Survey: Lands and Natural Resources, 62 DEN. U.L. REv. 273, 273-78 (1984).
13. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct.
3291 (1986). Judge Doyle wrote the opinion of the court. The majority of the court
joined Judge Seymour in a concurring opinion. Judge Seth, joined by Judge Barrett,
dissented.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1088-89.
16. Id. at 1089-90.
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Finally, the court addressed the status of the Uncompahgre
Reservation. 17
a. The Solem Test for Determining Disestablishment
In light of the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Solem
v. Bartlett,18 the initial decisions of the trial court and Tenth Circuit be-
came suspect and, therefore, warranted review.19 Thus, in this decision,
the Tenth Circuit considered disestablishment and diminishment issues
utilizing the Supreme Court's newly formulated Solem test.
Historically, the Supreme Court mandated careful and specific re-
view of events affecting the status of an Indian reservation to determine
"whether a congressional determination to terminate is 'expressed on
the face of the Act or [is] clear from the surrounding circumstances and
legislative history.' "20 The 1984 Supreme Court decision in Solem con-
firmed that courts have only two alternative tests to determine whether
Congress intended to disestablish or diminish an Indian reservation.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Solem cautioned that under either
test "[d]iminishment, moreover, will not be lightly inferred. Our analy-
sis ... requires that Congress clearly evince an 'intent to change bound-
aries' before diminishment will be found."'' l The first test concentrates
on the statutory language used to open the Indian lands. The Court
explained that "[e]xplicit reference to cession or other language evi-
dencing the present and total surrender of all tribal interests strongly
suggests that Congress meant to divest from the reservation all unallot-
ted opened lands."'2 2 If such language is paired with an unconditional
commitment to pay a sum certain for the lands, "there is an almost in-
surmountable presumption that Congress" intended to diminish the
reservation. 23 In the absence of such explict statutory language, the al-
ternative test focuses on whether "events surrounding the passage of a
surplus land act.., unequivocally reveal a widely-held, contemporane-
ous understanding that the affected reservation would shrink as a result
of the proposed legislation."
'2 4
b. The Uintah Reservation
Utilizing the Solem test as the standard for review in the case at bar,
17. Id. at 1090-93.
18. 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
19. See note, Eleventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey: Lands and Natural Resources, 62 DEN.
U.L. REV. 273, 276-78 (1984).
20. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneipp, 430 U.S. 584, 588 n.4 (1977) (quoting Mattz v.
Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973)); see Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
21. Solem, 465 U.S. at 470 (quoting Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 615).
22. Id. (citing DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444-45 (1975)); see
also Seymour, 368 U.S. at 354-57 (1962).
23. Solem, 465 U.S. at 470, 471; see, e.g., DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 447-48 (Agreement be-
tween tribe and United States not only opened all unallotted lands for settlement, but also
appropriated and vested in the tribe a sum certain per acre in exchange for relinquishment
of all unallotted lands.).
24. Solem, 465 U.S. at 471.
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the Tenth Circuit found neither explicit nor implicit evidence in any
congressional enactment of intent to diminish or disestablish the Un-
compahgre and Uintah Reservation. 25 Judge Doyle, writing for the
court, supported the district court's finding that Congress preserved the
Uintah Reservation when it opened a portion of the unallotted lands to
non-Indian homestead and townsite entry in 1905.26 Judge Doyle based
his decision on two factors: first, the Uintah Reservation was clearly es-
tablished as a permanent home for the Ute Tribe by the Act of May 5,
1864,27 and second, in 1905, the Indian Appropriations Act2 8 did noth-
ing more than open the Uintah Reservation for non-Indian settlement.
Utilizing the standards set forth in Solem, Judge Doyle found it signifi-
cant that the 1905 Act failed to include any language of cession or words
"evidencing the present and total surrender of all tribal interests." 2 9 It
was noted that the Ute Indians showed a complete unwillingness to re-
linquish their reservation3 0 and "the language used in that Act, is suffi-
ciently clear to support a finding that the Act [did not disestablish or
diminish] the Uintah Reservation."'3
In summary, the court believed that Congress did not disestablish
the entire Uintah Valley Reservation. The Utes were unwilling to permit
the Reservation to be allotted, but did acquiesce to a limited entry
designed by Congress to encourage gradual non-Indian settlement for
"the purpose[s], in part, of promoting interaction between the races and
of encouraging Indians to adopt white ways." '3 2 Furthermore, the
court's analysis of the legislative history failed to show a "clear" con-
gressional intent to terminate the Uintah Reservation.
3 3
In marked contrast to Judge Doyle's opinion,Judge Seth's dissent
3 4
supported diminishment of the Uintah Reservation. His opinion looked
to Congress' withdrawal of land as indicative of diminishment. 3 5 More-
over, Judge Seth contended that when Congress provided for land allot-
ments to individual Indians, 3 6 the unallotted lands were returned to the
public domain.
3 7
25. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1093.
26. Judge Doyle's opinion was in accordance with his dissent in the earlier panel deci-
sion of this identical case, Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 716 F.2d 1315-22 (10th Cir. 1983)
(Doyle, J., dissenting). Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1089; see supra note 12.
27. Act of May 5, 1864, ch. 79, 13 Stat. 64 (1865).
28. Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1048 (1906).
29. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1088; Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984).
30. Ule Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1089; see also Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp.
1072, 1118 (D. Utah 1981) ("Indian consent to the opening [for settlement] of the Uintah
Reservation was wholly lacking in 1903, and never subsequently appeared.").
31. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1088.
32. See Matt v. Arnett, 412 U.S. at 496 (1973).
33. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1089. Reiterating the test in Solem,Judge Doyle stated
"that in the absence of 'substantial and compelling evidence of a congressional intention
to diminish Indian lands,' the courts' 'traditional solicitude for the Indian tribes' must
compel a finding that 'the old reservation boundaries survived the opening.' " Id. (quoting
Solem, 465 U.S. at 472); see also Mattz, 412 U.S. at 505.
34. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1101. (Seth, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 1114-16 (Seth, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 1109 (Seth, J., dissenting).
37. Id. (Seth, J., dissenting). Judge Seth's "public domain" argument formed the ba-
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c. Uintah Forest Reserve
The second boundary issue involved the status of the Uintah Forest
Reserve which was set aside under the authority of the Act of March 3,
1905.38 That Act provided that certain lands within the Uintah Reserva-
tion be set apart and reserved.3 9 The Act provided only for a change in
federal management of the land and nothing in the Act referred to a
relinquishment of boundaries. 40 Furthermore, the court indicated that
there is nothing in the Act to indicate that the Ute Indians ceded their
interests in the forest lands.4 1 ThusJudge Doyle wrote "[t]here is clear
evidence that Congress did not intend to extinguish the forest lands of
the Uintah Reservation."
'4 2
The Supreme Court in Solem confirmed that there must be clear
congressional intent to "change boundaries" before diminishment will
be found. 43 Following Solem, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the set-
ting aside of national forest lands in 1905 failed to indicate such an in-
tent to change boundaries. 4 4 The court also noted that the only
changes which have occurred since 1905 are that non-Indians as well as
Indians now hunt on the national forest lands, a successor federal
agency administers the lands, and in 1931 the Indians were paid for a
portion of the value of the timber reserves.
4 5
sis for his opinion in Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 716 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1983). See supra
note 12.
38. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1089-90; see Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat.
1048, 1070 (1906).
39. Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1048 (1906). The Act opened the unallot-
ted tribal lands to non-Indian entry and authorized the President to "set apart and reserve
forest lands." Id. at 1070. The Act also allowed the President to "set apart and reserve
any reservoir site or other lands necessary to conserve and protect the water supply for the
Indians or for general agricultural development," and over fifty thousand acres of reserva-
tion lands "were withdrawn from disposal" for reclamation purposes. Id.; see also Ute In-
dian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1121 (D. Utah 1981).
The Congressional reclamation authorization in 1905 to the President was limited to
reserving certain of the unallotted lands for homestead and townsite entry. Ute Indian
Tribe, 521 F. Supp. at 1133. Significantly, in 1910 Congress passed a second statute which
clearly extinguished all Indian claim, title and interest in the lands set aside for reclama-
tion. Act of April 4, 1910, ch. 140, 36 Stat. 269, 285 (1911). It is important to note,
however, that a similar statute was never enacted which would have extinguished the Ute
Indians' title and interest to the forest reserve land. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090.
In 1931, Congress enacted provisions to compensate the Utes for 973,779 acres of the
1,010,000 acres of forest lands set aside in 1905. See Act of February 13, 1931, ch. 124, 46
Stat. 1092 (1931); Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090. At that time, Congress clarified the
Indians' legal and equitable interests in the lands set aside in 1905. Therefore, by one
statute, Congress extinguished all Indian title and control over the reclamation lands, Act
of April 4, 1910, ch. 140, 36 Star. 269, 285 (1911); yet in the other, Congress compensated
the Utes for the value of the land, but did not extinguish all of their title, claim and inter-
est. Act of February 13, 1931, ch. 124, 46 Stat. 1092 (1931).
40. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090; see Act of February 1, 1905, ch. 288, 33 Star. 628
(1905) (the administrative authority over the forest lands had been transferred from the
Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of Agriculture a month prior to the enactment).
41. Utle Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090; see Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat.
1048, 1060-70.
42. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090.
43. Solem, 465 U.S. at 470.
44. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090.
45. Id.
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Judge Seymour, in his concurring opinion, analyzed the effect of the
1905 Act as it related to the establishment of the Uintah Forest Re-
serve.4 6 Judge Seymour examined the language of the 1905 Act and
then reviewed previous congressional actions relating to changes in res-
ervation land status, 4 7 as well as congressional motives behind the crea-
tion of the forest reserve,4 8 to support his view that Congress elected
not to extinguish the Uintah Reservation boundary when it created the
Uintah Forest Reserve.
49
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Seth concluded that "[n]o express
language of termination of Indian jurisdiction over the Forest Service
lands or an express extinguishment of the reservation boundaries was
required." 50 Judge Seth supported this view by pointing to the fact that
the management of the forest lands was transferred from the Depart-
ment of the Interior to the Department of Agriculture.5 Therefore, the
dissenting view interpreted the 1905 Act as withdrawing forest lands
from the reservation and placing those lands under the administration
of the Department of Agriculture. The opinion indicated that the laws
and regulations of the Department of Agriculture are entirely different
from the laws and regulations governing Indians and Indian reserva-
tions and stressed that decisions regarding forest lands should be
viewed in terms of the standards of the Department of Agriculture and
not of the Department of Interior.
52
d. Uncompahgre Reservation
The final issue before the court "is said to be the least popular of
the group." 5 3 The Uncompahgre Reservation covers approximately
2,000,000 acres 54 of land in eastern Utah and since its establishment in
1882 very few Indians or non-Indians have elected to live on the reser-
46. Id. at 1099-1101 (Seymour, J., concurring). Judge Seymour was joined by Chief
Judge Holloway and Judges McKay and Logan to form a majority bloc.
47. Id. at 1093-98 (Seymour, J., concurring). Judge Seymour, focusing on the surplus
land acts enacted at the turn of the century, concluded that the statutes were ambiguous in
the use of "public domain" language and, therefore, explicit language of disestablishment
was not present. Furthermore, he relied on the apparent confusion on the part of Con-
gress concerning the exact nature of the tribe's rights and interests in the land. Id. at
1097-98.
48. The 1905 Act "merely contemplated the opening of the reservation to non-Indi-
ans" rather than disestablishing the reservation. Id. at 1099. Thus, the Act did not termi-
nate the Indians' interests, but preserved them.
49. Id. at 1099-1100.
50. Id. at 1114 (Seth, J., dissenting). Judge Seth initially argued that the transfer of
lands from reservation status to Forest Reserve status for public use evidenced an intent to
remove the lands from the reservation. Id. (Seth, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1115 (Seth, J., dissenting).
52. Id. (Seth, J., dissenting). Such laws and regulations may be in conflict with one
another. An example of such a conflict arises when Forest Service regulations regarding
hunting and fishing on Forest Service lands differ from hunting and fishing laws regarding
Indians. See, e.g., Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 668-69, modified, 444 U.S. 816 (1979); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 176 n.15 (1977).
53. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090.
54. Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F. Supp. at 1108 n.l 12.
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vation. 5 5 The reservation's "highest value, in addition to agriculture, is
its mineral deposits, such as gilsonite. ' '5 6 The district court found that
the Uncompahgre Reservation had been disestablished. 5 7 However, the
finding seems to have been based on the "temporary" 5 8 nature of the
reservation and, more importantly, on the interpretation of the phrase
"public domain," in the 1894 Act. 59 The district court found these
words indicative of disestablishment. 60
Following Solm, Judge Doyle concluded that the term "restore to
public domain" is not the same as congressional intent to disestablish
the reservation. 6 1 Instead, he reasoned that "restoring to the public do-
main" is an expression confirming that Indian lands are open to public
entry and settlement, but that the reservation boundaries are to remain
intact. 62 The court held that there was insubstantial evidence to show
diminishment and thus reversed the lower court's decision. 6 3 Not only
did the Uncompahgre Indians fail to cede the unallotted lands of the
Uncompahgre Reservation, but Congress did not use explicit language
of disestablishment or extinguishment in the operative Acts. 64 Further-
more, according to the court, the surrounding circumstances failed to
show "substantial and compelling" evidence of an intent to terminate
the reservation. 6 5 Therefore, the 1882 Uncompahgre Reservation re-
mained intact.
The concurring opinion 6 6 reinforced Judge Doyle's opinion and
underscored the conclusion that a fair and complete reading of the legis-
lative history and surrounding circumstances shows a lack of any lan-
guage or understanding that Congress intended to disestablish the
Uncompahgre Reservation. Judge Seymour stressed that there was a
great deal of historical confusion and ambiguity regarding the Uncom-
pahgre Reservation and the "nature of the Uncompahgres' rights in the
reservation." '6 7 Following Solem, 68 the concurring opinion supported
Judge Doyle's decision and emphasized that the court was "bound to
resolve this ambiguity in favor of the Tribe."
69
55. Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1305.
56. Ute Indian Tibe, 773 F.2d at 1091.
57. Utelndian Tribe, 521 F. Supp. at 1153.
58. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1101-03.
59. See Act of August 15, 1894, ch. 290, 28 Stat. 286, 337 (1895) [hereinafter the 1894
Act].
60. Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F. Supp. at 1153.
61. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1092.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1093.
64. Id.
65. Id. The court concluded that "evidence as to 'surrounding events' [was] ambigu-
ous." Id. Newspaper articles from the period, referring to the Uncompahgre Reservation
as the "former" or "old" reservation, could not be accorded much significance because
they were written from the white settler's point of view. Similarly, the language of the
1894 and 1897 Acts were also ambiguous and therefore without sufficient evidence of an
intent to diminish. Id.
66. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1093-1101 (Seymour, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 1098 (Seymour, J., concurring); see supra note 49.
68. 465 U.S. 475 (1984); see supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
69. Ule Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1098; see infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
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Judge Seth offered another viewpoint in his dissent. 70 He con-
cluded that the 1894 Act established an intent to extinguish the Uncom-
pahgre Reservation by directing the Secretary of the Interior to open the
unallotted lands of the reservation. 7 1 The dissent then analyzed the
1897 Act "which made the allotment and opening of the Uncompahgre
Reservation mandatory," 72 and concluded that the 1897 enactment sup-
ported disestablishment. 73 Relying particularly on the 1894 Act which
contained the restoration to "public domain" language, Judge Seth em-




Generally, cases involving Indian lands and related jurisdictional is-
sues have been concerned largely with the complex nature of the Indian
tribe's interest in those lands. Certainly, broad generalizations in this
area are hazardous due to the fact that tribal property interests are tied
to specific agreements and treaties rather than to any generalized theo-
ries of tribal sovereignty. This has the effect of burdening the courts
with an expansive analysis of those historical agreements and treaties.
Necessarily involved in this process is an extensive review of the legisla-
tive and executive history associated with enactments and agreements
which established and modified Indian rights to land.
A review of this case confirms the complexity of that analytical pro-
cess. Judge Doyle reviewed the issues in light of the recent Supreme
Court decision, Solem v. Bartlett,7 5 the benefit of which the district court
did not have in their analysis of the case. Based on the Solem decision,
Judge Doyle affirmed the district court's holding that the 1864 Uintah
Reservation had not been diminished by subsequent enactments. 76 Ba-
sic to this holding is that Solem "provides inferences against diminish-
ment" 7 7 and that in the absence of compelling evidence of
congressional intent to disestablish or diminish reservation lands, the
original boundaries are not changed.
78
In reversing the district court's decision regarding the withdrawal of
70. Id. at 1101, 1105-08 (Seth, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 1106-07 (Seth, J., dissenting). Judge Seth reiterated his position that the
land returned to the public domain. Id. at 1106 (Seth, J., dissenting). Furthermore, "limi-
tations on entry" present in the 1894 Act, supra note 59, did not, as the trial court sug-
gested, demonstrate that Congress intended to limit full public domain status, but simply
meant that the land was restored to the public domain and public land laws would apply
without changing the status of the land. Finally, Judge Seth argued that the intent of the
1894 Act was to allot the land to Indians as individuals and open up the land not allotted
under public land laws. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1106. (Seth, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1107 (Seth, J., dissenting); see Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62, 87
(1899).
73. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1107 (Seth, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 1106.
75. 465 U.S. 475 (1984).





the Uintah Forest Reserve, Judge Doyle stated that "[t]here is clear evi-
dence that Congress did not intend to extinguish the forest lands of the
Uintah Reservation. ' 79 Judge Doyle also reversed the lower court's de-
cision regarding the disestablishment of the Uncompahgre Reservation.
He resolved the issue in terms of the Solem decision by stressing, again,
that clear evidence of intent to disestablish the reservation could not be
found.8 0
The concurring opinion placed emphasis on the historical back-
ground of the salient legislation and executive orders. Clearly, Judge
Seymour and the majority of the court captured the essence of the prob-
lem in this case - that ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the
tribe.
However, the reasoning of the court was not left unchallenged.
Judge Seth, in a dissenting opinion, found disquieting gaps in the rea-
soning and analysis of the case and even indicated that any reference to
the Solem standard was inappropriate.8 ' Judge Seth developed alterna-
tive interpretations of the legislative history involved in the case, which,
in his opinion, would require the disestablishment and diminishment of
reservation land.
II. NAVIGATIONAL WATERS
A. Cherokee Nation v. United States
1. Facts
The Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma brought a compensatory action
against the United States regarding property used by the United States
in the McClellan-Kerr Navigation Project. 82 The basis for the claim was
that the construction of dams and waterways altered the channel of the
Arkansas River causing a loss of valuable assets of sand, gravel and coal
in the Arkansas riverbed, and thus constituted an uncompensated taking
under the fifth amendment. 8 3 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment in favor of the
Cherokee Nation, holding that the United States had granted fee simple
title to the Cherokee Nation, without the reservation of a navigational
servitude.84 Therefore, the district court reasoned that since the Chero-
79. Id. at 1090.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1103 (Seth. J., dissenting).
82. Cherokee Nation v. United States, 782 F.2d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1986). The Mc-
Clellan-Kerr Navigation Project [hereinafter the Project] was an element of the construc-
tion of the Arkansas River Navigation System. Id.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. V states in pertinent part: "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." The Cherokee Nation "sought just com-
pensation for the past and future loss of the mineral deposits, fair market value of the
damsites, and other damage to the bed and banks of the Arkansas River." Cherokee Nation,
782 F.2d at 873.
84. Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 873. The court stated "that the term navigational
servitude describes the superior interest of the United States in navigation and the nation's
navigable waters." Id. at 875-76 (citing United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S.
222, 224-25 (1956)). Additionally, the Tenth Circuit noted that "[t]he term expresses the
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kee Nation had a vested property right in the riverbed, the United States
was monetarily liable for a taking of private tribal interests.
85
On an interlocutory appeal by the United States, the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's decision, but it did not adopt the district
court's reasoning.8 6 The sole issue before the court was whether the
United States' assertion of a navigational servitude over land held in fee




During the first half of the Nineteenth Century, the Cherokee In-
dian Nation was relocated west of the Mississippi River pursuant to trea-
ties with the United States Government.88 In the Treaty of New
Echota,8 9 the United States agreed to convey lands in fee simple to the
Cherokees. It also agreed that no part of the lands granted to the Indi-
ans would be included in any state or territory. Some eastern Cherokees
were reluctant to leave their homeland, but were moved by military
force to lands west of the Mississippi River in 1838.90 A major portion
of the Arkansas River lay within the exterior bounds of the Cherokee
Nation by virtue of the Treaty of New Echota, which incorporated by
reference two earlier treaties. 9 1
In order to pave the way for the creation of the State of Oklahoma,
however, the United States Government negotiated the extinguishment
of tribal titles.9 2 The Dawes Commission of 189393 recommended an
agreement with the Cherokees which, in essence, nullified the earlier
treaties and provided for the allotment of Indian lands to individual
members of the Cherokee Nation. 94 The bed of the Arkansas River was
notion that the right of the public to use a waterway supersedes any claim of private own-
ership." Id. at 876; see United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
85. Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 876.
86. Id.
87. Id. The court reserved a second issue - "whether the exercise of a navigational
servitude constituted the breach of some duty of care to the Cherokee Nation" - pending
appeal. Id.
88. Treaty with the Cherokees, May 6, 1828, 7 Stat. 311 (western Cherokees' ceded
lands in Arkansas for land in Oklahoma); Treaty with the Cherokees, Feb. 27, 1819, 7 Stat.
195 (1820) ("Old Settler" or western Cherokee were relocated to lands provided for them
in Arkansas Territory); Treaty with the Cherokees, July 8, 1817, 7 Stat. 156 (1818) (Chero-
kee Nation traded lands in Georgia for an equal amount of land in Arkansas Territory).
89. Treaty with the Cherokees, December 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478 (1836) (referred to as
the "Treaty of New Echota").
90. Thousands died in this forced migration, which is known as the "Trail of Tears."
See generally, F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN Lw 92 (1982).
91. Treaty with the Cherokees, May 6, 1828, 7 Stat. 311 (1828); Treaty with the Cher-
okees, Feb. 14, 1833, 7 Stat. 414 (1834).
92. Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 209, § 16, 27 Stat. 612, 645 (1894).
93. The Dawes Commission was created by the Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 209, 27 Stat.
612, 645 (1894).
94. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 627 (1970); see Act ofJune, 28, 1898,
ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495 (1899) (enacted the recommendations of the Dawes Commission and
forced the Cherokee Nation to execute an agreement with the United States); Act ofJuly 1,
1902, ch. 1375, 32 Stat. 716 (provided for final disposition of affairs of Cherokees and
required that lands be held by the United States for the use and benefit of the Indians); Act
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not allotted. Therefore, under the patent issued by the United States to
the Cherokee Nation in 1838, the fee simple title to the Arkansas
riverbed arguably was vested in the Cherokee Nation, and held in trust
by the United States for the Cherokees.9 5 Subsequently, in 1907,
Oklahoma was admitted to the Union "on an equal footing with the
original states."
9 6
3. The Tenth Circuit's Decision
In recounting the early, often troubled, history of the Cherokee Na-
tion, the Tenth Circuit relied heavily upon the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma.9 7 In Choctaw Na-
tion, the State of Oklahoma argued that, in accordance with the equal
footing doctrine, title to the bed of the Arkansas River passed from the
United States to "Oklahoma upon admission to the Union as an incident
of statehood."' 98 However, the Supreme Court held that the United
States intended to and did convey the title to land underlying the navi-
gable portions of the Arkansas River and, more specifically, the owner-
ship of the minerals beneath the riverbed.9 9
In light of the Choctaw Nation decision, the Tenth Circuit held that
while the United States could exercise a navigational servitude in the
Arkansas River, the Cherokee Nation had the right to just compensa-
tion. 10 0 This article reviews the court's reasoning and conclusions.
a. Navigational Servitude
The Tenth Circuit first reviewed the district court's holding that a
failure to reserve a navigational servitude in the land patent resulted in
the loss of the right to assert it.' ° 1 The United States' argument on
appeal was two-pronged: first, that "the navigational servitude is a con-
stitutional power arising from the Commerce Clause and permits no
of April 26, 1906, ch. 1876, § 27, 34 Stat. 137, 148 (1906) (provided that remaining tribal
property "be held in trust by the United States for the use and benefit of the Indians").
95. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 627, 634-36.
96. Act ofJune 16, 1906, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267 (1907). New states are admitted on an
equal footing with the other states and the United States holds beds to navigable waters in
trust for future states. The equal footing doctrine is a court-made rule founded upon
Article IV, section 3, clause 2 of the United States Constitution which provides that "[t]he
Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations re-
specting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 3, cl. 2. The Supreme Court first articulated the doctrine in Pollard v. Hagan, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 212, 222-23, 229 (1845):
When Alabama was admitted into the Union, on an equal footing with the
original states, she succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and
eminent domain which Georgia possessed at the date of the cession, except so far as
this right was diminished by the public lands remaining in the possession and under the control
of the United States, for the temporary purposes provided for in the deed of cession,
and the legislative acts connected with it.
Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
97. 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
98. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 627-28.
99. Id. at 621,635.
100. Cherokee Nation v. United States, 782 F.2d 871, 879 (10th Cir. 1986).
101. Id. at 875.
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'special exception' for Indian tribes," and, second, that the Cherokee
Nation is a "quasi-sovereign at the sufferance of Congress and subject to
the dominant power of a navigational servitude."10 2 The Tenth Circuit
agreed that a navigational servitude may in the interest of interstate
commerce create an exception to the United States' obligation to pay
just compensation under the taking clause of the fifth amendment.'
0 3
However, the court cautioned that "the Supreme Court has never held
that 'the navigational servitude create[d] a blanket exception to the Tak-
ing Clause whenever Congress exercises its Commerce Clause authority
to promote navigation.' "104
The Tenth Circuit noted that, despite other reservations, 10 5 the
United States failed to reserve a navigational servitude in the Treaty of
New Echota. Nevertheless, it found indisputable the fact that the Com-
merce Clause' 0 6 grants Congress broad powers over interstate activity,
including navigation.1 0 7 At this point, however, the Tenth Circuit devi-
ated from the district court, and held that the existence of the navigational
servitude in the Arkansas River was never in question, but the effect of
the reservation was at issue. 10 8 The court proceeded to limit the appli-
cation of the navigational servitude. Judge Moore, writing for the ma-
jority, observed that "the assertion of a navigational servitude on
particular waters acknowledges only that the property owner's right to use
these waters is shared with the public at large."' 1 9 Furthermore, the
court held that fifth amendment constitutional limitations apply to navi-
gational servitudes.110
As Choctaw Nation indicates, the 1838 patent of the United States
granting to the Cherokee Nation fee simple title to the Arkansas
riverbed was unique because after the patent the Cherokee Nation was
not a mere riparian owner of land along the Arkansas River, but the fee
simple title owner of the riverbed."'I Consequently, cases dealing with
the rights of riparian owners along a public navigable stream were not
102. Id.
103. Id. at 876.
104. Id. (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 172 (1979)).
105. Id.
106. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
107. Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 876; see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 22
(1824) ("It is a common principle, that arms of the sea, including navigable rivers belong
to the sovereign, so far as navigation is concerned. Their use is navigation." (emphasis in origi-
nal)); see, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 173-74 (1979) (A shallow la-
goon, dredged for development as a marina, fell within the definition of "navigable
waters" and thus was subject to Congress' "extensive authority over this Nation's waters
under the Commerce Clause."); United States v. Grand River Authority, 363 U.S. 229,
231-32 (1960) ("[W]hen the United States asserts its superior authority under the Com-
merce Clause to utilize or regulate the flow of the water of a navigable stream there is no
'taking' of 'property' in the sense of the Fifth Amendment because the United States has a
superior navigation easement which precludes private ownership of the water or its
flow."); United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940) (au-
thority of Congress over navigable waters is as broad as the needs of commerce).
108. Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 876.
109. Id. at 877 (emphasis in original).
110. Id.
11. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 633-35; Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 877.
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applicable." 2 In the opinion of the court, the instant case was one of
special circumstances which favored the Indian tribe.
In conclusion, the court held that when the United States Corps of
Army Engineers entered the Arkansas River without the consent of the
Cherokee Nation, altered its natural course and destroyed the valuable
sand and gravel assets of the Cherokee Nation by dredging its main
channel and building three dams on the riverbed, the United States took
private property from the Cherokees and converted it to its own public
use." t 3 Therefore, the court decided that the United States was re-
quired to pay just compensation to the Cherokee Nation, the fee title




Based on the uniqueness of the riverbed's ownership granted to the
Cherokees, the court also "consider[ed] the principle that rights secured
by treaty will not be deemed to be abrogated or modified absent a clear
expression of Congressional purpose."' 14 The Supreme Court has es-
tablished certain canons of construction that must be applied in matters
involving the interpretation and construction of Indian treaties. These
canons mandate that treaties be liberally construed in favor of Indi-
ans, 15 that ambiguous expressions in treaties must be resolved in favor
of Indians, 1 16 and that treaties should be construed as the Indians
would have understood them.'
17
112. Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 877.
113. Id. at 878-79. The Army Corps of Engineers acted pursuant to the Flood Control
Act of 1944, Act of Dec. 22, 1944, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887, 890 (1945), and the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1946, Act of July 24, 1946, ch. 595, 60 Stat. 634, 635-36 (1947).
114. Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 877.
115. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Choate v. Trapp, 224
U.S. 665, 675 (1912).
116. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Carpenter
v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908).
117. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 631; United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. I 11,
116 (1938); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 551-54, 582 (1832). In view of the
principles set forth in Choctaw Nation, it was not disputed by the court that "to take a valua-
ble portion of the grant to the Cherokee Nation without compensation would alter the
purpose for which Congress set aside the land originally." Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at
878. See also Moore v. United States, 157 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1946). The Cherokee Nation
paid no small price for the reservation that was set aside for their exclusive use and benefit.
The Cherokee Tribe was at the mercy of the United States' "superior negotiating skills and
superior knowledge of the language in which treat[ies were] recorded." Washington v.
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675-76
(1979).
Moreover, the reluctance of the Supreme Court to hold that an act of Congress abro-
gates a treaty has led to a number of other special rules concerning construction of Indian
treaties. For example, in Leavenworth, Lawrence, and Galveston R.R. Co. v. United
States, 92 U.S. 733 (1876), where the issue was whether a statutory grant included treaty
lands, the Supreme Court concluded that "there [must] be an express declaration to that
effect," otherwise, "the presumption is conclusive that Congress never meant to grant it."
Id. at 741-42. In United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941), where the
United States sued to protect Indian occupancy of lands, the Court held that Indian title
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In Cherokee Nation, the Tenth Circuit recognized the Supreme
Court's reluctance to abrogate Indian treaty rights, 1 8 and concluded
that "if the effect of exercising a navigational servitude is to alter or ex-
tinguish rights secured by treaty and unrelated to the power to use with-
out the express authorization of Congress, just compensation is
required." 19
ii. Fiduciary Relationship
The court also examined the navigational servitude within the con-
text of a fiduciary relationship between the United States and the Chero-
kee Nation. 120 Citing the Act of April 26, 1906, the Supreme Court in
Choctaw Nation, held that all unallotted tribal property would " 'be held
in trust by the United States for the use and benefit of the Indians.' ",121
As a consequence of this trust relationship, the Tenth Circuit found that
a limitation on Congressional power was mandated. 12 2 This trust rela-
tionship required the United States to manage and control the tribe's
affairs and imposed a duty to guard the trust property for the benefit of
the Cherokee Nation. 123 According to the Cherokee Nation, therefore,
when the United States took Cherokee property for its own public uses
in the construction of the McClellan-Kerr Navigation Project, the United
States violated the trust relationship.
had never been extinguished because there was no showing that Congress had expressed a
"clear and plain" intention to extinguish the Tribes' right. Id. at 354.
The same special rules of construction have been followed in cases asserting that a
later general Congressional act abrogated an earlier treaty right. For example, in Choate
v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912), the State of Oklahoma contended that an act of Congress
allowed the state to tax Indian allotments. The Court held that doubtful expressions in
the statute must be "resolved in favor of" the Indians. Id. at 676. Later, in Squire v.
Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956), the issue was whether the later-enacted capital gains provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code could be applied to income generated from trust prop-
erty, despite the language of the earlier-enacted General Allotment Act which required
property to be given to Indians free of liens. Although the government argued that the
income tax could be levied even though no lien could be imposed, the Court held that it
could not agree that the "taxability of respondents in these circumstances is unaffected by
the treaty." Id. at 6. A more recent case, Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404
(1968), involved the question of whether a termination statute enacted by Congress nulli-
fied treaty rights of tribal members to hunt and fish on the reservation free from state
regulation. The Court emphasized that the act contained no "explicit statement" abrogat-
ing hunting and fishing rights, and that such an intention would not be "lightly imputed"
to Congress. Id. at 413 (quoting Pigeon River Co. v. Cox Co., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934)).
In fact, the Court recognized that treaty rights are a form of property protected by the fifth
amendment. Id. at 413. Finally, Menominee was expressly reaffirmed in Washington v.
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) where
the Court stated that "[a]bsent explicit statutory language, we have been extremely reluc-
tant to find congressional abrogation of treaty rights." Id. at 690.
118. Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 877.
119. Id. at 878.
120. Id. at 878-79.
121. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 627 (citing Act of April 26, 1906, ch. 1876, § 27, 34
Stat. 137, 148 (1907)).
122. Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 878.
123. Id. The Supreme Court stated in United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371
(1980) that "this power to control and manage [is] not absolute. While extending to all
appropriate measures for protecting and advancing the tribe, it [is] subject to limitation
inhering in .. .a guardianship and to pertinent constitutional restrictions." Id. at 415.
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In upholding the Cherokee's contention, the Tenth Circuit relied
on United States v. Creek Nation, 124 where the Supreme Court held that as
a guardian of the property of an Indian tribe the United States can man-
age and control the trust property, but it cannot give it away to others or
use it for its own purposes without becoming liable to the tribe. The
court concluded that "[l]ike any other trust relationship, the United
States, as trustee, is obligated to act for the benefit of the tribe absent
Congressional authorization to the contrary."' 25 This duty to the Cher-




The dissenting opinion 12 7 of Judge Seth is persuasive through its
logical veracity. He argued that "the nature and source of [the Chero-
kee Nation's] title makes no real difference."' 2 8 Noting that all con-
cerned parties agreed that the Arkansas River is navigable, 129 he
explained that navigable waters are "public property" under the exclu-
sive control of the federal government pursuant to the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution. 13 0 Therefore, in Judge Seth's
view, this power to regulate navigation gave the United States a "domi-
nant servitude;" the exercise of which was not an invasion of any private
property rights in the river or any lands underlying it. l 3 l Hence, there
could be no taking from riparian owners for which just compensation
was due.
Judge Seth also responded to the Cherokee Nation's assertion that
they are a sovereign nation and, therefore, the navigational servitude of
124. 295 U.S. 103 (1935). In Creek Nation, like the instant case, the Creek Nation had
fee simple title to the lands. "That title was acquired and held under treaties, in one of
which the United States guaranteed to the tribe quiet possession." Id. at 109. In analyzing
the relationship between the Creek and the United States, the Court held that while the
tribe was under the guardianship of the United States and the United States was responsi-
ble for the management and control of the reservation, that control "did not enable the
United States to give the tribal lands to others, or to appropriate them to its own purposes,
without rendering . . .just compensation for them." Id. at 110.
125. Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 879. In neither the Flood Control Act nor the Rivers
and Harbors Act was any provision made for payment to the Cherokee Nation for lands
taken for the construction of the three dams on the Arkansas riverbed. Furthermore, Con-
gress did not indicate that there was an "overriding public need" for the construction of
the dam which might authorize such a taking. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 880-83 (Seth, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 880 (Seth,J., dissenting). Judge Seth emphasized that the navigational servi-
tude represents a constitutional power, not a property right. Referring to the Supreme
Court's decision in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), Judge Seth stated:
" '[T]he United States retains a navigational easement in the navigable waters lying within
the described boundaries for the benefit of the public, regardless of who [Montana or the
Crow Tribe] owns the riverbed.' " Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 882 (Seth, J., dissenting)
(quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 555).
129. Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 880-81 (Seth, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 881 (Seth, J., dissenting); see supra notes 101-15 and accompanying text.
131. Id. (Seth, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 122-23
(1967)).
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the United States could not be effective against them.' 3 2 He argued that
Indian tribes had lost many of the attributes of sovereignty, and there
was no reason to limit the application of the navigational servitude doc-
trine to exclude Indian tribes. For Judge Seth, the Cherokees were not
above the application of the doctrine of navigational servitude, espe-
cially since the exercise of the servitude is not the taking of property but
the exercise of a power to which any riparian-property owner, including
the Cherokee Nation, has always been subject.
13 3
5. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit determined that although the United States
could exercise a navigational servitude in the Arkansas River, the Chero-
kee Nation was entitled to just compensation for the taking. Both Chero-
kee Nation and Ute Indian Tribe marked victories for the Indian tribes over
the intrusion of governmental interests. More importantly, however,
the decisions in this area reflect a general sentiment that ambiguities are
to be resolved in favor of the Indian tribes, a trend which will undoubt-
edly continue in the Tenth Circuit.
B. Utah v. United States
1. Facts
Utah Lake is a large, fresh-water lake, covering approximately 150
square miles, located in Utah County, Utah. 134 In 1889, the United
States designated Utah Lake as a reservoir site, under the provisions of
the Sundry Appropriations Act of 1888.135 The controversy prompting
this litigation, however, did not arise until 1976 when the Bureau of
Land Management (the BLM) issued oil and gas leases on the bed of
Utah Lake. 1
3 6
The State of Utah sought an injunction 13 7 in the United States Dis-
132. Id. at 882 (Seth, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 882-83 (Seth, J., dissenting).
134. For a general description of Utah Lake, see Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 800-01
(10th Cir. 1984).
135. Act of October 2, 1888, ch. 1069, 25 Stat. 505, 526-27 (1889) [hereinafter the
1888 Act].
136. Utah v. United States, 780 F.2d 1515, 1516 (10th Cir, 1985).
137. The State of Utah insisted that its action was one for declaratory judgment, while
the defendant United States maintained that the action was one under the Quiet Title Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1978). The district court found that a declaratory judgment action
would lie against the United States, relying on section 702 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982) for the proposition that section 702 waived the sovereign im-
munity of the United States for a declaratory judgment action in which subject matter
jurisdiction was based upon federal question jurisdiction. Utah v. United States, 624 F.
Supp. 622, 624-26 (D. Utah 1985). See Carpet & Linoleum & Resilient Tile Co. v. Brown,
656 F.2d 564, 567 (10th Cir. 1981) (section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act
waived sovereign immunity in mandamus action based on federal question jurisdiction).
The Tenth Circuit recharacterized the action as one for quiet title, relying on the Supreme
Court decision in Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of University and School Lands, 461
U.S. 273, 282-90 (1983), and stated that "the Court ruled that Congress intended the
Quiet Title Act to provide the exclusive means by which adverse claimants could challenge
the United States' title to real property." Utah, 780 F.2d at 1517 n.2.
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trict Court for the District of Utah claiming that it obtained title to the
bed of Utah Lake under the equal footing doctrine at the date of state-
hood, or alternatively, that it obtained title to the lakebed under the
Submerged Lands Act of 1953.138 The United States contended, how-
ever, that by withdrawing the lake as a reservoir site, the federal govern-
ment effectively reserved the lakebed of Utah Lake in federal ownership
thereby preventing title from passing to Utah under the equal footing
doctrine at the date of its statehood.13 9 After the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the United States, 140 Utah appealed to
the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, quieting title to the bed
of Utah Lake in the United States.'
4 1
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The principal issues presented on appeal were (1) whether the State
of Utah obtained title to the bed of Utah Lake under the equal footing
doctrine, or (2) whether the State of Utah gained title to the bed of Utah
Lake under the Submerged Lands Acts. 1
42
a. The Equal Footing Doctrine
Under the principles of the equal footing doctrine, the presumption
exists that the United States "holds [lands under navigable waters] in
trust for future States, to be granted to such States when they enter the
Union and assume sovereignty on an 'equal footing' with the established
state."' 4 3 In applying the equal footing doctrine, the critical issue is
whether Congress plainly or "definitely declared" its intent to withdraw
the land before a State entered the Union. 14 4 In analyzing congres-
sional intent, courts will determine if a "public exigency' 14 5 necessi-
tated a departure from the policy of reserving owernship of land under
navigable waters for the future states.
138. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1516; see 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1982).
139. Utah v. United States, 780 F.2d 1515, 1516 (10th Cir. 1985); see supra note 96 and
accompanying text.
140. Utah v. United States, 624 F. Supp. 622 (D. Utah 1985). Based upon its interpre-
tation of the language used in correspondence and documents surrounding the events, the
district court found that the United States withdrew the bed of Utah Lake as part of its
1889 reservoir site selection. Id. at 626-27. The lower court further found that the equal
footing doctrine did not cut off the United States' title in the lakebed where "[t]he with-
drawal of Utah Lake was made 'after acquiring the territory and before the creation of the
state' for the carrying out of 'public purposes appropriate to the objects for which the
territory was held.' " Id. at 628 (quoting United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54-
55 (1926)). Finally, the district court found that the bed of Utah Lake was excepted from
the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1964), by way of a provision which ex-
cluded "all lands expressly retained by ... the United States when the State entered the
Union." Id.; see 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1964).
141. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1525.
142. Id. at 1517.
143. Id. at 1518 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551-52 (1981)); see
supra note 104 and accompanying text.
144. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1518-19 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552
(1981)); see United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
145. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1519; Montana, 450 U.S. at 552.
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i. The 1889 Reservoir Site Selection
In the instant case, the Tenth Circuit found that the withdrawal of
Utah Lake, including the bed, was clearly made for a public purpose and
motivated by public exigency. The requisite congressional intent was
evidenced by Congress' concern "that arid lands of the western states be
orderly and fairly irrigated, reclaimed, and settled."' 14 6 Furthermore,
the court's review of the United States Geological Survey (U.S.G.S.)




(A.) The Sundry Appropriations Act of 1888
The Sundry Appropriations Act of 1888148 provided that all lands
selected as reservoir sites "are from this time henceforth hereby re-
served from sale as the property of the United States and shall not be
subject ... to entry, settlement or occupation until further provided by
law."' 49 The Act authorized the selection of land for reservoir sites and
reserved such designated sites as the property of the United States.
The State argued that "the Act's proscription on 'entry, settlement
or occupation' of lands selected under the Act' 150 limited lands which
could be selected to those which could be entered, settled or occupied
and, therefore, excluded the beds of navigable waters. However, the
Tenth Circuit found no merit in the argument and concluded that the
Act "imposes no restriction on the U.S.G.S.'s selection authority on the
type of lands that could be designated or selected."
15 '
(B.) Subsequent Congressional Action
The State also relied on its interpretation of the legislative history
of amendments to the 1888 Act to support the view that the United
States did not have the authority to select Utah Lake as a reservoir
site. 152 Utah initially looked to statements made in subsequent house
146. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1524.
147. Id. at 1520. These documents also showed that the United States contemplated
plans to lower the level of the lake as well as to make the water available by means of
ditches and canals from the lake. Id. at 1523. Thus, these documents indicated that Utah
Lake was withdrawn for an important public purpose and these plans could not have been
realized unless the bed of Utah Lake had also been withdrawn. Id. at 1524.
148. Act of October 2, 1888, ch. 1069, 25 Stat. 505, 526-27 (1889) [hereinafter the
1888 Act].
149. Id. at 527.
150. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1521.
151. Id.
152. Id.; see Act of August 30, 1890, ch. 897, 26 Stat. 371, 391 (1891) (repealing the
1888 Act except as it reserved reservoir sites); Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat.
1095, 1101-02 (1892) (restricting the reservation of reservoir sites to "only so much land
as is actually necessary for the construction and maintenance of reservoirs" and providing
for rights of way across public lands for the construction of irrigation canals and ditches to
the extent construction did not interfere with the United States' occupation of the land);




debates to bolster the premise that the purpose of the 1888 Act was to
arrest the monopoly and rampant speculation of western public
lands. 153 The State further asserted that (1) the legislative history dem-
onstrates that reservoir site withdrawals were not permanent, but only
temporary, in order to facilitate the fair development of the public
lands 154 and (2) "by their nature, beds of navigable waters simply could
not have been part of the problem Congress wanted to remedy."'
155
The court discounted both arguments as being in direct conflict with the
provisions of the 1888 Act.' 5 6
Furthermore, the State argued that Congress intended that only the
adjacent uplands surrounding natural navigable lakes be withdrawn as
reservoir sites. Utah's argument was based on the assumption "that
Congress was concerned in every instance with those uplands that might
be inundated if and when the water level was raised."' 5 7 The court was
not persuaded by the State's contention and pointed out that the con-
cern of the U.S.G.S. with respect to Utah Lake was not limited to the
adjacent uplands that might be inundated, but rather necessarily ex-
tended to the natural lakebed itself which would be exposed as the water
level was lowered.1
58
Therefore, in reviewing the legislative history of the amendments to
the 1888 Act, the court found nothing to substantiate the State's asser-
tion that Congress revoked any of the reservoir selections made by the
U.S.G.S. pursuant to the 1888 Act. 159 The court concluded that the
U.S.G.S. intended to withdraw the bed of Utah Lake in its 1889 reservoir
selection. 160 Furthermore, the court cautioned the State for basing its
153. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1522. The historical background of the passage of the 1888 Act
and the legislative history of subsequent amendments make it clear that one of Congress'
primary concerns was the monopolization of reservoir sites by corporations. By 1888 it
had come to the attention of Congress that large corporations were making fraudulent
land filings under the various land entry laws and were seeking to acquire vast tracts of the
public domain in the West. There was also evidence that the large corporations were
seeking to monopolize water resources of the area in order to sell water to farmers at
exhorbitant profits. See generally, 21 CONG. REC. 7297-7399 (1890) (statement of Sen.
Reagan).
154. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1522.
155. Id.
156. Id. Regarding the first argument, the Tenth Circuit found that the plain language
of the 1888 Act, reserving sites to the United States "until further provided by law," re-
futed the State's claim by allowing for the possibility of non-temporary withdrawals. Id.
The court relied on the language of the Act and the U.S.G.S. interpretation of it to dispose
of the second argument. Id. at 1522-23.
157. Id. However, a U.S.G.S. report stated that the segregation of Utah Lake included
"not only the bed but the lowlands up to the mean highwater." U.S.G.S., ELEVENTH ANN.
REP. OF THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, PT. II, 183, 184
(1889-90). Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit pointed out that "although officials of the
U.S.G.S. initially thought that the water level of Utah Lake should be raised, subsequent
studies indicated that the water level should be lowered below the natural shoreline."
Utah, 780 F.2d at 1523. Similarly, the U.S.G.S. stated that the withdrawal of Utah Lake was
a "segregation of the land around and under the lake." U.S.G.S., TWELFTH ANN. REP. OF
THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, PT. II - IRRIGATION 339
(1892),
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line of argument on the "views of individual Congressmen who were
part of a different Congress from that which passed the 1888 Act."'
16 1
(C.) Mineral Estate
Utah alternatively claimed that "the 1888 Act authorized withdrawal
of the surface estate only, and not the mineral estate" of the lakebed.
162
Utah's argument reasoned that the reservoir site withdrawal did not seg-
regate the mineral estate from the public domain and since "the mineral
estate had not been reserved or withdrawn, it would have passed to Utah
at statehood."' 16 3 No authority was cited for this proposition. The court
noted that the 1888 Act makes no distinction between the surface and
subsurface estates. 16 4 The court held that "the 1888 Act and the reser-
vation made pursuant to it covered the lakebed, and underlying miner-
als, not just the surface of the bed, among the lands withdrawn in
connection with Utah Lake."'
6 5
iii. The Selection Process
The State next argued that there was a strong presumption against
pre-statehood withdrawals of lands underlying navigable waters "except
upon a strict and narrow concept of 'public exigency.' "166 Utah as-
serted that "a public exigency requires a public necessity and not simply
an 'appropriate public purpose.' ",167 The State relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Montana v. United States 168 to support its argument.
In Montana, the Court ruled in favor of the State of Montana and against
a claim that Montana's title to a navigable riverbed had been defeated by
the creation of an Indian reservation prior to statehood.' 69 The Court
in Montana examined whether a "public exigency" would have required
a departure from the federal policy of reserving ownership of the land
under navigable waters for future states. Although the Court did not
find that the treaties with the Crow Nation demonstrated an intent by
the United States to convey the riverbed to the tribe,' 70 the Court em-
161. Id. " '[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring
the intent of an earlier one.' " Id. (citing United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)).
162. Id. at 1523.
163. Id.
164. Id. It was not until 1909 that Congress enacted any law which split estates be-
tween the surface and subsurface. See 30 U.S.C. § 81 (1982); see also Udall v. Tallman, 380
U.S. i (1965), in which the regulations governing oil and gas leases in the Kenai Moose
Range in Alaska were upheld. Over two million acres were withdrawn for the protection of
moose. Although the Executive Order which created the range did not mention the sub-
surface estate, the Court concluded that there was no doubt that the United States Gov-
ernment retained ownership of it. Id. at 4-5; see Exec. Order No. 8979, 6 Fed. Reg. 6471
(1941).
165. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1523.
166. Id. (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 552).
167. Id.
168. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
169. Id. at 550.
170. Id. at 556-57. The Court held that title to the bed of the Big Horn River passed to
Montana upon its admission into the Union because the United States had not, prior to
statehood, conveyed beneficial ownership of the riverbed to the Crow Nation by certain
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phasized that a "public exigency" would constitute a valid pre-statehood
conveyance of lands underlying navigable waters and would prevent
passage to a state under the equal footing doctrine.
17
In analyzing the present case, the Tenth Circuit found that a "pub-
lic exigency" clearly did exist at the time of the Utah Lake with-
drawal. 172 The court concluded "that the withdrawal of Utah Lake,
including the bed, was made for a public purpose motivated by a public
exigency, given Congress' stated concerns that arid lands of the western
states be orderly and fairly irrigated, reclaimed, and settled."'
73
b. The Submerged Lands Act
Finally, the State argued that if it did not obtain title to the lakebed
under the equal footing doctrine, it obtained title pursuant to the Sub-
merged Lands Act 174 because the United States was not in "actual pos-
session" of the lakebed in 1953.175 However, the court explained that
sections 1311(a) and (b) (1) of the Submerged Lands Act provide that
the Act does not confirm the title to the states of any lands expressly
retained by the United States. 176 As the court stated, "the United States
expressly reserved the bed of Utah Lake for federal reservoir purposes
in 1889, seven years before Utah became a state. Thus, this case falls
squarely within the language of section 1313(a), and the 1889 with-
drawal remains valid."' 17 7 The court concluded that since the United
States retained title to the lakebed at statehood, Congress specifically




A. Poverty Flats Land & Cattle Company v. United States
1. Facts
Plaintiff Poverty Flats Land & Cattle Co. (Poverty Flats) brought an
treaties. Id. The Court noted that the treaties expressed no intention by the United States
to convey the riverbed to the tribe. Id. at 554.
171. Id. at 552, 556.
172. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1524.
173. Id.
174. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-43 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). The court focused particular atten-
tion on sections 1311 (a) and (b) (1) of the Act which read in pertinent part:
(a) It is determined and declared to be in the public interest that (1) title to
and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the
respective States, and the natural resources within such lands and waters ... be,
and they are, subject to the provisions hereof, recognized, confirmed, established
and vested in and assigned to the respective States ... ;
(b)(1) The United States releases and relinquishes unto said States and per-
sons aforesaid, except as otherwise reserved herein, all right, title, and interest of
the United States, if any it has, in and to all said lands, improvements, and natural
resources ....
43 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), (b)(1) (1982 & Supp. II 1984); see Utah, 780 F.2d at 1525.
175. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1524.
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action 179 to quiet title to ranch land in New Mexico. Poverty Flats' pred-
ecessor in interest, the C.L. Crowder Investment Company, had origi-
nally acquired the land in January of 1970, pursuant to an exchange of
lands provision under section 8 of the Taylor Grazing Act. 180 The pat-
ent issued to the C.L. Crowder Investment Company reserved to the
United States "[a]ll mineral deposits in the lands so patented, and to it,
or persons authorized by it, the right to prospect, mine and remove such
deposits from the same under the applicable law."'' During the ex-
change negotiations, no discussion was ever had regarding the subject
of caliche 182 and its status as part of the surface or mineral estate.' 8 3 In
June of 1981, Poverty Flats discovered that a lessee of the United States,
Oilfield Construction Company, had entered plaintiff's land and by Feb-
ruary of 1982, was removing dirt, rock, and caliche from the land.'
8 4
Thus, Poverty Flats sought to establish that, under a proper construc-
tion of the land patent, the United States had not reserved an interest in
these materials.
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
granted the government's motion for summary judgment on the ground
that the suit was barred by the twelve-year statute of limitations for quiet
title actions against the United States.' 8 5 The Tenth Circuit reversed,
holding that it was error to grant summary judgment on the statute of
limitations issue without determining whether it was unreasonable for
the landowner to believe that the government's reservation of "mineral
rights" included a reservation of caliche, and remanded to the trial court
for such a factual determination.18 6 On remand, the district court found
that the action was brought within the applicable time period, but con-
cluded, as a matter of law, that caliche was included in the mineral reser-
vation. 187 On subsequent appeal, the Tenth Circuit again reversed in
favor of Poverty Flats and ruled that caliche was not included in the min-
eral reservation.
1 8 8
179. Poverty Flats Land & Cattle Co. v. United States, 788 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1986).
180. Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269, repealed by Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2792 (codified at
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82 (1982)).
181. Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 677.
182. "According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary, caliche is 'a crust or
succession of crusts of calcium carbonate that forms within or on top of the stony soil of
arid or semiarid regions.' Caliche is apparently used in road building along with sand and
gravel." Poverty Flats, 706 F.2d at 1079 n.l.
183. Povery Flats, 788 F.2d at 679.
184. Id. at 678-79.
185. Poverty Flats, 706 F.2d at 1078; see 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(f) (1982) (providing for
twelve-year statute of limitations on quiet title actions). The district court found that no-
tice of the mineral reservation in the 1970 patent was notice to the successors in interest,
Poverty Flats, that the United States claimed to own dirt, rock and caliche in the patented
land by virtue of the reservation. Poverty Flats, 706 F.2d at 1079.
186. Poverty Flats, 706 F.2d at 1078, 1080.
187. Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 677.
188. Id. at 676, 683-84.
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2. The Decision of the Tenth Circuit
Judge Seth, writing for a unanimous court, addressed the issue of
whether caliche was a statutorily reserved mineral under the Taylor
Grazing Act and the discretionary patent reservation of mineral deposits
or a material not within the reservation of minerals. Judge Seth pro-
ceeded to review the mineral reservation in the context of the Taylor
Grazing Act,18 9 the Surface Resources Act of 1955, 190 and the common
law principles set forth in Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc. 19 1
a. Interpretations of the Taylor Grazing Act
First, the court determined that the patent to the land in question
was expressly provided for in section 8 of the Taylor Grazing Act.1
9 2
This statutory provision, according to the court, was unique in that "the
nature and extent of the mineral reservation ... in the patent were left
to the complete discretion of the Secretary of the Interior."' 19 3 The
Tenth Circuit decided that "[t]he unusual statutory provision for com-
plete discretion in the Secretary" eliminated the factor of congressional
intent as to the scope of the reservation which is used in other situations
where a mandatory mineral reservation was provided. 194 Therefore, in-
stead of looking to congressional intent, the court relied upon adminis-
trative interpretations of the Taylor Grazing Act.
189. Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269, repealed by Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2792 (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-82 (1982)).
190. The Surface Resources Act of 1955, ch. 375, 69 Stat. 368 (codified as amended at
30 U.S.C. § 611 (1982)).
191. 462 U.S. 36 (1983).
192. Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 677-78. Section 8 of the Taylor Grazing Act was codified
at 43 U.S.C. § 315g (1970) but was repealed by the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2792 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82 (1982)).
193. Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 678. For instance, section 8 of the Taylor Grazing Act
also authorized the Secretary to exchange public lands for state-owned lands. Such an
exchange could be based upon lands of either equal value or equal acreage. In the case of
an exchange by the Secretary of lands of equal acreage which were mineral in character,
section 8 required that the patent contain a reservation of "all minerals" to the United
States. However, in the case of an exchange of lands of equal value, as in this case, the
statute left both the reservation of minerals and the scope of any such reservation to the
discretion of the parties to the exchange and provided in part:
Provided, That either party to an exchange based upon equal value under this
section may make reservations of minerals, easements, or rights of use. Where
reservations are made in lands conveyed either to or by the United States the
right to enjoy them shall be subject to such reasonable conditions respecting in-
gress and egress and the use of the surface of the land as may be deemed
necessary.
Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, ch. 865, § 8, 48 Stat. 1269, repealed by the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2792 (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-82 (1982)) (emphasis added).
194. Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 678. The court also noted that the discretionary author-
ity of the Secretary, coupled with the ever-changing policy stance of the Department of the
Interior, made "reliance on similar language or wording in other reservations of question-
able worth." Id. Cf Millsap v. Andrus, 717 F.2d 1326, 1328 (10th Cir. 1983) (where deed
reservation incorporated language of congressional legislation, "the proper construction
of the deed depends on what Congress intended to reserve").
1987]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
i. The Mineral Reservation
Generally, federal mineral reservations are to be construed in favor
of the government with no rights passing by implication.' 9 5 However,
federal grants of land resources "are to receive such a construction as
will carry out the intent of Congress,"' 19 6 and "are not to be so con-
strued as to defeat the intent of the legislature, or to withhold what is
given either expressly or by necessary or fair implication."' 9 7 Similarly,
it is well settled that "[p]atent mineral reservations are construed ac-
cording to the purpose for which the legislative body granted the sur-
face and reserved the minerals. Therefore the statute authorizing the
patent controls the reservation if the patent language is erroneous or
even if the reservation is omitted from the patent."' 9 8 The Tenth Cir-
cuit added that a constructional preference in favor of a government
agency which did nothing to reveal its beliefs regarding the scope of a
mineral reservation until eleven years after the transaction, would pro-
mote instability of land titles and unfairly penalize innocent grantees. 1
9 9
Following the 1970 land transaction in Poverty Flats, evidence
showed that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) began to construe
mineral reservations in a different way and classified caliche as a "min-
eral." However, "[t]his change was not made known publicly and the
Government point[ed] to no notice or change in the regulations. '20 0 As
the court indicated, the inconsistency with this policy change lay in the
fact that the caliche sold to the Oilfield Construction Company "was
sold as a common surface material [and] not treated as a 'mineral.' "201
b. The Surface Resources Act of 1955
The Surface Resources Act of 1955202 was enacted to remove a
large group of "common materials" from the "locatable minerals" cate-
gory. Common "materials" were removed from the application of the
mining laws and put under a permit system. 20 3 The court held that the
United States was improperly attempting to place caliche into the cate-
195. See United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957) (grant of right-
of-way through public lands by United States to railroad company did not convey mineral
lands where expressly reserved by Congress); see also Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prod.
Co., 436 U.S. 604, 617 (1978).
196. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 682 (1979) (quoting Winona & St.
Peter R. Co. v. Barney, 113 U.S. 618, 625 (1885)).
197. Id. at 682-83 (quoting United States v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., 150 U.S. 1,
14 (1893)).
198. See Mall, Federal Mineral Reservations, 20 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 399, 410 (1975).
199. Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 683.
200. Id. at 679.
201. Id.
202. 30 U.S.C. §§ 601-15 (1976). This was intended to "prevent mining locations on
public lands containing these materials being made with a view to ultimately obtaining title
to the lands." Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 680.
203. Section 611 of the Surface Resources Act provides in part that "[n]o deposit of
common varieties of sand, stone, gravel . . . shall be deemed a valuable mineral deposit
within the meaning of the mining ... laws so as to give effective validity to any mining
claim hereafter located under such mining laws." 30 U.S.C. § 611 (1982).
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gory of minerals, known as "mineral materials," outside the scope of the
Surface Resources Act. According to the Court, though, caliche could
not be both a "locatable mineral" falling within the mineral reservation
and a "common material" under the Surface Resources Act. 20 4 As Judge
Seth stated, "[c]aliche cannot be both fish and fowl."' 20 5 The court con-
cluded that caliche is a non-locatable common surface material.20 6
c. Western Nuclear Applied
Finally, the Tenth Circuit distinguished Poverty Flats from Watt v.
Western Nuclear, Inc., 207 in which the United States Supreme Court held
that gravel was a mineral reserved to the United States under the Stock
Raising Homestead Act of 1916.208 The two cases evidence separate
tests used by courts to determine what is to be considered a mineral
under a mineral reservation: the separate value test 20 9 and the settled
expectations test.
21 0
i. The Separate Value Test
In Western Nuclear, the Supreme Court relied on the separate value
test 2 1' to determine that gravel was a reserved mineral. The Court con-
cluded that in order for a substance to be a reserved mineral under the
Stock Raising Homestead Act, it must first be "mineral in character,"
capable of being "removed from the soil," and able to "be used for com-
mercial purposes."'2 12 Secondly, "there [must] be no reason to suppose
204. Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 680.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 683; see United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 500 (1968); see also Robert L.
Berry, 25 I.B.L.A. 287, 294-96 (1976) (holding that "common dirt," while literally a min-
eral, cannot be classified as a locatable mineral).
207. 462 U.S. 36 (1983). Western Nuclear purchased land on which an open gravel pit
was located. The conveyance of the land patent was made in 1926 and was issued under
the Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916 (SRHA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-301 (1976), suspended
by Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269, repealed by Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified at 43
U.S.C. §§ 1701-82 (1982)). The patent reserved to the United States "all the coal and
other minerals." Western Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 37. Western Nuclear, as part of its mining
and milling operations, used gravel obtained from the pit.
In 1975, the Wyoming office of the Bureau of Land Management (the BLM) cited
Western Nuclear for trespass upon the mineral estate. At the administrative hearing, the
BLM determined that the gravel on and underlying Western Nuclear's land was reserved
to the United States. Id. at 41. Following several appeals to administrative agencies and
lower federal courts, the case was appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. at 36. The Court, in
a 5-4 decision, concluded that gravel was a mineral under the SRHA reservation. Id. at 60.
208. Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916, 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-301 (1976), suspended by
Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269, repealed by Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 1701-82 (1982)).
209. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1903) (land containing
deposits of common substances are classified as mineral lands if the deposits render the
land more valuable than for agricultural purposes).
210. See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979) (recognizing the expecta-
tions of patentees).
211. Western Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 53-54; see supra note 209.
212. Western Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 53.
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[it was] intended to be included in the surface estate." 213 Applying this
test, the Western Nuclear Court categorized gravel as a valuable, locatable
mineral.
2 14
In Poverty Flats, Judge Seth concluded that caliche has never been
considered a locatable mineral "under any administrative or court deci-
sion or practice and thus [did] not meet Western Nuclear's basic require-
ment."'2 15 Moreover, the court decided that caliche does not qualify as a
locatable mineral as defined in Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products.2 16 The
court noted that although caliche has "value as fill dirt and surfacing...
[n]othing can be extracted from it nor derived from it. It is used by
reason of its physical characteristics only."'2 17 Furthermore, its occur-
rence over vast areas of the West necessitated the categorization as a
non-locatable common surface material and not as a mineral within the
scope of the reservation.
2 18
ii. Settled Expectations Test
This test looks to the expectations of patentees at the time the pat-
ent was issued. The test was first recognized in Leo Sheep Company v.
United States219 and is premised on the need for certainty and predict-
ability in land titles. Accordingly, the implied reservations in a patent
cannot be asserted after patentees have come to expect certain stability
in their titles.
2 20
The dissent in Western Nuclear emphasized that western settlers had
expectations of perpetual ownership and control of the land.22 1 How-
ever, the majority in that case did not apply the settled expectations test
to determine the meaning of a "mineral" under the Stock Raising
Homestead Act mineral reservation.
Poverty Flats acknowledged the recognized position of the BLM at
the time the Taylor Grazing Act was enacted and when the patent was
issued to Poverty Flats' predecessor in title. The court indicated that
caliche was not considered a mineral under the Secretary of Interior's
mineral reservation at the time of the exchange. The court considered
and applied the settled expectations test of Leo Sheep to determine the
meaning of a "mineral" under the Taylor Grazing Act exchange mineral
reservation. Therefore, by not claiming ownership in caliche for nearly
eleven years, the surface owners had the right to expect that this mate-
213. Id.
214. Id. at 59-60.
215. Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 682.
216. 462 U.S. 604 (1978). The Tenth Circuit noted that the Charlestone Court had
"considered the two factors on which the experts based their opinion in the case before
us:" chemical identification as a mineral and whether the substance had value. Poverty
Flats, 788 F.2d at 682.
217. Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 683.
218. Id.
219. 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
220. Id. at 687.
221. Western Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 71-72 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell defended
the concept of "citizen sovereignty" of the soil. Id. at 71 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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rial was part of the surface estate. To now take caliche away from Pov-
erty Flats would raise serious doubts regarding the extent of land titles
granted under the Taylor Grazing Act. As stated by the Supreme Court
in Leo Sheep, there is a "special need for certainty and predictability
where land titles are concerned.
22 2
In conclusion, Poverty Flats marked the triumph of the rights of pri-
vate citizens over the claim of the United States Government to a mate-
rial not specifically mentioned in a mineral reservation. The Tenth
Circuit refused to extend the litany of "minerals" which the government
may claim under mineral reservations and thereby limited the scope of
governmental power.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
A. Lidstone v. Block
1. Facts
In 1976, the City of Cheyenne Board of Public Utilities applied to
the United States Forest Service for a right of way over part of the
Medicine Bow National Forest in order to construct a water diversion
project. 22 3 The purpose of the project was to provide an adequate sup-
ply of water for the City of Cheyenne, Wyoming. At that time, Chey-
enne was drawing water from wells and from Douglas Creek, a tributary
of the North Platte River. The Douglas Creek water diversion project
was referred to as Stage 1.224 Stage I and additional water sources sup-
plied approximately 14,700 acre-feet of water annually to the City of
Cheyenne.
225
In view of anticipated growth and attendant increase in water de-
mand, Cheyenne proposed a project in 1978, known as Stage II, seeking
to increase its annual water supply to approximately 28,100 acre-feet.2 26
Following the procedure established in the Stage I project, the Stage II
application proposed the diversion of additional water from the North
Platte River with replacement from the Little Snake River. To accom-
modate the increased water flow, the city proposed to expand the Stage
222. Leo Sheep, 440 U.S. at 687.
223. Lidstone v. Block, 773 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1985); EPA Final Environmental Im-
pact Statment for the City of Cheyenne [hereinafter FEIS] at 2 (December 8, 1981).
224. FEIS, supra note 223, at 4. Under the provisions of Stage I, Cheyenne constructed
the Rob Roy Reservoir on Douglas Creek and a pipeline to transport water to the Granite
Springs Reservoir. However, the Stage I diversion project permits were conditioned on
the replacement of water taken from the North Platte with water drawn from the tributa-
ies of the Little Snake River on the western side of the Continental Divide. Id.
In order to meet this condition, Cheyenne constructed a diversion and collection sys-
tem which draws water from certain tributaries of the Little Snake River and transports the
water through a tunnel under the Continental Divide to Hog Park Reservoir. Water is
released from the Hog Park Reservoir into the Encampment River, a tributary of the North
Platte. The Little Snake diversion and the Hog Park Reservoir collection system were
constructed on lands in the Medicine Bow National Forest under a permit from the United
States Forest Service. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 15.
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I project by constructing additional diversion structures and pipelines
on tributaries of the Little Snake that had not previously been af-
fected.2 2 7 This expansion project included construction over lands in
the Medicine Bow National Forest; therefore, the city applied for a right
of way pursuant to section 501 of the Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act (FLPMA).
2 28
In accordance with the requirements of the National Environmental
Policy Act,2 2 9 an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was prepared
by the Forest Service. The initial EIS was rated inadequate by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency and a revised draft was prepared. 23 0 On
December 8, 1981, the Regional Forester issued the Final Environmen-
tal Impact Statement (FEIS) together with his Record of Decision, which
granted a conditional right of way that was more restrictive than that
sought in Cheyenne's application. 23 ' The Forest Service found that
Cheyenne's proposal was not environmentally acceptable because it did
not provide for the required maintenance and flushing flows in all di-
verted streams. 2 32 Consequently, the Forest Service eliminated Chey-
enne's proposal and instead selected five alternatives for detailed study
and comparison. 23 3 The right of way which was granted by the Forest
Service was consistent with Alternative C.2 3 4 Although Alternative C
would not permit all of the diversion facilities that Cheyenne had pro-
posed, this alternative would provide for the required maintenance and
flushing flows in all the diverted streams. 23 5 Additionally, the Regional
Forester placed two conditions on the issuance of the permits: (1) Chey-
enne was required to demonstrate its financial ability to carry out the
project, since the bond issue to finance the project had been defeated in
a municipal election; and (2) a joint statement from the city and State of
Wyoming was required that, in essence, would justify that the selected
227. Lidstone, 773 F.2d at 1136. Additionally, the city proposed to enlarge both the
Hog Park Reservoir and the Rob Roy Reservoir to accommodate the increased flow. The
city also proposed to construct another pipeline from the Rob Roy Reservoir to carry the
water to the City of Cheyenne. The estimated cost of the Stage II diversion project was
$100,000,000. FEIS, supra note 223, at 18-19.
228. Lidstone, 773 F.2d at 1136; 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1761-71 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
230. FEIS, supra note 223, at 5.
231. Lidstone, 773 F.2d at 1136. The FEIS included a comprehensive discussion of the
city's proposal, alternatives to the proposal, and the environmental impacts of certain al-
ternatives. Id.
232. FEIS, supra note 223, at 19.
233. Lidstone, 773 F.2d at 1136. The five alternatives were: (A) the no action alterna-
tive; (B) Cheyenne's full proposal coupled with environmental restrictions; (C) mitigation
measures which limited the extent of the new diversion facilities in the Little Snake Basin,
but permitted full development of the remainder of the proposal with the application of
the mitigation measures; (D) mitigation measures which would have replaced the Little
Snake diversion system with a reservoir on that river and a pumping station to deliver
water to the existing tunnel under the Continental Divide, and; (E) mitigation measures
which would have abandoned Stage II and relied instead on a combination of water con-
servation, water rights purchase and groundwater development to meet the estimated de-
mand. FEIS, supra note 223, at 82-101.
234. Lidstone, 773 F.2d at 1136.
235. FEIS, supra note 223, at 1-2.
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alternative was compatible with the State's water development plans. 23 6
Subsequently, Cheyenne amended its application by postponing,
for ten to fifteen years, the construction of the additional pipelines from
Douglas Creek to the city's water system. Although this reduced the
estimated cost of the project by $40,000,000, there was not a similar
reduction in the amount of water to be transferred from the Little Snake
to the North Platte River.23 7 State legislation required the City to mar-
ket the excess water and to apply the proceeds to repayment of a loan
made by the state to the city to finance construction. 23 8 Voters ap-
proved the revised bond issue and the city and state provided a state-
ment that the project was compatible with the State's water development
plans. Since the two conditions had been met, the Regional Forester
issued the permits and this decision was affirmed by the Chief of the
Forest Service.
239
Appellants then brought this action in the United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming challenging the Forest Service's deci-
sion to grant the right of way. The complaint alleged violations of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),2 40 the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act (FLPMA), 2 4 ' the Endangered Species Act, 2 4 2 the
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact (Compact), 24 3 and the Supreme
Court's decree in Nebraska v. Wyoming. 24 4 The appellants then moved to
disqualify the trial judge, Judge Brimmer. The stated grounds for dis-
qualification were that the judge had made a financial contribution to a
committee organized to promote the passage of the bond issues for the
Stage II water diversion project.
24 5
2. The Lower Court Decision
The district court denied the motion to disqualify, concluding that
Judge Brimmer's small contribution to an organization supporting the
bond issue did not create a reasonable question as to his impartiality.
24 6
The court also dismissed all claims based on the Nebraska v. Wyoming
case, the Compact, and the Endangered Species Act.24 7 Finally, the
court granted the federal and city defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment on the NEPA and FLPMA claims. The lower court concluded that
the FEIS contained a satisfactory discussion of the alternatives and had
dealt with the issues appellants raised under the Upper Colorado River
236. Id. at 1.
237. Id. at 20.
238. Id. at 17. See Wyo. STAT. § 41-2-210(e) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
239. FEIS, supra note 223, at 17-18.
240. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-70 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
241. 43 U.S.C. § 1701-84 (1982 & Supp. I 1984).
242. 16 U.S.C. § 15 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
243. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31 (1949); see infra note 261
and accompanying text.
244. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
245. Lidstone, 773 F.2d at 1137; see infra note 250.
246. Id. at 1137-38.
247. Id. at 1136. The claim under the Endangered Species Act was dropped.
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Basin Compact and the decree in Nebraska v. Wyoming. The court also
rejected the FLPMA claim, holding that the selection of Alternative C
and the mitigation measures ordered by the Forest Service satisfied its
duty to limit the right of way so as to do no unnecessary damage to the
environment.
2 48
3. The Tenth Circuit Decision
Affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit found that
the environmental effects of the proposed project had been thoroughly
examined. 249 Judge Seth, writing for the court, agreed that no personal
bias could be found in Judge Brimmer's contribution to a Cheyenne or-
ganization seeking to educate the public about the bond issue proposed
for the expansion of the water system.
250
a. Standard of Review - Environmental Impact Statement
The standard of judicial review of an environmental impact state-
ment is well established and was described in Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Andrus:
2 5 1
Judicial review of an EIS is limited to a consideration of the
following: (1) does the EIS discuss all of the five procedural
requirements listed in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); (2) does the EIS
constitute a good faith compliance with the demands of NEPA;
and (3) does the statement contain a reasonable discussion of
the subject matter involved in the five respective areas?
252
248. Id. at 1137.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1137-38. The appellants attempted to disqualify the district court judge on
the basis of a modest financial contribution, twenty-five dollars, made by Judge Brimmer,
before suit was filed, to a group in Cheyenne seeking to inform the public about a pro-
posed bond issue to finance the Stage II expansion project. Disqualification was sought
under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982), which states that ajudge "shall disqual-
ify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."
Lidstone, 773 F.2d at 1137.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that Judge Brimmer properly remained sitting on this
action because "the plaintiff's failed to meet the standard set forth in United States v. Irwin."
Id. (citing United States v. Irwin, 561 F.2d 198 (10th Cir. 1977)). The standard is that
"[t]he bias charged must be of a personal nature and must be such as would likely result in
a decision on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the
case." Irwin, 561 F.2d at 200.
In affirmingJudge Brimmer's decision not to recuse himself, Judge Seth pointed out
that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate any real connection between the contribution
and the issue of whether the Forest Service complied with the applicable federal law. Lid-
stone, 773 F.2d at 1137-38.
251. 619 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1980) (Environmental groups sought to compel the Sec-
retary of the Interior to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act in connection
with approving detailed development plans prepared by defendant lessees, in lieu of an
environmental impact statement, under a prototype oil shale leasing program.).
252. Id. at 1376 (quoting Save Our Invaluable Land (SOIL), Inc. v. Needham, 542 F.2d
539, 542-43 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977)). The five procedural re-
quirements listed in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) are:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the propo-
sal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
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Thus, the duty of the reviewing court is limited to determining whether
the consideration and disclosure of the environmental consequences
was adequate. 2 53 Moreover, the reviewing court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency as to the ultimate choice of action.
2 54
The National Environmental Protection Act requires that an EIS in-
clude a comprehensive examination of the relevant environmental con-
sequences of a project and that the reviewing agency disclose the results
to the public. 25 5 The Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA) authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to grant rights of way
over lands in national forests for "reservoirs, canals, ditches, flumes, lat-
erals, pipes, pipelines, tunnels, and other facilities and systems for the
impoundment, storage, transportation, or distribution of water."
'25 6
Furthermore, the FLPMA requires that each right of way must be "lim-
ited to the ground which the Secretary ... determines . . . will do no
unnecessary damage to the environment. ' 2 57 Also rights of way must
contain terms and conditions that will "minimize damage to scenic and
esthetic values and fish and wildlife habitat and otherwise protect the
environment. '2 58 Finally, the FLPMA requires that the location of the
right a way be "along a route that will cause least damage to the environ-
ment, taking into consideration feasibility and other relevant fac-
tors." 25 9 In the present case, the Tenth Circuit found that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in its review of whether the Forest
Service had complied with the requirements of the FLPMA and NEPA.
b. Water Diversion Issues
Appellants also advanced issues related solely to water rights. The
court found, however, that right of way applications for a water project
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
253. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) ("The only role for a court is
to insure that the agency has taken a 'hard look' at environmental consequences; it cannot
'interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action
to be taken.' "); see, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97-98 (1983); Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S.
223, 227-28 (1980) (per curiam) (agency must not elevate environmental concerns over
other appropriate considerations); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978) (NEPA imposes "upon an agency
the obligation to consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a pro-
posed action.").
254. Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 560 (10th Cir. 1977) ("court should not sec-
ond-guess the experts"); Save Our Invaluable Land (SOIL), Inc., 542 F.2d at 543 ("Nor
should the courts in evaluating an EIS engage in hindsight judgment by way of second
guessing."); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1002-03 (10th Cir.) (court
rejected concept that environmental statement is judicially reviewable on the merits to
determine sufficiency), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1973).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982 & Supp. I 1984).
256. 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a)(1) (1982).
257. 43 U.S.C. § 1764(a)(4) (1982).
258. 43 U.S.C. § 1765(a)(ii) (1982).
259. 43 U.S.C. § 1765(b)(v) (1982).
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involve land use determinations and not water rights determinations. 260
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
water rights arguments based on alleged violations of the Nebraska v.
Wyoming decree and the Upper Colorado River Compact. The court em-
phasized "that the right of way grant had nothing to do with the ques-
tion as to whether Wyoming could move the water out of the Snake
River Basin." 2 6 1 Consequently, the court held that the Forest Service
260. Lidstone, 773 F.2d at 1137.
261. Id. Appellants argued that the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact precluded
transbasin diversion of the Little Snake River. Id. at 1136. The Compact was designed to
protect allocations of water between the states, not the methods of dividing waters within
the state boundaries. The most applicable language of the Compact is Article XI, section
(f), which states that "[wiater use projects initiated after the signing of this Compact, to the
greatest extent possible, shall permit the full use within the Basin in the most feasible
manner of the waters of the Little Snake River and its tributaries." Upper Colorado River
Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31, 39 (1949).
The State Engineer of Wyoming specifically required the diversion of Little Snake
waters into the North Platte Basin under this project. In so doing, the State Engineer
indicated that the State may appropriate water for use in Wyoming so long as the amount
is within its apportionment under the Compact and so long as the State meets its delivery
obligation to the Lower Basin. FEIS, supra note 223, at 13-23. The Compact must be
interpreted in light of the principle expressed in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589
(1945): "Our problem is not to determine what allocation would be equitable among the
canals in Nebraska or among those in Wyoming. That is a problem of internal administra-
tion for each of the States." Id. at 645.
Article VIII, section 3, of the Wyoming Constitution deals with "internal administra-
tion" and expresses the rule as follows: "Priority of appropriation for beneficial uses shall
give the better right. No appropriation shall be denied except when such denial is de-
manded by the public interests." WYo. CONsT. art. VIII, § 3. This does not prohibit trans-
basin diversion. In Willey v. Decker, 11 Wyo. 496, 531, 73 P. 210, 220 (1903), the
following principle was established: "The appropriator, though he may not own the land
on either bank of a running stream, may divert the water therefrom, and carry the same
whithersoever necessity may require for beneficial use, without returning it, or any of it, to
the natural stream in any manner." Id. (quoting Oppenlander v. Left-Hand Ditch Co., 18
Colo. 1012, 31 P. 854 (1892)); see also, Moyer v. Preston, 6 Wyo. 308, 44 P. 845 (1896).
In 1929 the United States Supreme Court resolved a dispute between Wyoming and
Colorado involving the waters of the Laramie River. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419
(1929). The Laramie flows north from Colorado into Wyoming. Colorado appropriators
built a canal to divert water out of the Laramie River Basin into a foreign basin for agricul-
tural use. Wyoming complained that "the waters of this interstate stream cannot rightfully
be taken from its watershed and carried into another." Id. at 456-57. In finding for Colo-
rado and allowing the transbasin diversion, the Court noted that both states subscribed to
a policy of prior appropriation which allowed transbasin diversion. The Court stated:
Both States pronounce the rule just and reasonable as applied to the natural
conditions in that region; and to prevent any departure from it the people of both
incorporated into their constitutions. It originated in the customs and usages of
the people before either State came into existence, and the courts of both hold
that their constitutional provisions are to be taken as recognizing the prior usage
rather than as creating a new rule.
Id. at 470.
The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31 (1949), does not pro-
hibit transbasin diversion, it promotes beneficial use. Article XI, section (c) of the Com-
pact reads: "Water uses under the apportionment made by this Article shall be in
accordance with the principle that beneficial use shall be the basis, measure and limit of
the right to use." 63 Stat. at 38.
Furthermore, Article III, section (b) reads as follows:
The apportionment made to the respective States by paragraph (a) of this
Article is based upon, and shall be applied in conformity with, the following prin-
ciples and each of them:
(1) the apportionment is of any and all man-made depletions;
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properly restricted its environmental study to the land use issues with
which it had the authority to deal and evaluate.
262
4. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit correctly concluded that the district court had
properly followed the established standard of review in considering a
challenge to an EIS. The grant of a right of way is an agency action
subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
2 6 3
Under that statute, the decision must be upheld unless it is "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
1aw."1264
The FEIS demonstrated that the Forest Service did not violate its
duty under the FLPMA when it granted the right of way. The Regional
Forester met the requirements of the FLPMA and NEPA by thoroughly
examining the environmental consequences of the project and recom-
mending an approach which would minimize environmental damage.26 5
The Tenth Circuit found that, procedurally, the Forest Service had con-
sidered all "feasible, reasonable alternatives." '2 6 6 The district court did
not have the authority to second guess the judgment of the Forest Ser-
vice, but only to determine if the Forest Service had complied with the
requirements of preparing an EIS. The Tenth Circuit properly affirmed
the district court's decision.
Suzanne L. Schmelter
(4) The apportionment to each State includes all water necessary for the supply
of any rights which now exist.
63 Stat. at 33.
262. Lidstone, 773 F.2d at 1137.
263. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
264. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).




SECURITIES AND COMMODITY FUTURES REGULATION
G. KELLAM SCOTr*
OVERVIEW
This Survey Article is limited to a discussion of the three cases de-
cided during the survey period which principally address the Securities
Act of 19331 (Act), the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 (Exchange
Act), and the Commodity Exchange Act of 19743 (CEA). During the
survey period, the Tenth Circuit decided two cases that reaffirmed previ-
ous decisions respecting the definition of "security," one of which also
discussed "controlling person" liability under the federal securities
laws. The third and probably the most significant case, reaffirmed the
scienter requirement in fraud actions under the CEA and rejected the
"trust and confidence" test in state law fiduciary duty claims between a
broker and its customer.
I. COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT: HILL V. BACHE HALSEY
STUART SHIELDS INC.
In Hill v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Inc. ,4 the Tenth Circuit reversed
a judgment awarding plaintiff Glenn Hill damages in the total amount of
$2,047,0005 under claims that Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Incorpo-
rated (Bache), his futures commission merchant (broker),6 engaged in
unauthorized trading in his account and misrepresented or failed to dis-
close material facts, all in violation of section 4b(A) of the CEA.
7
* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Stuart James Research Center, Univer-
sity of Denver College of Law. B.S. Rutgers College, 1970; Ed.M. Rutgers University,
1971;J.D. Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis, 1977.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1985).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ii (1985).
3. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1 et. seq. (1985).
4. 790 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1986).
5. Judgment was entered in the district court, after a six-day trial. The jury returned
a verdict in favor of Hill on all of his claims and in favor of defendant on its counterclaim
for breach of contract. Judgment, as amended, was entered providing Hill $64,795.55 in
compensatory damages ($47,000 on verdict plus $17,795.55 in prejudgment interest) plus
$2,000,000 for exemplary or punitive damages, for a total of $2,064,795.55. Bache was
awarded $2,390.50 on its counterclaim for breach of contract. Id. at 820 n. 1.
6. A "futures commission merchant" (FCM) is a firm with access to trading rights on
a commodity exchange. A "futures commission agent" is the registered representative of
the FCM. Throughout this article "broker" will be used interchangeably to refer to both
an FCM and its registered representative. For the purposes of this article, the same princi-
ples apply to an FCM as apply to a securities broker-dealer; any differences are beyond the
scope of this survey article.
7. 7 U.S.C. § 6(b)(A) (1976). Section 6b of the CEA provides, in part:
It shall be unlawful... (2) for any person, in or in connection with any order to
make ... any contract of sale of any commodity for future delivery, made, or to be
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A. Facts
Hill, a farmer from Haxtun, Colorado, called Bache in November of
1979 and opened a nondiscretionary commodities account8 trading
corn, pork belly, and cattle futures through Wayne Wright, a futures
commission agent in the Denver office of Bache. At the time his account
was opened, Hill was given and signed a copy of the Bache Customer
Agreement, a Commodity Suitability Letter, and a Risk Disclosure State-
ment. Between November, 1979, and February, 1980, Wright executed
fifty-nine commodities transactions 9 in Hill's account. During this same
period of trading, Wright and Hill engaged in at least sixty-five conver-
sations over the telephone, including three conversations in which Hill
complained that he was "losing money" and that Wright was "getting
into things" Hill did not want to purchase.' 0 Confirmations for the
transactions were sent to Hill for each trade. Hill received the confirma-
tions within four days of each trade, but, outside of the telephone dis-
cussions, never complained about the trades, even though he admitted
reading the confirmations. As fortune would have it, due to interna-
made, on or subject to the rules of any contract market, for or on behalf of any
other person ...
(A) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such other person;
(B) willfully to make or cause to be made to such other person any false
report or statement thereof, or willfully to enter or cause to be entered for such
person any false record thereof;
(C) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such other person by any
means whatsoever in regard to any such order or contract or the disposition or
execution of any such order or contract, or in regard to any act of agency per-
formed with respect to such order or contract for such person.
7 U.S.C. § 6(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
8. Hill, 790 F.2d at 828. A nondiscretionary account requires the authorization of
the customer prior to each trade. A discretionary account allows the broker to trade with-
out express authorization from its customer.
9. Commodities transactions involve the purchase or sale of commodity futures con-
tracts. A commodity futures contract requires the purchaser (seller) to buy (sell) a speci-
fied quantity of a commodity with delivery of the underlying goods at a future date.
Futures contracts are traded on margin. The leveraged transactions, as is the case in se-
curities accounts, may result in compound gains or losses as the price of the commodity
changes. Some traders engage in commodity futures trading for speculative purposes, i.e.,
realization of gain due to occurrence of anticipated price fluctuations. Other traders, such
as a corn farmer trading corn futures, trade in order to hedge business risks by selling or
buying futures contracts to protect against possible adverse price changes. Settlement of
futures contracts by delivery of the consideration (cash/commodity) is unusual and occurs
in less than five percent of the contracts. CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, COMMODrrY TRADING
MANUAL 31 (1980). Usually anr offsetting purchase or sale is effected to liquidate or close
out the account. Thus, trading in a futures account must be effected rapidly as price fluc-
tuations become known. When adverse price movement occurs, trades must be executed
quickly to reduce losses. See F. HORN & V. FARAH, TRADING IN COMMODITY FUTURES
(1979); CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, COMMODITY TRADING MANUAL (1980). Although analo-
gies may be drawn between securities and commodities transactions, there are distinctions
between the two. For example, one may invest in securities or merely trade securities,
while commodities are usually traded due to their volatility and short life. A securities in-
vestor gains from capital appreciation and, if appropriate, dividends; a commodities trader
only benefits from price changes which must occur within relatively short periods of time.
The volatility that creates trading pressure in commodities transactions is unlike that oc-
curring in securities, with the possible exception of options. This resultant trading pres-
sure may suggest different threshold considerations for churning in commodity futures
cases as than in securities cases. See infra note 13.
10. Hill, 790 F.2d at 820.
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tional political events beyond Hill's control, the market fell sharply re-
sulting in substantial losses for Hill. Due to the precipitous market
decline, Hill was required to make additional cash payments into his ac-
count, and his account was eventually closed with a negative balance.
Seeking compensation for his loss, Hill filed a civil action in federal
district court. " Hill claimed that Wright, upon whom Hill relied, failed
to fully discuss and properly advise Hill about the actual mechanics and
risk of loss associated with futures trading. 12 Hill alleged none of the
trades were discussed with him before their execution. Therefore, Hill
charged, the trades executed by Bache constituted "churning" or exces-
sive unauthorized trading. 13 Hill argued that Bache churned his ac-
count and failed to disclose material facts regarding the nature of his
commodity futures account which violated section 4b of the CEA.' 4
Bache, on the other hand, argued that Hill authorized the trading in
his account during numerous telephone conversations, and that, in any
event, Hill received and read the confirmations without complaint,
thereby ratifying any previously unauthorized trades. 15 The jury re-
jected this claim and returned a verdict in Hill's favor. Bache appealed
the award and amount of damages.
B. Scienter, A Necessary Element Under CEA Section 4b
1. The District Court's Constructive Fraud Instruction and
Section 4b Liability
A customer may recover damages from his broker under section 4b
of the CEA if he can prove fraud or willful conduct; a showing of mere
negligence, mistake, or inadvertence will not suffice. 16 At trial, the dis-
trict court "instructed the jury that even 'constructive fraud' by a com-
modity futures broker violated § 4b(A)."' 17 The trial court defined
constructive fraud as "a breach of duty which, irrespective of moral
guilt, the law declares fraudulent because of the tendency to deceive, to
violate confidence or to injure public interests. Liability for constructive fraud
11. Under the CEA, Hill had several forums with which to pursue his damages reme-
dies: a reparations proceeding before a Commodity Futures Trading Commission adminis-
trative law judge, 7 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1982), arbitration, 7 U.S.C. § 7(a)(ll) (1985), or a
private action, 7 U.S.C. § 25 (1985).
12. Hill, 790 F.2d at 820.
13. Id. at 820-21. "Churning" includes not only trading in excess of authority but
also that which is excessive in light of the customer's investment objective and financial
situation. In either event, trading which only benefits the broker through increased com-
missions, at the expense of the customer, is fraudulent. Churning of a securities account
violates Rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act. Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 170-71 (10th Cir. 1974). Churning of a commodities account
should result in a violation of section 4b of the CEA.
14. Hill, 790 F.2d at 820-21.
15. Id. at 821.
16. Master Commodities, Inc. v. Texas Cattle Management, 586 F.2d 1352, 1355
(10th Cir. 1978).
17. Hill, 790 F.2d at 822. Hill initially asserted that Bache violated sections 4b(B) and
4b(C), as well as section 4b(A). During the course of the trial, however, Hill apparently
limited his case to reliance on section 4b(A).
1987]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
under [§ 4b] may be based on negligent acts or omission."'1 8
The trial court apparently agreed with Hill's argument that a breach
of state law fiduciary duty gives rise to an action under section 4b. Such
reasoning follows the decision of the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission (CFTC) in Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.,19 a reparations
case, in which the CFTC held that a negligent breach of fiduciary duty by a
commodity futures broker violates section 4b.
20
2. The Tenth Circuit's Rejection of the District Court's
Culpability Standard
The Tenth Circuit, electing not to follow Gordon, reversed the trial
court's lenient fraud standard under section 4b. Relying upon its previ-
ous decision in Master Commodities, Inc. v. Texas Cattle Management Co.,21
and similar rationale applied by the First, Second, Fifth, Eighth and
Ninth circuits, 2 2 the court of appeals held the trial court's constructive
fraud instruction amounted to a negligence standard which, as applied
under federal securities law, is too broad.23 Furthermore, the Tenth
Circuit panel reasoned that section 4b is a fraud provision which makes
no reference to fiduciary duty. 24 The court stated that "the purpose of
fiduciary duty rules is to eliminate the need for a fraud inquiry." 2 5 Con-
sistent with a conclusion that the two actions are not identical, the dis-
tinctions to be drawn between a fraud action and a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty are substantive and reflect more than procedural niceties.
Thus, as the court noted, the district court's jury instruction regarding
section 4b, with its reference to a "fraudulent" breach of duty and "neg-
ligent acts," does seem ambiguous and at best confusing. Judge Logan's
opinion admonished that "on retrial the district court should instruct
the jury that it must find willfulness for violation of § 4b or § 4b(A)" and
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 21,016 at 23,975 (CFTC Apr. 10, 1980), af'd on other
grounds sub nom., Shearson Loeb Rhodes, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 673
F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1982).
20. The wisdom and logic of the Gordon decision has been the subject of second guess-
ing. See, e.g., Hunter v. Madda Trading Co., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,242 at 25,204
n.8 (CFTC Sept. 2, 1981); Markham, Customer Rights Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 37
VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1334-38 (1984).
21. 586 F.2d 1352 (10th Cir. 1978).
22. Hill, 790 F.2d at 822. See Greenwood v. Dittmer, 776 F.2d 785, 789 (8th Cir.
1985); McIlroy v. Dittmer, 732 F.2d 98, 102 (8th Cir. 1984); First Commodity Corp. v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 676 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1982); Commodities Fu-
tures Trading Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 283 (9th Cir. 1979); Haltmier v. Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm'n, 554 F.2d 556, 562 (2d Cir. 1977); McCurnin v.
Kohlmeyer & Co., 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973).
23. Hill, 790 F.2d at 823. This standard of culpability requiring scienter also exists
under Colorado law. Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210 (D. Colo. 1983); People v. Milne,
690 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1984) (decided under former securities law); People v. Blair, 195
Colo. 462, 579 P.2d 1133 (1978) (jury instructions should be phrased in terms of "know-
ingly," willfully," and "aware"); People v. Terranova, 38 Colo. App. 476, 563 P.2d 363
(1976) (simple negligence alone is insufficient).




that the instruction for section 4b "should not refer to fiduciary duty." 26
3. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's holding that intent beyond negligence is neces-
sary to meet the scienter requirement is consistent with Master Commodi-
ties and is particularly appropriate in light of judicial precedent under
analogous securities fraud provisions. Hill does not state the minimum
standard necessary to meet the scienter requirement. The Tenth Cir-
cuit, however, previously addressed that issue in Hackbart v. Holmes,2 7 a
decision postdating Master Commodities, but not discussed in Hill.
Although brought under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,28 reliance
upon Hackbart would not be misplaced.
Hackbart involved a civil action brought by Dale Hackbart against his
former college football teammate and longtime friend, James Holmes.
Using Holmes' attorney to prepare the necessary documents and relying
upon Holmes' business expertise to organize the new corporation,
Hackbart agreed to join Holmes as equal, or nearly equal, shareholders
of a corporation formed to carry out their joint business interests. After
the corporation was formed, shares of stock were issued to both Holmes
and Hackbart, Holmes receiving common stock and Hackbart receiving
non-participating preferred stock. Although Hackbart considered his
relationship with Holmes to be tantamount to "an equal partnership, ' 2 9
Hackbart's preferred shares were non-participating and did not permit
him to share in the success of the enterprise or corporate growth unless
they were previously converted by the board of directors, which Holmes
controlled. 30 Hackbart's shares were never converted. Eventually the
two had a falling out and agreed to liquidate the enterprise. It was then
that Holmes advised Hackbart he was only entitled to the $5,000 he con-
tributed and that the preferred shares did not permit Hackbart to par-
ticipate in the corporation's success.
3 1
As a result, Hackbart sued Holmes seeking his "share" of the fruits
of their labor. The trial court entered judgment for Hackbart and
Holmes appealed. Affirming judgment for Hackbart, the Tenth Circuit
held that, respecting their business dealings, a relationship of trust ex-
isted between Hackbart and Holmes creating a duty of candor which
Holmes owed Hackbart. The court found that Holmes did not withhold
information from Hackbart, but that Holmes "acted recklessly in not
making sure Hackbart understood he was not going to participate in the
growth of the corporation." '32 Holmes breached his duty of candor
when he failed tofully disclose, in a manner understandable to Hackbart,
the actual nature of the interest Hackbart acquired in their corporation.
26. Id.
27. 675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1983).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (b) (1985); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
29. Hackbart, 675 F.2d at 1116.
30. Id. at 1116-17.
31. Id. at 1117.
32. Id. at 1118, 1120.
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The court held Holmes liable, stating that recklessness will meet scien-
ter requirements under Rule lOb-5 of the federal securities laws.
33
By analogy to the federal securities laws, recklessness or gross neg-
ligence should meet the minimum culpability standard under CEA fraud
requirements.3 4 Under Master Commodities, "recovery must be based on
fraud or willful conduct, and not mere negligence, mistake or in-
advertance."3 5 Although at times the scienter requirement appears to
place an insurmountable obstacle in the path of plaintiffs, the Tenth Cir-
cuit's recklessness standard, which should apply also to commodity fu-
tures cases, seems reasonable. Moreover, the Hill decision reaffirms a
holding that finds great support in the language of the statute. The
Supreme Court has previously held the use of the term "manipulative"
in section 10(b) to be "virtually a term of art when used in connection
with securities markets," 3 6 and evidences a Congressional intent to re-
quire scienter. Under comparable language held to be "analogous" to
antifraud provisions under the Securities Act, the Tenth Circuit in
33. Id. at 1117-18. The court stated:
Circuits subsequently addressing the question all have concluded that reckless
behavior satisfies the scienter requirement.
This Circuit at least implicitly has concluded that recklessness is enough. See
Wertheim & Co. v. Codding Embryological Sciences, Inc., 620 F.2d 764, 766-67
(10th Cir. 1980); Cronin v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856, 862 (10th
Cir. 1980); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir. 1979).
At this time we expressly hold that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement.
We do so for the same reasons given by the other circuits: first, because the
Securities Acts are to be broadly construed to achieve their remedial goals, Mans-
bach [v. Prescott, Ball & Turben], 598 F.2d at 1024 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151,92 S. Ct. 1456, 1470, 31 L.Ed.2d 741 (1972));
second, because requiring the plaintiff to show intent would be unduly burden-
some, [G.A.] Thompson [& Co. v. Partridge], 636 F.2d at 961 n.32; Mansbach, 598
F.2d at 1025; Rolf [v. Blythe, Eastman Dillon & Co.], 570 F.2d at 47; and third,
because the Securities Acts were intended to proscribe actions akin to common
law fraud, see [Ernst & Ernst v.] Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 212 n.32, 96 S. Ct. at 1390
n.32 (reviewing legislative history and finding that the SEC believed the rule
would proscribe fraudulent behavior), and reckless behavior satisfies the scienter
requirement of common law fraud, Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1024. For purposes of
applying Rule 1 Ob-5, the best definition of reckless behavior is conduct that is "an
extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a
danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is
so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it." Sundstrand Corp. [v. Sun
Chemical Corp.], 553 F.2d at 1045 (quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev.
Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976)).
Hackbart, 675 F.2d at 1117-18.
34. Hill, 790 F.2d at 822 n.8; cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197
(1976). However, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has not yet determined
whether recklessness is a level of culpability sufficient to meet scienter requirements. Id. at
194 n.12 (recklessness exists where one can establish the making of a statement with no
belief in its truth). See also Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889). See generally, D. DOBBS,
R. KEETON, W. PAGE KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 212-14 (5th ed.
1984). Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's failure to conclude whether recklessness sat-
isfies the scienter requirement, several lower federal courts have determined that reckless-
ness suffices. Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 1983); G. A. Thomson
& Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981); Keinnam v. Homeland, Inc., 611
F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1980); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197-99 (3d Cir.
1979); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978); Sanders v.
John Nureen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977).
35. Master Commodities, 586 F.2d at 1355.
36. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199.
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Master Commodities determined the same to be true in CEA actions.3 7
The Supreme Court has held that intent to deceive (scienter), and not
negligence, meets the requisite culpability level intended by Congress
under federal securities laws.
38
The similar statutory construction and purposes of the securities
acts and the CEA beg the question. Both securities and commodities
laws are intended, in substantial part, to protect the investing public
from fraudulent conduct. Thus, the plain language of section 4b which
uses "cheat" and "defraud" should, as under federal securities law, re-
quire some form of purposefully misleading conduct.3 9 It is only rea-
sonable to conclude that an action grounded in fraud or for deceit
requires a showing of scienter. The Tenth Circuit properly determined
that scienter is necessary under the CEA.
40
Thus, in light of Hill, every trial attorney harboring a glint in his or
her eye for section 4b litigation is well advised to pay homage to scienter
requirements. However, should the facts appear insufficient to support
a finding of scienter, claims made under state law may provide an alter-
native for plaintiffs with buyers remorse.
4 1
C. State Law Fiduciary Duty Claims And Broker Liability
Because of the potential difficulty plaintiffs may have proving scien-
ter, the existence of a state law fiduciary duty claim is of more than aca-
demic interest. In Hill, the significance of state law fiduciary duty claims
was brought home with a vengeance by the court's holding that not only
will it "not foreclose liability" on such pendent claims, 42 but that liabil-
37. Master Commodities, 586 F.2d at 1355.
38. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 214; see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980)
(holding scienter is required in Rule lOb-5 actions whether for damages or an enforce-
ment action of the Securities and Exchange Commission); SEC v. Mick Stack Assoc. Inc.,
675 F.2d 1148, 1149-50 (10th Cir. 1982) (reversing and remanding a case to allow the SEC
to specifically allege scienter).
39. Master Commodities, 586 F.2d at 1356 (citing McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 347 F.
Supp. 573 (E.D. La. 1972)). Also directed at section 4b, the court quoted Judge Rubin in
McCurnin:
[section 5] is clearly directed only toward willfull misconduct.
The C.E.A does not use sweeping terms. Its pejoratives are simple and
pointed: it uses the words "cheat" and "defraud" and "willfully." By any defini-
tion, these connote deliberate acts or a degree of negligence so gross as to ap-
proach wilfullness....
Id.; see Ernest & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 185, 199; see also Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1976) (holding a breach of fiduciary duty without deception, misrepresentation, or non-
disclosure will not constitute a cause of action under Rule 1Ob-5).
40. Master Commodities, 586 F.2d at 1356. In Hill, consistent with the court's holding
that section 4b is a fraud provision, the court held "[t]he instruction on fiduciary duty
under the CEA was inappropriate and only confused that issue." Hill, 790 F.2d at 823.
The court reasoned that because liability can be found without a fraud inquiry when a
fiduciary has breached his duty to his beneficiary, if section 4b is an anti-fraud provision,
then a determination of whether it has been breached, of necessity, includes a fraud in-
quiry. Id.; see also McIlroy v. Dittmer, 732 F.2d 98, 102 (8th Cir. 1984) (violation of section
4b(A) requires more than mere carelessness).
41. See infra notes 42-70 and accompanying text.
42. Hill, 790 F.2d at 827.
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ity under breach of fiduciary duty claims may include punitive damages.4 3
There is an old adage, that the Lord giveth and the Lord taketh
away. The same may be said of the Tenth Circuit. While the court de-
nied Hill's claims under section 4b, it determined that, under state law
fiduciary duty claims, plaintiffs may obtain compensatory and exemplary
damages for harms suffered at the hands of unscrupulous brokers.
Although Hill held that Colorado law does not recognize a fiduciary duty
existing in all broker-customer relationships,4 4 it also held that in those
cases where the duty is breached, substantial liability may attach.
4 5
Under Colorado law, such liability may exist under breach of contract or
breach of fiduciary duty claims.
4 6
43. Id. "We hold that under current Colorado law the district court had subject mat-
ter jurisdiction to award punitive damages to Hill." Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 824-25.
45. Although a discussion of Colorado law is beyond the scope of this article, it
should be noted that the source for Colorado law on punitive damages in fiduciary duty
claims is Adams v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 686 P.2d 797 (Colo. App. 1983),
aff'd, 718 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1986), a decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals and not the
Colorado Supreme Court. In Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis v. Adams, 718 P.2d 508,
513-14 (Colo. 1986), the Colorado Supreme Court did not determine whether punitive
damages were available since the issue was not raised on appeal. As a general rule, issues
not presented in the trial court are deemed waived and cannot be raised on appeal. See
Christensen v. Hover, 643 P.2d 525, 531 (Colo. 1982); Matthews v. Tri-County Water
Conservancy Dist., 200 Colo. 202, 206, 613 P.2d 889, 892 (1980); McMullin v. Magnuson,
102 Colo. 230, 244-45, 78 P.2d 964, 971 (1938).
The defendants in Paine Webber, through their pleadings, did nothing to limit the
district court to the exercise of only its equitable jurisdiction, nor did they object to Caryl
Adams' request for ajury trial, which is available only in actions at law. See Kaitz v. District
Court, 650 P.2d 553, 555 (Colo. 1982). Thus, the real issue as to punitive damages did
not involve whether the trial court's power to award such damages was within its jurisdic-
tion, but rather whether the action was an equitable one, and if so, whether exemplary
damages were available as a remedy. Properly framed, the issue did not involve a chal-
lenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, and since it was not raised before the
courts below, it was deemed waived. The Colorado Supreme Court noted that
In Kaitz v. District Court, 650 P.2d 553, 556 (Colo. 1982), we held that puni-
tive damages are not available in actions in equity. However, we did not decide in
Kaitz, as Ocrant and Paine Webber now assert, that all actions involving a claim
for breach of fiduciary duties are equitable, not legal, in nature.
In Kaitz, we held that an action for breach of fiduciary duties brought by the
beneficiaries of several guardianship estates against the guardian of the estates
was one in equity. We noted that "[a]ctions by a beneficiary or ward against a
trustee or guardian in an existing trust or guardianship are generally, but not always,
equitable in nature." Id. at 555 (emphasis added). Thus, Kaitz does not foreclose
the real possibility that certain fiduciary duty claims can be tried at law, and the
court of appeals has recognized that possibility since Kaitz was decided. See Ma-
honey Marketing Corp. v. Sentry Builders of Colorado, Inc., 697 P.2d 1139
(Colo. App. 1985); Holter v. Moore & Co., 681 P.2d 962 (Colo. App. 1983).
Paine, Webber, 718 P.2d at 514 n.5 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
46. Paine, Webber, 718 P.2d at 508; see Uniform Fiduciaries Law, CoLo. REV. STAT.
§§ 15-1-101 (1973 & 1986 Cum. Supp.). The Colorado Uniform Fiduciaries Law includes
in its definition of a fiduciary "any other person acting in a fiduciary capacity for any per-
son." CoLo. REV. STAT. § 15-1-103(2) (1973). Although the complaint alleged breach of
fiduciary duty, Hill elected to bring his action at common law rather than under the Colo-
rado statute. Under the remedies available, if one can establish a knowing or bad faith
breach, punitive damages may be awarded. Adams v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
686 P.2d 797, 802 (Colo. App. 1983).
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1. The Tenth Circuit's Application of State Law Fiduciary Duty
Claims
The district court, obviously relying on the Colorado Court of Ap-
peals' decision in Adams v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis (Adams),4 7 in-
structed the jury that a recovery under plaintiff's state law fiduciary duty
claim required proof by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) That the plaintiff reposed his trust and confidence in Wright, or
plaintiff's trust and confidence was induced from him by Wright, and
thus a fiduciary relationship existed; (2) That Wright breached
his fiduciary duty by failing to deal with the plaintiff in utmost
good faith and solely for the plaintiff's benefit in the handling
of his commodity futures account; (3) That the plaintiff in-
curred losses; and (4) That the plaintiff's losses were caused by
Wright's breach of duty.
4 8
According to the Tenth Circuit, the district court's test, based primarily
on Hill's perceptions of his relationship with his broker, failed to suffi-
ciently examine the actual relationship existing between Hill and Bache.
Judge Logan, speaking for the Tenth Circuit, ruled the trial court's
instruction was "too broad,"' 4 9 and held that a fiduciary duty "cannot be
defined by asking the jury to determine simply whether the principal
reposed 'trust and confidence' in the agent."' 50 The opinion noted that
a fiduciary duty, if any, arose from Hill's agency relationship with Bache.
Under agency law, agents are fiduciaries with respect to matters within
the scope of their agency.5 1 The Tenth Circuit panel held the "trust and
confidence" instruction is simply not sufficient to define the nature of
the fiduciary duty since it fails to address the scope of the agency, which
47. 686 P.2d 797 (Colo. App. 1983), aft'd, 718 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1986). The Adams
court stated that:
The existence of a fiduciary relationship between a customer and a stockbro-
ker is a question of fact, and the burden of establishing its existence is upon the
party asserting its existence, here, the customer. Tschudy v. Sudler, 158 Colo.
421, 407 P.2d 877 (1965).
... [I]nvestment banking is a business based principally on the foundation of
confidence. Hughes v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.
1943). Under this theory, an agency analysis is applied to stockbroker-customer
relationships, and in determining whether a fiduciary relationship exists between
broker and customer, a court is to look for trust and confidence, either given by a
customer to a broker, or induced from a customer by a broker. We therefore rule
that if the facts show that the relationship between stockbroker and customer is
accompanied by proof of the customer's trust and confidence in the broker, a
fiduciary relationship is created. See generally S. GOLDBERG, FRAUDULENT BROKER-
DEALER PRACTICES § 8.4 (1978).
Id. at 800. (citations omitted).
48. Hill, 790 F.2d at 824 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 823, 828. Although Judge Holloway entered an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part, the panel was unanimous as to all issues other than the trial court's
exclusion of evidence of subsequent trading per FED. R. EVID. 403.
50. Hill, 790 F.2d at 824.
51. Judge Logan properly noted that "all agents are fiduciaries 'with respect to mat-
ters within the scope of [their] agency.' " Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 13 (1958); Sherman v. Schoioff, 570 F. Supp. 1266, 1269 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 COMMENT B (1959)).
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it viewed as the "key question." 5 2 Moreover, reasoned the court, since
the agency relationship is consensual, the inquiry, a question of fact for
the jury to determine, should focus on "what Wright had agreed to do
for Hill" and whether he "executed those tasks properly."15 3 The court
found that the jury, not being properly instructed, failed to determine
the scope of the agency relationship, if any.
2. Control: A Bright-Line Test to Determine the Scope of the
Agency Relationship
In Colorado, the controlling jurisdiction, a professional relationship
existing between a broker and a customer does not per se establish the
fiduciary relationship. 5 4 Whether a commodity or securities broker
owes a fiduciary duty to his customer is determined by the amount of
control the broker exercises over the customer's account. The fiduciary
duty owed by a broker administering a nondiscretionary account is "very
narrow - primarily not to make unauthorized trades."'5 5 The fiduciary
duty owed by a broker administering a discretionary account is "to avoid
excessive trading" or churning. 56 Wright and Bache agreed to adminis-
ter Hill's account at Bache as a nondiscretionary account. 5 7 However,
the determination as to whether an account, as originally opened, was
discretionary or nondiscretionary is not wholly dispositive as to the
scope of the broker's duty. A nondiscretionary account may be "con-
verted," by the conduct of the parties, into a de facto discretionary ac-
count.58 In Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis v. Adams (Paine Webber),59 the
affirmance of the Adams case, the Colorado Supreme Court held:
In assessing the existence of control by a broker, courts
have not limited the scope of their vision to the documentation
pursuant to which a customer's account is maintained, but in-
stead have examined how account transactions have actually
been conducted. Thus, it has been held that a broker could
usurp control over a technically nondiscretionary account, ren-
dering that broker subject to the same fiduciary duties as if the
account had been discretionary from its creation. The closely
related criterion of a broker's "involvement" in transactions in
a customer's account also has been considered material in
resolving the factual question of the existence of a fiduciary
duty. If a broker has acted as an investment advisor, and partic-
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Adams v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 686 P.2d 797, 800 (Colo. App. 1983).
55. Hill, 790 F.2d at 824. A nondiscretionary account is an account in which the cus-
tomer directs the trading and determines which purchases and sales to make. See N. WOLF-
SON, R. PHILIPS AND T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS, AND SECURITIES
MARKETS § 2.11 (1985).
56. Hill, 790 F.2d at 824.
57. Id. at 820.
58. Id. at 824. The court did not address the factors utilized to determine whether
Hill's account was a defacto discretionary account. However, the inquiry into control of the
account should support or refute such a conversion.
59. 718 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1986).
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ularly if the customer has almost invariably followed the bro-
ker's advice, this is an indication that the broker exercises
functional control of the account and that the broker-customer
relationship is fiduciary.
60
Under Hill, if Wright's actions, with Hill's acquiescence, converted the
account into a discretionary account, then Bache was in control of the
account and had at least a fiduciary duty under state law to avoid exces-
sive as well as unauthorized trading.
6 1
Although the Hill court stated it was following Adams, 62 in fact
Judge Logan's opinion, while adopting the Adams punitive damages
standard, set forth a fiduciary duty claim similar to that adopted by the
Colorado Supreme Court in Paine Webber. Much like Paine Webber, Hill
would allow state law fiduciary duty liability to rest on whether the bro-
ker exercised "functional control.''63
Whether a defendant exercises functional control is a question of
fact. The existence of functional control depends, in substantial part,
upon the sophistication, experience, intelligence, and investment acu-
men of the customer as well as the character, advisory or ministerial, and
frequency of communications between the broker and its customer.
64
Hill claimed that he was not a sophisticated trader and that he lacked
experience and knowledge of the mechanics of commodities trading and
risks inherent therein. It is conceivable that, under appropriate circum-
stances, customer sophistication alone may be determinative of control.
In Hill, however, there are other facts urging a different conclusion. For
example, "at least sixty-five" telephone conversations occurred between
Wright and Hill during the period in which the trades took place.
65
Therefore, a finding that trades were discussed before their execution is
not unlikely. Further, even though he reviewed confirmations of each
trade, Hill failed to immediately complain about or object to trades
which he claimed were made without authority. 6 6 Of course, if Hill's
version of the facts is sustained, it seems reasonable to excuse his failure
to immediately repudiate the trades. Both repudiation and ratification
require knowledge and sophistication which, according to Hill, Bache
and Wright prevented Hill from obtaining. In any event, the issues are
not unlike those discussed in Paine Webber.
6 7
In Paine Webber, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the decision
60. Id. at 516 (citations omitted).
61. Hill, 790 F.2d at 824. The distinction between excessive trading and unauthorized
trading often is blurred. Excessive trading, however, may occur as to transactions which,
taken alone, are suitable. Some confusion may result regarding Judge Logan's citation to
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), an important churning
case. The reference appears to be directed to the discussion of control which, once suffi-
ciently established to prove a churning claim, should support claims regarding a fiduciary
duty and the limits of such duty.
62. Hill, 790 F.2d at 827.
63. Id. at 824; Paine Webber, 718 P.2d at 517-18.
64. Hill, 790 F.2d at 824; Paine Webber, 718 P.2d at 517-18.
65. Hill, 790 F.2d at 820.
66. Id. at 820-21.
67. Paine Webber, 718 P.2d at 517.
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for Caryl Adams granting her compensatory and punitive damages. Ad-
ams, who was without business acumen, acquired a securities account
previously traded in her name through settlement of her divorce. Her
former husband originally opened and traded the account. After the
divorce, Adams advised Ocrant, Paine Webber's representative, she
would trade her account. Thereafter, Ocrant had numerous contacts
with Adams and "maintained close personal and social contacts."
68
Finding Ocrant "engendered customer's reliance and growing trust,"
the appellate court determined Ocrant eventually controlled and
churned the account. 69 Caryl Adams relied totally and solely upon
Paine Webber. The trial court awarded damages and the Colorado
Supreme Court, in declining to adopt a rule that a broker/customer re-
lationship is, per se, fiduciary, held "that proof of practical control of a
customer's account by a broker will establish that the broker owes fiduci-
ary duties to the customer with regard to the broker's handling of the
customer's account.''70
Consistent with Paine Webber, the Tenth Circuit rejected a test
which, applied by the district court, required only a determination of
whether the customer "reposed trust and confidence" in his broker.
Separately, both the Tenth Circuit and the Colorado Supreme Court
adopted a "functional control" test as determinative of state law fiduci-
ary duty claims.
3. Broker Compliance: Customer Disclosure Documents and
Subsequent Trading Behavior
The court did determine that the "[v]iolation of an internal rule of a
brokerage house alone is not sufficient for imposition of liability."
'7 1
However, the effect of the use and nature of risk disclosure documents,
customer suitability forms, and related documents 72 upon broker liabil-
68. Adams, 686 P.2d at 799.
69. Id.
70. Paine Webber, 718 P.2d at 517. In Paine Webber, the Colorado Supreme Court set
forth various factors intended to determine whether the broker directly exercised control
over the account as a discretionary account or otherwise. These factors include the bro-
ker's involvement in transactions, his actions as an investment advisor, his trading of a
customer's account without prior approval, and the investor's investment acumen. Id. at
516-17.
71. Hill, 790 F.2d at 821 n.4.
72. Under CEA Rules 1.55 and 33.7, 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.55, 33.7 (1986), an FCM must
advise its customer of risks associated with commodities trading at the time the account is
opened and approved for trading. The process for accomplishing this is carried out by use
of compliance documents such as risk disclosure statements. FCMs must make a written
disclosure indicating trading is not suitable for all potential customers, the volatile nature
of commodities trading, and the potential for substantial loss. Customers are advised they
should not engage in trading until they understand the nature and extent of their rights
and obligations. On the other hand, customer suitability forms, which are usually com-
pleted by the customer with the FCM agent, provide information intended to enable the
FCM to determine whether commodities trading is appropriate in light of the customer's
investment objectives and previous investment or trading history. Other documents allow
management and compliance personnel within the firm to supervise and control the ac-
tions of the FCM's employees. Together, these compliance documents make a necessary
disclosure to customers while enabling the firm to meet its obligations under the CEA.
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ity was not articulated by the Tenth Circuit. While only briefly com-
menting upon the use of disclosure documents, the Hill court
encouraged their use by stating "courts generally are reluctant to find
that there have been misrepresentations when a prospective customer
has received disclosure documents."7 3 From a policy standpoint, the
use of disclosure documents should be encouraged to allow investors
and the public to benefit from disclosure. At the same time, proof that
the disclosure and suitability forms were used should not absolve bro-
kers of any and all claims of wrongdoing. Although the CEA provides
traders with the means to recover from the unscrupulous broker, the
commodity laws were never intended to relieve investors of their vigil
nor to reward naivete. As stated by Professor Loss: "Congress did not
take away from the citizen 'his inalienable right to make a fool of him-
self.' It simply attempted to prevent others from making a fool of
him."
74
Finally, the Tenth Circuit held that evidence of subsequent trading
which "lasted for a similar short period of time, exhibited a similar type
and frequency of trading, followed a similar pattern of phone calls, and
resulted in a similar loss" is admissible in cases involving claims of unau-
thorized trading. 75 During the trial, Bache offered evidence of subse-
quent and similar trading initiated by Hill at another firm only five
months after liquidating his account at Bache. The district court ex-
cluded the evidence, ruling that its probative value was outweighed by
its potential for confusion and delay.7 6 The Tenth Circuit, while recog-
nizing the broad discretion of the trial court to determine whether evi-
dence is irrelevant, held the trial court in error, reversed, and ruled that
evidence of subsequent trading is admissible and of probative value in
determining whether Hill authorized the trades, Bache's involvement,
and whether Hill or Bache was responsible for the losses. 77 In ruling on
the probative value, the court suggested that summary or expert testi-
mony may be used to lessen the likelihood of confusion or delay.
78
D. Conclusion
If the Hill opinion has a flaw, it is the court's recognition of two
distinct actions which may be brought by customers against their bro-
They may prove instrumental in providing evidence of the firm's conduct and the scope of
its agency relationship with particular customers.
73. Hill, 790 F.2d at 824 (citing Markham, Customer Rights Under the Commodity Exchange
Act, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1299, 1314-16 (1984)). Bache provided Hill several documents in-
cluding a copy of its Standard Disclosure Statement, required under Rule 1.55, 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.55 (1986).
74. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIEs REGULATION 36 (1983).
75. Hill, 790 F.2d at 826.
76. Id; see FED. R. EVID. 401. A discussion of the rules of evidence is beyond the
scope of this article, but counsel should be aware of this development.
77. The Tenth Circuit ruled that "[gliven the high probative value of the evidence of
Hill's later trading and the low and controllable danger of confusion and delay, we must
hold that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded all evidence of the later
trading." Hill, 790 F.2d at 826-27.
78. Id. at 826.
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kers. Confusion may arise because each of these claims has different
procedural and substantive thresholds. However, not only is the court's
dichotomy reasonable, but the cumulative remedy approach, providing
two distinct causes of action to address different types of wrongdoing
from the same conduct, is not unique under federal law. Any doubt as
to such an approach should have been resolved by Justice Marshall's
opinion in Herman and Maclean v. Huddleston,79 holding such an approach
is not novel and that the Act and the Exchange Act "prohibit some of
the same conduct." 80 Huddleston is more than sufficient authority and
precedent to sustain the Tenth Circuit's reasoning.8 1
II. SECURITIES REGULATION
Two additional cases worthy of note which were decided during the
survey period are McGill v. American Land & Exploration Co.8 2 and San
Francisco-Oklahoma Petroleum Exploration Corp. v. Carstan Oil Co.83 Both in-
volve the age-old debate: what is a "security?" A debate which will con-
tinue in search of resolution as long as promoters exercise American
ingenuity and yankee know-how to "use the money of others on the
promise of profits." 8 4 The McGill case should be of particular interest
to those attorneys representing partnership or joint venture enter-
prises. 8 5 In addition, the Carstan Oil case presents a discussion of "con-
trolling person" liability.
A. Definition of a Security8 6
1. McGill v. American Land & Exploration Co.
McGill involved a successful attempt by plaintiff Gene McGill to re-
79. 459 U.S. 375 (1983); see also A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD &
CoMmoDrrs FRAUD § 2.5(4) (1985).
80. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 383 (citing United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778
(1979)).
81. Id.
82. 776 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1985).
83. 765 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1985).
84. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (determined the sale of inter-
ests in orange groves was a security and called for a broad, "not technical," application of
the definition of "security").
85. As to whether a joint venture or general partnership interest may be a security,
see SEC v. Professional Assoc., [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,421
(6th Cir. 1983) (passive investors in joint venture acquire a security); Williamson v.
Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981) (a joint venture or general
partner interest may be a security where the investor has only the power of a limited part-
ner or where the investor is so dependent on a promoter, that he cannot exercise meaning-
ful venture or partnership power); Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973)
(determination of whether an interest is a "security" depends upon the facts and circum-
stances; applied the economic realities test to hold a partnership interest was not a
security).
86. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1),
defines a "security" as:
[Any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-
trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
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scind his purchase of a joint venture interest and obtain a return of his
original investment. McGill was approached by defendants and offered
the opportunity to purchase an interest in a "sure-fire investment,"8 7 a
joint venture to develop certain real estate located near Duncan,
Oklahoma. The joint venture investment was represented by the de-
fendants as "risk-free" since all lots were sold or under contract for sale
assuring future development. 8 8 McGill accepted the offer and invested
$80,000. Under the terms of the joint venture agreement, McGill was to
"recoup his original investment and, in addition, receive half of any
profits" derived from the joint venture enterprise.8 9 Contrary to repre-
sentations made to McGill, the joint venture remained inactive and was
eventually liquidated. Dissatisfied with the venture, McGill filed a civil
suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma alleging violations of sections 12(1) and 12(2) of the Act. 90
He also alleged, inter alia,9 1 violations of section 10(b) 9 2 of the Ex-
change Act and Rule lOb-5.
9 3
Applying the Supreme Court's "investment contract" test first es-
tablished in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co. 9 4 and later refined in United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,9 5 the trial court held the joint venture agree-
ment "did not constitute a 'security' because it did not give rise to a 'common
enterprise,' "96 and dismissed the action. The Howey-Forman test defines
an "investment contract" and, thus, determines a "security" to exist
where there is: (1) an investment (2) in a common enterprise (3) with
the expectation of profits (4) to be derived from the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of others. 9 7 Finding McGill to be the sole investor,
the district court determined the interest was not a security because
there was no "pooling of funds received by a promoter from multiple
investors." 9 8 The trial court, however, mistakenly relied upon prece-
dent in the Third, Sixth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal, all con-
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,... or, in general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also section 3(a)(10) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(10) (1982). Although slightly differ-
ent, according to the Supreme Court both are to be treated as "virtually identical."
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982), Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36
(1967).
87. McGill, 776 F.2d at 924.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 925
90. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1)(1), (2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
91. McGill's complaint also included a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions (RICO) claim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982 and Supp. III 1985) and pendent
claims under Oklahoma law. McGill, 776 F.2d at 924.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
94. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
95. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
96. McGill, 776 F.2d at 924 (emphasis added).
97. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 298-99; Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
98. McGill, 776 F.2d at 924.
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trary to the law in the Tenth Circuit.9 9
Noting that the "Supreme Court has never decided whether 'hori-
zontal commonality' is required before a joint venture can constitute a
'common enterprise,'" as well as the "split in authority among the cir-
cuits," 1 00 the Tenth Circuit reversed. The court rejected what it re-
ferred to as the "rigid 'horizontal commonality' requirement" which it
stressed has never been part of the law of the Tenth Circuit.1 0 ' Instead,
the panel held, courts in the Tenth Circuit must follow the Supreme
Court's "direction" in Tcherepnin v. Knight 102 and "determine the 'eco-
nomic reality' of the transactions that occurred" to conclude whether
they give rise to a common enterprise within the Howey test.'
0 3
The court's logic is sound. The record before the court disclosed a
scheme by which promoters sought an individual investor to provide
capital to fund an enterprise totally within the control of the promoters.
The interest was sold to McGill as an "investment." The joint venture
agreement provided, upon liquidation, for a return of capital and half of
any profits, not a purchase of assets or other commercial transaction.'
0 4
Unfortunately, the court did not set forth specific factors for its
"economic reality" test. However, it appears that, where appropriate,
the answers to the following questions will control on a case-by-case ba-
sis: (1) Do the promoters intend to continue to manage and operate the
enterprise?' 0 5 (2) Is there a substantial lack of control or participation in
the management of the venture by the purchaser?' 0 6 (3) Are the inter-
ests sold in a manner intended to induce or create in the purchaser an
expectation that he is participating in an investment? 10 7 (4) Does the
interest represent an investment as opposed to a commercial ven-
ture? 10 8 and (5) Is the return to the purchaser dependent upon how
profitable the venture is? 10 9 If the answer to any one of these questions
is yes, arguably a common enterprise exists.1 10
In lieu of setting out an objective, clearly defined test, the Tenth
Circuit relied upon McGovern Plaza Joint Venture v. First of Denver Mortgage
Investors."'1 McGovern Plaza held that where purchasers or investors pro-
vide the capital, in exchange for profits, and the sellers or promoters
99. Id. The trial court relied on Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, 682
F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1982); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, 622 F.2d 216
(6th Cir. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Milnarik v. M. S. Commodities,
Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
100. McGill, 776 F.2d at 925 n.2.
101. Id. at 925.
102. 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
103. McGill, 776 F.2d at 925.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 927.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 923-24.
108. Id. at 925-26.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 926; see Hillard & Ricciardelli, Investment Contracts Under the Colorado and Uni-
form Securities Acts, 49 U. COLO. L. REv. 391, 426-29 (1978).
111. 562 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1977).
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manage and operate the enterprise, a security exists.12 In McGovern
Plaza, the suspect interest, a construction loan coupled with a perma-
nent, long-term commitment, did not constitute a security because the
transaction was "purely commercial" and the plaintiff purchasers "were
dependent on their own efforts" to make a profit." 13 Further, the court
distinguished McGovern Plaza from its earlier decision in United States v.
Austin,' 14 where it held a loan commitment to be a security. Austin was
distinguishable, according to the court, because the purchasers "were
induced, by advertising and solicitation, to put up money with the ex-
pectation of profits," ' 1 5 a conclusion derived by applying the economic
realities test.
Although the rhyme may be absent, in McGill, the reason is clear. A
joint venture agreement between a promoter and a single investor,
which in economic reality is an investment, involves the sale of a security
and provides the purchaser protection under the Act despite the ab-
sence of a pooling of funds from multiple investors. If the nature of the
transaction were solely determined by the number of investors - multi-
ple or single - the sale of interests which might otherwise be securities
would be determined by factors not relevant to the substance. A pro-
moter who was fortuitous enough to have his activities questioned
before making an offer to a second investor might escape the reach of
the Act only because he was stopped before making offers to an addi-
tional unsuspecting investor. The Tenth Circuit's commer-
cial/investment test places the focus of the inquiry on the character of
the interest sold and the nature of the transaction.' 1 6 McGill is consis-
tent with other Tenth Circuit opinions't 7 which have relied upon the
parties' economic arrangements and understandings rather than being
constrained by the limitations of the technical application of the "invest-
ment contract" test.' 18
112. Id. at 647.
113. Id.
114. 462 F.2d 724 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972).
115. McGovern Plaza, 562 F.2d at 648.
116. The Supreme Court has long required courts to recognize substance over form.
See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); SEC v. C. M. Joiner, 320
U.S. 344 (1943).
117. Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoeller and Danneberg Exploration, Ltd., 544 F.2d
1059 (10th Cir. 1976); McGovern Plaza, 562 F.2d at 647; Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak,
Inc., 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972); Continental Mktg. Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th
Cir 1967). McGovern Plaza was cited by the court, and although Mr. Steak and Continental
Marketing were not cited - perhaps because they turned on the efforts or participation of
the purchaser - they also speak to the "economic realities" test applied by the Tenth
Circuit.
118. The test applied under state law may differ from the commercial/investment di-
chotomy test or economic realities test of the Tenth Circuit. For example, in two cases,
the Colorado Supreme Court set forth the "investment contract" test. See Raymond Lee
Organization v. Division of Securities, 556 P.2d 1209 (Colo. 1976) and Lowery v. Ford Hill
Investments Co., 556 P.2d 1201 (Colo. 1976). In Raymond Lee, the Colorado Supreme
Court held that certain invention agreements between investors and a promoter which did
not result in a pooling of interests between investors was not a common enterprise and
therefore did not involve the sale of a "security." Raymond Lee, 556 P.2d at 1212-13.
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2. San Francisco-Oklahoma Petroleum Exploration Corp. v. Carstan Oil,
Co.
Like McGill Carstan also involved a plaintiff seeking rescission of his
purchase of an interest claimed to be a "security." ' 1 9 Carstan Oil Com-
pany, Inc. (Carstan) was organized for the purpose of selling undivided
interests in oil properties. Defendants William Rogers (Rogers) and
Courtney Rogers (Courtney), father and son respectively, were directors
of Carstan. Rogers provided the money to organize the company and
was its sole shareholder. Courtney was an active participant in the com-
pany, but due to problems with creditors, had his father, Rogers, appear
as the owner and a director. Courtney's name was not used but he was,
in fact, running the company.1
20
Carstan offered investors interests in producing wells, which were
located in Kansas and were to be operated by Carstan. The interests
were offered for sale through advertisements in newspapers of general
circulation in several states. The record before the trial court estab-
lished that Rogers signed the corporate minutes, was aware of the sales
of the undivided interests and purchased one himself, and had actual
knowledge of the transactions and how they were handled. The inter-
ests, however, were never registered, and the plaintiff brought suit
under both federal and state securities laws.
12 1
The trial court entered summary judgments against Courtney and
the corporation, but the judgments remained unsatisfied since the obli-
gations of both Carstan and Courtney were discharged in bankruptcy.
The remaining defendant, Rogers, who was not involved in the bank-
ruptcy proceeding and was thus the only solvent defendant and the sole
source to effect rescission, was determined to be a "controlling person"
under section 15 of the Act. 122 Reasoning that Rogers did not have suf-
ficient knowledge of the facts, however, the trial court found him not
liable. 1
2 3
The Tenth Circuit, utilizing the "investment contract" test, held the
interest, a fractional undivided working interest in an oil lease con-
nected to an operating agreement, to be a "security."' 1 2 4 This holding is
not unique nor does it conflict with the court's decision in McGill. Read-
ing both McGill and Carstan together,' 2 5 it appears that Tenth Circuit
courts must follow a two-step process. First, the court must make an
independent determination as to whether the particular interest before
it meets the literal language of any term in section 2(1) of the Act or
comes within the definition of any such term. If so, the inquiry is com-
pleted and the interest is a "security." Second, assuming the interest is
119. Carstan, 765 F.2d at 963.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 964.
122. Id. at 963; see 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1985).
123. Carstan, 765 F.2d at 963.




not determined to be a "security" under the first step, the "economic
realities" or "commercial/investment" analysis of the second step is
applied.
In Carstan, the interest met the first element of the test since the
express terms of section 2(1) include a "fractional undivided interest in
oil... rights" and an "investment contract." 126 Because the interest fit
neatly into the statutory definition of a "security," unlike McGill, further
inquiry was not necessary.
In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp. ,127 the Supreme Court, without
specifically addressing whether the subject oil leases were investment
contracts, held the sale of oil leases encumbered with a drilling agree-
ment was more than the sale of naked leasehold rights. After examining
the relationships of the various parties and noting the purchaser's reli-
ance upon the promoters, the Court determined such interests were "se-
curities." The interests sold by Carstan are indistinguishable from those
in Joiner. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit's two-step process is in accord
with the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Landreth Timber Company v.
Landreth. 1
28
As his defense, Rogers argued that the plenary language of Section
2, "unless the context otherwise requires," should be applied and the
interest should be deemed unusual or unique so as to escape the reach
of the Act. 129 Although persons making such an argument may find
comfort in the Supreme Court's decision in Forman,Is0 under the facts
prevalent here such comfort is misplaced. The defendant's argument
goes beyond Forman. The only statement in support of his argument
offered by Rogers was not the uniqueness of the interest but that "the
transaction was between knowledgeable experienced parties in the oil
business."'1' Although the knowledge and experience of the investor
may speak to whether the interest must be registered or is exempt, such
an argument is futile and of no consequence in determining whether the
interest is a "security." Roger's argument fell on deaf ears, and prop-
erly so. The argument, used in earlier cases,' 32 may be quickly dis-
126. Id. at 965. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see supra note 86.
127. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
128. 471 U.S. 681 (1986). The Tenth Circuit's decision follows the suggested analysis
in Landreth and United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), two Supreme
Court decisions that should be read together. These decisions similarly address the defini-
tion of a "security." In Landreth, the Court, citing Forman, rejected the sale of business
doctrine, which had its genesis in the Tenth Circuit. Chandler v. Kew, Inc., [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,966 (10th Cir. 1977). The Court reversed a Ninth
Circuit opinion and held that the transfer or sale of interests denominated "stock" and
which have attributes commonly associated with stock under state law (i.e., dividends, vot-
ing rights, etc.) are securities under the Act. However, the Supreme Court expressly lim-
ited its analysis in Landreth to "stock."
129. Carstan, 765 F.2d at 965.
130. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
131. Carstan, 765 F.2d at 965.
132. Id. (citing Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970) and Woodward v.
Wright, 266 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959)); see also Doran v. Petroleum Mgt. Corp., 545 F.2d
893 (5th Cir. 1977).
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posed of by referral to SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp. 133 and SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co. 134 A "security" does not lose its character because it
is offered to a few.13 5 This ill-conceived interpretation of the reach of
the Act should not move a court any more than a similar argument as-
serting an exemption from registration for an offering made to a few. 1
3 6
Even those who mistook Forman to represent a hostility in the attitude of
the Supreme Court to the federal securities laws should now recognize
this fact.
B. "Controlling Person" Liability
In Carstan, the court of appeals also set aside the trial court's deter-
mination that William Rogers (Rogers) did not have sufficient knowl-
edge to be held accountable as a "controlling person."' 13 7 The district
court held that Rogers did not have "knowledge of or reasonable
ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the
liability" of Carstan was determined. ' 3 8 The panel found the position of
the trial court to be contrary to the record.1
3 9
It does seem rather anomalous that the trial court could conclude
that Rogers - who organized the corporation, was aware of its purpose,
signed the corporate minutes and reports, knew the corporate business
and knew its business was effected through the mails - had no knowl-
edge of the existence of the facts. Moreover, the trial record also estab-
lished that Rogers personally purchased interests similar to those sold to
investors and acted to involve his acquaintances in the enterprise as
shareholders. 140 As his defense, Rogers claimed he was merely a "fig-
urehead" director and as such acted only to allow his name to be used
because his son could not use his own name. He further argued that he
neither participated in nor made an effort to learn what the corporation
was doing. 14'
As a fair reading of Rule 405142 requires, control "means the pos-
session ... of the power to direct," but does not require the exercise of
133. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
134. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
135. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1986); SEC v. Ralston Purina
Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
136. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 125.
137. Section 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982 & Supp. III 1985) provides, in pertinent part:
Every person, who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise ....
controls any person liable under section [11 or 12] shall also be liable ... unless
the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in
the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person
is alleged to exist.
Id. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1986) provides:
The term "control". .. means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power
to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person,
whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.
138. Carstan, 765 F.2d at 964 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77o).
139. Id. at 964-65.
140. Id. at 964.
141. Id.
142. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1986); see supra note 130.
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such power. The essential issue on appeal was not whether Rogers had
control but whether he came within the knowledge exception. Relying
on Myzel v. Fiekds,'4 3 the appellate court held Rogers may not have been
aware of each and every transaction, but from his involvement even as a
figurehead director, he was aware of the "existence of the basic facts
relating to the course of business of the corporation."' 14 4 Whether lia-
bility would attach in the case of a director who made an effort to find
out information regarding his enterprise and was unable to do so, or was
prevented from doing so, was not before the court.
The underlying rationale for "controlling person" liability is to sup-
plant the doctrine of respondeat superior with a new claim to reach those
defendants who could potentially evade liability by exercising power
through "dummy" corporations and to hold accountable those persons
who could control an offending issuer or corporation but fail to do so.
The defense of "no knowledge" should only be available to those acting
in good faith. Roger's lax exercise or the failure to exercise his duties as
a director of the corporation and his ostrich-head-in-the-sand approach
should not be rewarded. Nor should similar conduct in others be en-
couraged by extending the "no knowledge" defense to those acting or
failing to act in good faith. 145 The appeals court properly noted that as
a director, Rogers "had the duty to know the basic or sole function for
the corporation - the sale of undivided interests - and how this was
being carried out."1
46
In Carstan, the Tenth Circuit acted reasonably by interpreting sec-
tion 15 of the Act in a manner which should induce those who have the
power to control an issuer to do so. Had the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
decision of the trial court, only those defendants who were discharged in
bankruptcy would have been held accountable and Rogers, an active
participant, would have escaped liability. One can only hope that the
judicious interpretation of the federal securities laws will serve to pre-
vent fraud and that antifraud provisions are applied to provide a remedy
to illegal actions and omissions of wrongdoers including those who
knowingly fail to cause persons within their control to act within the law.
CONCLUSION
If we have learned anything during the recent retrenchment caused
by the Supreme Court's decisions respecting securities actions, 147 it can
be fairly stated in two rules of thumb: (1) federal law, in its sanctions,
143. 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
144. Carstan, 765 F.2d at 965. Although not discussed in the Tenth Circuit opinion,
recall that under opinions addressing state law, "figurehead" directors are held to the
same standard as other directors. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 162 N.J. Super. 355, 392
A.2d 1233 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978), aff'd, 87 N.J. 15,432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1979). See
generally Veasey, Insights into Judicial Deference to Directors' Business Decisions: Should we Trust the
Courts?, 39 Bus. LAw. 1461-1559 (1984) and 40 Bus. LAw. 1373-1455 (1985).
145. See Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Va. 1981).
146. Carstan, 765 F.2d at 964.
147. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Santa Fe Indust., Inc. v.
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and morality are not coextensive, 14 8 and; (2) considerations of fairness
or injustice under state law are not coterminous with fraud under fed-
eral law. 14 9 This lesson was restated by the Tenth Circuit in Hill v. Bache
Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. For the Pyrrhonist, Hill makes it clear that com-
modities and securities fraud actions based on negligence have indeed
"gone the way of the do-do bird." For others, Hill illustrates the serious
implications for actions by customers against their brokers under state
law fiduciary duty claims. Additionally, at least in the Tenth Circuit, re-
gardless of the ingenuity of promoters, a scheme or plan which in "eco-
nomic reality" constitutes an investment, whereby one uses the money of
others on the promise of profits, involves a "security."
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
148. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654, 667-68, 678-79 (1983) (Blackmun,J., dissenting);
see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
Earlier securities cases, beginning withJ.I. Case Co. v. Berah, 377 U.S. 426 '1964) and
SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), in which the Supreme Court first recog-
nized and later embellished on implied causes of action, found their capstone in Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). The current Court's predisposition
may be the result of political persuasion more than legal analysis. To quote one commen-
tator: "the Court underlined its conclusions with policy considerations drawn not from
considerations of fairness or effectuation of the securities laws' purposes, but from strong
principles of federalism." Branson, Discourse on the Supreme Court Approach to SEC Rule lOb-5
and Insider Trading, 30 EMORY L.J. 263, 271 (1981).
149. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985); Santa Fe Indust., Inc. v.




There is an apparent trend within the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for safeguarding taxpayers' interests in tax litigation. The admin-
istrative and procedural cases analyzed in this article' have been
selected to illustrate how the circuit has made the government account
for its procedures in investigating and enforcing compliance with the
federal tax laws. Further, the scope of this article demonstrates that an
over-extension of the holdings in these cases could significantly limit the
government's capability to successfully prosecute future violations of
the federal tax laws.
In United States v. Phillips2 and United States v. Wells, 3 the Tenth Cir-
cuit adopted a subjective standard for assessing a taxpayer's "good faith
misunderstanding of law" defense for failure to file income tax returns
in violation of I.R.C. section 7203. 4 Such a subjective standard could
have wide-ranging ramifications on the government's efforts to effec-
tively deal with future tax protestor problems.
Two cases were decided during the survey period which applied the
"legitimate purpose" rule established in United States v. Powell 5 to assess
the appropriateness of the government's initiation of civil tax investiga-
tions. In United States v. Balanced Financial Management,6 the Tenth Cir-
cuit presented a thorough analysis of the proper standard by which the
initiation and implementation of civil tax investigations are judged in the
context of the Powell rule and subsequently enacted statutory and proce-
dural provisions. In United States v. Church of World Peace,7 the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that certain statutory and constitutional safeguards served to
limit this "legitimate purpose" standard of Powell with respect to tax in-
vestigations of churches.
The Tenth Circuit, in Cyclone Drilling, Inc. v. Kelley, 8 developed its
interpretation of the "reasonable diligence" standard to which the I.R.S.
1. This survey article discusses tax cases that were decided by the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals between June, 1985 and May, 1986. Each of these cases involve statu-
tory provisions that are located in Subtitle F, Procedure and Administration, of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.
2. 775 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1985); see infra notes 12-53 and accompanying text.
3. 790 F.2d 73 (10th Cir. 1986); see infra notes 27-53 and accompanying text.
4. I.R.C. § 7203 (Supp. III 1985) provides, in pertinent part:
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or required
by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return,
keep any records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to pay such esti-
mated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such informa-
tion, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to
other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor....
5. 379 U.S. 48 (1964); see infra notes 54-91 and accompanying text.
6. 769 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1985); see infra notes 54-70 and accompanying text.
7. 775 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1985); see infra notes 71-91 and accompanying text.
8. 769 F.2d 662 (10th Cir. 1985); see infra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
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would be held in satisfying the statutory notice requirements for a valid
tax assessment under I.R.C. sections 62129 and 6213.10 Finally, in Voss
v. Bergsgaard, " I the Tenth Circuit provided its interpretation of the stan-
dard for particularity in a search warrant issued in connection with a
criminal tax investigation.
I. THE STANDARD FOR ASSESSING A GOOD FAITH MISUNDERSTANDING
OF LAw DEFENSE
A. Background
Because tax laws are highly complex and because Congress did not
intend to make criminals out of everyone who misunderstood them,
courts have frequently permitted a "good faith misunderstanding of
law" as a valid defense to negate the "willfulness" element in a prosecu-
tion for failure to file a tax return. 12 In United States v. Murdock,' 3 the
Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend that a person become
a criminal by reason of a bonafide misunderstanding of his liability for the
tax, of his duty to make a return, or of the adequacy of the records he
maintained, should he fail to measure up to a prescribed standard of
conduct.14 The Supreme Court explained in United States v. Bishop 15 that
wilfullness, in the context of tax litigation, is an "intentional violation of a
known legal duty."'
16
Based on the judicial interpretation of the applicable tax statutes,
courts have required that in order to prove willfulness in a tax case, the
government must show that the defendant intended to break the law.
17
While this rule was intended to prevent defendants from being con-
victed as criminals in the context of a complex tax issue, it has resulted
in an onerous burden on the government in tax protestor litigation.18
The question that has emerged in the prosecution of persons
charged with willful failure to file income tax returns in violation of
I.R.C. section 7203 is whether the proper standard for judging a mistake
of law is a subjective or an objectively reasonable one. The Supreme
9. I.R.C. § 6212(a)(1982) provides that the notice of deficiency must be sent by certi-
fied or registered mail to the taxpayer at his last known address.
10. I.R.C. § 6213(a)(1982) provides that any assessment imposed upon a taxpayer
without a notice of deficiency having been sent is void and illegal.
11. 774 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1985); see infra notes 106-132 and accompanying text.
12. It has long been recognized that ignorantia legis neminem excusat or "ignorance of the
law excuses no one." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 673 (5th ed. 1979). However, in the con-
text of tax litigation, courts have frequently been more permissive. See United States v.
Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933); see also United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976);
United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
13. 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
14. Id. at 396.
15. 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
16. Id. at 360 (emphasis added).
17. See cases cited supra note 12.
18. For a discussion of the problems inherent in the possible over-extension of the
rule that a "good faith misunderstanding of law" should be a valid defense in tax prosecu-
tions, see infra notes 37-53 and accompanying text.
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Court's opinion in Spies v. United States 19 seems to imply some sort of
"reasonableness" standard: "It is not the purpose of the law to penalize
frank difference of opinion or innocent errors made despite the exercise of
reasonable care."20 This was not an expressly stated standard, however,
and other circuits have reached inconsistent conclusions in applying a
standard.
2 1
B. Subjective Standard Employed in Assessing Wilfullness in Criminal Tax
Prosecutions Under I.R.C. Section 7203: United States v. Phillips
and United States v. Wells
1. United States v. Phillips
After trial to a jury, the defendant was convicted of willfully and
knowingly failing to file income tax returns for three years in violation of
I.R.C. section 7203. Thejury rejected the defendant's argument that his
failure to file was because he had sincerely and honestly believed that
wages were not income. The defendant appealed the conviction on the
ground that ajury instruction given at the trial2 2 significantly limited his
"good faith misunderstanding of law" defense. The jury instruction re-
quired an objectively reasonable belief rather than a subjective belief.
In reversing the conviction, the Tenth Circuit followed a First Cir-
cuit holding and applied a subjective standard. 23 The court chose to
reject the Seventh Circuit decision in United States v. Moore,24 that a mis-
take of law must be objectively reasonable to be a valid defense. After
distinguishing Moore because the issue in that case involved the alleged
unconstitutionality of the tax law, the Tenth Circuit held that ". . . to the
extent Moore can be read as requiring that a good faith misunderstand-
ing of the tax laws be objectively reasonable, we decline to follow it."12 5
It should be noted that the Tenth Circuit distinguished between misun-
derstandings and disagreements and, in dicta, implied that good faith
disagreements with the tax laws or good faith beliefs that the laws are
19. 317 U.S. 492 (1983).
20. Id. at 496 (emphasis added).
21. Compare United States v. Witvoet, 767 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Barney, 674 F.2d 729 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1139 (1982); United States v. Moore,
627 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981) (objectively reasonable stan-
dard) with United States v. Aitken, 755 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Burton,
737 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970) (subjective standard).
22. The good faith instruction given at trial was:
A mistake of law must be objectively reasonable to be a defense. If you find
that the defendant did not have a reasonable ground for his belief, then regard-
less of the defendant's sincerity of belief, you may find that he did not have a
good faith misunderstanding of the requirements of the law.
United States v. Phillips, 775 F.2d 262, 263 (10th Cir. 1985).
23. United States v. Aitken, 755 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1985). Defendant Phillips argued
for the application of the purely subjective standard that was adopted by the First Circuit
in Aitken, which was decided after Defendant Phillips was convicted, but before the filing of
Phillips' appeal.
24. 627 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
25. Phillips, 775 F.2d at 264.
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unconstitutional would not be valid defenses in any case. 2 6
2. United States v. Wells
The Wells case involved substantially similar facts as those involved
in Phillips.2 7 The defendant in Wells was convicted by a jury of willfully
and knowingly failing to file income tax returns for four years in viola-
tion of I.R.C. section 7203. The defendant unsuccessfully argued that
his failure to file was the result of a mistaken interpretation of the tax
laws. Following its earlier holding in Phillips, the Tenth Circuit reversed
the conviction and remanded for a new trial based on its finding that the
jury instruction was erroneous.
3. Analysis
a. Split Among and Within Circuits
By adopting the standard used by the First Circuit in Aitken, the
Tenth Circuit may have created a stumbling block for successful prose-
cution of tax protestors. After Phillips and Wells, a defendant must only
show that he honestly holds a subjective belief, regardless of how outra-
geous, to negate the willfulness requirement of section 7203. This
purely subjective standard is contrary to previously established tax law
which provided that certain subjective beliefs would never be permitted
as valid defenses. These defenses include beliefs that the tax laws are
unconstitutional 28 and personal disagreements with the tax laws. 2 9 Not
only does the Phillips panel ignore the merits of the Seventh Circuit's
Moore decision, but it also appears to deviate from the position previ-
ously taken by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Jensen,30 United States v.
26. Id.
27. The Wells case involved a "good faith misunderstanding of law" defense, similar
to the Phillips case. However, unlike Defendant Phillips, Defendant Wells did not testify at
his own trial to explain the nature of his beliefs, but rather chose to rely on the contents of
his previous written replies to the I.R.S. correspondence to explain the nature of his be-
liefs. The beliefs listed in the letters submitted into evidence at Wells' trial included the
belief that the defendant's wages were not "income," but rather were merely payments
received in exchange for his time and labor that resulted in no taxable gain or loss, and the
belief that the defendant was not a "taxpayer" as that word is used in the Internal Revenue
Code.
28. United States v. Jones, 628 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967
(1981); United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 167 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1012 (1980); United States v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400, 405 (10th Cir. 1979).
29. United States v. Burton, 737 F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Kar-
sky, 610 F.2d 548, 550 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1092 (1980). In addition to
beliefs that the tax laws are unconstitutional and other disagreements, there are several
exceptions which prevail in some jurisdictions which adhere to the subjective standard,
including beliefs that the requirement of filing a tax return violates the taxpayer's fifth
amendment rights (United States v. Jensen, No. 82-1648 (10th Cir. May 11, 1983)); that
one is not a "person" as defined in the tax laws (United States v. Romero, 640 F.2d 1014
(9th Cir. 1981)); and that insufficient funds justifies failure to file (Yarborough v. United
States, 230 F.2d 56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 969 (1956)). None of these beliefs are
recognized as valid good faith beliefs sufficient to constitute an affirmative defense to ne-
gate the "willfulness" that is required as a requisite to the crime.
30. No. 82-1648 (10th Cir. May 11, 1983).
[Vol. 64:2
Wainwright,3 1 and United States v. Ware32 which was to require some de-
gree of reasonableness before a particular belief was accepted as a valid
defense.
i. Appropriateness of Subjective Standard: United States v. Aitken
In the First Circuit case of United States v. Aitken, 3 3 the defendant was
convicted in the district court for willfully failing to file tax returns in
violation of I.R.C. section 7203, and for willfully filing false withholding
exemption certificates in violation of I.R.C. section 7205. 3 4 The convic-
tions were vacated on appeal and the case was remanded to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with the First Circuit's ruling
that "willfulness" in a criminal tax prosecution under I.R.C. sections
7203 and 7205 is measured by a subjective standard. In reaching its
decision, the Aitken court relied upon several Supreme Court opinions
which it interpreted as standing for the proposition that a subjective
standard was the appropriate measure for assessing a good faith be-
lief.35 The inherent fallacy in this purely subjective standard is that it
fails to recognize any objective constraints. Such a standard is contrary
to pre-existing tax law which provides that certain subjective beliefs
would never be valid defenses.
3 6
ii. The Objectively Reasonable Standard: United States v. Moore
In United States v. Moore,3 7 the defendant was convicted for willfully
failing to file tax returns. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the
defendant's contention that the jury instructions did not adequately in-
form the jury of his "good faith" defense. The court concluded that
when the district court gives a correct definition of "willfully" to the
jury, no additional "good faith" defense instruction is required.3 8 More
significantly, the court stated that "the mistake must be objectively
reasonable.''39
31. 413 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970).
32. 608 F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979).
33. 755 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1985).
34. I.R.C. § 7205(a) (Supp. III 1985) provides in pertinent part:
Any individual required to supply information to his employer .. .who willfully
supplies false or fraudulent information, or who willfully fails to supply informa-
tion .. .shall, in addition to any other penalty provided by law, upon conviction
thereof, be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or
both.
35. See cases cited supra note 12.
36. See supra notes 28 and 29.
37. 627 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
38. Id. at 833; see also United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 11 (1976) ("willful act"
defined as "one done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do some-
thing which the law forbids, that is to say with [the] bad purpose to disobey or to disregard
the law"); United States v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400, 405 (10th Cir. 1979) ("willfully" means a
"voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty"); Yarborough v. United States,
230 F.2d 56, 61 (4th Cir.) ("willful" defined as "voluntary, purposeful, deliberate and in-
tentional"), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 969 (1956).
39. Moore, 627 F.2d at 833 (citing United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 948 (D.C.
Cir. 1976)); see also United States v. Moore, 586 F.2d 1029, 1033 (4th Cir. 1978); Kratz v.
Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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In Phillips, the Tenth Circuit downplays the significance of the Moore
opinion by incorrectly claiming that the objectively reasonable standard
was discussed in dicta, and by claiming that the Seventh Circuit ap-
peared to have vascillated between an objective and subjective stan-
dard.40 This is not, however, an accurate depiction of the state of affairs
in the Seventh Circuit. The "objectively reasonable" language in Moore
was expressly reaffirmed by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Anton 4 1
and in United States v. Witvoet.
4 2
The Seventh Circuit's subsequent affirmations of its holding in
Moore plainly indicate that the primary holding of the Moore decision is
that an objectively reasonable standard is the appropriate measure to
assess a good faith belief, and that such a holding is an "accurate expres-
sion of the law in the Seventh Circuit." 4 3 Thus, the Tenth Circuit's at-
tempt in Phillips to minimize the significance of the Moore standard and
to deny that there is a split among the circuits is disingenuous.
b. Subjective Beliefs Which Are Never Considered
to be Valid Defenses
Although Phillips holds that a subjective standard is the appropriate
measure to assess a good faith belief, there are some recognized excep-
tions which would not be valid defenses in any case. Defendants who
honestly believe that the income tax laws are unconstitutional are not
afforded a defense for their mistaken belief.4 4 Similarly, a good faith
disagreement with the tax laws is not a valid defense no matter how sin-
cerely the disagreement is felt.4 5 The Tenth Circuit has expressly rec-
ognized these exceptions to a subjective standard.4 6 As stated in
Phillips: "we decline to impose criminal liability on individuals who in
good faith misunderstand the law. These individuals are, of course, to
be distinguished from those who understand the obligations imposed
upon them by the tax law but disagree with that law or view it as unconstitu-
tional."'4 7 In light of these exceptions to a subjective standard, a purely
subjective standard is an impossible measure to assess a "good faith mis-
understanding of law" defense.
A possible resolution to this dilemma would be to recognize an ad-
ditional exception. Some degree of reasonableness should be required
of a belief before a "good faith misunderstanding of law" defense is per-
mitted to negate a claim of willfulness. This proposed resolution is not
a novel position. As suggested by the Tenth Circuit in United States v.
40. United States v. Phillips, 775 F.2d 262, 264 (10th Cir. 1985).
41. 683 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir. 1982).
42. 767 F.2d 338, 340 (7th Cir. 1985). Witvoet was decided after the First Circuit deci-
sion in Aitken.
43. Id.
44. See supra note 28.
45. See supra note 29.
46. United States v. Jensen, No. 82-1648 (10th Cir. May 11, 1983); United States v.
Weninger, 624 F.2d 163 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980); United States v.
Ware, 608 F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979).
47. United States v. Phillips, 775 F.2d 262, 264 (10th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
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Ware,4 8 if a belief is so "devoid of reason and logic" that no one could
possibly have believed it, then the "good faith" defense should not be
permitted.
4 9
Similarly, in United States v. Jensen,5 0 the Tenth Circuit rejected as
meritless the defendant's purported good faith assertion of his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Tenth Circuit
stated that to accept such a belief as a valid defense against a claim of
willfulness would be to permit a "good faith" defense to anyone who
had some notion of how the fifth amendment privilege worked, no mat-
ter how outlandish the notion.5 1 In assessing the taxpayer's beliefs, the
Jensen court refused to accept the taxpayer's outlandish interpretation of
the fifth amendment as a valid "good faith" defense.
52
Clearly, the court's adoption of a subjective standard in Phillips and
Wells is out of step with prior Tenth Circuit decisions. The adoption of
such a standard could lead to further inconsistencies within the Tenth
Circuit as future cases are decided.
53
4. Implications of Holdings
The imposition of a purely subjective standard to assess a "good
faith misunderstanding of law" defense may further limit the govern-
ment's capability to effectively control tax protestors' defiance of tax
laws. Because there appears to be a split among the circuits and incon-
sistent holdings within the Tenth Circuit, guidance from the Supreme
Court may be necessary. In the alternative, reconsideration by the
Tenth Circuit, or at the very least, extreme care in the application of this
liberal, subjective standard, seems appropriate.
II. THE STANDARD BY WHICH CIVIL TAX INVESTIGATIONS ARE
INITIATED AND IMPLEMENTED
A. Background
In the landmark Supreme Court case of United States v. Powell,5 4 it
was established that to initiate a civil tax investigation, the investigation
48. 608 F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979).
49. Id. at 405-06. Furthermore, the court stated: "The defendant contends that his
personal belief in what the law is, or should be, supersedes the federal Constitution and
statutes as construed and applied by the Supreme Court. If each citizen is a law unto
himself, government will exist in name only."
50. No. 82-1648 (10th Cir. May 11, 1983).
51. Id. at 5.
52. Id.
53. Both defendants in Phillips and Wells were re-convicted on remand by juries that
were given revised jury instructions. However, the burden placed on the government by
the imposition of a purely subjective standard to assess a "good faith misunderstanding of
law" defense could likely deter future prosecution of tax protestors by the government.
The fact that the jurors on the remand of Phillips and Wells were unconvinced that the
respective defendants held a sincere and honest mistaken belief of law, cannot be under-
stood to mean that future jurors who are presented with similar evidence will be likewise
unconvinced. The government will have to be prepared to satisfy this heavy burden and
therefore may become reluctant to prosecute tax protestors.
54. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
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must have a legitimate purpose, the inquiry must be relevant to the pur-
pose, the information sought must not already be within the Commis-
sioner's possession, and the administrative steps required by the Code
must have been followed." '5 5 The Tenth Circuit presented a thorough
analysis of the Powell "legitimate purpose" standard in United States v.
Balanced Financial Management 56 in the context of subsequently enacted
statutory and procedural provisions.
57
The "legitimate purpose" standard, as restated in Balanced Financial
Management, was subsequently limited with respect to civil tax investiga-
tions of churches in United States v. Church of World Peace.5 8 The reason-
ing for this limitation stemmed from the Tenth Circuit's interpretation
and application of certain statutory and constitutional safeguards.
59
In Cyclone Drilling, Inc. v. Kelley,60 the Tenth Circuit developed its
interpretation of the "reasonable diligence" standard that governs the
I.R.S. in satisfying the statutory notice requirements for a valid tax
assessment.
B. Powell Standard Upheld and Analyzed in Light of New Statutory and
Procedural Provisions: United States v. Balanced Financial
Management
1. Case in Context
This case provides a useful overview of the standards by which the
initiation and implementation of civil tax investigations by the govern-
ment are judged. Although the government's investigation procedures
were found to be proper, the review of the government's compliance
with prescribed standards of conduct is indicative of the court's concern
for taxpayers' interests.
2. Statement of Case
Balanced Financial Management ("BFM") was an Arizona corpora-
tion with a principal office in Salt Lake City, Utah, and several offices in
Colorado. BFM promoted investments in property owned byJarelco, a
Texas corporation which owned master audio tape recordings of chil-
55. Id. at 57-58.
56. 769 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1985). See infra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
57. I.R.C. §§ 7401, 7402, and 7604 (1982) (these sections authorize the commence-
ment of a civil action for recovery of taxes and grant jurisdiction to federal district courts
to enforce I.R.S. summons); Rev. Proc. 83-78, 1983-2 C.B. 596. Rev. Proc. 83-78 has been
modified and is effective as modified for returns, claims or applications filed after Decem-
ber 10, 1984. Rev. Proc. 84-84, 1984-1 C.B. 307. For an explanation of Rev. Proc. 83-78,
see infra note 61.
58. 775 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1985).
59. These safeguards include I.R.C. § 7605(c) (1982) and first amendment freedom of
religion and freedom of association rights. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Section 7605(c) has
been changed substantially by I.R.C. § 7611 (Supp. III 1985). It should be noted, how-
ever, that the appeal in Church of World Peace arose under I.R.C. § 7605. For the language
of § 7605(c), see infra note 79.
60. 769 F.2d 662 (10th Cir. 1985).
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dren's music and related original artwork. Jarelco marketed leases of
interests in the master recordings and represented to investors that they
would be able to claim investment tax credit pass-throughs which were
based on appraised values. The government subsequently alleged that
the appraised values were grossly inflated. The I.R.S. issued an adminis-
trative summons to BFM directing its officers to appear to testify and to
produce for examination specified records relating to the period ex-
tending from January 1, 1981 through January 6, 1984.61 The records
requested included BFM's books and financial records, essentially all of
BFM's records relating to its business transactions with Jarelco and sev-
eral other named persons, and all of its records relating to the promo-
tion of tax shelters. BFM did not respond to the summons.
The government filed a petition in district court to enforce the sum-
mons. The court found that because the government's actions were not
improper, BFM was required to comply with the summons. Subse-
quently, BFM filed a motion to enjoin further government investigation,
which was denied by the court. The government filed a petition for an
order to show cause why BFM should not be held in contempt for failing
to comply with the summons. The court eventually dismissed the gov-
ernment's petition for failure to prosecute. Both sides appealed.
3. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
a. Enforcement of Administrative Summons and Denial of BFM's
Request to Enjoin Further Government Investigation
BFM appealed the district court's order enforcing an I.R.S. sum-
mons and denying BFM's request to enjoin further government investi-
gation. The I.R.S. contended that it was conducting an investigation to
determine whether BFM was liable for any internal revenue tax or penal-
ties for promoting abusive tax shelters, 62 or had committed any offense
under the internal revenue laws. BFM argued that the summons issued
by the district court was issued for an illegitimate purpose, in violation
of the Powell standard. BFM contended that this illegitimate purpose
61. The summons related to an examination being conducted pursuant to Rev. Proc.
83-78 which, in addition to the penalty and injunction provisions, could have resulted in
the issuance of notices to BFM's clients and potential clients who were identified through
the use of the summons.
Revenue Procedure 83-78 describes the program implemented by the Internal Reve-
nue Service to identify and investigate abusive tax shelter promotions. The purpose of
this revenue procedure was to discuss the procedures to be followed in identifying and
investigating abusive tax shelters and to describe the options available to the Service once
an abusive tax shelter has been identified and investigated. These options include a re-
quest for injunctive relief under section 7408 of the Internal Revenue Code, assertion of
penalties under section 6700, and issuance of pre-filing notifications to investors.
62. Penalty provisions for promoting abusive tax shelters are found in I.R.C. § 6700
(1982). I.R.C. § 6700 was added to the Internal Revenue Code by the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, and was subsequently amended by the Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6700
(1984)). The provision provided for penalties against persons who promote abusive tax
shelters, and granted the I.R.S. the authority to obtain an injunction against such
promotors to enjoin them from further promotion.
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was evidenced by the fact that the I.R.S. was conducting simultaneous,
multi-district, duplicate examinations which amounted to harassment of
BFM, and that the I.R.S. was making unauthorized disclosures to the
public concerning the existence and status of tax examinations against
BFM for the purpose of ruining its business in Colorado.
63
The Tenth Circuit determined that the standard set forth in Powell
applied to the statutes and that the government had satisfied this stan-
dard by establishing in its affidavit that the investigation had been con-
ducted pursuant to a "legitimate purpose." 64  The Tenth Circuit
affirmed both the district court's denial of BFM's request for an injunc-
tion and its issuance of the order enforcing the summons. This decision
was based on the Tenth Circuit's finding that BFM had failed to meet its
burden of refuting the government's prima facie showing for enforce-
ment of the summons. 65 Furthermore, the court rejected BFM's conten-
tion that Revenue Procedure 83-78 was being administered in a
harassing manner, holding that the Procedure does not require centrali-
zation of an investigation of a tax shelter promotion which operates in
several districts.
66
b. Denial of Motion for Limited Discovery Privileges
BFM sought limited discovery privileges and an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether the I.R.S. had an illegitimate purpose behind the
summons. Relying on prior Tenth Circuit decisions,6 7 the court held
that discovery is available in summons enforcement proceedings only in
extraordinary situations. Since BFM failed to make a substantial prelim-
inary showing that the I.R.S. did not issue the summons in good faith,
BFM's discovery motion was denied.
c. Requirement for John Doe Summons, Pursuant to L R.C. Section
7609(f), Not Applicable
I.R.C. section 7609(f) includes a "John Doe" provision which re-
quires judicial approval before the I.R.S. can serve a summons seeking
information from unnamed taxpayers. 68 The Tenth Circuit held that
the I.R.S. need not comply with these requirements when it serves a
63. BFM, 769 F.2d at 1445.
64. Id. at 1443.
65. Id. at 1444.
66. Id. at 1446.
67. United States v. Security Bank and Trust Co., 661 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Southern Tanks, Inc., 619 F.2d 54 (10th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
68. I.R.C. § 7609(f) (1982) provides:
Additional requirement in the case of a John Doe summons. Any summons de-
scribed in subsection (c) which does not identify the person with respect to whose
liability the summons is issued may be served only after a court proceeding in
which the Secretary establishes that-
(1) the summons relates to the investigation of a particular person or ascertain-
able group or class of persons,
(2) there is a reasonable basis for believing that such person or group or class of
persons may fail or may have failed to comply with any provision of any internal
revenue law, and
(3) the information sought to be obtained from the examination of the records
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summons on a known taxpayer for the dual purpose of investigating
both the tax liability of that taxpayer and the tax liabilities of unnamed
parties, as long as all of the information sought is relevant to a legiti-
mate investigation of the summoned taxpayer. 6 9
d. Allegation of L R. S Waiver of Right to Compel Compliance With
Summons Reected
BFM contended that the I.R.S. waived its right to compel compli-
ance with the summons when a revenue agent "agreed" that BFM would
not be required to comply with the summons until it had received a writ-
ten response to its letter to the Regional Commissioner requesting cen-
tralization of the I.R.S. investigation. In his declaration under penalty of
perjury, the revenue agent stated that he had never agreed to "suspend,
waive, or postpone [BFM's] appearance pursuant to the summons in is-
sue," but merely stated that he "understood [BFM's] position."'70
Since the question of an "agreement" between BFM and the I.R.S.
was not before the court on appeal, the Tenth Circuit did not address
the question of whether there was an "agreement" and whether such
"agreement" would have constituted a waiver. However, the court held
that even assuming the I.R.S. had agreed to change the original compli-
ance date, it had effectively responded to BFM's request by letter advis-
ing BFM that a sufficient basis existed for each district to proceed with
its respective investigation. The court thus rejected BFM's contention
that the I.R.S. had waived its right to compel compliance with the
summons.
4. Implications of Holding
This decision represents a thorough restatement of the current
standards to which the I.R.S. is held in initiating and implementing civil
tax investigations. These standards are premised on the long-estab-
lished judicial precedent set forth in Powell and applied in the context of
subsequently enacted statutory and procedural provisions. Although
the court resolved the issues in favor of the government in this case, its
thorough review of the government's compliance with such standards is
indicative of an apparent trend by the circuit to require strict adherence
by the government to a high standard of care in conducting tax
investigations.
(and the identity of the person or persons with respect to whose liability the sum-
mons is issued) is not readily available from other sources.
69. BFM, 769 F.2d at 1448-49 (citing Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. v. United States, 469 U.S.
310 (1985)).
70. Id. at 1449 n.9.
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C. Limitations of the Powell Standard for Investigations of Churches Under
I. R.C. Section 7605(c) and its Successor, Section 7611: United
States v. Church of World Peace
1. Case in Context
Although the standard of care applied in the initiation and imple-
mentation of general tax investigations had been clearly established in
Powell, the question before the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Church of
World Peace71 was whether an administrative summons issued by the
I.R.S. should be examined under a more restrictive standard when the
investigation involves a church.
Statutory provisions such as I.R.C. section 7605(c) 72 reflect a con-
gressionally-determined balance between the government's legitimate
interest in tax records and the rights of church organizations under the
first amendment. The issue addressed by the Church of World Peace court,
however, was whether the Powell "legitimate purpose" standard was ap-
plicable or whether some measure of necessity was imposed by section
7605(c). 73 While the Tenth Circuit had not previously addressed the
issue, courts which have addressed it are not in agreement.7 4 After care-
ful consideration and analysis, the Tenth Circuit required the govern-
ment to exercise greater care in the case of church investigations. The
government was required to satisfy the "extent necessary" language of
section 7605(c). 75 Since this was not accomplished, the district court's
71. 775 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1985).
72. Subsection (c) of Section 7605 of the Internal Revenue Code was added by Sec-
tion 121( ) of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 548 (1969) (codi-
fied at 26 U.S.C. § 7605(c) (1969)). Section 7605(c), the section under which the appeal in
this case arose, provides:
Restriction on examination of churches.
No examination of the books of account of a church or convention or association
of churches shall be made to determine whether such organization may be en-
gaged in the carrying on of an unrelated trade or business or may be otherwise
engaged in activities which may be subject to tax under part III of subchapter F of
chapter 1 of this title (section 511 and following, relating to taxation of business
income of exempt organizations) unless the Secretary or his delegate (such officer
being no lower than a principal internal revenue officer for an internal revenue
region) believes that such organization may be so engaged and so notifies the
organization in advance of the examination. No examination of the religious ac-
tivities of such an organization shall be made except to the extent necessary to deter-
mine whether such organization is a church or a convention or association of
churches, and no examination of the books of account of such an organization
shall be made other than to the extent necessary to determine the amount of tax
imposed by this title. (emphasis added).
73. Church of World Peace, 775 F.2d at 267.
74. See generally United States v. Coates, 692 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1982) (statute permits
examinations necessary to determine tax liability under any I.R.C. provision); United
States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1981), (District court's application of a "truly
necessary" standard in error) cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983 (1982); United States v. Life Science
Church, 636 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1980), aff'd after remand sub nom. United States v. Norcutt,
680 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1982) (I.R.S. summons overly broad); United States v. Holmes, 614
F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980) (summons of impermissible scope); United States v. Freedom
Church, 613 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1979) (refusing to restrict I.R.S. inquiry).
75. United States v. Church of World Peace, 775 F.2d 265, 268 (10th Cir. 1985).
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order enforcing the I.R.S. administrative summons was set aside. 76
The Tenth Circuit's ruling that the purpose of section 7605(c) was
to place limits on the examination of churches or inquiries by the I.R.S.
is consistent with the trend to safeguard the taxpayer's interests and to
hold the government accountable to a high standard of care in its inves-
tigative efforts. The concern raised by such a decision is whether this
holding might limit the government's ability to control the tax abuse of
fraudulent religious groups.
2. Statement of Case
Church of World Peace involved a district court order enforcing an ad-
ministrative summons issued by the I.R.S. The summons requested cer-
tain books and records 7 7 of the Church of World Peace as well as the
testimony of its pastor, Reverend William Conklin.
After determining that the summoned data might be relevant to de-
termine the tax exempt status of the church and its possible tax liability,
the district court issued an order enforcing the summons. This holding
was based on the view that the public interest in making such determina-
tions outweighed the church's privacy interests.
78
The church appealed on the ground that the district court erred in
holding that the summons was enforceable because it satisfied the Powell
standard. 7 9 The church contended that I.R.C. section 7605(c) placed
limitations on the Powell standard for investigation of churches, main-
taining that the enforcement order should be reversed due to the gov-
ernment's failure to meet this higher statutory standard. 80 Further, the
church argued that the district court erred in its determination that the
summons was not overbroad.
8 1
The government responded that an examination of books and
records for the purpose of reviewing whether a church qualifies for tax
exempt status does not result in "excessive entanglement" or violate
rights of freedom of religion and association. 8 2 Further, the govern-
ment argued that it had satisfied the "extent necessary," "notice," and
"belief" requirements provided in the relevant Treasury Regulations 8 3
76. Id.
77. According to the district court's record, the summons requested, among other
items, all books, records, and papers of the Church of World Peace and all records relating
to any and all assets owned or used by the Church of World Peace and the manner in
which such assets were acquired. Records regarding the nature and specific extent of all
religious activities conducted by the Church were also requested. Record on Appeal,
United States v. Church of World Peace, 775 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1985)(No. 84-2200).
78. United States v. Church of World Peace, No. 84-X-236, slip op. at 2 (D. Colo.
Aug. 30, 1984).
79. Brief for Appellant at 5, United States v. Church of World Peace, 775 F.2d 265
(10th Cir. 1985)(84-2200).
80. Id. at 10-11.
81. Id. at 12-13.
82. United States v. Coates, 692 F.2d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Christian Ech-
oes National Ministry Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856-57 (10th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
83. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7605-1(c)(2) (1985) provides:
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by sending a letter from the Regional Commissioner to the church, stat-
ing that it was necessary to examine its books and records. 84 The final
argument raised by the government was that section 7605 placed no re-
strictions on the examination of churches because the government's
duty to determine the proper taxes due overrides any statutory
restrictions.
85
The Tenth Circuit set aside the enforcement order, finding that
I.R.C. section 7605(c) and first amendment safeguards prevented the
application of the Powell standard in examinations of churches. The gov-
ernment, according to the Tenth Circuit, failed to meet this higher stan-
dard. 8 6 Citing In re First National Bank, Englewood, Colorado,8 7 the court
found that the church's affidavits were sufficient to shift the burden of
proof to the government to justify its request to identify the members of
the church, and that the government failed to meet its burden. The
court also rejected the government's claim that section 7605 placed no
restrictions on the examination of churches because such a proposition
would nullify the effect of the statute and render it without a purpose.
8 8
The court relied on the Eighth Circuit decision in United States v. Life
Science Church ,89 and the Fifth Circuit ruling in United States v. Holmes90 in
reaching its conclusion that the all-inclusive language in the summons
was overly broad under section 7605(c). In support of its conclusion,
the court quoted the Fifth Circuit decision in Holmes:
Restriction on examination of churches-
Books of account. No examination of the books of account of an organization which
claims to be a church or a convention or association of churches shall be made
except after the giving of notice as provided in this subparagraph and except to
the extent necessary (i) to determine the initial or continuing qualification of the
organizations under section 501 (c)(3); (ii) to determine whether the organization
qualifies as one, contributions to which are deductible under sections 170, 545,
556, 642, 2055, 2106, or 2522; (iii) to obtain information for the purpose of as-
certaining or verifying payments made by the organization to another person in
determining the tax liability of the recipient, such as payments of salaries, wages,
or other forms of compensation; or (iv) to determine the amount of tax, if any,
imposed by the Code upon such organization. No examination of the books of
account of a church or convention or association of churches shall be made unless
the Regional Commissioner believes that such examination is necessary and so notifies the or-
ganization in writing at least 30 days in advance of examination. The Regional
Commissioner will conclude that such examination is necessary only after reason-
able attempts have been made to obtain information from the books of account
by written request and the Regional Commissioner has determined that the infor-
mation cannot be fully or satisfactorily obtained in that manner. In any examina-
tion of a church or convention or association of churches for the purpose of
determining unrelated business income tax liability pursuant to such notice, no
examination of the books of account of the organization shall be made except to
the extent necessary to determine such liability. (emphasis added).
84. Record on Appeal at 12-13, United States v. Church of World Peace, 775 F.2d 265
(10th Cir. 1985)(No. 84-2200).
85. Church of World Peace, 775 F.2d at 268 (citing United States v. Coates, 692 F.2d 629
(9th Cir. 1982) and United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 983 (1982)).
86. Id.
87. 701 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1983).
88. Church of World Peace, 775 F.2d at 268.
89. 636 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1980).
90. 614 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980).
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The second prong of the Powell test was pruned back by Con-
gress in 1969, in regard to examination of churches, when it
added subsection (c) to 26 U.S.C. § 7605. That provision limits
the inquiry into the religious activities and books of account of
churches "to the extent necessary" to ensure that the organiza-
tion is a church and to determine the amount of tax owing.
The "extent necessary" syntax is certainly more restrictive than
the "may be relevant" language in the second tier of Powell.9 1
3. Implications of Holding
The Church of World Peace decision is consistent with the Tenth Cir-
cuit's attempt to require the government to strictly adhere to a high
standard of care in conducting tax investigations, especially those in-
volving first amendment considerations. However, limiting examina-
tions of churches in this fashion could possibly hamper the
government's ability to control the tax abuse of fraudulent religious
groups.
D. Notice Requirements for Valid Tax Assessments Pursuant to I. R. C. Sections
6212 and 6213: Cyclone Drilling, Inc. v. Kelley
1. Case in Context
I.R.C. section 621392 provides that any tax assessment imposed
upon a taxpayer without proper notice is void and illegal. I.R.C. section
621293 provides that a Notice of Deficiency must be sent by certified or
registered mail to the taxpayer at his "last known address." Generally,
the I.R.S. is required to use "reasonable diligence" in attempting to de-
termine the taxpayer's correct address. 94 The issue addressed by the
Tenth Circuit in Cyclone Drilling was the extent to which the taxpayer
could explore the "reasonable diligence" that the I.R.S. exercised in as-
certaining the taxpayer's "last known address."
2. Statement of Case
The taxpayer sought an injunction barring the I.R.S. from collect-
ing an assessment of tax deficiencies for the 1979 and 1980 tax years
which the taxpayer claimed were void due to improper notice. The issue
91. Id. at 988 (footnote omitted).
92. See supra note 10.
93. See supra note 9.
94. Cool Fuel Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 313 (9th Cir. 1982) (duty of I.R.S. to
exercise reasonable diligence not complied with where it was put on notice that taxpayer
had moved when notice of deficiency was returned as undeliverable); Mall v. Kelly, 564 F.
Supp. 371, 373 (D. Wyo. 1983) (reasonable diligence in locating taxpayer is satisfied by
following published I.R.S. procedures on obtaining taxpayer's last known address); Tan-
gren v. Mihlbachler, 522 F. Supp. 701, 703 (D. Colo. 1981) (I.R.S. failed to exercise rea-
sonable diligence in determining taxpayer's new address before it attempted to seize
taxpayer's property to satisfy alleged tax deficiency); Alta Sierra Vista, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 62 T.C. 367, 374 (1974), aff'd mem., 538 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1976) (reasonable dili-
gence in determining taxpayer's correct address satisfied when Commissioner used the
address appearing on taxpayer's return as the last known in the absence of clear and con-
cise notification from the taxpayer directing the Commissioner to use a different address).
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before the district court was whether the I.R.S. had sent the Notice of
Deficiency to the taxpayer's "last known address." The court found that
there was no material issue of fact and that the I.R.S. had properly sent
the notice. Accordingly, the district court granted the government's
motion for summary judgment and denied the taxpayer's requests for
discovery and for an injunction to enjoin the I.R.S. from collecting the
tax. The issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in its de-
termination that no issue of material fact existed.
Since the taxpayer used its new post office box address on its Appli-
cation for Additional Time to File Corporation Income Tax Return and
on its actual 1980 return, and because the I.R.S. had used the taxpayer's
new post office box address approximately fifteen times in correspon-
dence concerning unrelated employment tax matters, the Tenth Circuit
held that an issue of material fact remained as to what was the I.R.S.'
actual knowledge of the taxpayer's "last known address."'9 5 Further, the
court held that by denying the taxpayer's discovery requests, the tax-
payer was unable to review the government's compliance with the "rea-
sonable diligence" standard and its own internal procedures.9 6 The
court concluded that the taxpayer did not have a full and fair opportu-
nity to explore whether the I.R.S. had, in fact, exercised "reasonable
diligence" in determining the taxpayer's "last known address".9 7 Ac-
cordingly, the case was reversed and remanded for a complete consider-
ation of all pertinent facts and reasonable inferences.
3. Analysis
An analysis of this decision begins with the definition of "last known
address." In the absence of a statutory definition, courts have inter-
preted it to mean "that address to which the I.R.S. reasonably believes
the taxpayer wishes the notice sent." 9 8 Generally, when a taxpayer
changes his address, he is required to give the I.R.S. notice of the
change.9 9 In deciding what constitutes adequate notice, the Tenth Cir-
cuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, 10 0 holding that the filing
of a tax return for a year subsequent to the year at issue and bearing a
new address is "clear and concise" notice to the I.R.S. 10 Accordingly,
the address on the taxpayer's most recent return will ordinarily be the
taxpayer's "last known address."
10 2
95. Cyclone Drilling, Inc. v. Kelley, 769 F.2d 662, 665 (10th Cir. 1985).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 665 (citing Cool Fuel Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d. 309, 312 (9th Cir. 1982)).
98. Id. at 664 (citing United States v. Ahrens, 530 F.2d 781, 785 (8th Cir. 1976) and
Sorrentino v. Ross, 425 F.2d 213, 215 (5th Cir. 1970) and Delman v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 384 F.2d 929, 932 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 952 (1968)).
99. Weinroth v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 430, 435 (1980).
100. United States v. Zolla, 724 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 169 U.S. 830
(1984); Cool Fuel v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 312 (9th Cir. 1982); McPartlin v. Commis-
sioner, 653 F.2d 1185, 1190 (7th Cir. 1981) (citing Ninth Circuit cases).
101. Cyclone Drilling, Inc. v. Kelley, 769 F.2d 662, 664 (10th Cir. 1985).
102. See DeWelles v. United States, 378 F.2d 37 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986
(1967); Cohen v. United States, 297 F.2d 760 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962).
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The relevant inquiry focuses on the government's knowledge,
rather than on the taxpayer's actual current address.10 3 In addition, the
I.R.S. is required to use "reasonable diligence" in attempting to deter-
mine the taxpayer's correct address.'
0 4
4. Implications of Holding
The Tenth Circuit's ruling that the taxpayer is entitled to know
more about how its own case was handled is indicative of the court's
concern for the taxpayer's interests. It could be expected that the "com-
plete consideration" on remand of the case would include a review of
the methods used by the I.R.S. in ascertaining the taxpayer's "last
known address" and a review of any pertinent I.R.S. procedural manu-
als.' 0 5 Accordingly, the I.R.S. will have the burden of proof to show
compliance with its own internal procedures.
The court's decision to hold the I.R.S. strictly accountable to a "rea-
sonable diligence" standard, the shift in the burden of proof, and the
increased public scrutiny to which the I.R.S. is being subjected are addi-
tional examples of an apparent trend within the Tenth Circuit to protect
the taxpayers' interests at the risk of limiting the government's abilities
to enforce compliance with the internal revenue laws.
III. THE STANDARD FOR PARTICULARITY IN SEARCH WARRANTS ISSUED
IN CONNECTION WITH CRIMINAL TAX INVESTIGATIONS
A. Background
The fourth amendment provides that persons have a right to be
protected from unreasonable searches and seizures by the govern-
ment. 10 6 Generally, this right has been construed to prevent the issu-
ance of general search warrants by imposing certain requirements on
their issuance. For a search warrant to issue, there must be a showing
supported by a written affidavit of probable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed, that the items sought are evidence of such crime,
and that such evidence will be at the place sought to be searched. 10 7
The fourth amendment's particularity requirement provides that the af-
fidavit must describe in detail the items sought so that "nothing is left to
the discretion of the officer executing the warrant."' 0 8 The particularity
requirement may cause significant problems in the case of tax investiga-
103. Cyclone Drilling, 769 F.2d at 664 (citing Alta Sierra Vista, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62
T.C. 367, 374 (1974), aff'd mem., 538 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1976)).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
107. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 558-59 (1978).
108. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (quoting Marron v. United States,
275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)).
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tions involving the seizure of business records and documents because
the items sought must be specifically described.
The particularity requirement is generally less stringent when ap-
plied to the search of business enterprises that are considered to be per-
vasive schemes to defraud or are inherently criminal. 10 9 Cases in
support of this notion hold that if an entire business enterprise is per-
meated with criminal activity and the government sufficiently supports
its probable cause determination, a warrant seeking all business records
is not overbroad.I l0
B. Limitations Placed on Scope of Search Warrant Issued for Premises of an
Enterprise Alleged by the I.R.S. to be a Pervasive Tax Fraud Scheme:
Voss v. Bergsgaard
1. Case in Context
Voss v. Bergsgaard III involved a review of the particularity require-
ment as it relates to a criminal tax investigation of an enterprise that
allegedly promotes fraudulent tax shelters in violation of I.R.C. section
6700.112 According to the Tenth Circuit, the sufficiency of the govern-
ment's showing that the taxpayer's activities are inherently criminal and
the protection of certain first amendment freedoms are factors which
affect the particularity requirement. The court also addressed whether
the warrant was at least partially in compliance with the particularity
standard, which would justify severance and acceptance of the valid
portion.
The Tenth Circuit's affirmation of the district court's decision both
to invalidate the search warrant because it did not meet the particularity
standard and to grant the taxpayer's motion for the return of all prop-
erty seized is an example of the circuit's imposition of a high standard of
care on the government. The decision to uphold the taxpayer's interests
over the government's need for the information in connection with its
criminal tax investigation is consistent with an apparent trend by the
circuit to safeguard taxpayers' interests.
2. Statement of Case
This case reviewed the validity of search warrants issued upon ap-
plication by I.R.S. agents. Each application for a search warrant was
supported by an affidavit which outlined an extensive investigation of an
109. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (seizure of business records from of-
fice for evidence of fraudulent real estate scheme); see also United States v. Offices Known
as 50 State Distributing Co., 708 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1021
(1984) (seizure of records justified where affidavit showed pervasively fraudulent opera-
tion encompassing entire business); United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980) (seizure of business records justified by a finding of probable
cause that defendant was committing mail and wire fraud).
110. See supra note 109.
111. 774 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1985).
112. Seesupra note 62.
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alleged tax protestor group and contained a detailed description of the
items to be seized." 13 After the warrants were executed, the taxpayer
filed a Rule 41(e) motion1 1 4 seeking the return of all documents and
other evidence seized. The taxpayer alleged that the warrants were not
supported by sufficient probable cause and that they failed to describe
with sufficient particularity the property to be seized. The district court
ruled that although the affidavits set forth sufficient probable cause, they
were nevertheless invalid on particularity grounds.'15
The government appealed on the grounds that the district court
erred in finding that the search warrants did not meet the particularity
requirement and in granting the taxpayer's motion for the return of the
seized property. The government's alternative argument was that it
should have been allowed to retain the evidence seized under those pro-
visions of the warrant which were sufficiently particular.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the war-
rants were invalid on particularity grounds and that they amounted to
illegal writs of assistance since they gave the government "carte blanche
... to take anything that they saw, whether it was nailed down or other-
wise." 1 1 6 The court also rejected the government's request for sever-
ance of the warrant and retention of the evidence seized under
sufficiently particular provisions. The basis for this ruling was that most
of the warrant's provisions were overbroad and largely subsumed those
provisions that would have been adequate standing alone."1
7
3. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
a. Fourth Amendment Considerations
The Tenth Circuit rejected the government's contention that the
search warrants did not amount to general warrants given the criminal
nature of the taxpayer's activities. The court held that the government
failed to show that the taxpayer's activities amounted to a pervasive
scheme to defraud, which could have supported the seizure of all busi-
ness records. The court did not agree with the government's reliance
on Andreson v. Maryland 18 as standing for the proposition that white
113. The items to be seized included substantially all of the taxpayer's business
records. Voss, 774 F.2d at 406 n.l.
114. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) provides as follows:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district
court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the prop-
erty on the ground that he is entitled to lawful possession of the property which
was illegally seized. The judge shall receive evidence on any issue of fact neces-
sary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted the property shall be
restored and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial. If a
motion for return of property is made or comes on for hearing in the district for
trial after an indictment or information is filed, it shall be treated also as a motion
to suppress under Rule 12.
115. Voss, 774 F.2d at 403.
116. Id. at 404 (quoting Record at 68, Voss (Nos. 85-447M, 85-448M, 85-450M)).
117. Id. at 406.
118. 427 U.S. 463, 480-81 n.10 (1976).
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collar criminals should not find refuge behind the particularity require-
ments simply because the extent and the complexity of their activities
make impossible a more precise definition of the evidence sought. Ac-
cordingly, the court rejected the government's claim that under the cir-
cumstances the description of the items to be seized was as specific as
could be expected.
b. First Amendment Considerations
The Tenth Circuit did not accept the government's contention that
first amendment free speech and free association considerations do not
impose a higher standard of "scrupulous exactitude" 1 9 when items
seized have evidentiary value independent of any protected speech they
might contain or associations they might identify. 12 0 The court did not
find any merit to the argument that first amendment rights are not in-
fringed, and the "scrupulous exactitude" test of Stanford v. Texas 12' does
not apply when the basis for the seizure of written material is not for the
ideas they contain. 122 The court also rejected the argument that the
government's interest in securing compliance with its internal revenue
laws overrides any incidental infringement of first amendment associa-
tion rights. 1
23
The Tenth Circuit also discounted the argument that the public
should not be permitted to shield criminal conduct from government
investigation via first amendment freedom of association protection.
12 4
The court rejected the government's contention that the first amend-
ment safeguards that the Tenth Circuit sought to uphold in its 1983
decision of In re First National Bank of Englewood, Colorado 125 would not be
eliminated when, as in this case, the government has made an abundant
showing of probable cause to believe that members of an organization
are engaged in criminal activity.
The circuit's reliance on the "scrupulous exactitude" test of Stanford
should be viewed in light of a Supreme Court case 126 decided after Voss.
In New York v. P.J. Video, Inc. ,127 the Court held that "an application for a
warrant authorizing the seizure of materials presumptively protected by
the First Amendment should be evaluated under the same standard of
119. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); see also Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978).
120. United States v. Truglio, 731 F.2d 1123, 1127-28 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
862 (1984).
121. 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
122. Truglio, 731 F.2d at 1127-28. See also United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786 (9th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Apker, 705 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005
(1984).
123. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 611 (1985); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S 367, 377 (1968).
124. See United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1983) (items which are normally
protected by the first amendment can be the proper subject of a search when those items
will prove the taxpayer's association with criminal activity).
125. 701 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1983).




probable cause used to review warrant applications generally."' 128 Ac-
cordingly, the circuit's rejection of the argument that first amendment
considerations do not impose a higher standard on the government
should be reevaluated.
c. Request for Severance of Warrant
The circuit denied the government's request that the warrant be
severed and that the government be allowed to retain the items seized
under the provisions of the warrant which were sufficiently particular.
This ruling was based on the court's finding that the warrant's over-
breadth largely subsumed those provisions of the warrant which could
have been adequate standing alone.129 The court rejected the govern-
ment's reliance on the principles stated in United States v. Fitzgerald 130
and United States v. Apker 131 that absent a showing of bad faith, the inva-
lidity of part of a search warrant does not require the suppression of all
evidence seized during its execution.
d. Concurring Opinion
Although Judge Logan concurred with the majority decision, he did
not accept the majority's disapproval of the government's reliance on
United States v. Brien 132 and United States v. Offices Known as 50 State Distrib-
uting Company '33 to support an all-records search. His concurring opin-
ion was apparently premised on the fact that the government had
difficulty identifying the exact statute which the taxpayer had violated,
thus causing the warrant to be overbroad. Judge Logan concluded by
stating that "[t]he government has neither demonstrated that virtually
all of the NCBA's activities are illegal nor pinpointed the statutes that
the business allegedly has violated. The purpose of an 'all records'
search cannot be to find out what crime a person or entity might have
committed."134
4. Implications of Holding
The precedential weight of this holding within the circuit will make
it likely that search warrants issued in connection with future tax investi-
gations will be judged under the stricter standard outlined herein. This
holding could have an adverse effect on the government's capability to
investigate possible violations of federal tax laws in the future due to
such a strict particularity requirement to obtain a search warrant.
128. Id. at 1615.
129. Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 406 (10th Cir. 1985).
130. 724 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984).
131. 705 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
132. 617 F.2d 299 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980).
133. 708 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1021 (1984).
134. Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 409 (10th Cir. 1985) (Logan, J., concurring).
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CONCLUSION
During the survey period, consideration for taxpayers' interests was
apparent in a number of decisions rendered by the Tenth Circuit. In
Phillips and Wells, the court adopted a subjective standard for assessing a
taxpayer's "good faith misunderstanding of law" defense. In Church of
World Peace, the court relied on certain statutory and constitutional safe-
guards as authority to limit a tax investigation of a church. In Cyclone
Drilling, Inc., the court held the government to a high standard of care in
satisfying the notice requirements for a valid tax assessment. In Voss, the
government was likewise held to a high standard of care in satisfying the
particularity requirement for a valid search warrant in connection with a
criminal tax investigation.
If the holdings in these decisions were to be further extended, there
could be a detrimental effect on the government's capability to success-
fully investigate and prosecute future violations of the federal tax laws.
Such a result, although an apparently unintended consequence of the
circuit's holdings, is a possibility nonetheless. Accordingly, care should
be taken when applying these holdings as judicial precedent.
Vincent . Oliva
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF TENTH
CIRCUIT DECISIONS
I. ASPEN SKIING Co. v. ASPEN HIGHLANDS SKIING CORP.: THE SUPREME
COURT UPHELD AN ANTITRUST DECISION AGAINST A MARKET-
DOMINANT COMPANY WHICH REFUSED TO
COOPERATE WITH A COMPETITOR
A. Introduction
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., I brings together fierce
competition, the Colorado ski industry, and the volatile field of antitrust
law. Currently in an uncertain state as a result of strong international
competition and governmental efforts to lessen the burden of regula-
tion,2 American antitrust law has had a long and tumultuous history,
beginning with deliberate policies of economic regulation formed in the
late nineteenth century. 3 Although possession of monopoly power by
itself will not generally constitute a violation of the Sherman Act's
prohibitions against restraint of trade,4 it is unclear to what extent cer-
tain activities or purposes will, when performed by a business possessing
1. 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985), aff'g 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984).
2. The Reagan administration announced in February of 1986 that it would attempt
to ease some of the burden antitrust laws place on businesses, such as the provision that
treble damages can be awarded to the prevailing party in an antitrust action. This could be
accomplished by influencing Congress to pass legislation changing antitrust laws. Middle-
ton, New Antitrust Era Takes Shape, The National Law Journal, January 13, 1986, at 1.
3. Rapidly expanding railroads were accused of rate discrimination, illegal kickbacks,
and other unfair practices. Hearings on Proposed Amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act, Hear-
ing on S. 1629, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1935). The nation's first antitrust statute, the
Sherman Act, was passed in 1890 in response to these accusations. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982). The history and intricacies of antitrust law have captured the interest of many
scholars. For comprehensive analyses of antitrust law and its history, see H. THORELLI,
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1955); P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw (1978).
An emerging position claims that all antitrust laws in general have been harmful to this
country. For example, see D. T. ARMENTENO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL
(1986).
4. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared to be illegal.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 2 states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106
(1911); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1093 (1980). But see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945) (in which general intent to maintain a market position which was a monopoly,
rather than specific intent to harm competitors, was found to be the basis for a section 2
violation, suggesting that mere monopoly power could constitute such a violation); United
States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (where it was implied that,
had the applicable market been more narrowly defined, duPont's 75% market share of that
narrower market alone could have provided the basis for a section 2 violation).
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monopoly power in a defined market, combine to become a violation of
the Act. 5 Aspen Skiing Co., the first monopolization case since 1973,6 dis-
cussed and further defined one area of business conduct which may, in
combination with monopoly power, violate section 2 of the Sherman
Act: the refusal to deal with competitors. Affirming both the Tenth Cir-
cuit and the Federal District Court, a unanimous Supreme Court found
the conduct of Aspen Skiing Company, in concert with its partial mo-




Aspen, Colorado boasts four superb facilities for downhill skiing.
Aspen Highlands, Aspen Mountain (Ajax), and Buttermilk were devel-
oped into ski resorts by private developers between 1945 and 1960.
Aspen Skiing Company (Aspen) purchased Ajax and Buttermilk, then
developed a fourth ski area, Snowmass, which opened in 1967. Aspen
Highlands is still owned and operated by an independent company,
Aspen Highlands Corporation (Highlands).
From 1962 until 1978, with one exception, joint passes were sold
which allowed a skier to ski any of the four mountains during a limited
time period. For all but the 1977-1978 season, revenues from the sale
of these "all-Aspen" tickets were divided among the four ski areas based
on usage of each area.8 Various methods were used to determine how
many skiers with the "all-Aspen" ticket used each mountain.
For the 1977-1978 season, Aspen offered to continue the "all-
5. Developmental cases involving section 2 violations include: United States v. Grif-
fith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). The reasoning of these cases culminated in a monopolization
test introduced in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966), which has re-
mained the standard for over twenty years.
6. Travers, Does a Monopolist Have a Duty to Deal with its Rivals? Some Thoughts on the
Aspen Skiing Case, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 727 (1986); Note, The Monopolist's Duty to Cooperate in
Joint Marketing Ventures with Competitors: The Quandry ofAspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp., 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1243, 1256 (1986) (hereafter cited as "The Monopolist's
Duty") (Aspen Skiing is the first Supreme Court section 2 monopolization case since Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973)).
7. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir.
1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985). For other commentaries and discussions of the sub-
ject case, see Malina, Supreme Court Update, 54 ANTrTRUST L.J. 280, 289-90 (1985) ("possibly
the most significant decision of the October 1984 Term"); The Monopolist's Duty, supra note
6; Travers, supra note 6; Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120, 275-83 (1985). For a thor-
ough analysis of monopolies, including a review of the subject case, see Cirace, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Antitrust Law's Natural Monopoly Cases, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 677 (1986).
8. Various methods were used to determine the usage of each ski area. For the
1971-72 season, an all-Aspen ticket was monitored by lift operators recording the ticket
numbers of persons using the slopes of Highlands. For the 1973-74 season, a random-
sample survey was commissioned to determine how many skiers with the four-area ski
ticket used each mountain. The ski areas allocated revenues from the ticket sales based on
the survey's results. Highland's share of those revenues was 17.5% in 1973-74; 18.5% in
1974-75; 16.8% in 1975-76 and; 13.2% in 1976-77. Highlands' measured share of the
total market was 15.8% in 1973-74; 17.1% in 1974-75; 17.4% in 1975-76 and; 20.5% in
1976-77. Aspen Skiing Co., 105 S. Ct. at 2851.
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Aspen" ticket only if Highlands would accept a fixed share of the ticket
revenues. Fearing that the alternative might be no joint ticket at all, and
hoping to persuade Aspen to reinstate the division of revenues based on
use of each facility, Highlands eventually accepted a fixed percentage of
revenues for the 1977-1978 season.9 That season, however, was the last
for the "all-Aspen" ticket.
Aspen ended its cooperation with Highlands by eliminating the "all-
Aspen" ticket.' 0 The company began to market its own three-area ski
package featuring only its own mountains. In addition, Aspen took
other actions1' which made it extremely difficult for Highlands to mar-
ket its own multi-area package to replace the joint "all-Aspen" ski ticket.
Highlands' market share for downhill skiing services declined stead-
ily after the "all-Aspen" ticket based on usage was abolished. 12 In 1979,
Highlands brought suit in the Federal District Court of Colorado, alleg-
ing antitrust violations by Aspen of section 2 of the Sherman Act.
C. The Federal District Court Decision
In her instructions to the jury, District Judge Zita Weinshienk de-
fined monopolization by use of the two-part test developed in United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 13 for determining section 2 violations of the Act. 14
The offense of monopolization consists of: "(1) the possession of mo-
nopoly power in a relevant market, and (2) the willful acquisition, main-
tenance, or use of that power by anticompetitive or exclusionary means
or for anticompetitive or exclusionary purposes." 15 The jury instruc-
tions further read:
In considering whether the means or purposes were anti-com-
petitive or exclusionary, you must draw a distinction here be-
tween practices which tend to exclude or restrict competition
on the one hand and the success of a business which reflects
only a superior product, a well-run business, or luck, on the
other hand. 
16
9. Highlands accepted 15% of the revenues for the 1977-78 season. No survey was
made during that ski season to determine actual usage of Highlands. Id. at 2852.
10. Aspen and Highlands were unable to reach an agreement for the 1978-79 ski sea-
son. Indeed, a member of Aspen's Board of Directors had advocated making Highlands
"an offer that [it] could not accept." Id.
11. These actions included: 1) an advertising campaign strongly implying that Ajax,
Buttermilk and Snowmass were the only ski mountains in the Aspen, Colorado area; 2) re-
fusal to sell Highlands any lift tickets for Aspen's mountains, either at the tour operator's
discount or at retail and; 3) refusal to accept vouchers from Highlands' newly developed
"Adventure Pack," an alternative ski package consisting of a 3-day pass at Highlands and
three vouchers, each equal to the price of a daily lift ticket at an Aspen mountain. The
vouchers were guaranteed by funds on deposit in a local bank, and were redeemable by
local merchants at full value. Id. at 2853.
12. Highlands' share of the market for downhill skiing services was 20.5% in 1976-77;
15.7% in 1977-78; 13.1% in 1978-79; 12.5% in 1979-80 and; 11% in 1980-81. Id.
13. 384 U.S. 563 (1966); see also Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 276; The Monopolist's
Duty, supra note 6, at 1258; Travers, supra note 6, at 730 (discussing the Grinnell test and its
background).
14. Aspen Skiing Co., 105 S. Ct. at 2854.
15. Id. at 2855; Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71.
16. Aspen Skiing Co., 105 S. Ct. at 2854.
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The Sherman Act provides for treble damages. Thejury found Aspen in
violation of section 2 of the Act and calculated Highlands' actual dam-
ages at $2.5 million. As sought in Highlands' complaint, treble damages
of $7.5 million and attorney's fees were awarded.
17
D. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
On appeal before the Tenth Circuit, Aspen argued that the effect of
the District Court's decision was to hold that businesses have a duty to
deal or cooperate with their competitors.' 8 The Tenth Circuit ex-
amined this argument in some depth, admitting that defining those in-
stances in which a monopolist has a duty to cooperate with its
competitors is "one of the most 'unsettled and vexatious' issues in anti-
trust law."' 19 The court, citing Byars v. Bluff City News Co., Inc., recog-
nized two lines of cases defining circumstances in which the duty to deal
with competitors might be imposed by law:20 cases involving essential
facilities and cases demonstrating an intent to create or maintain a mo-
nopoly by refusing to deal with competitors.
2 1
The essential facilities or "bottleneck" theory of antitrust law in-
volves control of facilities essential to the operation of an industry within
a market area. 22 For example, when railroad companies jointly owned a
terminal facility that was the only feasible terminal in a city, the owners
were required to make the facility available to non-proprietor railroads
on non-discriminatory and reasonable terms. 2 3 In analyzing the facts of
Aspen Skiing Co. under the bottleneck theory, the Tenth Circuit noted
Aspen's ownership of three out of the four ski mountains in the defined
area market; the difficulty and high cost of entry into the market by de-
veloping a new ski area; Aspen's lack of cooperation with Highlands on
ticketing arrangements amounting to a denial of the use of the facility
even though only partially monopolized; and evidence that joint market-
ing arrangements for ski tickets was both feasible and profitable. 2 4 The
court concluded that the essential facilities analysis was applicable and
established a duty to deal on the part of Aspen.
25
The court then turned briefly to the second possible basis for such a
duty: intent. It stated that "a 'business is free to deal with whomever it
pleases so long as it has no purpose to create or maintain a monop-
17. Id.
18. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 738 F.2d at 1518-20.
19. Id. at 1519 (quoting Byars v. Bluff City News Co., Inc., 609 F.2d 843, 846 (6th Cir.
1980)).
20. Id.
21. The court, in concluding that both lines of reasoning applied to the case before
them, noted other cases where a duty to deal was found based on both theories, or gener-
ally, without distinguishing between the two. Id. at 1520 n.13.
22. Id. at 1520.
23. Id. (citing United States v. Terminal R.R. Assoc., 224 U.S. 383 (1912)).
24. The court followed the four-part analysis of liability under the bottleneck theory
promoted in MCI Communications v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 234 (1983). Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 738 F.2d at 1520.
25. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 738 F.2d at 1521.
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oly.' "26 The court here, however, held the evidence sufficient for ajury
to find an intent to monopolize from Aspen's conduct. Factors listed as
influential were Aspen's refusal to cooperate with Highlands on a joint
ski ticket program, Aspen's refusal to honor Highlands' "Adventure
Pack" vouchers despite bank guarantees; and Aspen's raising of lift
ticket prices, thwarting any future modification of the "Adventure Pack"
idea.27 The trial court's decision was upheld, as were awards of triple
damages2 8 and attorney's fees.
E. The Supreme Court Opinion
Justice Stevens wrote the eight-justice unanimous opinion 29 for the
Supreme Court, affirming the Tenth Circuit decision. The opinion cov-
ered the facts in depth, underscoring those actions taken by Aspen Ski-
ing Company that adversely affected Highlands.
The issue, as defined by the Supreme Court, was whether the jury
finding of a section 2 violation was erroneous as a matter of law because
it was based on the premise that those with monopoly power have a duty
to cooperate with their competitors.30 The Court found that, in light of
District Judge Weinshienk's instructions, 3 1 the jury verdict was not based
on any assumption of a duty to deal.
3 2
However, the Court held that the general right to refuse to deal
with others is not unqualified. 3 3 The opinion then discussed LorainJour-
nal v. United States.34 In Lorain, the only local newspaper disseminating
news and advertising in a small Ohio town, refused to sell advertising to
persons who patronized a competing radio station.3 5 In holding that
this conduct violated section 2 of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court
said that the Journal's right to select customers and refuse advertise-
26. Id. at 1519 (citing Byars v. Bluff City News Co., Inc., 609 F.2d 843, 855 (6th Cir.
1980) (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919))).
27. Id. at 1521-22.
28. The court also discussed in some detail Aspen's arguments against the injury and
damages findings, id. at 1523-27, but held that the evidence was sufficient for ajury finding
of lost revenues, and that the damages were reasonably estimated, in fact well under the
estimates given by two expert witnesses. Id. at 1527.
29. Justice White took no part in the consideration of this case.
30. Aspen Skiing Co., 105 S. Ct. at 2849. The tension between the Sherman Act's major
provisions becomes apparent in considering a general duty to cooperate with competitors.
An interpretation of section 2 requiring cooperation, could in some instances lead to a
violation of section l's prohibition of combinations "in restraint of trade." See supra note
4. It is interesting to note that in 1975, just four years before the institution of this suit,
the Attorney General of Colorado brought a federal antitrust suit against both Aspen and
Highlands, challenging, among other things, the joint ticket offered by the two companies.
The suit was settled by a consent decree which subjected the sale of the "all-Aspen" ticket
to certain restrictions. The irony of the two actions emphasizes the complexity and flexi-
bility of antitrust theories. See Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 280 n.43 (noting conflicts
between the Sherman Act's section 1 proscriptions against competitor cooperation and the
possible scope of the Aspen Skiing Co. decision in defining a duty to deal with competitors).
31. Aspen Skiing Co., 105 S. Ct. at 2854-55.
32. Id. at 2856.
33. Id. at 2857.
34. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
35. Id. at 153.
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ments was a qualified one. "In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain
a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business freely to exercise
his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal."
'36
The Court emphasized that Aspen did not reject a new proposal by
a competitor, but "elected to make an important change in a pattern of
distribution that had originated in a competitive market."13 7 Because the
jury instructions allowed for a possibility of monopoly based on business
superiority alone, the Court assumed that the jury, in following the in-
structions, found no valid business reasons for Aspen's refusal to deal
with Highlands.3 8 In reviewing the record for support of the the jury's
conclusions, the Court looked beyond the effect on Highlands alone to
the effect on consumers and the market. Factors the Court highlighted
in its review were consumer preference for the four-mountain "all-
Aspen" pass; the decline of Highland's market share despite their miti-
gatory measures; Aspen's willingness to forego sales from Highlands of
Aspen's own tickets or of vouchers from Highland's "Adventure Packs"
without a valid business justification; and Aspen's failure to convince the
jury that the "all-Aspen" pass was a problem to administer.3 9 The
Court concluded that the record supported the jury's finding that
Aspen's efforts were "a deliberate effort to discourage customers from




The Supreme Court, while affirming the Tenth Circuit decision, did
not analyze the case based on the essential facilities or "bottleneck" the-
ory of a duty to deal with competitors. This doctrine was crucial to the
Tenth Circuit's opinion. However, without identifying a particular stan-
dard, the Court's analysis did utilize an intent theory,4 2 emphasizing
Aspen's justifications, or lack of valid justifications, for its actions in re-
fusing to deal with Highlands on the "all-Aspen" ticket. 4 3 This focus on
36. Aspen Skiing Co., 105 S. Ct. at 2857 (quoting Lorain, 342 U.S. at 155 (quoting
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919))).
37. Id. at 2858; but see Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 279; The Monopolist's Duty, supra
note 6, at 1262 (suggesting that the scope of the Aspen Skiing Co. decision could extend to
new ventures promoted by competitors).
38. Aspen Skiing Co., 105 S. Ct. at 2858-59; see Malina, supra note 7 (If a refusal to deal
changes "the character of the market," and is therefore illegal, it would be a "harsh rule
indeed.").
39. Aspen Skiing Co., 105 S. Ct. at 2859-61.
40. Id. at 2861.
41. Id.
42. See Travers, supra note 6, at 741; Malina, supra note 7.
43. See Malina, supra note 7 (absence ofjustification by Aspen is the key to the Court's
unanimity); The Monopolist's Duty, supra note 6, at 1246-49 (justification for a monopolist's
refusal to deal with competitors is the dividing line between the right to deal with whom-
ever one wants and a violation of section 2). But see Travers, supra note 6, at 742 (The
Court did not differentiate between Aspen's refusal to continue the "all-Aspen" ticket and




intent alone may serve to further limit the use of the essential facilities
theory, 44 or may simply be an indication that intent is the common nu-
cleus of both tests, since valid business-based justifications may serve to
absolve a monopolist of section 2 wrong-doing in either instance.
4 5 If
intent to monopolize is to be the focal point of any analysis of a duty to
deal with one's rivals, it is unlikely that such a duty would be applied in
cases of new ventures offered to market monopolists4 6 unless specific
intent on the part of key actors could be proved. Without a history of
conduct leading to a monopoly, such as found in Aspen Skiing Co., and
without a past cooperative record to show the disparity of proferedjusti-
fications for a monopolist's actions, proof of intent to monopolize would
be difficult. Therefore, the scope of the Aspen Skiing Co. decision may be
limited to situations involving on-going business dealings.
II. FDIC V. PHILADELPHIA GEAR CORP.: THE SUPREME COURT HELD A
STANDBY LETTER OF CREDIT IS NOT AN FDIC-INSURED DEPOSIT
A. Introduction
Banks are now failing at a faster rate than at any time since the
"Great Depression."'4 7 Many banks are in jeopardy because of the twin
onslaughts of the depressed agricultural and oil industries. 4 8 Failure of
the infamous Penn Square Bank4 9 led to litigation which culminated in
this case.
Due to the importance of maintaining public confidence in the
banking system at all times, Congress has created federal safeguards in
order to protect depositors' earnings in the event of a bank failure.
When the Comptroller of the Currency declares a federal bank insol-
vent, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is appointed as
the receiver. 50 Each depositor is insured by the FDIC for the amount of
deposit up to the statutory limit, which is now $100,000.5 1 In FDIC v.
Philadelphia Gear Corp. ,52 the issue was whether a standby letter of credit
backed by a contingent promissory note is a "deposit" which would be
44. See Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 283 (essential facilities doctrine limited to situa-
tions where more than one competitor controls the facility).
45. But see Travers, supra note 6 ("intent" adds nothing to conduct).
46. See supra note 38.
47. See Wall Street Journal, Nov. 25, 1986, p.31.
48. Id.
49. When the Penn Square Bank was declared insolvent onJuly 5, 1982, the FDIC, for
only the third time in its history, had to create a special bank in order to refund deposits.
Investors of the insolvent bank immediately moved to block redemption of letters of
credit. Legal Times Washington, July 12, 1828, at 1, col. 2. See generally, Note, The After-
math of Penn Square Bank: Protecting Loan Participants from Setoffs, 18 TULSA L.J. 261 (1982).
The Penn Square probe eventually became a criminal investigation. L.A. DailyJ., Sept. 29,
1982, at 5, col. 5.
50. 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (Supp. IV 1980). The FDIC was established by the Banking Act
of 1933. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162, 168. These provisions were revised in 1950 and
are currently codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-32 (1982).
51. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (1982) sets forth $100,000 as the maximum amount gener-
ally insured by the FDIC for any single depositor at a given bank.
52. 106 S. Ct. 1931 (1986).
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insured by the FDIC. 53 The U.S. District Court 54 and the Tenth Circuit
55 both held that such a note is an FDIC-insured deposit. The United
States Supreme Court reversed.
B. Facts
Orion Manufacturing Corporation (Orion) produced pumping
equipment for use in the oil fields of Oklahoma and Texas. Philadelphia
Gear is a trade supplier which furnished major parts for Orion's equip-
ment. Penn Square Bank was a federal bank in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma.
Orion had requested Penn Square Bank to issue an irrevocable
standby letter of credit for $145,200 for the benefit of Philadelphia
Gear. The purpose of this letter of credit was to allow Philadelphia Gear
easy and reliable access to any money owed to it by Orion. As security
for the letter of credit, Orion agreed to execute an unsecured promis-
sory note in favor of Penn Square Bank for the same amount. Both the
letter of credit and the note were executed on April 23, 1981.56
The letter of credit was contingent upon certain events. Philadel-
phia Gear was required to present a "signed statement that [it had] in-
voiced Orion Manufacturing Corporation and that said invoices have
remained unpaid for at least fifteen (15) days" 57 in order to receive pay-
ment from Penn Square. The bank would then pay Philadelphia Gear,
and charge interest to Orion Manufacturing Corporation for the amount
borrowed.58
Penn Square was declared insolvent on July 5, 1982.59 The FDIC,
as receiver and liquidator of the bank, received drafts from Philadelphia
Gear on the letter of credit in excess of $700,000.60 The FDIC disaf-
53. The volume of material concerning letters of credit is large and growing. See gener-
ally B. CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS 8-1 to -80
(rev. ed. 1981);J. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDrr (1984); H. HARFIELD, LETrERS
OF CREDIT (1979);J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAWS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 104-53 (2d ed. 1980). Pertinent law review articles on the subject of
standby letters of credit include Arnold & Bransilver, The Standby Letter of Credit - The Contro-
versy Continues, 10 U.C.C. L.J. 272 (1978); Garma, Standby Letters of Credit and Guarantees: Do
We Understand What We're Doing, 1978J. COM. BANK LENDING 3 (1978); Harfield, The Standby
Letter of Credit Debate, 94 BANKING L.J. 293 (1977); Katskee, The Standby Letter of Credit Debate
- The Case for Congressional Resolution, 92 BANKING L.J. 697 (1975); Comment, The Standby
Letter of Credit: What It Is and How to Use It, 45 MONTANA L. REV. 71 (1984). For a thoughtful
treatment of the history and proper interpretation of whether standby letters of credit
should be treated as federally insured deposits, see Note, Standby Letters of Credit: Are They
Insured Deposits?, 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1165 (1986) (concluding that standby letters were
never intended to be federally insured).
54. Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. FDIC, 587 F. Supp. 294 (W.D. Okla. 1984), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 751 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1931 (1986).
55. Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct.
1931 (1986).
56. Id. at 1133.
57. Id.
58. ld. at 1135.
59. Id.
60. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1933. Philadelphia Gear maintained that Penn
Square Bank owed $724,728.50 on the standby letter of credit. Of that amount,
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firmed "any and all" obligations under the letter of credit and returned
the drafts unpaid, declaring that the letter of credit was not a "de-
posit." 6 ' Litigation ensued.
C. The Federal District Court Decision
This case was tried before Judge Lee T. West of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. 6 2 Judge West
found the deposits to be FDIC-insured and ordered the FDIC to pay
Philadelphia Gear $100,000 in its capacity as insurer and $45,200 in its
capacity as receiver. In response to post-trial motions, the court denied
an award of attorney's fees to Philadelphia Gear. 63
D. The Tenth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the FDIC advanced three arguments justifying its posi-
tion that section 1813(l)(1) should not be interpreted to include standby
letters of credit. First, a standby letter of credit fails to satisfy the defini-
tion of "deposit" that is contained in section 1813(l)(1) because it is not
"money or its equivalent." 64 Since Philadelphia Gear could not present
the letter of credit to Penn Square Bank unless Orion did not pay cur-
rent invoices, this contingent letter of credit did not create the uncondi-
tional obligation which is the essential element of "money or its
equivalent." Second, this standby letter of credit was not "money or its
equivalent" because the promissory note that Orion gave to Penn
Square Bank as a security was accompanied not by cash, but a mere
promise to pay in the event the letter of credit was presented to the
bank. Third, a standby letter of credit is not an obligation for which the
bank is "primarily" liable, because standby letters of credit represent
secondary liabilities. 65 The FDIC asserted that because it is charged
with administering the provisions of the statute referring to letters of
credit, and had always interpreted section 1813(l)(1) as excluding
$100,000.00 was claimed to be federally insured, with $624,728.50 remaining as the unin-
sured outstanding balance. Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1133.
61. Id. at 1134.
62. The actual case was not published in the Federal Supplement. What was pub-
lished was the court's opinion in response to two post-trial motions. Philadelphia Gear, 587
F. Supp. at 297.
63. Id. at 302.
64. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(/)(1) (1982). This section of the Act defines a "deposit" as:
The unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held by a bank in the
usual course of business and for which it has given or is obligated to give credit,
either conditionally or unconditionally . . . which is evidenced by ... a letter of
credit ... on which the bank is primarily liable: Provided, that, without limiting the
generality of the term 'money or its equivalent,' any such account or instrument
must be regarded as evidencing the receipt of the equivalent of money when
credited or issued in exchange for ... a promissory note upon which the person
obtaining any such credit or instrument is primarily or secondarily liable. ...
(emphasis in original)
The Tenth Circuit also rejected the FDIC's contention that the note that Orion executed
in favor of Penn Square Bank was not a "promissory note" within the meaning of U.C.C.
§ 3-104(l)(b) (1978), because it did not represent an unconditional promise to pay. Phila-
delphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1134-35.
65. Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1135.
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standby letters of credit, its interpretation of the statute was entitled to
substantial deference.66
The Tenth Circuit rejected all three arguments. Judge Logan wrote
the opinion. While acknowledging that courts often accord deference to
the interpretations that an administrative agency gives a federal stat-
ute,6 7 the court also pointed out the circumstances under which such
interpretations can be disregarded.6 8 The court found no evidence that
Congress had expressly delegated authority to the FDIC to refine the
statutory definition of "deposit", and chose to disregard the FDIC's
interpretation.
With regard to the FDIC's second argument, the court examined
the difference between the promissory note that Orion gave to Penn
Square Bank and the agreement between Orion and Philadelphia Gear
creating the standby letter of credit. The court stated that the negotia-
bility of an instrument such as a promissory note must be determined by
examining the face of the document that Orion gave to Penn Square
Bank without regard to extraneous documents. 69 The court found that
the terms of the agreement between Orion and Philadelphia Gear were
not contained in the agreement between Orion and Penn Square Bank.
Therefore, concluded the court, no conditions restricting the negotiabil-
ity of the letter of credit were present, and the letter of credit was found
to be "money or its equivalent."
70
The FDIC finally argued that the structure of section 181771 ex-
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (1982). The definition of "deposit" found in section 1813(l)(1)
is based upon the former Regulation I, Rule 1, Oct. 1, 1935, 12 C.F.R. § 301.1 (1939),
revoked after incorporation into statutory law, 12 C.F.R. § 234 (Supp. 1962). That Congress
incorporated the FDIC regulatory definition of "deposit" into the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act amendments in 1960 lends credence to the validity of the FDIC interpretation.
Pub. L. No. 86-671, 74 Star. 546 (1960) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l)(1) (1982)). In
addition, although the FDIC issued no regulations excluding standby letters of credit from
the regulatory definition of "deposit," there is some indication that FDIC officials in 1935
thought that they were excluded. One official, when asked whether a letter of credit was a
deposit, stated:
If your letter of credit is issued by a charge against the depositor's account or for
cash and the letter of credit is reflected on your books as a liability, you do have a
deposit liability. If, on the other hand, you merely extend a line of credit to your
customer, you will only show a contingent liability on your books. In that event
no deposit liability has been created.
FDIC v. Irving Trust Co., 137 F. Supp. 145, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (quoted in Philadelphia
Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1938); see alsoJ. DOLAN, THE LAw OF LErrERS OF CREDIT 12.02(1)(a) at
12-2 to 4 (1984) ("[I]n the FDIC's view, the beneficiary of a standby credit does not have a
provable claim.").
67. See, e.g., Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm.,
454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981) (judicial deference granted to interpretation of administrative
agencies is often appropriate).
68. Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1135. In deciding the degree ofjudicial deference to
attach to an administrative interpretation, courts should consider the thoroughness of the
agency's research, the validity of its reasoning, and how consistent such an interpretation
is to prior and subsequent agency pronouncements. Adams Wrecking Co. v. United
States, 434 U.S. 275, 284 n.5 (1978).
69. Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1134; see U.C.C. § 3-105(2)(a) (1978) & Official
Comments.
70. Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1134-35.
71. 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (1982).
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cludes standby letters from the scope of section 1813(l)(1)'s definitions
of "deposit." Section 1817 establishes guidelines for determining the
amount each member bank is assessed for insurance. Member banks are
required to report to the FDIC their total deposit liabilities that would
be "absolutely due and owing in the event of a bank failure." 7 2 Because
standby letters of credit are contingent, they do not fall into the category
of an absolute obligation that member banks are required to report.
Therefore, maintained the FDIC, even though section 1817(4) refers to
section 1813 for its definitions of "deposit," it could not include a
standby letter of credit as a deposit upon which insurance rates are as-
sessed. The court rejected this line of reasoning, finding no support in
the language or legislative history of section 1817.
7 3
The Tenth Circuit's decision upheld the judgment against the FDIC
for $100,000 based on the FDIC's status as insurer, and for $45,200
based on the FDIC's status as receiver. 74 The decision also overruled an
award of prejudgment interest, stating that the FDIC was immune to
such judgments because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 7 5
E. The United States Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority Opinion
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion stressed the history of banking
regulation and insurance in this country. Her opinion referred to legis-
lative history in order to assert that the purpose of the FDIC has been to
protect the "assets and 'hard earnings' that businesses and individuals
have entrusted to banks."' 76 She stated that this purpose "is not fur-
thered by extending deposit insurance to cover a standby letter of credit
backed by a contingent promissory note, which involves no such surren-
der of assets or hard earnings to the custody of the bank."' 77
The FDIC had argued that it provides insurance based only on the
amount of deposits in a bank, and that the FDIC has not included in its
computation of deposits the amount of standby letters of credit backed
by contingent promissory notes. 78 Although this argument failed to
persuade the Tenth Circuit, it found a more receptive audience in the
Supreme Court.
Noting that in 1950 Congress had reenacted the provisions of the
Banking Act of 1935 without alteration, the Court relied on the maxim
of statutory construction that reenactment of a statute without change
72. Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1137.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1140.
75. Id. at 1138-39.
76. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1936. See S. REP. No. 1821, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 7,
10 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3234.
77. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1936.
78. Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1138. The FDIC also does not include standby let-
ters of credit in its computation of the premiums it charges member banks. Philadelphia
Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1938. In 1985, standby letters of credit represented potential obliga-
tions of more than $137 billion. Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1985, at 46, col. 4.
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signals congressional approval of whatever interpretations its terms had
received. 79 The Court acknowledged that the FDIC's interpretation of
the statute defining "deposit" had never been reduced to a specific reg-
ulation. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that in the circumstances of
this case the FDIC's "practice and belief" that a standby letter of credit
backed by a contingent promissory note does not create a "deposit"
within the meaning of the statute was entitled to the "considerable
weight [that] should be accorded to an executive department's construc-
tion of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer." °8 0 Based on
this, the Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the district court and
the Tenth Circuit Court, holding that a standby letter of credit backed
by a contingent promissory note does not give rise to an insured
deposit.
2. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent, authored by Justice Marshall, acknowledged that there
was considerable common sense backing the Court's opinion.8 1 Never-
theless, Justice Marshall maintained that in order to reach its result, the
majority had to read qualifications into the statute that did not appear
there. In so doing, Justice Marshall claimed that the majority ignored
settled principles of banking law and created distinctions that were sup-
ported neither by the plain meaning of the statute nor by its legislative
history.8 2 The dissent cited another Tenth Circuit case analyzed here,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corp. ,83
for the proposition that "when the ingenuity of businessmen creates
transactions and corporate forms that were perhaps not contemplated
by Congress, the courts must enforce the statutes that Congress has en-
acted."'8 4 Accordingly, argued Justice Marshall, section 1813(l)(1) as
written does not recognize the distinction between a commercial and a
standby letter of credit. While such a distinction might be worthwhile,
79. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1937; see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 275
(1974).
80. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1938-39 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). Unlike a standby letter of credit,
a commercial letter of credit is without question a federally insured deposit. FDIC v. Ir-
ving Trust Co., 137 F. Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). A commercial letter of credit differs
from a standby letter of credit in another important respect. Banks that issue commercial
letters of credit expect that the beneficiary will present the letter to the bank no matter
how smoothly the underlying transaction proceeds. See B. CLARK, supra note 53, 8.2, at
8-5. By contrast, banks that issue a standby letter of credit do not expect the beneficiary to
present the letter to the bank for payment unless the party to whom the letter is issued is
unable to pay. SeeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 53, at 713 (1980);Justice, Letters of
Credit: Expectations and Frustrations - Part 1, 94 BANKING L.J. 424,430-31 (1977). In fact, only
about 2% of all standby letters of credit are ever presented for payment. See Lloyd-Davies,
Survey of Standby Letters of Credit, 65 FED. RESERVE BULL. 716, 717 (1979).
81. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1939 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Even before the Federal Deposit Insurance Act was
promulgated, it had long been recognized that a promissory note whose obligation to pay
was contingent must appear so on the face of the note rather than by resort to extraneous
documents. SeeJ. THORNDIKE, STORY ON PROMISSORY NOTES 34 (7th ed. 1878).
83. 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986).
84. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1939 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Justice Marshall concluded, it is up to Congress, not the FDIC or the
Court, to make such a decision. 85 Therefore, the dissent would have
affirmed the lower court's inclusion of standby letters of credit within
the definition of section 1813(l)(1).
Justice Marshall also objected to the majority's characterization of
the promissory note that Orion gave to Penn Square Bank as a "contin-
gent" obligation that rendered it non-negotiable. He felt that no imped-
iments to immediate enforceability appeared on the face of the note, and
that the note therefore represented an unconditional promise to pay,
which satisfied the requirements of full negotiability under the Uniform
Commercial Code and Oklahoma law.8 6 As an example, Justice Mar-
shall observed that if the note that Orion gave to Penn Square Bank had
somehow been assigned to another, then Orion would have been re-
quired to honor it. 8 7 Justice Marshall concluded that the majority lacked
judicial restraint by interpreting section 1813(l)(1) not as it was written,
but how the majority would like it to be.
88
F. Analysis and Conculsion
The Supreme Court was faced with the thankless task of interpret-
ing a legislative scheme that failed to anticipate its own ambiguity, much
less offer guidance through legislative history. By deciding that standby
letters of credit are not insurable deposits within the meaning of section
1813()(1), the Court succumbed to the temptation to make rather than
interpret law. Professor Tribe has described this tendency as the
Court's "persistent willingness to hear legal music in the sounds of si-
lence." 89 In the process, it overruled a Tenth Circuit opinion that
demonstrated good sense as well as commendable judicial restraint.
The Court acknowledged that the FDIC's interpretation of "de-
posit" is not expressed in any formal regulation, but nevertheless ar-
gued that Congress adopted its interpretation by reenacting the law
without alteration in 1950.90 The Court conceded that the document
that Orion gave to Penn Square Bank not only bore a facial resemblance
to, but also satisfied the Oklahoma statutory requirements of a promis-
sory note. Even so, the Court concluded that the document cannot be
considered a promissory note for purposes of federal insurance law be-
cause of its contingent nature. 9 1
A literal reading of section 1813(l)(1) supports the contention of
the Tenth Circuit that standby letters of credit, like commercial letters of
credit, should be treated as federally insured deposits. Section
1813(l)(1) defines a "deposit" as:
85. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1940 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see U.C.C. § 3-104(1) (1978); O.A. STAT. tit.
12A, § 3-104(1) (1978).
87. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1941 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. Id (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89. L. TRIBE, CONSTITu-IONAL CHOICES 30 (1985).
90. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1937.
91. Id. at 1934.
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[T]he unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or
held by a bank in the usual course of business and for which it
has given or is obligated to give credit, either conditionally or uncondi-
tionally... which is evidenced by . . . a letter of credit ... on which
the bank is primarily liable: Provided, That, without limiting the
generality of the term "money or its equivalent", any such...
instrument must be regarded as evidencing the receipt of the
equivalent of money when issued in exchange ... for a promissory
note upon which the person obtaining any such.., instrument
is primarily or secondarily liable.
9 2
Therefore, since a standby letter of credit is by definition an obligation
on the part of a bank which is conditional upon the inability of its cus-
tomer to pay, it would appear that a standby letter of credit would rest
within the ambit of section 1813(l)(1). 93 Although the Supreme Court
properly recognized that the springboard of statutory construction is the
language of the law in question, it chose to place greater weight upon
the informal interpretation of the agency charged with enforcing the
statute then upon a reading of the statute itself.9 4 Because neither inter-
pretation is inconsistent with the legislative purpose of protecting the
earnings of depositors, the more constricted reading that the Supreme
Court gave to section 1813(l)(1) seems uncalled for.
The dissenting trio was composed of Justices Marshall, Blackmun
and Rehnquist. Although it may seem strange to see Justice Rehnquist
joining such an alliance, he remains faithful to the strict constructionist
philosophy - rule on the basis of what the law states, not on what he
might like the law to be - which earned him recent appointment as
ChiefJustice. As the dissent noted, Philadelphia Gear's status as an in-
sured depositor depends upon the terms of the underlying repayment
agreement between Orion Manufacturing and Penn Square Bank. Ordi-
narily, the beneficiary of a letter of credit would pay no attention to the
terms of the agreement between the issuing bank and its customer be-
cause the nature of letters of credit are such that issuing banks merely
examine the face of the letter when it is presented. 9 5 However, with this
92. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(/)(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
93. See, e.g., Regulation H of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
which defines a standby letter of credit as one "which represents an obligation to the bene-
ficiary on the part of the issuer... (3) to make payment on account of any default by the
account party in the performance of an obligation." 12 C.F.R. § 208.8(d)(1) (1977). One
observer has analyzed this passage of section 1813(l)(1) and come to the conclusion that
the phrase "conditionally or unconditionally" does not modify the words "is obligated to
give credit;" instead, maintains the writer, it refers to the presence or absence of a require-
ment that the beneficiary of a letter of credit present certain documents when demanding
payment. As such, it would not include standby letters of credit in the definition of "de-
posit." See Note, supra note 53, at 1182. While this argument has some merit, it presumes
that Congress intended to use the phrase "is obligated to give credit, conditionally or
unconditionally" in a technical sense rather than deriving its meaning from the words in
their ordinary usage. In the absence of an indication to the contrary in the legislative
history of section 1813(l)(1), it makes more intuitive sense to adopt the straightforward
construction given to the statute by the Tenth Circuit. See Phild4elphia Gear, 751 F.2d at
1137.
94. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1938-39.
95. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1937-38.
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opinion, the Supreme Court has recognized a distinction between com-
mercial and standby letters of credit for purposes of federal deposit in-
surance coverage. 9 6 Companies and their lawyers need to note this, and
to adjust accordingly so that they will not find themselves in Philadel-
phia Gear's predicament.
9 7
III. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM V.
DIMENSION FINANCIAL CORP.: THE SUPREME COURT SETS ASIDE
A FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD RULE REGULATING
"NONBANK" FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AS
BANKS
A. Introduction
The Federal Reserve Board has regulatory authority over any com-
pany controlling an institution that is defined as a "bank" by the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956. 98 This holding company regulation is in
addition to the regulations imposed on banks themselves. 99 By taking
advantage of a definitional loophole in the statute, many financial insti-
tutions had successfully placed themselves outside of the narrow defini-
tion of a "bank" so that their holding companies could escape the
onerous regulations of the Federal Reserve Board. 0 0 In an effort to
reduce the competitive advantages enjoyed by those institutions outside
the purview of the Bank Holding Company Act,' 0 1 the Federal Reserve
Board promulgated rules that expanded the definition of a "bank" to
96. See U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1978) & Official Comment 1. Justice Marshall found it
anomalous to require reference to the terms of the agreement between the bank and its
customer in order to determine the insurability of a letter of credit, because frequently the
beneficiary neither knows nor cares what those terms are. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at
1941 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1940-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1982) (defining
bank holding company); 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982) (defining banks).
99. Although nonbank institutions are treated as banks for purposes of most of the
Title 12 provisions of the United States Code, their holding companies can successfully
dodge the second layer of regulation that is imposed on bank holding companies if the
institution they control does not meet the narrow statutory definition of a "bank" that is
found in section 1841(c) of Title 12. Note, The Demise of the Bank-Nonbank distinction: An
Argument for Deregulating the Activities of Bank Holding Companies, 98 HARV. L. REV. 650, 653-
54 (1985).
100. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982), as amended, defines a "bank" as any institution which
"(1) accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and
(2) engages in the business of making commercial loans." Ifa "bank" does not meet both
parts of the definitional test, its holding company will not be subject to the Act. Id.
101. Under the Bank Holding Company Act, bank holding companies are subject to
stringent application requirements to acquire a bank, see 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)-(c) (1982);
extensive financial reporting requirements, see 12 U.S.C. § 1844(a) and (c) (1982); exami-
nation and supervision by the Federal Reserve Board, see 12 U.S.C. § 1844(e)(1) (1982);
minimum capital requirement at the holding company level, see 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1984);
and requirements that they engage in only a narrow range of nonbanking activities
deemed by the Federal Reserve Board to be closely related to banking and which must
reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public, see 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)
(1982).
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include many of these "nonbank" financial institutions. 10 2 In Dimension
Financial Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 10 3 the
Tenth Circuit invalidated the Board's attempt to regulate these nonbank
financial institutions. 10 4 The Supreme Court's affirmation' 0 5 of this
Tenth Circuit decision will allow nonbank financial institutions to con-
tinue their growth into traditional banking areas.
B. Facts
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956106 was passed "to restrain
the undue concentration of commercial banking resources and to pre-
vent possible abuses related to the control of commercial credit."'
0 7
The definition of a bank depended on the bank's charter under the orig-
inal Act.10 8 Since the Act's passage, the definition of a bank has been
narrowed. In 1966, the charter test was eliminated, and a "bank" was
redefined as an institution which accepts deposits which the depositor
has a legal right to withdraw on demand. 10 9 In 1970, the definition was
further restricted by requiring that the institution must also be engaged
in the business of making commercial loans."10
The Federal Reserve Board was concerned that certain unregulated
nonbank financial institutions were enjoying a competitive advantage
over those institutions regulated as bank holding companies as a result
of these definitional restrictions." ' 1 In an attempt to protect bank hold-
ing companies from the unfair advantages enjoyed by such nonbank
banks, the Board redefined the demand and commercial loan compo-
nents of the statutory provision.'' 2 The intent of this administrative ac-
tion was to regulate nonbank financial institutions, such as Dimension
Financial Corporation, that were offering the functional equivalent of
traditional banking services. 
1 13
102. Revision of Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1984) provides that the Board's broad
interpretation of the statutory definition of a "bank" include
any institution that accepts deposits that as a matter of practice are payable on de-
mand, and that engages in the business of making any loan other than a loan to
an individual for personal, family, household, or charitable purposes, including
the purchase of retail installment loans or commercial paper, certificates of de-
posit, bankers' acceptances, and similar money market instruments. (emphasis
added).
103. 744 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986).
104. Id. at 1411.
105. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corp.,
106 S. Ct. 681 (1986).
106. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 511, 70 Stat. 133 (1956).
107. S. REP. No. 91-1084, 9 1st Cong., 2d Sess., 24 reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5519, 5541.
108. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 511 (1956).
109. Pub. L. No. 89-484, 80 Stat. 235 (1966).
110. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat.
1760 (1970).
111. Revision of Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1984).
112. 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(a)(l)(A)-(B) (1985).
113. The types of nonbank financial institutions that the Board was concerned with
included those that offered NOW (negotiable order of withdrawal) accounts that do not
give the depositor a legal right to withdraw on demand. In addition, the Board was con-
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C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit invalidated the Federal Reserve Board's at-
tempted regulation of nonbank financial institutions on the ground that
the Board's broad interpretation of the statutory definition of a bank
exceeded the Board's rulemaking authority."14 While acknowledging
that the Board has authority under the Act to make rules and regula-
tions, 115 the court stated that this authority is limited to the degree
"necessary to enable it to administer and carry out the purposes of [the
statute] and prevent evasions thereof."' 1 6 The court stated that the def-
erence usually accorded regulatory agencies is based on the assumption
that the regulatory action has been taken to "carry out the particular
purpose of the statute and not to meet other conditions, related or not,
that the agency decides should be changed or regulated."'i 7 The court
found that the Board's new definition of a bank "had nothing to do with
the original meaning of the term nor the then current meaning, but in-
stead was a device to accomplish an end - a change in the Board's juris-
diction."' 18 Since the conditions for permissive regulatory action were
not met, the Board's attempt to implement and enforce the changes in
the regulations were held invalid.' 9
With regard to the demand deposit element of the statutory defini-
tion, the court, relying on its earlier decision in First Bankcorporation v.
Board of Governors,' 20 held that accounts which are subject to withdrawal
upon demand as a practical matter, but not as a right, were not included
in that definition. 12 ' The court stated that the demand deposit element
of the definition was clearly settled in First Bankcorporation, wherein it was
held that an institution which retains a technical prior notice require-
ment before withdrawal of funds, does not, for the purposes of the statu-
tory definition of a bank, accept deposits that the depositor has a legal
right to withdraw on demand.122 The court more carefully analyzed the
commercial loan element of the statutory definition, and held that the
inclusion of money market transactions within the term "commercial
loans" was not supported by the purpose or legislative history of the
Bank Holding Company Act, nor was the new definition of a "bank" in
accord with common usage of the term in the financial community. 123
cerned with those institutions that were involved in money market transactions. Dimension
Financial Corp., 106 S. Ct. at 683.
114. Dimension Financial Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
744 F.2d 1402, 1410, 1411 (10th Cir. 1984).
115. See 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b) (1982).
116. Dimension Financial Corp., 744 F.2d at 1408.
117. Id. at 1410 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 1405.
119. Id. at 1411.
120. 728 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1984).
121. Id. at 436, 437.
122. Dimension Financial Corp., 744 F.2d at 1404.
123. Id. at 1406.
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D. The United States Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Fed-
eral Reserve Board acted within its rulemaking authority in redefining
banks under the Bank Holding Company Act. 12 4 The Court did not
limit its review to analyzing the commercial loan element of the defini-
tion developed by the Tenth Circuit. Rather, its detailed analysis ex-
tended to the demand deposit element previously developed by the
Tenth Circuit in First Bankcorporation, 125 and summarily relied upon by
the Tenth Circuit's decision below.
In affirming the Tenth Circuit's decision, the Court accepted the
Circuit's rulings on both elements of the definition. 12 6 The Court held
that the Board had not acted within its rulemaking authority in defining
banks subject to regulation under the Bank Holding Company Act, and
that the Board's interpretation of the statutory definition could not be
supported on the asserted basis that it fell within the Act's plain purpose
of regulating institutions functionally equivalent to banks.
127
With regard to the demand deposit element of the definition of a
bank, the Court stated that judicial deference to agency interpretation of
a rule should not be applied in contravention of Congress' express in-
tent. The Court continued:
No amount of agency expertise - however sound may be the
result - can make the words "legal right" mean a right to do
something "as a matter of practice." A legal right to withdraw
on demand means just that: a right to withdraw deposits with-
out prior notice or limitation. . . . The Board's definition of
"demand deposit," therefore, is not an accurate or reasonable
interpretation of § 2(c).
1 2 8
With regard to the commercial loan element of the definition of a
bank, the Court stated that "money market transactions do not fall
within the commonly accepted definition of commercial loans."' 129 Af-
ter a review of the legislative history of the statute and of the Board's
prior position on the definition of a commercial loan, the Court found
nothing to indicate that Congress meant to use the term "commercial
loan" in anything but its accepted usage, and held that the Board's defi-
nition was "not a reasonable interpretation of § 2(c)."'
1 30
The Court concluded by stating that, while regulation of nonbank
banks might be a desirable end, the Act's failure to protect public inter-
ests is "a problem for Congress, and not the Board or the courts, to
address."131
124. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corp.,
106 S. Ct. 681, 683 (1986).
125. 728 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1984).
126. Dimension Financial Corp., 106 S. Ct. at 684.
127. Id. at 684, 688, 689.
128. Id. at 686.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 688.




In this decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's
invalidation of an attempt by the Federal Reserve Board to regulate
nonbank financial institutions. Although the opinion focused more on
the rulemaking authority of regulatory agencies than on the banking in-
dustry itself, the effect on banking will be significant nonetheless. The
Court's decision will obviously curtail the Board's ability to eliminate the
competitive advantages presently enjoyed by nonbank banks that are
free from activities regulation. Accordingly, it could be expected that
the continued growth of nonbank banks into traditional banking areas
will cause increased concern on the part of many banks and regulatory
agencies, leading to a call for legislative reform.13 2 Since congressional
action alone can resolve these issues, perhaps the time has come for
legislators to review the matter with an eye towards developing a satis-
factory resolution. Unless Congress does act in this manner, however,
we can expect to see continued rapid change in the structure of financial
institutions and the services they provide.
Bill Van Horn*
IV. MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY V. PUEBLO
OF SANTA ANA: THE SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT PUEBLO
INDIANS MAY ALIENATE THEIR LANDS WITHOUT
CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL
A. Introduction
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Pueblo of Santa
Ana 133 involved the validity of a telephone and telegraph easement
purchased in 1928 by Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany (Mountain Bell) from the Pueblo of Santa Ana, in New Mexico.
The dispute centered on apparently conflicting provisions of two stat-
utes. The first statute, the Nonintercourse Act of 1834,134 generally re-
quires a treaty or convention, and thus congressional approval, to
validly alienate Indian lands. The second statute, the Pueblo Lands Act
of 1924135 contains language which had been interpreted by the Secre-
tary of the Interior as allowing the Secretary the authority to approve
132. See generally, Note, The Demise of the Bank-Nonbank Distinction: An Argument for Deregu-
lating the Activities of Bank Holding Companies, 98 HARV. L. REV. 650 (1985); Note, Product
Expansion in the Banking Industry: An Analysis and Revision of § 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding
Company Act, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1127 (1985); Note, Avoiding the Glass-Steagall and Bank
Holding Company Acts: An Option for Bank Product Expansion, 59 IND. L.J. 89 (1984); Note,
Restrictions on Bank Underwriting of Corporate Securities: A Proposalfor More Permissive Regulation,
97 HARV. L. REV. 720 (1984).
0 The author gratefully acknowledges the writing and editing assistance of Victoria
Parks on Aspen Skiing, Edward J. Posselius III on Philadelphia Gear, and Vincent Oliva on
Dimension Financial.
133. 105 S. Ct. 2587 (1985).
134. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982).
135. Ch. 331, 43 Stat. 636 (1924).
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alienation of Pueblo lands without congressional approval. This case
involved an alienation approved by the Secretary but not by Congress.
The Pueblo argued that the Nonintercourse Act applied and that
the language of the Pueblo Lands Act did not extinguish the necessity of
congressional approval to alienate Pueblo lands. Mountain Bell con-
tended that the Pueblo Lands Act allowed the Secretary of the Interior,
without the approval of Congress, to approve alienation of Pueblo
lands. The Supreme Court agreed with Mountain Bell and found the
easement valid. In so doing, it interpreted the Pueblo Lands Act under
normal canons of statutory construction rather than the accepted canons
of Indian law construction that had been applied by the district court
and considered by the Tenth Circuit in ruling for the Pueblo.
B. Facts
The subject of the suit was a telephone and telegraph line which
was constructed on a right of way acquired in 1905 by a predecessor to
Mountain Bell. In 1927, the government, on behalf of the Pueblo,
brought a quiet title action to challenge the validity of the easement.
136
The litigation was settled in 1928 when Mountain Bell purchased the
easement from the Pueblo. The transaction was approved by the Secre-
tary of the Interior, and the company was dismissed from the suit. The
poles and lines were removed in 1980 and the easement was relin-
quished. Shortly thereafter the Pueblo again brought suit; this time a
trespass action against Mountain Bell, seeking compensation for the
time that the poles had been in place.'
3 7
C. Legal Background
The dispute involved two apparently contradictory statutes, the first
being the Nonintercourse Act of 1834 which states: "[n]o purchase,
grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim
thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any valid-
ity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention
entered into pursuant to the Constitution."' 3 8 The second statute, the
Pueblo Lands Act of 1924, was enacted by Congress to provide for the
final adjudication and recognition of approximately 3,000 land titles, ac-
136. The United States has historically initiated litigation on behalf of Indians as part
of its trust and guardianship responsibilities. F. COHEN, FELIX COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FED-
ERAL INDIAN LAW 308-11 (1982).
137. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 105 S. Ct. at 2593-94 (1985). During the times the poles were
in place, they were used, at least in part, to serve the Pueblo. At the time the suit was
brought, the Indians did not know that the poles had been removed. Had they known, the
suit might not have been brought. Mountain Bell's potential financial liability, in any case,
was small in comparison to that of the Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company,
which took an active interest in the litigation. Personal communication with K.M. Krause
(Jan. 17, 1987). The Secretary of the Interior may generally grant rights-of-way for tele-
phone and telegraph lines. 25 U.S.C. § 319 (1982), 25 C.F.R. § 169 (1983). These provi-
sions were not applicable to the easement in question.
138. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982). See generally F. COHEN, supra note 136, at 510-22 (discuss-
ing Nonintercourse Act applications and exceptions).
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quired from Pueblo Indians by non-Indians, outside the provisions of
the Nonintercourse Act.' 3 9 The Act also provided for consolidation of
Pueblo lands. The first sixteen sections of the Pueblo Lands Act reme-
died past actions. Section 17 provided a confusing prescription for fu-
ture land alienation.14
0
D. The District Court Opinion
In a short unpublished opinion, 14 1 Judge Edwin L. Mecham of the
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico held the
easement void and found Mountain Bell liable for trespass. The court
found the statutory language controlling the case to be unclear and ap-
plied accepted canons of Indian law construction which require that stat-
utory ambiguities be resolved in favor of the Indians. 14 2 The court also
found that the previous litigation had no resjudicata or collateral estop-
pel effect.143 Interlocutory appeal of the liability finding was certified.
139. The settlers acquiring the land from the Pueblos relied on the Supreme Court's
ruling in United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1877), that the Pueblo Indians were not an
"Indian tribe" within the meaning of the Nonintercourse Act and could freely alienate
their lands. The subsequent decision in United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913),
disapproved Joseph's distinction of the Pueblo Indians under the Nonintercourse Act and
applied liquor laws to the Pueblos. The disapproval of Joseph placed the titles acquired
from the Pueblo Indians in reliance on Joseph in doubt. This was at least part of the incen-
tive for passage of the Pueblo Lands Act. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 105 S. Ct. at 1591-2.
140. The section reads:
No right, title, or interest in or to the lands of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico
to which their title has not been extinguished as hereinbefore determined shall
hereafter be acquired or initiated by virtue of the laws of the State of New Mexico,
or in any other manner except as may hereafter be provided by Congress, and no sale,
grant, lease of any character, or other conveyance of lands, or any title or claims
thereto, made by any Pueblo as a community, or any Pueblo Indian living in a
community of Pueblo Indians, in the State of New Mexico, shall be of any validity
in law or in equity unless the same be first approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
Ch. 331, 43 Stat. 641 (1924) (emphasis added).
141. Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., No. 80-
841 (D. N.M. June 2, 1982). The district court's opinion is reproduced in theJoint Appen-
dix to the Petition for Certiorari of Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company
85-94 (hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix).
142. Joint Appendix, supra note 141, at 90, 92. See infra note 161 and accompanying
text. Professor Cohen points out that:
The rules for construing federal statutes in Indian affairs have a pervasive influ-
ence in Indian law. The canons are variously phrased in different contexts, but
generally they provide for a broad construction when the issue is whether Indian
rights are reserved or established, and for a narrow construction when Indian
rights are to be abrogated or limited. These canons play an essential role in im-
plementing the trust relationship between the United States and Indian tribes and
are involved in most of the subject matter of Indian law.
F. COHEN, supra note 136, at 224-25 (discussing canons of construction). Numerous
Supreme Court cases have used the canons to resolve cases in favor of Indians. See, e.g.,
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) (cited in Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Moun-
tain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 734 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir. 1984), by the Court of
Appeals in resolving statutory ambiguities in favor of the Indians); United States ex rel.
Haulpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 345 (1941) (cited by the Supreme
Court dissent in Pueblo of Santa Ana, 105 S. Ct. at 2609, for proposition that alienation of
Indian property is not to be "lightly implied" (quoting ex rel. Haulpai Indians, 314 U.S. at
354)). See generally, Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As
Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows upon the Earth "-How Long a Time is That?, 63 CALIF. L.
REV. 601, 634-45 (1975).
143. Joint Appendix, supra, note 141, at 92.
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E. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed Mountain Bell's appeal
and upheld the decision of the district court in all respects. 14 4 Judge
Breitenstein 1 4 5 traced much of the history of the Pueblo Indians as well
as court decisions concerning the tribe. He noted that the Tenth Circuit
had previously applied the Nonintercourse Act to the Pueblos three
times. 146 In holding that it applied in this case, he noted that while the
legislative history of section 17 was ambiguous, the mandate of congres-
sional approval for alienation of Pueblo lands was not ambiguous. He
further reasoned that even if there was some ambiguity, the accepted
canon of Indian law that "statutes passed for the benefit of dependent
Indian tribes . . . are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions be-
ing resolved in favor of the Indians .. " would mandate resolution in
favor of the Pueblo. 147 Prior administrative interpretation of section 17
and any resjudicata effect of the prior suit were unpersuasive in the face
of what the court perceived as the clear mandate of section 17 for secre-
tarial and congressional approval of any alienation of Pueblo lands. 1
48
F. The United States Supreme Court Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
In a 5 to 3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the district court
and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court, in an opinion au-
thored by Justice Stevens, 149 held that the Nonintercourse Act of 1834
does not apply to the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico, thereby allowing
them to alienate their lands without congressional approval. 150 Like the
Tenth Circuit, the Court traced the history leading up to the passage of
the Pueblo Lands Act. They also described the title clearing actions that
occurred as a result of the Act, including the 1927 suit challenging the
144. Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co, 734 F.2d
1402 (10th Cir. 1984).
145. Other members of the panel included Judge McWilliams and Judge Logan.
146. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 734 F.2d at 1404-05. In the previous applications of the
Nonintercourse Act to the Pueblos, as here, the Tenth Circuit had interpreted United
States v. Sandoval as specifically overruling United States v. Joseph and generally applying
the Nonintercourse Act to the Pueblos. In the present case, the Supreme Court described
the holding of Sandoval as restricted to the application of liquor laws, alienation issues
being addressed only by implication. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 105 S. Ct. at 2596; see supra note
138.
147. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 734 F.2d at 1406-07 (quoting Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S.
373, 392 (1976)); see supra note 142.
148. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 734 F.2d at 1406-07. The arguments of resjudicata and estop-
pel were, in part, rejected because the previous dismissal of Mountain Bell was not by
formal court action, but rather by letter. In fact, the suit involving the easement was only
one of many property interests that were being adjudicated as a result of the Pueblo Lands
Act. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. Apparently the letter was only a matter of
convenience and it was assumed that other more formally treated cases to which Mountain
Bell was a party would provide adequate documentation of the procedures involved. Per-
sonal communication with K.M. Krause (Jan. 17, 1987).
149. Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger, Justice
O'Connor, and Justice White in the majority. Justice Powell took no part in the decision.
150. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 105 S. Ct. at 2598.
[Vol. 64:2
SUPREME COURT
easement. 15 1 The Court apparently found neither the plain language of
section 17 nor its legislative history clearly determinative of congres-
sional intent. Instead, resolution rested on a choice between two statu-
tory construction arguments.1
5 2
First, the majority reasoned that an interpretation of section 17 re-
quiring congressional approval to alienate Pueblo lands would nullify
the effect of section 16. The intent of section 16 was to provide a rela-
tively expeditious method of consolidating Pueblo holdings by selling
some holdings and buying others. To facilitate this, the terms of section
16 required only secretarial approval of these transactions. The Court
felt that if section 17 generally required congressional approval for
alienation, it would also require such approval for transactions under
section 16 and, consequently, impede its expeditious purpose. Accord-
ingly, the canon that "a statute should be interpreted so as not to render
one part inoperative" applied to eliminate the congressional approval
requirement. 153 There was no discussion, however, of canons that
might dictate a different result, for example, that section 16 might be a
specific provision overriding the more general mandate of section 17.154
The second, and more important statutory construction rationale
applied was that "[t]he uniform and contemporaneous view of the Exec-
utive Officer responsible for administering the statute and the district
court with exclusive jurisdiction over the quiet title actions brought
under the Pueblo Lands Act 'is entitled to very great respect.' -155 The
Court seemed particularly deferential to the interpretation given the
Pueblo Lands Act by agencies and courts immediately after its passage
when the main title clearing provisions of the Act were being executed.
The Court said that judges considering such matters fifty years later,
should defer to this interpretation. 1
56
2. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, dis-
sented. The dissent parallels the structure of the Tenth Circuit and ma-
jority opinions by tracing the history of the Pueblo Lands Act and its
subsequent application. 157 The dissent made a credible case that the
statutory structure and legislative history could support application of
the Nonintercourse Act's requirement of congressional approval and
151. Id. at 2590-95.
152. The Court nowhere directly stated that the statutory language is ambiguous, but
hints at ambiguity when it states that two "constructions find some support in the lan-
guage of § 17." Id. at 1590. In any case, a discussion of statutory construction is not
generally applied where there is no authority. See SINGER, SUTHERLAND STAT. CoNsT.
§ 45.02 (4th ed. 1984).
153. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 105 S. Ct. at 2595-96.
154. See, e.g., D. Ginsberg Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932).
155. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 105 S. Ct. at 2597 (quoting Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827)).
156. Id. at 2597-98.
157. Id. at 2599-2602 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that past administrative construction was not very consistent.15 8
The most notable difference is the application of the canons of In-
dian law construction which would normally restrict alienation of Indian
lands and favor Indians where ambiguities clouded statutory interpreta-
tion.159 It was in these areas that the dissent particularly disagreed with
the majority's legal analysis. In spite of the rationalizations of statutory
consistency and deference to administrative interpretation used by the
majority, the dissent argued that, recognizing the ambiguity in section
17, the majority should have used the accepted Indian law canons to
come to a different conclusion.
160
G. Analysis and Conclusion
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Pueblo of Santa Ana
represents one more in a series of recent Supreme Court decisions re-
jecting use of the canons of Indian law construction on behalf of tribes
in their attempts to gain commercial or monetary advantage over parties
other than the federal government. 1 6 1 Though neither the Supreme
Court opinion nor the lower courts discussed the equity of having the
utility pay for an easement for the third time, this could not have been
totally ignored in the deliberations of the Justices. 16 2 It seems clear
from both majority and dissenting opinions that the peculiarities of In-
dian law were not given great weight by the Supreme Court decision.
163
On the other hand, the Court did not totally abandon the special
protections accorded Indians by outwardly applying concepts of law
normally applicable in a commercial situation. 164 The analysis relied to-
tally on interpretation of the statutes involved, not on concepts of the
parties' intent or estoppel that might have come into play in a commer-
cial contract litigation. The dealings of Indians, especially in matters
158. Id. at 2602-08 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
159. See supra note 142.
160. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 105 S. Ct. at 2598-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 106 S. Ct. 2217, 2220 (1986) (allowing abrogation
of treaty rights based on implication from legislative history); South Carolina v. Catawba
Indian Tribe, 106 S. Ct. 2039 (1986) (The Tribe argued that application of the
Nonintercourse Act voided titles of non-Indians who had purchased land from the Tribe,
thus they could claim a 225 square mile area. The argument was defeated by application
of a statutory construction that did not apply the Indian law canons. General statutory
construction applied in Pueblo of Santa Ana was cited. The circuit court decision, which was
favorable to the Tribe, was described in Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife v. Kla-
math Indian Tribe, 105 S. Ct. 3420, 3432 (1985) (discussing Indian law canons, but decid-
ing that their use was precluded by "fair appraisal" of other statutory construction aids);
United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39 (1985) (using reference to common law in construing
the word "payment" rather than Indian law canons); Note, Tribal Property: Defending the
Parameters of the Federal Trust Relationship under the Non-Intercourse Act, Catawba Indian Tribe
v. South Carolina, 718 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1983), 12 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 101 (1985). The
favorable impact of Indian law canons on the circuit court decision that was reversed is
mentioned in Foot, United States v. Dann: What it Portends for Ownership of Millions ofAcres in
the Western United States. 5 PUB. LAND L. REV. 183 (1984).
162. The question of triple payment was raised from the bench during oral argument
before the Supreme Court. Personal communication with K.M. Krause (Jan. 17, 1987).
163. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 105 S. Ct. at 2598-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
164. See F. COHEN, supra note 136, at 650-51 (discussing Federal wardship of Indians).
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concerning Indian lands, still seem to be very much a creature of federal
statute.
The applicability of more general statutory construction practice in
Indian cases is still very much in question. For example, the Tenth Cir-
cuit, in Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp.,165 used Indian law
canons in holding that a tribe could force a federal agency to abandon
its longstanding interpretation and apply a more favorable royalty calcu-
lation method for natural gas produced on a reservation. 166 The
Supreme Court's opinion in Pueblo of Santa Ana was advanced as a reason
for reversal of the Tenth Circuit decision both on rehearing and in a
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. 1 6 7 In neither case was it
persuasive.
Perhaps, as the dissent argues, this case should be restricted to
those few situations falling under the Pueblo Lands Act, for there is
nothing in the majority opinion specifying broader application. Never-
theless, it is hard to believe that Indians are not going to become more
and more sophisticated and more incorporated into the commercial and
economic life of society at large. When assimilation is complete, it
seems inconceivable that courts will alter basic precepts of law, such as
canons of statutory construction, so as to grant Indians commercial ad-
vantage. Perhaps Pueblo of Santa Ana is one small step towards the recog-
nition of Indian equality in commercial dealings and before the
courts. 168
Eric Twelker
165. 782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir.) (en banc), rev'g 728 F.2d 1555 (1984), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 471 (1986).
166. 782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam decision adopting the dis-
senting opinion ofJustice Seymour inJicarilla Apache Tribe, 728 F.2d at 1555 (1986)).
167. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Southland Royalty Co. v.Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 471 (1986).
168. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, noted that "[ciharacteristically, it is non-Indian
entities such as Petitioner and amici who argue for 'emancipation' of the Pueblos." Pueblo
of Santa Ana, 105 S. Ct. at 2610-11 (quoting Brief for Respondant Pueblo). There is some
indication that Indian arguments for more rights in some situations and less rights in
others will not continue to receive unquestioning acceptance from the courts. Justice Mar-
shall, in questioning from the bench during oral argument asked, in a tone expressing
incredulity, if counsel for the Pueblo was really asking for restraints on alienation of
Pueblo property. Personal communication with K.M. Krause (Jan. 17, 1987).
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Too MUCH PROTECTION WITH Too LITTLE SUPPORT: A
LOOK AT THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN LIGHT OF
GARCIA V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
INTRODUCTION
When a party files suit against a state in federal court there exists
the possibility of the action being barred under the eleventh amendment
to the Constitution of the United States. When a suit is filed against an
agency of the state, such as a highway commission, port authority,
ratemaking commission, or school board, a determination must be made
as to the extent of the amendment's protection. If the state agency is the
"alter ego" or "arm" of the state,' then it qualifies for protection from
suit under the amendment. If however, the entity is deemed to be a
"citizen" of the state, immunity under the eleventh amendment will not
apply.
Garcia v. Board of Education 2 is the Tenth Circuit's latest attempt to
decide whether local school boards qualify as alter egos of the State of
New Mexico, and are therefore entitled to protection under the eleventh
amendment. The focus of this discussion will be on the Garcia court's
decision to allow eleventh amendment protection to extend to local
school boards and the problems that arise from the court's failure to
provide adequate precedent in support of such a decision.3
I. THE GARCIA CASE
J. Placido Garcia brought a section 19834 action against the Board
of Education of the Socorro Consolidated School District in New Mex-
ico. Garcia's claim arose out of the school board's decision not to renew
his contract as superintendent for the school district. 5 The plaintiff
I. Factors which may constitute an adequate relationship between an agency and a
state to qualify the agency as an "arm" of the state include (1) state statutory definitions;
(2) the number of school boards within the state; (3) the extent of control and guidance
exercised by the state over the school board; (4) the power of the school boards to issue
bonds and levy taxes subject to certain state restrictions; and (5) the amount of state finan-
cial assistance. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-
81 (1977) (relying on provisions in the Ohio Revised Code Annotated). The last element
was set forth by the Court in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 551 (1974) holding that if the
source of funds used to satisfy the judgment was paid out of the state treasury the board
would be an "arm" of the state.
2. 777 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 66 (1986).
3. The Garcia court also discussed appellant's defamation counterclaim in detail. See
infra notes 15 to 24 and accompanying text.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
5. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1405. The board met on February 11, 1980, and at that meet-
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named as defendants the school board and its members in both their
individual and official capacities. 6 Initially, the school board gave no
public reason for its decision not to renew Garcia's contract. The plain-
tiff publicly stated, however, that his nonrenewal resulted from his re-
fusal of the board's request to engage in illegal activities. 7 The board
members then responded by drafting a statement explaining the rea-
sons for their decision not to renew Garcia's contract.
8
The plaintiff filed suit alleging a violation of his first amendment
rights and a deprivation of liberty and property without due process of
law. 9 The school board members counterclaimed for defamation.'
0
The jury awarded the plaintiff $180,000.00 and the defendants nothing,
from which the defendants appealed and the plaintiff cross-appealed. I"
After filing appellate briefs, the board amended its position, assert-
ing immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment to the United
States Constitution.' 2 This defense was raised but not pursued at the
trial court.1i Affirming in part and reversing in part, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the eleventh amendment barred suit against
the board and its members in their official capacities.1 4 The court fur-
ther held that the board members were public officials and could not
recover on their defamation claim unless "actual malice" could be
shown. 15
II. THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Defamation
The majority opinion, delivered per curiam, discussed several issues
involving defamation. Initially, the court addressed the board members'
challenge to the trial court's jury instruction regarding their defamation
ing, they voted four to one not to renew Mr. Garcia's contract. Mr. Gallegos voted against
the motion not to renew the superintendent's contract, and the four defendant board
members voted in favor. Appellant's Brief in Chief at 2, Garcia v. Board of Educ., 777
F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1985) (No. 82-1174), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 66 (1986).
6. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1405. Following three different conversations with the trial
court judge, Garcia voluntarily dismissed the suit against the individuals before the case
went to the jury. See id. at 1405-06.
7. Appellee's Answer Brief at 3, Garcia v. Board of Educ., 777 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir.
1985) (No. 82-1174), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 66 (1986).
8. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1405. The reasons given by the board included (1) constitu-
ents had continually expressed dissatisfaction with Mr. Garcia; (2) the conduct of the su-
perintendent had been detrimental to staff morale; (3) Mr. Garcia had become increasingly
unresponsive over the years and it had become more difficult to work with him. Id.
9. Id. at 1404-05.
10. Id. at 1405.
11. Id.
12. The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
13. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1405.
14. Id. at 1408-09.
15. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs 737-76 (4th ed. 1979).
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claim. 16 As the court noted, the defendant board members were re-
quired to overcome certain aspects of New York Times v. Sullivan.17 Ar-
guing the need to prove only common law negligence, however, the
defendants claimed that they were not public officials and therefore
were not subject to the New York Times "actual malice" standards. In
response, the court reviewed the accepted tests to determine public offi-
cial status as set forth in Rosenblatt v. Baer.18 For example, the public
official designation applies to those persons in governmental hierarchy
who "have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for
or control over the governmental affairs."' 19
Despite the school board's effort to dodge the definitional bounda-
ries of public official status, the court held that the school board and its
members were considered public officials. Relying on Rosenblatt, the
Garcia court found that governance of a public school system was of the
utmost importance, and that strong public interest warranted the con-
clusion that the board members were public officials.
20
In addition, the majority addressed the issue of whether a public
official suing for defamation can obtain a judgment against a nonmedia
critic as opposed to a media critic. By examining the holdings in several
cases, 2 ' the court concluded that first amendment protection should de-
pend on the subject of the speech and not the identity of the speaker.
2 2
Finally, the issue of the necessary standard of proof was addressed
by the court. Relying in part on the New York Times decision, the major-
ity held that the difficulty in defining "media," the concern for preserv-
ing constitutional values and the undesirability of allowing greater
constitutional protection for the media, merits the application of an "ac-
tual malice" standard when a public official sues a nonmedia defendant
for defamation. 23 The court, therefore, decided that correct instruc-
tions were given to the jury and that the defendants could only recover
on their counterclaim if actual malice was shown. Having exhausted the
discussion of defamation, the court proceeded to the issues raised under
the eleventh amendment.
B. The Majority View of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
In the earlier decision of Edelman v. Jordan,24 the Supreme Court
16. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1407. The trial court instructed the jury that in order to re-
cover on their defamation claim, the school board members, as public officials, were re-
quired to prove that Mr. Garcia's statement was made with "actual malice."
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
19. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1408 (citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966)).
20. Id.; see also Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85.
21. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1409-11. The cases considered by the court include: Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); and Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
22. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1410.
23. Id. at 1411.
24. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The defendants were two former directors of the Illinois
Department of Public Aid, the Comptroller of Cook County and the Director of the Cook
County Department of Public Aid. In view of the Court's decision that the eleventh
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observed that, despite defendant's failure to pursue an eleventh amend-
ment defense at the trial court level, the defense is jurisdictional and
may be raised for the first time on appeal or if raised and abandoned, it
may nonetheless be argued on appeal. 2 5 Relying on Edelman 2 6 the Gar-
cia court, although sympathetic to the plaintiff's position, recognized the
limitations placed on it by precedent.
The court then turned to the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, 2 7 and
noted that, with the exception of eight classes, 28 governmental immu-
nity had been statutorily reinstated. After examining the limitations on
waiver of immunity by other sections of the New Mexico statutes,2 9 the
court concluded that the school board's attorney was without the au-
thority to waive sovereign immunity, and that the school board was not
estopped from raising an eleventh amendment defense.
After resolving these issues, the court turned its attention to deter-
mining whether the local school board members in their official capacity
enjoyed protection under the state's eleventh amendment sovereign im-
munity. Following Edelman v. Jordan,30 the Tenth Circuit held that a
non-consenting state was immune from suit brought in federal court by
its own citizens as well as by citizens of another state. In addition, the
court, citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 3 1 observed that state
agencies and boards acting in their official capacities were protected
from suit under the eleventh amendment. A dilemma arose, however, in
determining whether the board or agency is acting on a state or local
level. If it is determined to be "local" as defined by case law, eleventh
amendment immunity is not available.
32
The pivotal point in the decision arose when the court addressed
the issue of whether New Mexico school boards were facets of the state
or of the local government. The court virtually bypassed the entire is-
sue, however, by claiming that it had already been raised and decided in
both Martinez v. Board of Education 
3 3 and Maestas v. Board of Education.3
4
amendment prohibited the award of retroactive relief, the Court apparently felt it unneces-
sary to discuss whether the defendants and their agencies were entitled to raise the de-
fense of the eleventh amendment in the first place. Conceivably, while the State
Department and officials could raise the defense, the county officials might not. The Court
did not discuss whether the county officials and their departments were the alter egos of
the state. The Court categorized all the defendants as "state officials" without further dis-
tinction. Id.
25. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 677-78.
26. 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (An eleventh amendment defense may be raised at any time in
the proceeding).
27. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-4 to 25 (1978).
28. There is an exception to the immunity granted under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4
(1978) for injury or damage caused by a public employee during the operation or mainte-
nance of (1) motor vehicles, aircraft and watercraft; (2) buildings, public parks, machinery,
equipment and furnishings; (3) airports; (4) public utilities; (5) medical facilities; (6) health
care providers; (7) highways and streets; or (8) law enforcement officers.
29. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-13 to 25 (1978).
30. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
31. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
32. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1407 (citing Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978)).
33. 748 F.2d 1393 (10th Cir. 1984).
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According to the Tenth Circuit, it was bound by the Martinez and Maestas
decisions that consider New Mexico school boards to be arms of the
state. The Garcia court, therefore concluded that the eleventh amend-
ment barred suit against the school board and its members in their offi-
cial capacities. 35 Based on this analysis, the judgment was reversed and
remanded for dismissal on the grounds of eleventh amendment immu-
nity, and the verdict against the counter-claimant was affirmed.
C. Judge McKay: An Alternate View
Although Judge McKay concurred with the majority's holding re-
garding non-variance in the standard of proof for defamation and the
timeliness of the eleventh amendment defense, he disagreed with the
majority's reasoning in allowing a local school board eleventh amend-
ment immunity.3 6 Judge McKay asserted that the local school board
should be viewed as a local entity, as the members are locally elected or
appointed and render decisions regarding the governance of local
schools.
3 7
McKay noted that the majority's problem in determining which lo-
cal units are similar to municipalities and therefore not protected by the
eleventh amendment began with the court's reference to Monell v. De-
partment of Social Services.3 8 To the contrary, McKay would have focused
on the Supreme Court's decision in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of
Education v. Doyle.39 According to the dissent, Mt. Healthy was the foun-
dational opinion in developing a two-part balancing test to differentiate
state alter egos from local governmental units. As Judge McKay ex-
plained, the test consists of determining to what extent the board func-
tions autonomously from the state government, and the extent to which
the agency is financially independent of the state treasury. 40 Citing
Edelman v. Jordan, Judge McKay reiterated that if the money for the judg-
ment against the board would be paid from the state treasury, then the
board may be immune from suit. 4 1 McKay observed, however, that the
"majority relied upon the source of the funds" standard to the exclusion
of other factors emphasized in prior case law.
42
34. 749 F.2d 591 (10th Cir. 1984).
35. The majority is not alone in its view. For example, the following cases have also
held school boards to be alter egos of states: Harris v. Tooele County School Dist., 471
F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973); Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962); O'Neill v. Early,
208 F.2d 286 (4th Cir. 1953).
36. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1411 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
37. The following cases have held school boards not to be alter egos of the state:
Adams v. Rankin County Bd. of Educ., 524 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 438 U.S. 904 (1978); Fabrizio & Martin, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 290 F. Supp. 945
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
38. 436 U.S. 658 (1977).
39. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
40. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1412 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280-81).
41. Id. (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Edelman v. Jor-
dan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)).
42. Id. at 1412 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Mt.
Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280-81.
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The majority based its opinion on the Tenth Circuit's decisions in
Martinez and Maestas.4 3 As the dissent recognized, these two cases held
that New Mexico school boards are state entities despite the fact that
other cases, addressing identical circumstances, have reached the oppo-
site conclusion.4 4 Judge McKay summed up the variations in the treat-
ment between similarly situated school districts in two words-
"absolutely ridiculous." 4 5 Furthermore, he noted the majority's failure
to recognize the importance of the Mt. Healthy decision to the Garcia
case, particularly as it related to the functions of the school board as set
forth in the New Mexico statutes.4 6 From his reading of the statute, Mc-
Kay concluded that the New Mexico statutory scheme shows a clear in-
tent to maintain local control over the schools and school boards.
4 7
Thus, the dissent stated that the majority, by focusing on the source of
funds for the judgment, had ignored the crucial issue of determining
control.
Additionally, the dissent illustrated the confusion that arises in at-
tempting to isolate the source of the funds. After discussing the relevant
sections of both the New Mexico Tort Claims Act 48 and the New Mexico
Public Liability Funds statutory provision, 49 Judge McKay dismissed the
statutes as inapplicable to the case at hand. He reached this conclusion
by reasoning that although there is a constitutional provision governing
the state's satisfaction of judgments, it does not necessarily extend to
suits for violations of federal constitutional rights. Since neither statute
clearly authorized the payment of a federal court judgment in an action
involving constitutional rights, 50 Judge McKay concluded that there was
no clear indication of how such a judgment would be paid. McKay be-
lieved that, due to this surrounding uncertainty, eleventh amendment
immunity should not depend on the source of the funds for payment of
a judgment.
5 1
Having exhausted the source of funds issue, the dissent again
stressed that the degree to which a local entity acts independently of the
43. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
44. The dissent compared the Tenth Circuit decisions in Stoddard v. School Dist. No.
1, 590 F.2d 829 (10th Cir. 1979) and Unified School Dist. No. 480 v. Epperson, 583 F.2d
1118 (10th Cir. 1978), holding school boards to be local because judgments were to be
paid from special levies raised within the district itself with a Utah case where the school
board was held to be a state entity because of the "possibility" of ajudgment being paid, at
least partially, out of state funds. See Harris v. Tooele County School Dist., 471 F.2d 218
(10th Cir. 1973). McKay concluded that the only significant difference was that the Utah
school districts were not required to levy taxes to pay liabilities. Thus, the judgment
"might" have to be paid by the states. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1413 (McKay, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
45. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1413 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4 (1978).
47. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1413 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to 27 (1978).
49. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-23 (1978).
50. See Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1416 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(the dissent discusses Article 8, section 7 of the New Mexico Constitution and selected
portions of the New Mexico statutes).
51. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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state is a major factor in determining whether the eleventh amendment
applies. Reiterating the approach taken in Mt. Healthy 52 and Unified
School District No. 480 v. Epperson,53 McKay restated his position that
where the state controls a local body to the extent of making decisions
that affect the constitutional rights of its citizens, the eleventh amend-
ment should apply. If, however, the school board functions indepen-
dently of the state, then immunity under the eleventh amendment
should not be available. The dissent further maintained that in order
for immunity to apply, the state must maintain actual control over the
board. General supervision over the board's actions would not be suffi-
cient. McKay concluded by stating that the New Mexico school boards
act independently of the state in day-to-day management. 5 4 The gen-
eral supervision that the state provides is not sufficient to qualify the
school board for protection under the eleventh amendment. Thus, Mc-
Kay determined that the New Mexico school board is subject to suit, and




It is doubtful that Justice Blackstone was aware of the imprint he
would leave on American jurisprudence when in 1765 he coined the
phrase "The King can do no wrong."'5 6 For centuries Blackstone's
phrase has been the foundation for the doctrine of sovereign or govern-
mental immunity. This doctrine has insulated both individual public offi-
cials and state and local governments from suit.
Under the original doctrine of governmental immunity, which has
been captured in the eleventh amendment, the state and its political
subdivisions were amenable to suit only if they consented to such. From
its earliest inception, the doctrine barred the recovery of an aggrieved
plaintiff from a sovereign defendant without consideration of the cause
of action or merits of the case. Recognizing the inherent injustice that
52. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280-81 (four factors used to determine the extent of an
agency's autonomy).
53. 583 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1978).
54. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1417 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. McKay ignored the plaintiffs assertion that the trial court erred in submitting
other constitutional issues to the jury. The plaintiffs failure to sustain his burden of
showing that his interest in free speech was a major factor in the school board's decision,
McKay noted, was fatal to his first amendment claim. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1417 (McKay, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 284-87). Simi-
larly, McKay rejected the property interest issue on the basis that a property interest does
not exist in the mere hope or expectation of contract renewal. To succeed on the liberty
interest claim, the reasons for dismissal must stigmatize the plaintiffs reputation or fore-
close future employment opportunities. Id. at 1418 (McKay, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Should such a stigma result, due process requires that an opportunity
to be heard be provided. Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-10 (1976) (mere injury to
reputation alone was not deprivation of plaintiffs "liberty" interest). McKay concluded
that it could not be said as a matter of law that the trial court erred in submitting the
constitutional issues to the jury.
56. 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 516 (1923).
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occurred from such lack of consideration, courts began to modify5 7 the
absolute immunity maxim. The modifications occurred on a state-by-
state basis and involved everything from complete abrogation to total
acceptance of immunity. Further, the stringent theory of "The King can
do no wrong" which was prevalent in the Blackstone era, has been tem-
pered with sensitivity to individual rights. One indication of such tem-
perance was the passage of section 1983.
B. Section 1983
Originally called the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,58 section 1983 is
the section of the Civil Rights Act under which Garcia alleged violations
of his first amendment rights. Garcia also asserted that the defendants
deprived him of liberty and property without due process. 59 Section
1983 was initially enacted to provide a measure of federal control over
state and territorial officials who were reluctant to enforce state laws
against persons violating the rights of newly freed slaves and union sym-
pathizers. Creating a right of action in the federal courts against local
government officials provided a neutral forum for an aggrieved citizen
to present his complaint.
60
In general, section 1983 serves as an enforcement provision for the
fourteenth amendment. 6' The two primary elements of this provision,
as explained by the Supreme Court, are (1) the deprivation of a federal
right and, (2) that the person caused the deprivation while acting under
color of state or territorial law.6 2 Other elements of a section 1983 ac-
tion include proof of proximate cause 63 and redress. 64 Usually, this last
57. One modification included separating the sovereignty of public entities' functions
from the general class of sovereign activity. Thus, a harm caused by a public employee
engaged in an activity not deemed sovereign was not granted immunity. A second modifi-
cation involved the development of a waiver of immunity thereby consenting to the suit.
Such consent was inferred from actions on the government's part such as purchasing lia-
bility insurance. Patula, The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act: A Prescription for Regression,
49 DEN. L.J. 567, 567-68 (1971).
58. H.R. REP. No. 548, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2609.
59. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1404.
60. See supra note 52.
61. Section 1983 operates on a "double incorporation" principle by incorporating the
fourteenth amendment which has been construed to incorporate selected provisions of the
Bill of Rights. Thus, this provision affords a civil remedy for the constitutional amend-
ments incorporated into the due process clause and applied to the states. See generally, S.
NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO SECTION 1983 § 2.03
(Cum. Supp. 1982).
62. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The Court observed "These ele-
ments reflect a congressional judgment that damages remedied against the offending party
is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees."
Id.
63. The need to show proximate cause was the result of the Court's decision in Mo-
nell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 463 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978) (requiring that the plaintiff show
a causal relationship between defendant's conduct and the alleged deprivation of rights).
64. To successfully maintain a section 1983 suit, a plaintiff must show actual damage
resulting from defendant's conduct. See, e.g., Corriz v. Baranjo, 667 F.2d 892 (10th Cir.
1982).
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element is satisfied by showing that the defendant's conduct caused
some actual damages.
A defense of immunity can be raised to defeat an otherwise valid
section 1983 claim. Such a defense can be presented in two ways: abso-
lute immunity or qualified immunity.6 5 Absolute immunity protects the
defendant entirely from any liability for damages asserted under section
1983. Qualified immunity, on the other hand, only protects a defendant
whose actionable conduct was undertaken in good faith. 6 6 Although the
immunity defenses were originally available to both individuals and gov-
ernmental entities faced with a federal civil rights action, in recent years
such immunities have been narrowed to protect only individual defend-
ants, and only against damages.
6 7
C. Eleventh Amendment
Article III of the Constitution provides, in part, that "[t]hejudicial
Power [of the United States] shall extend ... to Controversies . . .be-
tween a State and Citizens of another State .... ,,68 The United States
Supreme Court was called upon to decide if article III implied that a
state could be sued in assumpsit in federal court by a citizen of another
state. 69 In the early decision of Chisholm v. Georgia,70 the Court, despite
the existence of common law sovereign immunity, held that a state could
be sued in a federal court by a citizen of another state. 7 ' However, in
order to reinstate the doctrine of sovereign immunity to the states, and
in response to the Court's holding in Chisholm, the eleventh amendment
was passed by Congress in 1798.72 By its terms, the eleventh amend-
ment affords protection from suits by citizens of another state, but does
not provide protection for states sued in federal court by their own citi-
zens. The Supreme Court addressed this problem in Hans v. Louisiana.
73
The Court in Hans held that states should also enjoy eleventh amend-
ment protection from suits brought in federal court by their own citi-
zens. 74 Despite the expanded protection given to the states, the Court
did not view its decision as an extension of eleventh amendment cover-
age. 75 Rather, the Court reiterated that the amendment served to affirm
a state's sovereign immunity.
Notwithstanding the Court's posture in Chisholm and Hans, there re-
65. Rader, Section 1983, The Civil Rights Action: Legislative and Judicial directions, 15 CuM.
L. REV. 571, 610 (1985).
66. Id. at 611-13 (discussion of absolute and qualified immunity).
67. Id. at 610-11.
68. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2.
69. Silfen, Constitutional Law - The Eleventh Amendment as Applied to State Agencies: A
Survey of the Cases and a Proposed Model for Analysis, 22 VILL. L. REV. 153, 153-54 (1976-77).
70. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
71. Id. at 420. Chisholm, a citizen of South Carolina, bought an action as executor of
the estate of Farquhar, also a South Carolina citizen, on a claim for goods delivered to the
state of Georgia for which no payment was received.
72. See supra note 12.
73. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 12-14.
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mained an uncertainty as to the level of protection being provided by
the eleventh amendment. The line between permissible and impermis-
sible action was more clearly defined by the Supreme Court in Edelman v.
Jordan.76 Though not a school board case, Edelman set the pace for later
decisions regarding the eleventh amendment. Specifically, the plaintiff
in Edelman brought an action against two Illinois state officials. The suit
alleged deprivation and untimely payment by defendants of the plain-
tiff's monthly assistance program checks.
77
Based on its reading of eleventh amendment history, the Court con-
cluded that "the rule has evolved that a suit by private parties seeking to
impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state
treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.''78 Emphasizing the
agency's financial status, the Court held that the eleventh amendment
constituted a bar to the retroactive decree ordered by the district
court. 7 9 Thus, the Edelman Court, though intending to clarify the appli-
cation of the eleventh amendment, instead created more confusion re-
garding its applicability.
Further confusion arose in 1978 when the Court again was con-
fronted in Monell v. Department of Social Services80 with determining what
circumstances give rise to eleventh amendment protection. Having pre-
viously held that states as well as state officials and agencies were subject
to eleventh amendment protection, the Court focused on the circum-
stances under which such protection may be available to state officials
and agencies. The plaintiffs in Monell were pregnant women employed
by the New York State Department of Social Services and the Board of
Education. They sought redress for being required to take unpaid leave
of absence before such leaves were medically necessary. The Monell
Court set forth the rule that if an agency is the alter ego8 1 of the state,
then it enjoys eleventh amendment immunity. If, however, the agency is
determined to be local in nature as defined by case law, it will not enjoy
eleventh amendment immunity. 82 Thus, Monell narrowed the applicabil-
ity of eleventh amendment immunity by establishing a dichotomy be-
tween state and local functions to be determined by the relationship
between the state and the entity being sued.
8 3
76. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
77. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants, agency employees of the Illinois Depart-
ment of Public Aid, authorized grants only in the months during which the applications
were approved, and that they failed to follow the time regulations for processing applica-
tions. Id. at 653-56.
78. Id. at 663.
79. Id. at 668.
80. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
81. The term "alter-ego" has often been used by the courts to mean that the agency
embodies the attributes of the state and is entitled to its protection under the eleventh
amendment. See, e.g., George R. Whitten Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 493 F.2d
177, 180 (1st Cir. 1974) (quoting Charles Simkin & Sons, Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund,
352 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
82. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1407.
83. Id.
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D. The "Alter Ego" Concept
The alter ego issue was expanded by the Supreme Court in Mt.
Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle. 84 The Court of-
fered guidelines to be used in determining whether an entity is entitled
to protection under the eleventh amendment. Similar to the circum-
stances in Garcia,8 5 the plaintiff in Mt. Healthy was an untenured teacher
who was discharged under alleged violations of her civil rights. Among
the events leading up to the section 1983 action were: An altercation
with another teacher, arguments with employees, swearing and obscene
gestures to students and a phone call made by the plaintiff to a radio
station to discuss a faculty memorandum relating to teacher dress and
appearance. The radio station subsequently announced the adoption of
a school dress code as a news item. Thereafter, the defendant school
board advised the plaintiff he would not be rehired and cited his lack of
tact regarding professional matters, with specific reference to the two
unfavorable incidents, as grounds for its decision.
8 6
Claiming a violation of his rights under the first and fourteenth
amendments, the plaintiff brought an action against the school board.
The district court found in favor of the plaintiff, and the decision was
affirmed on appeal.8 7 Disagreeing with the district court's posture on
the school board's eleventh amendment immunity claim,88 the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether such immunity extends to school
boards .89
On appeal, the Court addressed the issue of whether the Mt.
Healthy Board of Education should be viewed as an arm, or alter ego, of
the State and thus entitled to eleventh amendment immunity, or instead
as a municipal corporation or other political subdivision that does not
enjoy the shield of the eleventh amendment. 90 In its brief discussion,
the Court determined that "[t]he answer depends, at least in part, upon
the nature of the entity created by state law." 9 ' The Court pointed out
that under Ohio law, the term "State" does not include "political subdi-
visions," of which local school districts are considered members. 92 The
Court also noted that Ohio had many local school boards of which the
defendant was only one. The defendant school board was, however,
84. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
85. See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text.
86. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 274 (although not detailed in the case, the altercation with
the other teacher resulted from an obscene gesture by the respondent).
87. The district court concluded that the telephone call to the radio station was clearly
protected by the first amendment and that because it had played a substantial part in the
board's decision not to rehire the plaintiff, he was entitled to reinstatement with back pay.
Id. at 276.
88. The district court evaded the issue of whether the eleventh amendment applied to
school boards. The court maintained that application of the eleventh amendment was
irrelevant to the case because, even if it did exist, it had been waived by the board. Id. at
279-80.
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subject to some guidance from the Ohio State Board of Education and
received significant revenue from the state.93 Finally, the local school
boards had power to levy taxes and issue bonds. Based on these find-
ings, the Court concluded that the Ohio school board was not entitled to
immunity under the eleventh amendment because "[o]n balance, the
record ... indicates that a local school board such as petitioner is more
like a county or city than it is like an arm of the State."'9 4 Thus, Mt.
Healthy established some of the factors to consider in determining an
entity's status under the eleventh amendment. 95
E. Cases Since Mt. Healthy
Since Mt. Healthy, several courts have addressed the issue of
whether a particular school board or district is entitled to eleventh
amendment immunity. For example, in Unified School District No. 480 v.
Epperson,9 6 the Tenth Circuit resolved a dispute initiated by two school
teachers against a Kansas school district. The teachers claimed that
their teaching contracts were not renewed in retaliation for their exer-
cise of first amendment rights. The Epperson court set forth that "the
powers, nature, and characteristics of the board or agency must be criti-
cally examined under state law." It further held that courts must ex-
amine: "(1) To what extent does the board, although carrying out a state
mission, function with substantial autonomy from the state government
and, (2) to what extent is the agency financed independently of the state
treasury." 9 7 Applying these factors to the case, the Epperson court held
that: (1) because an award of damages would be paid not by the state but
by a special levy within the defendant school district, and (2) because the
defendant was only supervised and not controlled by the state board of
education, the defendant was not immune from suit under the eleventh
amendment. 98
The eleventh amendment alter ego issue was also raised in Stoddard
v. School District No. 1.99 In this case, the Tenth Circuit was presented
with a suit by a schoolteacher against a Wyoming school district, mem-
bers of the board of trustees, and a principal, alleging nonrenewal of her
contract for reasons violative of the first and fourteenth amendments. ' 0 0
Reiterating the Court's holding in Mt. Healthy, the Tenth Circuit court
stated that "[t]he School District in the instant case is 'more like a city or
county than it is like an arm of the state.' "101 Thus, the Wyoming
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. For a general discussion of the factors that have been the basis for other courts'
decisions regarding whether a school board is the alter-ego of the state, see Comment,
State Governmental Corporation Immunity from Federal Jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment,
72 DICK. L. REV. 296 (1968).
96. 583 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1978).
97. Id. at 1121-22 (citations omitted).
98. Id. at 1123.
99. 590 F.2d 829 (10th Cir. 1979).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 835 (citations omitted).
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school district was not an arm of the state, and was therefore not entitled
to eleventh amendment immunity.
The alter ego issue was also raised by the Fifth Circuit in Moore v.
Tangipahoa Parish School Board.10 2 Although the facts differed slightly
from the Mt. Healthy, Epperson, and Stoddard cases, the conclusion was the
same. In a class action desegregation case against a Louisiana school
board, the Moore court noted several factors which exhibited the boards'
local character 10 3 and held that Louisiana school boards were autono-
mous political subdivisions and not alter egos of the state from the
standpoint of sovereign immunity.
Finally, the alter ego issue was considered in Travelers Indemnity Co.
v. School Board of Dade County. 104 The facts involved an action by a surety
based on a performance bond against the county board of education.
0 5
Notwithstanding the facts of the case, the Travelers court quoted the Fifth
Circuit, stating:
[t]he Eleventh Amendment does not bar [a plaintiff] from such
award so long as the entities sued are locally controlled, essen-
tially local in character, and funds to defray the awards would
not be derived primarily from the State Treasury. (Citations
omitted). Our analysis of the nature of Florida School Boards
in the context of determining their similarity to municipalities
is sufficient to convince us that they are not the type of entities
which are sheltered by the Eleventh Amendment.
10 6
Based on these standards, the court concluded that nothing in the na-
ture of the county school boards in Florida would entitle it to eleventh
amendment protection.
10 7
IV. ANALYSIS: GARCIA'S EFFECT UNDER EXISTING LAW
The Tenth Circuit Court's decision in Garcia with regard to the alter
ego issue disregards the Supreme Court's holding in Mt. Healthy. The
Garcia opinion, though not the first to stray' 0 8 from the Mt. Healthy and
Epperson decisions, represents a substantial detour from accepted stan-
dards. The decision also ignores relevant public policy issues.
In a cursory manner, the Garcia majority addressed the eleventh
amendment alter ego issue, and then disposed of the matter based on
102. 594 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1979).
103. The Moore court noted the following:
[1] Louisiana school boards, such as the defendants, have the power to sue and be
sued . . . [2] they have the power to contract . . . [3] they have the power to
purchase, hold and sell property ... [4] they have the power to borrow funds ...
[5] they have the power to levy and collect taxes from which back pay claims can
be met.
Id. at 493-94 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting the district judge in Smith v. Concordia Parish
School Bd., 387 F. Supp. 887, 891 (W.D. La. 1975)).
104. 666 F.2d 505 (11th Cir. 1982).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 507 (quoting Campbell v. Gadsen County Dist. School Bd., 534 F.2d 650,
655-56 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 539 F.2d 710 (1976)).
107. Id. at 508.
108. See supra note 35.
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prior holdings in Martinez v. Board of Education 10 9 and Maestas v. Board of
Education."10 Unfortunately, the cases relied upon most heavily by the
Garcia court handle the eleventh amendment issue inadequately. Thus,
the resultant weakness seeps over into Garcia.
Close examination of the Martinez opinion reveals the inherent flaws
in the court's analysis. Specifically, the Martinez court recognized the
need to decide whether New Mexico school boards were local in nature
or were controlled by the state board. Rather than examining the pow-
ers and responsibilities allocated to the local boards by statute,"' the
court selectively examined six duties delegated to the state board by the
legislature. 1i2
From this brief examination of the selected duties, and in conjunc-
tion with Art. XII, section 6, of the New Mexico Constitution, the court
concluded that the state had extremely broad powers over public
schools. 1'3 The court did recognize, however, and pay lip service to the
fact that some of the provisions of the New Mexico statutes were identi-
cal to those analyzed in Mt. Healthy. However, the court claimed that the
enumerated powers found in Mt. Healthy "were not in the context of the
state board's 'control, management, and direction.' '"'14
Finally, the Martinez court agreed that issuing bonds for capital im-
provements was a significant concern, and that the local boards had the
initial decision of whether or not to provide for such improvements.
Once again, the court skirted the issue of local control by noting that the
right to approve bond issues rested with the state depending on the type
of bonds proposed. 1 5 As a result, the court held that the local boards
were arms of the state system of education.
The Garcia court found favor with the reasoning applied by the Mar-
tinez and Maestas courts and relied heavily on these decisions. Such reli-
ance, however, led the court to a decision that might have been altered
by a more thorough investigation. Specifically, the Garcia court would
have been well advised to review and discuss the sixteen functions allo-
109. 748 F.2d 1393 (10th Cir. 1984).
110. 749 F.2d 591 (10th Cir. 1984).
111. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4 (1978).
112. The seven duties selectively examined by the court included:
(1) designate courses of instruction taught in all public schools in the state;
(2) determine the qualifications for.., any person teaching.., or administering
in public schools according to law ... a system of classification adopted ... by the
state board; (3) suspend or revoke a certificate held by an... instructor or admin-
istrator according to law for incompetency, immorality or for any other good and
just cause; (4) prescribe courses of instruction, requirements for graduation and
standards for all public schools; (5) accept and receive all grants of money from
the federal government ... and disburse the money; (6) adopt regulations for the
administration of all public schools; and (7) provide for management ... to oper-
ate any public school or school district which has failed to meet requirements of
law, state board standards or state board regulations.
Martinez, 748 F.2d at 1394-95.
113. Id. at 1394.
114. Id. at 1395.
115. Id.
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cated to local schools by the New Mexico legislative scheme. "6
The dissent recognized the importance of considering these factors.
Had the majority reviewed the statute, their outlook on the Garcia case
may have been altered. For example, the New Mexico statutes allow the
local school boards to employ a superintendent, to fix the superinten-
dent's salary, to fix the salary of all employees, to acquire and dispose of
property, to issue general obligation bonds of the school district, and to
adopt regulations pertaining to the administration of all powers or du-
ties of the local school board.11 7 These functions are clearly local in
nature, and require, only "some guidance" from the state board. 1 18
Therefore, according to the Mt. Healthy rationale, immunity based on
state control is lacking.
In addition, not only does the Garcia decision ignore Mt. Healthy,
but the decision also departs from similarly situated cases in other cir-
cuits."i 9 Ultimately, Garcia serves to complicate and blur the view of
who or what is entitled to protection under the eleventh amendment.
The opinion provides a lenient application of eleventh amendment im-
munity, yet fails to provide a stabilized definition of what constitutes an
alter ego. As it stands, the Garcia opinion can best be analogized to a
newborn foal attempting to stand for the first time: there exists the de-
sire to achieve a goal, but without the necessary support, the attempt is
wobbly and the result is to fall back to the position from which he
started.
V. BEYOND GARCIA
Notwithstanding Garcia, section 1983 and subsequent cases 120 ex-
emplify a movement away from "The King can do no wrong" to an era
that recognizes the responsibility of local school board members for
their decisions. Threat of suit for wrongful conduct by school board
officials effects both the type and the quality of the decisions school
board members make. Further, such shifts influence the preparation
that board members must undergo in taking office, as they will be held
accountable for protecting the rights of persons employed by the school
and of students enrolled in it. 12' Garcia, however, exempts board mem-
116. See supra note 104.
117. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1414 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4 (1978)).
118. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280.
119. See supra notes 102-107 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school officials held liable for
violation of student's constitutional rights); Hickman v. Valley Local School Dist., 619 F.2d
606 (6th Cir. 1980) (reinstatement and back wages for teacher dismissed for exercise of
first amendment rights); Kingsville Independent School Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109
(5th Cir. 1980) (awarding reinstatement to a teacher who sued the school board for viola-
tion of civil rights); Adelberg v. Labuszewski, 447 F. Supp. 267 (N.D. Il1. 1978) (money
damages awarded for violation of superintendent's civil rights).
121. The opposite side of the coin entails the notion that the threat of personal liability
for school board members interferes with the proper functioning of the educational sys-
tem by inhibiting public officials in the performance of their duties including involving
school officials in legal battles for months or years. SeeJ. MAHONEY, SECTnON 1983: SWORD
AND SHIELD 318 (R. Freilich & R. Carlisle ed. 1983).
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bers from having to justify or defend the actions taken, as any such chal-
lenges will now be warded off with the eleventh amendment shield.
Under the umbrella of the eleventh amendment, the Garcia case
gives a higher priority to the protection of the school boards then to the
protection and compensation of individuals experiencing infringements
of civil and constitutional rights. The viability of such a decision re-
mains questionable. Given the decisions that have emerged from other
jurisdictions, the Garcia court could have chosen several alternatives to
granting complete immunity. One such alternative is the qualification
of eleventh amendment immunity in situations involving school dis-
tricts. For example, if total abrogation of eleventh amendment immu-
nity is not desired, then perhaps a standard should be proposed which
obligates the New Mexico School Districts and Boards to compensate
plaintiffs for tortious activity committed by their employees. In essence,
the goal is to assure that a school board occupies no better position than
citizens do. Without doubt, circumstances will arise under which the
force of such a compensation principle will be suspended, thus, a system
of strict liability is not at issue.
122
Ultimately, a compensation principle enforced against the New
Mexico School Districts and school boards would help promote impor-
tant societal goals. America's educational system strives to enlighten
the young and transform illiterates into literates while socializing indi-
viduals into various civil roles. 12 3 Since the school officials play a crucial
role in a vital part of America, it is only reasonable to expect some form
of accountability on the part of those officials. It is such accountability
that is lacking in the Garcia decision. In essence, the Garcia decision
reduces the accountability of those who influence the very heart of
American life.
Shaun Tara Duley-Gloude
122. P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT, Yale University Press 111 (1983).
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